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Summary of Thesis 
 
This thesis uses three case-studies to assess the effect of judicial removals processes for lower-
court judges on judicial independence in the Argentine Republic. It consider two jurisdictions, the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (ACBA) and the Argentine federal level, where since the late 
1990s, removals have been conducted by way of a two-step process involving judicial councils 
and impeachment juries, and contrasts this with the experience of the province of Tucuman, 
where the process is conducted by a legislative committee and an impeachment jury. The thesis 
evaluates whether judicial independence is better protected where judicial removals processes 
have been professedly depoliticized by being entrusted to independent judicial councils. 
Differences in the regulation and political context of the judicial councils at the Federal and ACBA 
levels also illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial council model in dealing with 
different challenges.  
 
The analysis is based on in-depth interviews conducted individually with 36 participants across 
all three jurisdictions. A range of stakeholders in the judicial removals process were interviewed 
in each jurisdictions, including current and former judges, members of the relevant judicial 
councils and legislative commission, and lawyers working in private practice and for NGOs, who 
have filed complaints against judges or have followed removals processes in the course of their 
work.  
 
This thesis concludes that whilst the two judicial councils studied do successfully prevent judges 
from being removed for partisan reason, the earlier stages of investigations into judicial 
behaviour are susceptible to being used as a way to place pressure on judges. Whilst careful 
consideration to the composition of the council and the regulation of the process may help 
prevent this, this thesis finds that a more fundamental problem is the influence of interests other 
than the protection of judicial independence and accountability affecting decision-making in both 
judicial councils.   
 
 
 
  
Page 4 of 366 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
There are a great number of people without whom this research would not have been possible, 
and many more whose support and friendship made my time as a PhD student a wonderful 
experience. First of all, I would like to thank the University of Surrey’s School of Law for awarding 
me a studentship, without which I would not have been able to embark on this research. I would 
also like to extend my gratitude to my principal supervisor, Professor Indira Carr, for her 
guidance, kind patience, and support over the years. Sincere thanks also go to Rob Jago, my 
second supervisor for the first half of my studies, for his feedback as I narrowed down the scope 
of my research. I am also extremely grateful to Professor MariaLaura Di Domenico, my second 
supervisor for the latter half of my studies, for her thoughtful advice during the write-up phase. 
 
Thanks are also due to our former PGR Director, Dr Jane Marriott, for her kind support, and to 
our subsequent PGR Director, Dr Arman Sarvarian, whose dedication and advice I have much 
appreciated. A heartfelt thanks is also due to Karen Short at the Doctoral College, who was 
wonderfully supportive in arranging periods of leave for maternity, and to Diane Donnelly who 
helped me navigate the administrative side of things on many occasions. Thank you also to Fiona 
Harris and Catherine Batson at the university library who were very helpful in obtaining obscure 
materials, and sending books out to my home in Germany. I am also very grateful to Dr Sam 
Hopkins for arranging a mentorship programme and to my fantastic mentor Dr Sarah Robins-
Hobden for her helpful advice.  
 
Qualitative research of the kind conducted for this thesis is all about people, and this research 
would not have been possible without the goodwill of my participants, who shall remain 
anonymous as promised. I feel privileged that so many people with a great wealth of knowledge 
gave me their time and trusted me with their opinions and experiences. I am also immensely 
grateful to the many people, who will also remain anonymous, who helped put me in touch with 
my participants. This research would not have been possible without their help.  
  
I would like to thank Maria Beatriz, Laura, and their families for going out of their way to host me 
and make sure I was comfortable whilst carrying out my research in Buenos Aires and in 
Tucuman. Thank you also to Diego, Gabriela, Juan Pablo, Mariana, Andres, Ana, Luciana, David, 
and Melanie for welcoming me so kindly in Argentina. I would also like to thank Professor Roberto 
Gargarella for welcoming me at his seminar on Constitutional Theory and Political Philosophy 
held weekly at the University of Buenos Aires.  
 
During my time as a doctoral candidate, I had the good fortune of working on projects relating 
to the rule of law and judicial independence and accountability in Latin America together with 
researchers from other institutions, and to present on these topics at conferences in Brazil and 
Costa Rica. Thank you to Alex Wilks, formerly at the International Bar Association’s Human Rights 
Institute, and to Mat Tromme, Dr Jan van Zyl Smit, Dr Lawrence McNamara, and Dr Jean-Pierre 
Page 5 of 366 
 
Gauci at the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law for these opportunities, and for many interesting 
and enjoyable exchanges, that greatly enriched my research journey.  
 
I am also grateful to have had the opportunity to speak at the International Graduate Legal 
Research Conference at King’s College London, and the Graduate Conference on Corruption and 
Anti-Corruption at the University of Sussex, to have been invited to attend seminars on Latin 
American law and policy at the Institute of the Americas, University College London, and to have 
been welcomed at the II Graduate Conference on Latin American Law and Policy at the University 
of Oxford. The exchanges that took place at these events certainly helped me process my ideas, 
and sparked new ones.  
 
I am also very thankful to have had the opportunity to teach and actively participate in Law School 
life at Surrey. I would like in particular to thank Luke Mason, Dr Theodore Konstadinides, and Dr 
Noreen O’Meara for entrusting the convening of two undergraduate modules to me. It was a 
greatly enriching teaching experience that helped me finance the last part of my doctoral studies. 
I was also lucky to have had the opportunity to be an Assistant Coach for Surrey’s Jessup team 
two years running. I would also like to thank Jaime Fletcher, Helen James, and Julian Dobson, for 
the opportunity to teach at the University of Winchester. I learnt a lot from the wonderful 
teaching staff there.  
 
I was lucky to be able to share my doctoral journey with many other researchers at Surrey, and 
to learn from their experiences and insights. Thank you in particular to my fellow studentship 
receiver, Dr Anastasia Karatzia for her friendship; there is no-one I would have rather shared the 
PhD journey with. Thank you also to Dr Daniele Canestri, Evelyn Ehigie, Gbemi Odusote, Ndidi 
Ahiauzu, Dr James Tutu, Dr Cynthia Tseng, Dr Des Williamson, Dr Matthew Pauley, Nicholas 
Clapham, Dr Miriam Sheikh, Dr Tamaraudoubra Egbe, and Dan Benn for many interesting 
conversations.  
 
Thanks are also due to those who encouraged me in the lead-up to and during my studies. Thank 
you to Esteban Palazzo for always believing in me. Thank you to Rowan Planterose and to Killian 
Dorney for reviewing a draft of my initial research proposal. I should thank Sebastián Lew for first 
introducing me to the language and culture of Argentina back in 2006. I am also very grateful to 
my friends for their unwavering friendship and support. Thank you in particular to Sarah Warren, 
Céline Borès, Matthew Sturdy, Maren Woodward, Dr Johanna Richter, Pablo Lloveras, and to my 
sister, Nicola. 
 
A big thank you goes to my husband, Dr Dimitar Kutsarov, for his love and support that greatly 
eased the process of writing up this thesis. Finally, thank you to my daughter, Audra, for always 
being ready for a cuddle, and for inspiring me to do my best every day.  
  
Page 6 of 366 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my father, who showed me the value of professional integrity 
and my mother, whose curiosity about the world I appear to have inherited 
 
  
Page 7 of 366 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................... 12 
List of Cases ................................................................................................................................................ 13 
List of Legislation ........................................................................................................................................ 15 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................................. 18 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................... 19 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 20 
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 20 
1.2 Research Rationale ........................................................................................................................... 20 
1.3 Focus on the Removals Process ....................................................................................................... 24 
1.4 Empirical Research Using Three Case Studies .................................................................................. 27 
1.5 Interviews with Stakeholders in Judicial Removals Processes ......................................................... 30 
1.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 31 
Chapter 2: The Introduction of JCs and IJs in Argentina ............................................................................ 33 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 33 
2.2 The Introduction of the FJC and the FIJ ............................................................................................ 33 
2.2.1 The 1994 Constitutional Reform ............................................................................................... 33 
2.2.2 The Nature and Composition of the FJC .................................................................................... 37 
2.2.3 Continued Lack of Judicial Independence Following the Introduction of the FJC .................... 46 
2.2.4 The “Democratisation” of the Judiciary .................................................................................... 50 
2.2.5 The Removal and Lack of Removal of Judges ............................................................................ 53 
2.3 The Creation of the ACBA Judiciary .................................................................................................. 55 
2.3.2 The Nature and Composition of the ACBA Judicial Council ...................................................... 58 
2.4 The Introduction of an Impeachment Jury in the province of Tucuman ......................................... 61 
2.4.2 The Nature and Composition of the Tucuman PIC .................................................................... 65 
2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 66 
Chapter 3: Protecting Judicial Independence in Judicial Removals Processes........................................... 68 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 68 
3.2 Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence .................................................................................... 69 
3.2.1 The Role of Judicial Councils...................................................................................................... 70 
3.2.2 The Importance of Judicial Accountability ................................................................................ 75 
3.3 The Nature of the Removals Process ............................................................................................... 82 
3.3.1 Grounds for Removal ................................................................................................................ 85 
3.3.2 Removals and Interferences in the Judicial Function ................................................................ 91 
Page 8 of 366 
 
3.3.3 Due Process Requirements ....................................................................................................... 93 
3.4 The Procedure for Removing a Judge............................................................................................... 98 
3.4.1 Procedure at the Federal Level ................................................................................................. 98 
3.4.2 Procedure at the ACBA Level ................................................................................................... 103 
3.4.3 Procedure in Tucuman ............................................................................................................ 107 
3.5 Potential Problems with the Removals Process ............................................................................. 112 
3.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 114 
Chapter 4: Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 116 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 116 
4.2 Identification of Research Participants .......................................................................................... 116 
4.2.1 Categories of Participants ....................................................................................................... 117 
4.2.2 Identifying Participants: the Snowballing Technique .............................................................. 121 
4.3 Conducting Interviews .................................................................................................................... 125 
4.3.1 Face-to-face Interviews in Spanish .......................................................................................... 125 
4.3.2 One-to-one Interviews ............................................................................................................ 127 
4.3.3 Location of Interviews ............................................................................................................. 128 
4.3.4 Length of Interviews ................................................................................................................ 129 
4.3.5 Audio Recording ...................................................................................................................... 130 
4.3.6 Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................................. 132 
4.4 Content of Interviews ..................................................................................................................... 135 
4.4.1 Semi-structured Nature of Interviews ..................................................................................... 135 
4.4.2 Interview Schedule .................................................................................................................. 137 
4.5 Analysis of Interviews ..................................................................................................................... 139 
4.5.1 Transcriptions .......................................................................................................................... 139 
4.5.2 Translation of Data .................................................................................................................. 140 
4.5.3 Coding of Data using Nvivo ..................................................................................................... 140 
4.5.4 Analysis of Content .................................................................................................................. 142 
4.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 144 
Chapter 5: Research Findings and Discussion (Part 1): Judicial Removals Processes for Federal and ACBA 
Judges ....................................................................................................................................................... 146 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 146 
5.2 Filing of Complaints ........................................................................................................................ 147 
5.2.1 The Decision to File a Complaint ............................................................................................. 147 
5.2.2 Obtaining Evidence of Judicial Malperformance..................................................................... 149 
Page 9 of 366 
 
5.2.3 Who Files Complaints and Who Has Complaints Filed Against Them ..................................... 152 
5.3 The Admissibility of Complaints ..................................................................................................... 155 
5.3.1 The Admissibility of Complaints .............................................................................................. 155 
5.3.2 How the Decision to Accept or Reject a Complaint is Reached .............................................. 158 
5.3.3 The Acceptance and Rejection of Complaints in the ACBA JC ................................................ 161 
5.4 How Complaints are Investigated .................................................................................................. 162 
5.4.1 Length of Investigations .......................................................................................................... 163 
5.4.2 The Judge’s Right of Defence .................................................................................................. 166 
5.4.3 The Investigation of Complaints in the ACBA JC ..................................................................... 168 
5.5 The Plenary Decision to Accuse a Judge ......................................................................................... 169 
5.5.1 How the Decision to Accuse a Judge is Reached by the Plenary ............................................. 169 
5.5.2 The Composition of the FJC ..................................................................................................... 172 
5.5.3 Plenary Decisions in the ACBA JC ............................................................................................ 177 
5.6 Other Factors Affecting Proceedings in the JC ............................................................................... 181 
5.7 Proceedings before the Impeachment Jury ................................................................................... 183 
5.7.1 The Federal Jury ...................................................................................................................... 183 
5.7.2 The ACBA Jury .......................................................................................................................... 194 
5.8 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 196 
Chapter 6: Research Findings and Discussion: Judicial Removals Process for Tucuman Judges ............. 201 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 201 
6.2 Admission, Investigation, and Accusation by the Permanent Impeachment Commission of the 
Legislature ............................................................................................................................................ 202 
6.2.1 The Filing of Complaints .......................................................................................................... 202 
6.2.2 The Acceptance or Rejection of Complaints by the PIC .......................................................... 206 
6.2.3 Investigations by the PIC ......................................................................................................... 213 
6.2.4 Due Process Guarantees ......................................................................................................... 218 
6.2.5 Transparency of Proceedings .................................................................................................. 221 
6.3 Judicial Removal Proceedings before the Impeachment Jury of Tucuman ................................... 222 
6.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 225 
Chapter 7: Research Findings and Discussion (Part 3): The Context of Judicial Removals Processes ..... 230 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 230 
7.2 Wider Trend of Attempts to “Discipline” Judges at the Federal Level ........................................... 231 
7.2.1 Attempts to Undermine Impartiality ....................................................................................... 231 
7.2.2 Monitoring Judges ................................................................................................................... 232 
Page 10 of 366 
 
7.2.3 Discrediting and Intimidating Judges ...................................................................................... 233 
7.2.4 Appointing Acting Judges ........................................................................................................ 235 
7.2.5 Modifications of the Law ......................................................................................................... 235 
7.2.6 Intimidation of JC Councillors .................................................................................................. 236 
7.2.7 “Democratization” of the Judiciary ......................................................................................... 237 
7.3 Context at the ACBA Level .............................................................................................................. 240 
7.4 Context of “Discipline” of Judges in the Province of Tucuman ...................................................... 241 
7.5 Judicial Attitudes to Accountability ................................................................................................ 243 
7.5.1 The Role of Associations of Judges .......................................................................................... 248 
7.6 Lack of Institutionalisation ............................................................................................................. 248 
7.7 The Role of the Media .................................................................................................................... 250 
7.7.1 Media pressure on judges ....................................................................................................... 250 
7.7.2 Media pressure on judicial councils, disciplinary committees and juries ............................... 252 
7.8 The Role of Civil Society ................................................................................................................. 257 
7.8.1 The Role of Bar Associations ................................................................................................... 264 
7.9 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 269 
Chapter 8: Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 272 
8.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 272 
8.2 The Experience at the Federal Level .............................................................................................. 273 
8.2.1 The Influence of Party Politics in the FJC ................................................................................. 273 
8.2.2 The Federal Impeachment Jury ............................................................................................... 275 
8.2.3 Other Problems ....................................................................................................................... 276 
8.3 The Experience at the ACBA Level .................................................................................................. 277 
8.4 The Experience in the Province of Tucuman .................................................................................. 280 
8.5 The Strengths and Weaknesses of the JC Model ........................................................................... 281 
8.6 Suggestions for Improvement ........................................................................................................ 284 
8.7 Directions for Further Research ..................................................................................................... 288 
Appendix A: Favourable Ethical Opinion from the University of Surrey’s Ethics Committee .................. 291 
Appendix B: Participant Information Sheets ............................................................................................ 293 
Appendix C: Participant Consent Form in English and Spanish ................................................................ 317 
Appendix D: Interview Schedules in English and Spanish ........................................................................ 319 
Schedule for Interviews with Lawyers and People Working for NGOs (English) ................................. 319 
Schedule for Interviews with Lawyers and People Working for NGOs (Spanish) ................................ 321 
Schedule for Interviews with Judges and Former Judges (English) ...................................................... 323 
Page 11 of 366 
 
Schedule for Interviews with Judges and Former Judges (Spanish) .................................................... 325 
Schedule for Interviews with people from the Federal Judicial Council (English) ............................... 327 
Schedule for Interviews with people from the Federal Judicial Council (Spanish) .............................. 329 
Schedule for Interviews with people from the ACBA Judicial Council (English) .................................. 331 
Schedule for Interviews with people from the ACBA Judicial Council (Spanish) ................................. 333 
Schedule for Interviews with people from the Legislative Impeachment Committee of the Tucuman 
Legislature (English) ............................................................................................................................. 335 
Schedule for Interviews with people from the Legislative Impeachment Committee of the Tucuman 
Legislature (Spanish) ............................................................................................................................ 337 
Appendix E: Case-Study Protocol ............................................................................................................. 339 
Appendix F: List of Codes for Nvivo Analysis of Interview Transcripts .................................................... 341 
Appendix G: Glossary of Translated Terms .............................................................................................. 344 
Appendix H: Critical Self-Reflection.......................................................................................................... 345 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................. 352 
 
Page 12 of 366 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
ENGLISH 
 
ACBA Autonomous City of Buenos Aires 
CDA Commission for Discipline and Accusations 
FIJ Federal Impeachment Jury  
FJC Federal Judicial Council 
IJ Impeachment Jury 
JC Judicial Council 
OAS Organization of American States 
PIC Permanent Impeachment Commission (of the Tucuman legislature) 
TBAIC Tucuman Bar Association’s Impeachment Commission 
TIJ Tucuman Impeachment Jury 
 
SPANISH 
 
 
BO Boletín Oficial (Official Gazette for the Federal level) 
BOCBA Boletín Oficial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (Official Gazette of the 
ACBA) 
BOT Boletín Oficial de Tucumán (Official Gazette of Tucuman) 
CABA Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (Autonomous City of Buenos 
Aires)  
Const 
Nacional 
(Arg) 
 
Constitución Nacional Argentina (National Argentine Constitution) 
Const Prov 
Tuc 
Constitución Provincial de Tucumán (Provincial Constitution of 
Tucuman) 
CSJN  Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Supreme Court of Justice of 
the Nation) 
CSJTuc Corte Suprema de Justicia de Tucumán (Supreme Court of Justice of 
Tucuman 
Page 13 of 366 
 
List of Cases 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL CASES 
Constitutional Court v Peru, IACHR (31/01/2001) Series C No 71 
 
Apitz Barbera et al v Venezuela, IACHR (05/08/2008) Series C No 182 
 
Reverón Trujillo v Venezuela, IACHR (30/06/2009) Series C No 197 
 
Chocrón Chocrón v Venezuela, IACHR (01/07/2011) Series C No 227 
 
Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al) v Ecuador, IACHR (23/08/2013) Series C No 266 
 
ARGENTINA, FEDERAL CASES  
Urdamz y Compañia vs Ezequiel Ramos Mexia, por danos y perjuicios; sobre procedencia del 
recurso extraordinario, Fallos1 113: 317 
Provincia de Santiago del Estero v Enrique N Compagno, Fallos 198:78 
 
Arigos, Dr Carlos R (Juez de Instrucción) – se solicita su enjuiciamiento, Fallos 274:415 
  
López Osvaldo Antonio (ex Cabo Primero), Fallos 310:1797 
 
ATE San Juan, Secretario General Héctor Sánchez s/ juicio político- inconstitucionalidad, Fallos 
317: 885 
 
Nicosia, Alberto Oscar, Fallos 316: 2940 
 
Freidenberg de Ferreyra, Alicia Beatriz c/Honorable Legislatura de Tucumán, Fallos: 331:1755 
 
Editorial Perfil SA y otro c/ EN Jefatura Gabinete de Ministros SMC s/ Amparo Ley 16.986, Fallos 
334: 109 
 
Grupo Clarín SA y Otros s/ Medidas Cautelares, Fallos 335:705  
 
Rizzo, Jorge Gabriel (apoderado Lista 3 Gente de Derecho) s/ acción de amparo c/ Poder 
Ejecutivo Nacional, Fallos: 336:760 
 
Grupo Clarín SA y Otros c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional y otro s/acción meramente declarativa, 
Fallos: 336:1774 
                                                 
1 ‘Fallos’ is the official abbreviation for the Colección Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, 
the official journal of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Argentina.  
Page 14 of 366 
 
Uriarte, Rodolfo Marcelo y otro c/ Consejo de la Magistratura de la Nación s/ Acción Mere 
Declarativa de Inconstitucionalidad, Fallos 338:1216 
 
Boggiano Antonio c/ Estado Nacional – Ministerio de Desarrollo Social s/ Proceso Administrativo 
– Inconst Varias, Fallos 339:323 
 
Marquevich Roberto Jose c/ Anses s/Acción Meramente Declarativo, CSJN 2014, Fallo M 115 
XLIV Rex 
 
 
AUTONOMOUS CITY OF BUENOS AIRES CASES  
 
Jurado de Enjuiciamiento de Magistrados, Causa No 1/2009, SCD s/Denuncia, Magistrada Rosa 
Elsa Parrilli OJ 8 (BOCBA del 14/01/2010) 
 
 
TUCUMAN CASES  
 
Iñigo David y otros s/ Privación Ilegítima de la Libertad y Promoción de la Prostitución en 
Concurso Víctima, María de los Ángeles Verón, Sala II de la Cámara en lo Penal de la Provincia 
de Tucumán, 23554/2002 
Colegio de Abogados de Tucumán vs Honorable Convención Constituyente de Tucumán s/ 
inconstitucionalidad, CSJTuc, 888/2008 
Freidenberg, Alicia vs Estado Provincial (Honorable Legislatura) s/ Acción de Amparo, CSJTuc, 
30/10/2009  
Colegio de Abogados de Tucumán vs Provincia de Tucumán s/Acción Declarativa de 
Inconstitucionalidad, CSJTuc, 22/08/2017 
 
  
Page 15 of 366 
 
List of Legislation 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 Dec 1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III)(1948) 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 Dec 1966) 999 UNTS 171 and 
1057 UNTS 407, entered into force 23 Mar 1976 
 
American Convention on Human Rights (San Jose, Costa Rica, 22 Nov 1969) 9 ILM 673 (1970) 
entered into force 18 July 1978 
 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(New York, 10 Dec 1984) 1465 UNTS 85, 23 ILM 1027 (1984) as modified by 24 ILM 35(1985), 
entered into force 26 June 1987. 
 
United Nations Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, GA Res 40/32, UN GAOR 
40th Sess, Supp No 53, at 205, UN Doc A/40/53 (1985) and GA Res 40/146, UN GAOR 40th Sess, 
Supp No 53 at 254, UN Doc A/40/53(1985) 
 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2003/43: Independence and Impartiality of the 
Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers, 23 April 2003, 
E/CN.4/RES/2003/43 
 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2004/33: Independence and Impartiality of the 
Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers, 19 April 2004, E/CN.4 
RES/2004/33 
 
UN ECOSOC, Basic Principles of Judicial Conduct, E/Res/2006/23 (27 July 2006) 
 
UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No 32, Art 14, Right to Equality before Courts 
and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) 
 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers – Guarantees of 
Judicial Independence/Major Developments in International Justice, Human Rights Council, 11th 
Session, UN Doc A/HRC/11/41 (2009) 
 
Res 12/3, Human Rights Council, 12th Session (Agenda Item 3), UN Doc A/HRC/RES/12/3 (2009) 
 
Res 15/3, Human Rights Council, 15th Session (Agenda Item 3), UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/3 (2010) 
 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Human Rights 
Council, 38th Session (Agenda Item 3) UN Doc A/HRC/38/38 (2018) 
 
 
Page 16 of 366 
 
ARGENTINEAN LEGISLATION2 
 
FEDERAL LAWS  
 
Ley 23,774, Ampliase el Número de Jueces de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación que la 
Integran (BO del 16/4/1990) 
 
Ley 24,018, Jubilaciones y Pensiones: Poder Ejecutivo, Poder Judicial, Legisladores (BO del 
18/12/1991) 
 
Ley 24,430, Constitución Nacional: Ordena su Publicación (BO del 10/01/1995) 
 
Ley 24,588, Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Intereses del Estado Nacional (BO del 30/11/1995) 
 
Ley 24,620, Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Elecciones/Estatuto Organizativo (BO del 04/01/1996) 
 
Ley 24,937, Consejo de la Magistratura: Creación y Funcionamiento (BO del 06/01/1998) 
 
Ley 25,188, Ética en el Ejercicio de la Función Pública (BO del 01/11/1999) 
 
Reglamento Procesal del Jurado de Enjuiciamiento de los Magistrados, approved by Resolución 
26/99 (BO del 26/04/1999) 
 
Ley 26,080, Consejo de la Magistratura (BO del 27/02/2006) 
 
Reglamento de la Comisión de Disciplina y Acusación, approved by Resolución 98/2207 del 
Consejo de la Magistratura (BO del 28/03/2007) 
 
Ley 26,522, Regúlense los Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual en Todo el Ámbito Territorial 
de la República Argentina (BO del 10/10/2009)   
 
Ley 26,854, Medidas Cautelares en las Causas en las que es Parte o Interviene el Estado 
Nacional. Procesos Excluidos (BO del 30/04/2013)  
 
Ley 26,855, Consejo de la Magistratura (BO del 27/05/2013)  
 
Ley 26,856, Justicia, Publicación Integra de Acordadas y Resoluciones (BO del 23/05/2013) 
 
Ley 26,857, Ética en el Ejercicio de la Función Pública: Declaraciones Juradas Patrimoniales (BO 
del 23/05/2013) 
 
Ley 26,861, Justicia, Ingreso Democrático e Igualitario de Personal (BO del 03/06/2013) 
                                                 
2 As noted in New York University School of Law, Guide to Foreign and International Legal Citations) (2nd Edn, 
Wolters Kluwer 2009), there is no uniform citation manual for legal sources in Argentina. This thesis uses 
guidance from NYU’s Guide and OSCOLA in citing Argentine sources, however in order to avoid any confusion, 
abbreviations have been used sparingly. All references to laws cite the official national or provincial gazettes 
(Boletín Oficial, shortened here to BO for the Federal level, BOCBA for the ACBA, and BOT for Tucumán).    
Page 17 of 366 
 
 
Disposición 49/2011, Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos: Subizar Isidoro y Otro (BO 
del 04/03/2011) 
 
 
LAWS OF THE AUTONOMOUS CITY OF BUENOS AIRES 
 
Constitución de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (BOCBA del 10/10/1996) 
 
Ley Orgánica del Consejo de la Magistratura No 31 (BOCBA del 29/06/1998) 
 
Ley de Jurado de Enjuiciamiento No 54 (BOCBA del 19/08/1998) 
 
Reglamento Interno del Plenario y las Comisiones Del Consejo de la Magistratura de la CABA, 
approved by Resolución No 260/2004 (BOCBA del 26/04/2004) 
 
Reglamento Disciplinario para Magistrados e Integrantes del Ministerio Público, approved by 
Resolución 272 CMCABA/08 (BOCBA del 13/05/2008)  
 
Reglamento Disciplinario del Poder Judicial de la CABA Excluido el Tribunal Superior de Justicia y 
los Empleados y Funcionarios del Ministerio Publico, approved by Resolución CM No 19/2018 
(BOCBA del 08/03/2018) 
 
 
PROVINCIAL LAWS OF TUCUMAN 
 
Ley 5233, Ejercicio de la Profesión de Abogado y de la Profesión de Procurador. Colegio de 
Abogados de Tucumán (BOT del 11/02/1981) 
 
Ley 7977, Regula el Enjuiciamiento de los Miembros del Poder Judicial no Sometidos a Juicio 
Político (BOT del 31/12/2007)  
 
Ley 7978, Convocatoria a Todos los Abogados para la Elección de un Representante Titular y un 
Suplente Destinados a Integrar el Jurado de Enjuiciamiento (BOT del 03/01/2008) 
 
Ley 8176, Modifica el Artículo 1 de la Ley No 7978 (BOT del 16/04/2009)  
 
Ley 8199, Enjuiciamiento a los Miembros de los Ministerios Fiscal y Pupilar y Magistrados del 
Poder Judicial no Sometidos a Juicio Político (BOT del 12/08/2009) 
 
Ley 8734, El Proceso de Enjuiciamiento ante la Comisión Permanente de Juicio Político y el 
Jurado de Enjuiciamiento (BOT del 20/11/2014)  
 
Ley 8966, Modifica la Ley No 8734 de Regulación del Proceso de Jurado de Enjuiciamiento (BOT 
del 04/01/2017) 
 
Reglamento del Honorable Legislatura de la Provincia de Tucumán 
Page 18 of 366 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: The Process for the Removal of Federal Judges  
 
102 
Figure 2: The Process for the Removal of ACBA Judges 
 
107 
Figure 3: The Process for the Removal of Tucuman Provincial Judges 
 
111 
Figure 4: Main Steps in a Removals Process  
 
137 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Page 19 of 366 
 
List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Composition of the JC, the CDA, and the IJ at the Federal Level  
 
44-46 
Table 2: Composition of the JC, the CDA, and the IJ at the ACBA Level 
 
60 
Table 3: Composition of the PIC and the IJ in the Province of Tucuman 
 
65 
Table 4: Table of Participants Interviewed 
 
120 
Table 5: Length of Interviews  
 
130 
Table 6: List of Participant Codes 
 
139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Page 20 of 366 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the processes for the removal of lower-court judges (judges other than 
Supreme Court judges) for malperformance in three jurisdictions in Argentina: the Federal level, 
the newly Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (ACBA), and the province of Tucuman.3 These 
processes were historically conducted by way of impeachment in the legislature, however in the 
1990s following the reinstatement of democracy, were entrusted to newly created Judicial 
Councils (JCs) and Impeachment Juries4(IJs) at both the Federal and ACBA levels in an attempt to 
create more efficient processes, shielded from party politics and that better protect judicial 
independence and accountability. The new multi-sectorial JCs receive and investigate complaints 
against judges and decide whether to start removals proceedings before an independent IJ.  In 
the province of Tucuman, the legislature is still involved at the first stage of the removals process,   
with its Permanente Impeachment Commission5 (PIC) receiving and investigating complaints, 
however the final decision as to the removal is made by a provincial IJ created in 2006. Despite 
this professed de-politicisation of the removals processes in all three jurisdictions, there have 
nevertheless been continued controversies surrounding the regulation and workings of these 
councils, committees, and juries, as well as the removals and lack of removals that have taken 
place. This thesis therefore assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the JC and IJ model in 
protecting judicial independence in removals processes.  
 
1.2 Research Rationale 
International organisations have long recommended that countries around the world to establish 
JCs as a means of protecting judicial independence and protecting appointment and removals 
processes from external interference.6 Indeed, the adoption of JCs in Latin America was 
                                                 
3 This thesis provides a snapshot of the situation at the time the interviews were conducted in 2014, at the time 
when Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was President, Mauricio Macri (an opposition politician at the time, now 
President) was the Governor of the ACBA, and José Alperovich, a Kirchnerist, was the Governor of Tucuman. 
4 I have translated ‘Jurado de Enjuiciamiento’ as ‘Impeachment Jury’ given that it is the most commonly used 
translation in the literature. I however have my doubts as to the accuracy of this translation that I feel may be 
misleading as ‘enjuiciamiento’ can refer not only to impeachment but trials in general. Note that all translations 
provided in this thesis are my own.  
5 Note that the word ‘impeachment’ has been used more accurately here as a translation of ‘juicio politico’.  
6 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Human Rights Council, 38th Session 
(Agenda Item 3) UN Doc A/HRC/38/38 (2018). 
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promoted by aid providers from North America and Western Europe, and since the 1980s when 
dictatorships started to fall, several countries in the region adopted some form of JC.7 One of the 
principal aims of the establishment of JCs throughout Latin America,8 and indeed throughout the 
world,9 was to enhance judicial independence.10 Indeed, Hammergren explains that augmenting 
judicial independence ‘was the only clearly stated objective behind the Latin American 
councils’.11 However, there is a growing recognition that the establishment of a JC in itself does 
not secure these outcomes.12 There are therefore calls for studies into the experiences of JCs in 
various contexts and for creating international standards on the composition and function of JCs 
that best protect judicial independence.13 
 
However, there has only been ‘quite limited’ academic work on JCs with ‘very few empirical 
studies’,14 and there is a lack of in-depth data about the political contexts in which JCs were 
adopted and are operating.15 Furthermore, the literature concludes that there is ‘no evidence in 
                                                 
7 Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America (Rule of Law Series, 
Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Number 28, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2002) 1, 3-4 and 
9-12. Countries in Latin America that have adopted a JC are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela, although the councils of Uruguay and Venezuela have since been disbanded. There had also earlier 
been some JCs responsible for judicial appointments that were given functions taken away from disbanded 
bodies during military dictatorships.  
8 Rebecca Bill Chávez, ‘The Appointment and Removal Process for Judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils 
and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence’ (Summer 2007) 49(2) Latin American Politics and 
Society 33, 34; Hammergren (n 7) 15.  
9 According to Diego García-Sayán, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, ‘it is 
estimated that, to date, more than 70% of countries have some type of judicial council or equivalent body’: 
Diego García-Sayán, ‘Statement at the 38th Session of the Human Rights Council’ (UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2018), 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23793&LangID=E> accessed 15 June 2019. 
According to Garoupa and Ginsburg, in 2009, 60% of countries had some form of JC, many adopted on the basis 
of international “best practice” designed to promote judicial independence and quality. See Nuno Garoupa and 
Tom Ginsburg, ‘Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence’ (2009) 57(1) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 103, 104 and 129. 
10 Other aims varied according to each jurisdiction’s needs but can broadly be categorised as the improvement of 
the quality of judicial services.  
11 Hammergren (n 7) 15. See also p 4 of the same paper: councils were ‘heralded as means of depoliticizing 
appointments, guaranteeing the selection of better judges, and advancing judicial independence’. 
12 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Human Rights Council, 38th 
Session (Agenda Item 3) UN Doc A/HRC/38/38 (2018).  
13 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. This report recommends, in 
paragraph 89, that ‘given the absence of detailed legal standards… on the role of judicial councils,… [that] a 
comprehensive set of principles be developed… to identify common principles and good practices in relation to 
the establishment, composition, and functioning of such councils’. 
14 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 9) 119. 
15 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 9) 130. 
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support of the presumed relationship between council structure and judicial independence or 
quality’.16 On the contrary, more countries that adopted a JC after 1996 suffered a decline in 
quality of rule of law than an increase.17 Nevertheless, JCs are still touted as the best option for 
promoting judicial independence.18 There is, it is argued, simply a need to better understand how 
the institutions are working in practice, to pinpoint problems and gain a better understanding of 
how the context affects JCs efficiency.19  
 
Whilst the purpose and challenge of JCs around the world is the same - to protect judicial 
independence and accountability - differences in political context may create significant 
variations in the nature of this task. An examination of the effectiveness of JCs in different 
contexts is therefore important to determine the strengths and weaknesses of JCs in standing up 
to a variety of challenges, and what modifications can be made, for example to the composition 
and regulation of JCs, to tailor JCs to their context. This understanding can then serve as a 
platform for reform, to improve the performance of JCs worldwide. 
 
Many Latin American countries were among the first developing nations to introduce JCs as part 
of democratic reform packages following the reinstatement of democracy in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Given that many of these countries have now amassed more than 20 years of 
experience with their councils, they provide a rich source of information about what works and 
what does not work for other countries that have introduced them more recently, or that are 
considering introducing a JC. Whilst there are some statistics available as well as papers by 
practitioners reflecting on the Latin American experience with JCs, there are a lack of in depth 
empirical studies on this topic. The most notable work on the JCs in Latin America was published 
by Linn Hammergren who, as shall be discussed further in Chapter 2, broadly outlines many 
problems that councils throughout Latin America have faced in practice, concluding that there 
are still many improvements to be made to JCs if the quality and independence of judicial services 
is to be improved.20 
                                                 
16 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 9) 129-130. 
17 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 9) 129. 
18 García-Sayán (n 9). 
19 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (n 12) para 89.  
20 Hammergren (n 7). For a consideration of political interference in the discipline of judge as a wider trend across 
Latin America, and its effect on actual and perceived judicial independence, see also Jessica Walsh, ‘A Double-
Edged Sword: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Latin America’ (Thematic Paper No 5, International 
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This thesis focuses on Argentina’s experience with JCs as its experience with introducing a JC at 
the Federal level has been a continued source of controversy and political infighting. In 2014, 15 
years after the creation of the FJC, the Argentine judiciary was still perceived as lacking 
independence,21 and whilst the judiciary stood up to the government in some high profile cases, 
the executive retaliated by adopting judicial reforms that attempted to bring the judiciary further 
under executive control. In addition, there are some high profile cases of judges that appear to 
protect government officials from being investigated for corruption, and despite numerous 
complaints filed against these judges with the FJC, they have not been subjected to removals 
proceedings. Conversely, there have also been high profile cases of judges who ruled against the 
interests of the government, and consequently had investigations opened against them. Whilst I 
do not wish to suggest that these problems are representative of the Argentine judiciary as a 
whole, they do serve to indicate problems in the removals process, and they are detrimental to 
the public’s trust in these processes and in the judiciary.  
 
Nevertheless, at the time of conducting the empirical research for this thesis in 2014, there was 
little literature on the effectiveness of the FJC in protecting and promoting judicial independence, 
and the few papers that existed were published before the wide-reaching changes in regulation 
and composition of the FJC introduced in 2006.22 In 2016, an interesting edited book was 
published discussing Argentina’s experience with JCs from a critical multi-disciplinary 
perspective. However, none of these publications are based on a qualitative empirical study of 
the workings of the JC, and therefore leave many questions open about the in-depth workings of 
these institutions, particularly to those not familiar with the Argentine context. This thesis 
therefore aimed to gain an insight into the workings of JCs in Argentina that may provide valuable 
lessons to other JCs around the world.   
                                                 
Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute 2016). 
21 According to the 2013 Latinobarometro, 66% of people surveyed in Argentina said they had “little or no trust” in 
the judiciary: See <www.latinobarometro.org/documentos/LATBD_INFORME_LB_2013.pdf > accessed 20 
September 2019. Additionally, Agustín Salvia (ed), Un Régimen Consolidado de Bienestar con Desigualdades 
Sociales Persistentes: Claroscuros en el Desarrollo Humano y la Integración Social 2010-2013 (Educa 2014) 191, 
part of the Bicentenary Series of the Barómetro de la Deuda Social Argentina, reports that between 2010 and 
2013 only around 20% of the population trusted the judiciary. See also the figures given in this regard in Section 
2.2.3 below.  
22 This is recognised in the introduction of a 2016 edited book on the Argentine experience with their JCs, which 
looks at it from a critical multi-disciplinary perspective: Alejandra B Petrella (ed), El Consejo de la Magistratura: 
Abordaje Crítico y Sistémico desde Diversas Perspectivas (Editorial Jusbaires 2016) 9. 
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1.3 Focus on the Removals Process 
There is a very broad range of functions undertaken by JCs that vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Functions commonly include the appointment of judges, the financial and 
administrative management of the judiciary, institutional strategy, and disciplinary procedures 
against judges and judicial staff. This thesis focuses on one of these many roles: the removal of 
judges from office. This choice was based on a number of factors. First, that part of the impetus 
behind the creation of the FJC in Argentina was to streamline the process for the removal of 
judges in the hope of making if more effective. This was in a context of high perceived levels of 
judicial corruption and impunity, and low levels of trust in the judiciary and the previous system 
for removing judges via impeachment by the legislature. Second, despite this aim, there appear 
to be ongoing problems in achieving the removal of judges that are perceived to be corrupt. 
There is also very little literature on judicial removals processes as conducted specifically by JCs, 
partially because JCs are only responsible for the removal of lower-court judges and more is 
written about the removal of Supreme Court judges (usually by way of impeachment proceedings 
before the legislature),23 and partially as this function is carried out not only by JCs but by a range 
of different bodies around the world. 
 
Generally speaking, systems for the removal of judges have also received less attention in the 
literature than systems for appointing judges. This is perhaps understandable given that judges 
are not frequently removed, nor has there been seen to be a need to remove more judges in 
countries such as the USA and the UK.24 Even in developing countries, securing judicial 
independence was given more importance than accountability, given its role in upholding the 
rule of law and combating corruption.25 In countries where the state regularly undermines 
judicial independence in practice, there is also little incentive for governments to pursue the 
accountability of judges for bending to their will. Focusing on independence and appointments 
                                                 
23 See for example Andrea Castagnola, Manipulating Courts in New Democracies: Forcing Judges off the Bench in 
Argentina (Routledge 2018) that evaluates what factors influenced the stability in office for justices of both 
national and provincial supreme courts in Argentina. Turnover and vacancy creation at the national level is 
studies in the period between 1916 and 2014, whereas turnover in the provincial supreme courts is studied 
from 1983 to 2014.  
24 Indeed, American political literature on judicial turnover assumes that ‘the longevity of justices in office is mainly 
determined by the justices’ own decision’: Castagnola (n 23) 5. 
25 Greg Mayne, ‘Judicial Integrity: The Accountability Gap and the Bangalore Principles’ in Transparency 
International, Global Corruption Report 2007, Corruption in Judicial Systems (CUP 2007) 41. 
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results in a comfortable position where governments can pay lip service to judicial independence 
without being held accountable for this standard.   
 
In the literature that does exist on judicial accountability, emphasis has traditionally been placed 
on the need to make removing a judge as difficult as possible, so as to safe-guard judicial 
independence, and shield the judiciary from interference from the other branches of 
government. Indeed, one of the most common ways of protecting judicial independence is by 
providing judges security of tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term 
in office,26 where removal from office is only possible for incompetence, serious abuse of office 
or other criminal offences in accordance with stringent procedures.27 Such provisions recognise 
that job insecurity creates a dependency of judges on those who have power over their careers 
and that this may lead to partial decision making where a judge may be tempted to rule in 
accordance with the wishes of the persons or interests deciding the fate of his career (which may 
be more senior judges or an external body). The removal of judges from office is therefore one 
of the factors that has been used as an indicator of low levels of de facto judicial independence 
in indices for de facto judicial independence.28 Life tenancy of judges therefore commonly 
ensures that judges are not dependent on those appointing them and keeping them in office.  
 
There has been a lot less regard to the other side of the coin: ensuring judicial accountability, and 
putting in place efficient processes for removing a judge where necessary.29 Processes for the 
                                                 
26 Principle 12, UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. See also: Latin American Federation of 
Judges, ‘Declaration of Minimal Principles About Judiciaries and Judge’s Independence in Latin America’ 
(Campeche, April 2008) <https://flammagistrados.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DECLARATION-OF-
MINIMAL-PRINCIPLES-ABOUT-JUDICIARIES-AND-JUDGES%e2%80%99-INDEPENDENCE-IN-LATIN-AMERICA.pdf> 
accessed 31 August 2019, that states in its article 7 that ‘judges have to be appointed in a permanent way, and 
cannot be appointed for a period of time’; article 22 of the International Bar Association, ‘Minimum Standards 
on Judicial Independence’ (IBA 1982), ‘judicial appointments should generally be for life, subject to removal for 
cause and compulsory retirement at an age fixed by law at the date of appointment’; The Council of Europe’s 
Commission for Democracy through Law, ‘Report on the Independence of the Judicial System – Part One: The 
Independence of Judges’ CDL-AD(2010)004. For a slightly different position, see Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Guarantees for the Independence of Justice Operators: Towards Strengthening Access to Justice 
and the Rule of Law in the Americas (OAS official records 2013) 34, that agrees that job stability is necessary for 
judicial independence, but stops short of promoting only life tenure, instead stating that ‘good practice is… a 
one-term appointment for a fixed time period, thereby ensuring tenure… for the stipulated time period’. 
27 Principles 17-20, UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 
28 Lars Feld and Stefan Voigt, ‘Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using a New 
Set of Indicators’ (2003) 19(3) Eur J Pol Econ 497; Bernd Hayo and Stefan Voigt, ‘Explaining De Facto Judicial 
Independence’ (2007) 27(3) International Review of Law and Economics 269-290. 
29 ibid. 
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removal of a judge walk a fine line to avoid their potential to negatively impact de facto judicial 
independence in a variety of ways. The most obvious threat to judicial independence is where a 
judge is penalised for ruling impartially. In the worst-case scenario, a judge may be removed on 
the basis of a decision that displeases certain interests.30 The effect of such a removal is not 
limited to the judge in question: it could also have what has been called a ‘chilling effect’ on other 
judges whereby they may be more reluctant to rule against interests for fear of repercussions.31  
 
Even a lower sanction, or simply an investigation into a judge, or a credible threat of removal or 
sanctions can also be damaging to judicial independence as it could place pressure on judges to 
rule a certain way. Conversely, where judges fail to be impartial and rule in accordance with the 
wishes of interests, there is a danger that they may be protected from sanctions or removals. 
This would amount to a failure to uphold the standard of judicial independence, and may 
encourage other judges to take a similar path. Both the protection of partial judges and the 
removal of impartial judges may have the added effect of damaging public confidence in the 
removals process and the judiciary.32 The proposition behind these dangers is that the judicial 
removals process can be affected by interests other than the protection of judicial independence 
and accountability, and that judicial independence can therefore be negatively affected. This 
thesis maintains the focus on the need to protect judicial independence, but argues that 
accountability in the form of fair and efficient removals processes are necessary for upholding 
judicial independence.  
 
The fear of the removals process being impacted by factors other than the protection of judicial 
independence and accountability, for example where a judge is removed for political reasons, 
has prompted international organizations to argue that the bodies carrying out removals 
processes should be made up of a majority of judge members.33 This recommendation has 
however been called into question as being simplistic.34 In contexts where there are low levels of 
trust in the judiciary and there are high levels of perceived judicial corruption, a JC controlled by 
                                                 
30 Jan van Zyl Smit, ‘West Virginia Should be a Wake-Up Call: Normalising the Impeachment of US State Court 
Judges Threatens the Rule of Law’ (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2018) 
<www.biicl.org/bingham-centre/projects/wvaimpeachment> accessed 18 February 2019. 
31 Irving R Kaufman, ‘Chilling Judicial Independence’ (1979) 88(4) The Yale Law Journal 681,715. 
32 van Zyl Smit (n 30).  
33 Report of the Special Rapporteur (n 12) para 101.  
34 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 9) 130.  
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judges will do little to increase trust or independence. On the other hand, including politicians on 
JCs may simply maintain the permeability of judiciaries to political influence. The Argentine 
response to this dilemma was to create multi-sectorial JCs were no one interest group has full 
control, and therefore provides a very interesting case study on the efficiency of such a multi-
lateral body to protect judicial independence. 
 
1.4 Empirical Research Using Three Case Studies 
 
Argentina is federation whose judiciary is divided into 25 jurisdictions: each province, as well as 
the ACBA, is a separate jurisdiction with its own constitution and judiciary,35 and superimposed 
on this is the federal judiciary that oversees federal issues as regulated by the national 
constitution. In addition to the FJC and the FIJ that oversee the Federal judiciary, several 
provinces have also chosen to introduce some form of JC or IJ. The differences in the institutional 
histories of the judiciaries at these different levels, combined with the differences in the 
composition and regulation of their councils and impeachment juries makes for a very interesting 
study of the efficiency of councils and juries in various contexts.   
 
This thesis explores three of these jurisdictions: the Federal level, the ACBA, and the province 
Tucuman. Each of these processes is a separate unit of analysis. At both the Federal and ACBA 
levels, a multi-sectorial JC receives and investigates complaints against judges, and where it finds 
grounds for removal, oral proceedings are conducted in front of an independent IJ. In contrast, 
in Tucuman, complaints are investigated by the Permanent Impeachment Committee off the 
local legislature, although an IJ was created in 2006 to make the final decision as to the removal. 
The difference in context at the federal and ACBA are contrasted to explore to what extent the 
success of the JC’s protection of judicial independence is context specific. In addition, a 
comparison with the case of Tucuman, allows for an assessment of whether entrusting the 
process to a JC instead of a legislative committee really makes any positive difference.  
 
                                                 
35 As per article 121 of the national constitution, the provinces have all of the powers that were not expressly 
delegated to the federal government in the constitution, including the freedom to design their own local 
institutions. 
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The Federal and ACBA levels were chosen as two jurisdictions with vastly different institutional 
and political contexts: the creation of the Federal Judicial Council (FJC) was subject to a lot of 
political infighting in a context of a federal judiciary facing very low levels of popular approval. In 
contrast, the ACBA JC was part of a set of new institutions created when the ACBA first gained 
autonomy. With a clean sheet and full-spectrum political support, the ACBA JC played a role in 
appointing a brand new judiciary.36 Tucuman was chosen as a province with some high profile 
controversies surrounding removals processes, and a political context that is seen to threaten 
judicial independence. Notwithstanding the differences, all three jurisdictions face the challenge 
of building a new institutional identity for the judiciary based on the ideals of independence, 
impartiality, and the provision of high quality judicial services.  
 
The three cases are assessed at the point in time that the interviews were conducted (mostly in 
September and October of 2014). At the federal level this means evaluating the working of the 
council since the 2006 change in regulation and composition of the council. In Tucuman, this also 
means looking at the process since its creation in its current form, with the introduction of the 
TIJ in the 2006 provincial constitution. For the ACBA, it means looking at its performance since 
its establishment by the 1996 ACBA constitution.37 For an idea of scale, Tucuman is a small but 
densely populated province with a population of roughly 1.5 million, compared to roughly 2.9 
million in the ACBA, and roughly 40 million in Argentina as a whole.38 In total there are well over 
4,000 judges in Argentina, with about a quarter of them working at the federal level. There are 
also over 1,300 fiscales (public prosecutors) and over 800 defensores (public defenders) and 
62,500 civil servants and employees working for the judiciary.39 
 
 
                                                 
36 Poder Judicial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Consejo de la Magistratura, ‘Breve Historia del Poder Judicial’ 
(iJudicial) <https://ijudicial.gob.ar/breve-historia-del-poder-judicial/> accessed 18 April 2019. 
37 Note that the ACBA JC only started working in December 1998.  
38 See the data from the last national census here: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Censo 2010 (INDEC) 
<www.indec.gob.ar/nivel4_default.asp?id_tema_1=2&id_tema_2=41&id_tema_3=135> accessed 17 April 
2019.  
39 Due to a lack of available information, these were the figures in 2004 according to G C Garavano, Información y 
Justicia (1st edn, Unidos por la Justicia Asociación Civil, Konrad Adenauer 2006). 
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The contextual conditions being studied make this research ideally suited to the use of a case-
study model.40 By conducting in-depth empirical research on the removals processes in these 
three jurisdictions, this thesis provides an understanding of how the judicial removals process, 
and in turn judicial independence, are affected by their socio-political context. This is a step 
towards building an understanding of the ‘informal social norms’ that it has been argued keep 
judiciaries in Latin America dependent on political and other inappropriate influences and play a 
key role in judicial corruption, as well as being, it has been argued, the reasons why several 
attempts at judicial reform in the region have yielded unsatisfactory results.41 It also addresses 
the need for ‘scholars [to] conduct more thorough empirical research to understand the precise 
determinants of independence and accountability’ which it has been argued ‘are highly context-
specific and not susceptible to one-size fits-all solutions’.42  
 
This thesis represents a small step in the attempt to understand ‘the complexity of the role of a 
JC’ in protecting judicial independence.43 It rejects ‘the simplistic view that importing or 
transplanting certain types of JC is likely to have a decisive impact on the quality of the 
judiciary’,44 instead focusing on untangling the ways in which JCs interact with their contexts to 
impact on judicial independence. This understanding is intended to serve as a platform to identify 
ways in which JCs and the legal framework of judicial removals processes could be strengthened 
to further protect judicial independence, as well as identifying other factors that may need to be 
addressed. In this way, the thesis furthers our understanding of the conditions that impact on de 
facto judicial independence and the ways in which JCs and their processes should be designed to 
meet local challenges; lessons which are applicable beyond Argentina.45  
 
                                                 
40 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd Edn, Sage Publications 2003) 13; J Hartley, ‘Case 
Study Research’ in Cassell C and Symon G, Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research 
(Sage Publications 2004) 323. 
41 See Roberto Laver, ‘Judicial Independence in Latin America and the (Conflicting) Influence of Cultural Norms’ 
(2014) Edmond J Safra Working Papers No 35 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384125> 
accessed 25 January 2014. 
42 Garoupa and Ginsburg, (n 9) 131. 
43 Garoupa and Ginsburg, (n 9) 130. 
44 Garoupa and Ginsburg, (n 9) 130. 
45 See John Gerring, ‘What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?’ (2004) American Political Science Review, Vol 
98, No 2, 341, who explains that the generalisations abstracted from a case study can be applicable to a larger 
set of units than just the case being studied.  
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1.5 Interviews with Stakeholders in Judicial Removals Processes 
As shall be set out in detail in Chapter 4, qualitative empirical data was collected by way of semi-
structured, one-to-one interviews with various stakeholders in the three removals processes 
being studied. Participants were taken through a removals process step by step and asked to 
explain the way each step is conducted in practice. In addition, participants were asked some 
broader questions about judicial councils and judicial independence. The in-depth and semi-
structured nature of the interviews allowed for the collection of detailed data on these processes 
in practice, and for an exploration of the various perspectives and experiences of different 
participants.  
 
The interviews were conducted face-to-face in Spanish and took place mainly in Argentina.46 A 
total of 36 participants were interviewed across the three jurisdictions. Both judges in office and 
former judges (that had been removed or had resigned) in all three jurisdictions were 
interviewed, as well as councillors of the FJC and the ACBA JC, employees of the FJC and the FIJ, 
a member of the PIC of Tucuman, an opposition legislator in the Tucuman legislature, lawyers 
and prosecutors who had filed complaints against judges, and lawyers working for NGOs that 
conduct work relating to judicial independence. 
 
The thesis then uses the interview data to examine removals processes, and evaluates whether 
JCs fulfil their intended role of protecting judicial independence throughout these processes. 
Given the qualitative nature of the data collected and the relatively small sample size, the findings 
of this thesis are intended to be indicative and not representative of the phenomenon being 
studied. This thesis therefore does not intend to measure levels of judicial independence or 
provide statistics on judicial removals processes, rather to provide an insight and understanding 
of what is happening in practice. In-depth interviews with stakeholders allowed for the collection 
of detailed data on the challenges faced in practice, the identification of the factors involved and 
how they interact with judicial independence in a way that allowed for a thorough investigation 
into the efficiency of JCs and removals processes in protecting judicial independence and 
accountability.    
 
                                                 
46 Four interviews were conducted via telephone/Skype, and one interview was conducted face-to-face in England.  
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1.6 Conclusion  
Having set out the question this research seeks to answer and the method used in this chapter, 
the next chapter provides more background on judicial councils and impeachment juries, setting 
out the context into which they were introduced in each of the three case-studies. It includes a 
consideration of the institutional nature of judicial councils and the debate as to their 
constitutional role and ideal composition and regulation. It also provides contextual background 
on the political pressure that has been placed on these institutions since they were introduced.  
 
Chapter 3 then focuses on removals processes, starting with an evaluation of the threats to 
judicial independence that need to be addressed, and how the need for judicial accountability 
interacts with the protection of judicial independence. Defining these concepts at the start 
facilitates the later analysis of the findings of this thesis.47 With reference to the legal framework 
and international best practice, it then considers the nature of the removals process, the grounds 
on which judges can be removed and the need for due process guarantees in the process for 
removing a judge. The procedural rules in the three case studies are also set out, with potential 
issues highlighted.  
 
Chapter 4 goes on to set out the methodology used to carry out the research for this thesis, 
including details of who was interviewed and how the interviews were conducted, as well as 
explaining how the research questions of this thesis were broken down into a research protocol 
and interview schedules. The last part of Chapter 4 explains how the interviews were analysed.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7, discuss the research findings. Chapter 5 examines removals process at the 
Federal and ACBA levels in practice. Chapter 6 examines the findings relating to the removals 
process in Tucuman. Both chapters look both at what is working well and what is problematic 
from the perspective of ensuring judicial independence, as well as identifying external interests 
that may be influencing the process.  Chapter 7 then provides a more detailed consideration of 
the context in which these processes work, and how it may be affecting removals processes. The 
chapter sets out the factors that were brought up and discussed by participants during 
interviews, and includes: a wider trend of political interference in the judiciary and the political 
                                                 
47 Yin (n 40) 26.  
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corruption of judges; the media’s impacts on the judiciary and judicial removals processes; the 
ability of civil society to play a meaningful role in the processes; and the cultural and societal 
factors that affect institutional life in Argentina.  
 
Chapter 8 concludes by drawing together the findings from the previous three chapters, and 
comparing and contrasting them in order to evaluate both to what extent entrusting judicial 
removals processes to a JC is beneficial for the protection of judicial independence, and in what 
circumstances JCs can protect judicial independence. It also makes recommendations as to how 
problems in the removal processes conducted by JCs may be addressed in order to better protect 
judicial independence and accountability, as well as proposing directions for the further research 
that is needed on these important issues. 
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Chapter 2: The Introduction of JCs and IJs in Argentina 
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the three case-studies being evaluated by this thesis. 
Taking each jurisdiction separately, this chapter will explain the context into which JCs and IJs 
were introduced, and the reasons for their creation.  The controversies surrounding their 
introduction, including the debates about the institutional nature of the council and how they 
should be composed and regulated, are also explored. The resulting composition of the relevant 
institutions in each jurisdiction is set out, for ease of reference, in the form of three tables (see 
Sections 2.2.2, 2.3.2, and 2.4.2).  
 
Insight into the subsequent workings of these institutions is also provided, and some of the 
controversies surrounding the removals and lack of removals that have taken place are also 
explored. The Federal institutions are considered first in Section 2.2, followed by the ACBA 
institutions in Section 2.3, and the Tucuman institutions in Section 2.4. The background on 
regulation of the councils provided in this chapter provides the context for a discussion in Chapter 
3 on the meaning of judicial independence and how this concept was being perceived in 
Argentina at the time, as well as a discussion about the nature of removals processes and what 
constitutes grounds for removing a judge. 
 
2.2 The Introduction of the FJC and the FIJ 
2.2.1 The 1994 Constitutional Reform 
 
Upon the return to democracy in Argentina in 1983, there was a broad attempt at judicial reform 
that saw an ‘effort to “transform” the judiciary from a condition of “complicity in state terrorism” 
during the dictatorship to a condition of being at the service of a democratic state’.48 One of the 
driving forces behind this reform was therefore a desire to increase the independence of the 
judiciary vis-à-vis the executive. This signalled an attempt to reverse a trend that had been 
ongoing for several decades; ‘the informal practice of using a secretive process to appoint 
acquiescent judges became commonplace after Juan Domingo Perón assumed the presidency in 
                                                 
48 Peter DeShazo and Juan Enrique Vargas, ‘Judicial Reform in Latin America: An Assessment’ (Policy Papers on the 
Americas, Volume XVII, Study 2, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, September 2006), 3. The authors 
cite Alberto M Binder, Director of the CEPPAS, speaking at the conference that lead to this paper.  
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1946’.49 That decline in judicial independence was marked by the impeachment of four of the 
five justices of the Supreme Court in 1946.50  
 
Upon the return to democracy in 1983, President Raúl Alfonsín of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), 
created a nonpartisan advisory body, the Council for the Consolidation of Democracy, 
coordinated by legal and political philosopher Carlos Nino, to advise on reforming the 
constitution. The Council was disbanded in 1989 upon the election of President Menem of the 
Partido Justicialista (PJ), however when the debate about a constitutional reform was reassumed 
in 1993, former President Alfonsín proposed a pact to then President Menem to ensure that the 
reform took into consideration the views of both the UCR and the PJ, the two main political 
parties at the time. That pact, known as the Olivos Pact,51 lead to the adoption of the current 
version of the Argentine Constitution in 1994.  
 
The pact saw the UCR agree to a constitutional provision allowing a presidential re-election (that 
facilitated Menem’s re-election in 1995) in exchange for increased checks on the executive’s 
power,52 including an attempt to curtail his power to influence the judiciary. The new constitution 
incorporated many international treaties into the national legal framework, set out a section on 
human rights, regulated the power of the executive and the legislature, modified the electoral 
system, modified the balance of power between the provinces and the federal government, and 
granted the City of Buenos Aires autonomy. A number of new oversight bodies were also created, 
including the FJC53 that was entrusted with ‘the selection of [lower-court, federal] judges and the 
administration of the [federal] judiciary’.54 In addition, the FJC was given the power to receive 
                                                 
49 Rebecca Bill Chávez, ‘The Appointment and Removal Process for Judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial 
Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence’ (Summer 2007) 49(2) Latin American 
Politics and Society 33, 36.  
50 Andrea Castagnola, Manipulating Courts in New Democracies: Forcing Judges off the Bench in Argentina 
(Routledge 2018) 7. See also Gretchen Helmke, ‘The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in 
Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy’ (2002) 96 Am Pol Sci Rev, 292; Christopher Larkins, ‘The Judiciary 
and Delegative Democracy in Argentina’ [1998} Comparative Politics, 428.                
51 This was a series of memorandum of understanding signed at the Quinta de Olivos, the official presidential 
residence, on the 14 November 1993, and which were consolidated in the Pacto de la Rosada, signed on the 13 
December 1993 at the Casa Rosada, the Government House.  
52 Bill Chávez (n 49), Note 9. 
53 A loan from the International Monetary Fund was also conditional on the creation of the FJC, with the monies 
only being released 10 days after Congress passed the law governing the FJC in 1997: Bill Chávez (n 49) 36. 
54 Article 114, Const. Nacional (Arg).  
Page 35 of 366 
 
and investigate complaints against lower-court federal judges, and to decide whether to open 
removals proceedings before the FIJ, another newly created body.55 
 
President Alfonsín and his Council had initially rejected the creation of an FJC, fearing what they 
saw as the negative experience that Spain had with its council, and arguing that it would create 
an ‘establishment’ of judges that would be unresponsive to societal needs.56 They however 
changed their minds in the face of clear attempts by President Menem (president from 1989 to 
1999) to manipulate the courts.57 In 1990, the Supreme Court was expanded from five to nine 
justices58 following legislation proposed by President Menem.59 This along with the resignation 
of two former justices,60 gave President Menem the opportunity to appoint six justices in the 
early years of his presidency.61 He used an opaque appointment process to appoint justices with 
weak qualifications and loyalty to his party, the Partido Justicialista.62 This created what was 
known as the automatic Menemist majority on the Supreme Court, known for ruling in favour of 
Menem and who openly acknowledged their support for the government.63  
 
This, in combination with reports of corruption,64 intensified society’s criticism of the judiciary to 
the extent that by the end of 1992, 80% of the population deemed the judiciary to have little or 
                                                 
55 The FJC and FIJ do not have the power to appoint or remove the justices of the national Supreme Court.   
56 Bill Chávez (n 49), Note 9.  
57 Bill Chávez (n 49), Note 9. 
58 Law 23,774, Ampliase el número de jueces de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación que la integran (BO del 
16/4/1990). 
59 Owen M Fiss, ‘The Right Degree of Independence’ in Irwin P Stotzky, Transition to Democracy in Latin America: 
The Role of the Judiciary (Westview Press 1993) 62. 
60 It appeared that President Menem had encouraged the resignation of these justices by offering them 
ambassadorships: Fiss (n 59) 62. 
61 Bill Chávez (n 49) 37; and Adriana Tettamanti de Ramella, ‘Juicio Político: ¿Mecanismo de Control o Factor de 
Distorsión?’ in Jorge Horacio Gentile (ed), El Poder Legislativo: Aportes para el Conocimiento del Congreso de la 
Nación Argentina (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. 2008) 1011. 
62 The speed at which these appointments passed through the Senate prohibited any real debate about the 
nominations. Menem submitted his list of nominations to the Senate Appointment Committee one day after 
announcing the expansion. No opposition senators were present at either the deliberations of the Committee 
or in the Senate, with the nominations being approved in a seven minute long secret session: Bill Chávez (n 49), 
37-38. See also Fiss (n 59) 62: Menem’s party controlled the Senate, who confirmed the appointments, at the 
time, and ‘party loyalty was essentially taken for granted’. 
63 Bill Chávez (n 49), 37. 
64 For a consideration of how the deregulation and privatization processes of the 1990s created perceptions of 
corruption and impunity, see Karen Ann Faulk, In the Wake of Neoliberalism: Citizenship and Human Rights in 
Argentina (Stanford University Press 2013) 84. Cernadas has also argued that in the 1990s, the combination of a 
lack of justice for perpetrators of the Dirty War and highly visible corruption scandals meant that power itself 
was equated with impunity: Mabel N Cernadas de Bulnes, ‘Las Aporías de la Democracia Recobrada: La 
Construcción del Ciudadano en Argentina’ (2005) 8 Historia Actual On Line, 123-134. 
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no credibility.65 The Congress’ Impeachment Committee ‘received more impeachment suits 
between 1990 and 1998 than the total number between 1860 and 1990’.66 This culminated in six 
Supreme Court justices either being removed or resigning.67 In this context, therefore, it was 
hoped that a JC would not only serve to dissipate the government’s control over the appointment 
of judges, but also to facilitate the removal of corrupt judges by creating a more streamlined 
process for removals, not reliant on the politics of the legislature.68 This was framed as an 
attempt to ‘technify’ the removals process, distancing it from purely political processes.69  
 
The Constituent Convention of 1994 explicitly identified creating a new equilibrium between the 
executive, legislature, and judiciary, and increasing the independence of the judiciary, as 
objectives of the new constitution.70 Creating the FJC and the FIJ was part of that effort.71 It was 
                                                 
65 Laura C Roth, ‘Acerca de la Independencia Judicial en Argentina: La Creación del Consejo de la Magistratura y su 
Desempeño Entre 1994 y 2006’ (2007) 47(186) Desarrollo Económico 285, 285.  
66 Bill Chávez (n 49) 39. Note that this included requests to impeach Supreme Court justices, motivated in large 
part, according to Bill Chávez by the Menem appointees. See also Roth (n 65) 297, who explains that between 
1860 and 1998, there were a total of 27 impeachment proceedings opened against judges. Between 1998 and 
2005, the CDA recommended impeachment proceedings in 27 cases, 18 of which lead to the plenary deciding 
to open proceedings before the FIJ.  
67 La Nación, ‘Renunció Nazareno a la Corte Suprema’ La Nación (27 June 2003) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/renuncio-nazareno-a-la-corte-suprema-nid507030> accessed 20 September 
2019; Clarín, ‘Guillermo López Renunció como Ministro de la Corte Suprema’ Clarín (23 October 2003) 
<www.clarin.com/ultimo-momento/guillermo-lopez-renuncio-ministro-corte-suprema_0_B1go5kl0tg.html> 
accessed 20 September 2019; La Nación, ‘La Corte Confirmo la Remoción de Moliné O’Connor’ La Nación (1 
June 2004) <www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/la-corte-confirmo-la-remocion-de-moline-oconnor-nid606484> 
accessed 20 September 2019; Clarín, ‘Renunció el Juez de la Corte Adolfo Vázquez’ Clarín (1 September 2004) 
<www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores/renuncio-juez-corte-adolfo-vazquez_0_HJ-73AokAKl.html> accessed 20 
September 2019; Gustavo Ybarra, ‘Quinto Cambio en la Corte: Destituyeron a Boggiano’ La Nación (29 
September 2005) <www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/quinto-cambio-en-la-corte-destituyeron-a-boggiano-
nid742932> accessed 20 September 2019; ‘The Economist, ‘Argentina: Another Wig Falls: The Removal of a 
Fifth Supreme Court Judge Threatens the Separation of Powers’ The Economist (Buenos Aires, 6 October 2005). 
68 Lower-court federal judges had previously been subject to impeachment proceedings before the legislature in 
the same way as Supreme Court judges and other figures of government.  
69 Alejandra B Petrella, ‘Introducción’ in Alejandra B Petrella (ed), El Consejo de la Magistratura: Abordaje Crítico y 
Sistémico desde Diversas Perspectivas (Editorial Jusbaires 2016) 13. 
70 Diputados, Diario de Sesiones de la Convención Constituyente de 1994, 2210 (can be downloaded here: 
<www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/Debate-constituyente.htm> accessed 6 August 2019); Roth (n Error! 
Bookmark not defined.) 289. 
71 Enrique Paixao, speaking at the 1994 Sessions of the Constituent Convention, explains the justification given for 
the creation of the FJC: ‘The Argentinean society wants more transparency in the appointment of its judges, 
more efficiency in the removal of magistrates who have proven acts of misconduct, and more trustworthiness 
in the administration of the judicial task whilst judges carry out their specific function, which is to resolve 
contentious cases. The important judicial reform that the project in consideration contains, aims at these 
objectives.’ Diputados, Diario de Sesiones de la Convención Constituyente de 1994, 2209 (can be downloaded 
here: <www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/Debate-constituyente.htm> accessed 6 August 2019); See also 
Roth (n 65) 289. Article 114 of the Constitution that created the FJC also states that one of the responsibilities 
of the FJC is ‘to issue the regulations… that are necessary to ensure the independence of judges’. 
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hoped that by creating bodies that are removed from the politics of the other branches of 
government, the FJC and FIJ would be able to ‘offer greater aptitude and independence, ensuring 
in this way total impartiality to judge’.72 It reflected a belief that ‘the only solution… is the 
creation of an extraordinary tribunal, composed of individuals free of the passions and influences 
of political groups, and capable of feeling the tremendous weight of the functions entrusted to 
them’.73 Indeed, the FJC is now seen as ‘a guaranteeing body of the judiciary: guarantor of its 
independence and of the increased efficiency in the provision of judicial services’.74  
 
However, both the fact that the FJC was the result of a political bargain,75 and that the driving 
force behind its creation was low levels of judicial independence vis-à-vis the executive, 
foreshadowed some of the challenges it would face. Articles 114 and 115 of the constitution 
created the FJC and the FIJ, regulating the powers entrusted to them, however these articles did 
not specify what the precise composition of the council and the jury should be, prescribing only 
that the council will be ‘regulated by a special law sanctioned by the absolute majority of all of 
the members of each legislative house’, leaving them to battle out the details. At the time the 
constitution came into force in 1994, the PJ held the majority in congress, and ‘monolithic party 
control’ and intense disagreement between the parties as to the composition of the council 
prevented the FJC from being further regulated until December 1997 when opposition parties 
defeated the PJ in lower house elections, and law 24,937 was passed.76 The FJC started working 
in November 1998, four years after the constitutional reform. In the interim, there had been no 
official mechanism for appointing judges to fill any vacancies in the judiciary.77 
 
2.2.2 The Nature and Composition of the FJC 
The FJC is responsible, amongst other things, for investigating complaints against judges, for 
imposing administrative sanctions, and for deciding whether or not to start removals proceedings 
                                                 
72 Eduardo Fernando Luna, ‘El Juicio Político’ in Pérez Guilhou et al, Atribuciones del Congreso Argentino (Instituto 
Argentino de Estudios Constitucionales y Políticos - Depalma 1986) 539. 
73 José Manuel Estrada, Curso de Derecho Constitucional, tomo 3 (Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco 
1902) 268. 
74 Petrella (n 69) 11.  
75 Roth (n 65) 290. 
76 Law 24,937, Consejo de la Magistratura: Creación y Funcionamiento (BO del 06/01/1998); Bill Chávez (n 49), 40. 
77 Adrián Ventura, ‘Se Elegirá El Primer Juez Federal Desde 1994’ La Nación (11 June 2000) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/se-elegira-el-primer-juez-federal-desde-1994-nid24319> accessed 1 September 
2019.  
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before the FIJ. The recognition of the JC’s role in holding the judiciary to account in this way 
fuelled two of the main controversies surrounding the creation and regulation of the FJC. First 
was the debate as to whether FJC is part of the judiciary or whether it is a separate body that 
does not belong to one of the three powers of the state, which mirrored, from an institutional 
perspective, concerns about threats to judicial independence. Whilst some maintain that the FJC 
is an administrative body that does not fall within one of the three branches of government, 
commentators ultimately reached the conclusion that the FJC is in fact institutionally part of the 
judiciary,78 and as such does not represent a threat to judicial independence from an institutional 
design perspective,  
 
The second controversy was the debate about the ideal composition of the council. The 
Constitution only states (in its article 114) that the council ‘will be periodically composed in a way 
that ensures the equilibrium between the representation of the political bodies resulting from 
popular election, of judges of all instances, and of federally-registered lawyers. It will also be 
composed by other persons of the scientific and academic sphere, in the number and form 
indicated by law.’ This has led to continued debate and reform of law 24,937 that regulated the 
council. The original composition of the FJC was of 19 councillors, including 5 judges, 8 legislators 
(4 congressmen/women, and 4 senators), 4 lawyers, 1 academic, and 1 representative of the 
executive. This was modified by a controversial reform in 2006 that reduced the number of 
councillors to 13, including 3 judges, 6 legislators (3 congressmen/women, and 3 senators), 2 
lawyers, 1 academic, and 1 representative of the executive.79 This change meant that politicians 
went from having 9 out of 19 seats, to holding 7 out of 13 seats, and was seen as an attempt by 
the government to encroach upon the independence of the judiciary.80 A change in the quorum 
for meetings from 12 to 7 also meant that the political councillors now held a veto power if they 
chose to simply not attend a session.81  
                                                 
78 Petrella, (n 69) 10. 
79 Law 26,080, Consejo de la Magistratura (BO del 27/02/2006).  
80 See Comisión Internacional de Juristas, ‘Reforma de Consejo de la Magistratura No Resuelve los Problemas 
Existentes’ (CIJ 16 January 2006) <www.icj.org/es/reforma-de-consejo-de-la-magistratura-no-resuelve-los-
problemas-existentes-2/> accessed 1 September 2019; Hector M Chayer, 'Argentina's Politicians Strengthen 
Their Grip on the Judicial Council' in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007, Corruption in 
Judicial Systems (Cambridge University Press 2007); Daniel Alberto Sabsay and José Miguel Onaindia, La 
Constitución de los Argentinos: Análisis y Comentario de su Texto Luego de la Reforma de 1994’ (7th Edn, 
Errepar 2009).  
81 Article 9 of Law 24,937 as modified by Article 5 of Law 26,080.  
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There are two parts to the debate about the composition of the FJC: the first reflects the concerns 
from an institutional design perspective as to who will best ensure the dual functions of 
protecting both judicial independence and accountability; and the other is who understands 
enough about law, institutional balance and due process in order to be able to properly carry out 
the functions of the FJC. Hammergren argues that this second point is particularly relevant to 
effectively conducting the investigative and disciplinary role, as it requires a great deal of 
‘familiarity with internal operations’ of the judiciary. 82 She explains that it is only with this 
understanding that infractions can be identified, and possible justifications for any breaches 
understood. She also argues that knowledge of investigative techniques, and an understanding 
of the rules of legal evidence are necessary, as well as a clear understanding of the limits of 
judicial responsibility and privileges. She argues that disciplinary functions ‘have no inherently 
logical placement’ in terms of who conducts them, ‘but they do have fairly specific requirement 
as regards those who execute them’ in terms of the skills they require.83 She argues that if these 
functions are conducted by the judiciary, they ‘must… harbour a heavy dose of distance from the 
ordinary workings of the institution’, whilst an external council would need ‘a strong 
identification with the institutional role’ they play.84  
 
When considering the contextual reality in which the JC was introduced in Argentina, however, 
a third axes to this debate can be identified: another reason that the composition may affect 
whether or not the JC can effectively protect judicial independence and accountability is whether 
or not the composition is such that the ‘old vested interests’ affecting the governance of the 
judiciary prior to the introduction of the council can infiltrate the council and implement their 
interests through informal representation on the council.85 Whilst the intention of the creation 
of an external body such as the JC (and the IJ) was to avoid these interests, ‘nothing assures us 
that the members of this “tribunal” cannot be influenced by the different political sectors, or 
[that they will be] free of the passions that politics ignites, in which case this laudable intention 
                                                 
82 Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America (Rule of Law Series, 
Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Number 28, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2002) 28. 
83 Hammergren (n 82) 28-29. 
84 Hammergren (n 82) 29. 
85 Hammergren (n 82) 18. 
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will not stop being an important doctrinal contribution for a reality which could throw it to the 
ground after the first few steps’.86  
 
Hammergren explains that throughout Latin America, ‘disputes over council membership and 
functions have less to do with balancing institutional powers’ and ‘are more directly related to 
neutralizing the social and political groups formerly enjoying privileged access to court 
operations’.87 Who those groups are vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, although there are 
some obvious candidates. Hammergren identifies political parties as ‘often being active here’, 
explaining that ‘it did not take the parties long to understand that if they wanted to keep control 
of “their judges,” they needed to ensure they had their representatives on the council’.88 She 
however also identifies other interest groups that may seek representation on the council such 
as internal factions of the judiciary, which she identifies as potentially being the case on the FJC 
in Argentina at the time she was writing in 2002.89  
 
Hammergren argues that one of the enabling factors for this issue causing problems throughout 
Latin America is that ‘those holding seats on the council are [not]… institutional in their 
perspectives’, and that ‘seats on councils… have become means of advancing positions – often 
those of individual members; less frequently, those of the groups they presumably represent’.90 
Argentinean commentators have echoed these concerns, noting that ‘the nobility of institutions 
necessarily follows the nobility of the men that integrate it’.91 They tie this back to the technical 
debate about composition, and the need for those integrating the council to understand the 
importance of their work to the institutional development of the judiciary as well as maintaining 
the balance of powers between the branches of government. In addition, conducting the work 
of the council ‘requires not only political adaptability, but also a profound knowledge of the law 
                                                 
86 Eduardo Fernando Luna, Congreso y Control: Hacienda Pública, Responsabilidad Política, Estados de Emergencia, 
Relaciones Internacionales y Acuerdos (Jurídicas Cuyo 2007) 130.  
87 Hammergren (n 82) 18. 
88 Hammergren (n 82) 18. 
89 ibid. Although she also notes that ‘no one I interviewed in Argentina was able to provide [a] coherent 
explanation’ of this phenomenon. 
90 Hammergren (n 82) 18. 
91 Petrella (n 69) 15. The word nobility has been used here as a translation of grandeza, which literally means 
something like the level of moral greatness.  
Page 41 of 366 
 
in order to analyse whether men and women of the law merit a judicial position, or whether their 
conduct prevents them from continuing to exercise it.’92 
 
The underlying question here is what duties individual councillors have: whether they have a duty 
to be independent and impartial in their decision making, or whether they have a duty to 
represent the interest of those sectors or interest groups who elected them onto the Council. 
The viewpoint that councillors need legal knowledge to carry out their functions favours a purely 
technical type of accountability whereby it is understood that councillors should take decisions 
based not on the interests of those they represent but rather on purely technical criteria: ‘this 
amounts to being above any biased viewpoint, to with knowledge and a free conscience, without 
any type of pressure, carry out this profound analysis’ of who deserves to be appointed as a 
judge, and who, due to their conduct, should be removed.93  
 
The question however of whether or to what extent councillors represent those who elected 
them is not entirely straightforward. The Constitution sets out that the FJC should be made up of 
‘representatives’ of the judiciary, the legislator, lawyers, and academia. In addition, these 
councillors are elected by their respective peers for a four year period. When a candidate puts 
him or herself forward for election, they set out a vision for how the plan to use their period in 
office, what they hope to achieve. There is therefore some sense that if they are elected they are 
expected to carry out those promises and that they themselves are democratically accountable 
to those that elected them.  
 
A way of marrying up this reality with the need to protect judicial independence and 
accountability in a fair and impartial manner is to view councillors as representing the interests 
of society at large. The nature of the accountability they are responsible for enforcing could 
therefore be portrayed as political in the broadest sense of relating to the public affairs of the 
country, and the interests of the people. The inclusion in this sense of councillors from various 
sectors can be understood as giving a voice to the various stakeholders of judicial services: judges 
themselves, lawyers who plead before the courts, and legislators who in a system of 
representative democracy represent the people who are the users of the court services. The 
                                                 
92 Petrella (n 69) 15-16. 
93 Petrella (n 69) 16. 
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inclusion of representatives from academia can be understood  as taking into account the views 
of experts, but also as a more direct inclusion of the interests civil society.  
 
From this perspective, the benefit of including councillors from various sectors is to be able to 
use different perspectives to inform the best approach to judicial governance. As shall be 
discussed further in Section 3.2, maintaining judicial independence and accountability is an 
ongoing process, and it is important to be informed of the contextual challenges that may arise 
from time to time. Having representation of the points of view of various stakeholders here is an 
advantage. In this sense, councillors can be thought of as representing the views of the sectors 
they pertain to. However, as long as they are voicing views as to how judicial quality and 
impartiality is best achieved, this is not in conflict with judicial independence. How best to 
implement a strategy of judicial governance that balances judicial independence, accountability, 
and ensures good quality of judicial services is no straightforward matter, and there will naturally 
be different views and opinions on how this is best achieved. Representing these views does not 
represent an inherent danger to judicial independence.  
 
This is different to other types of interests that may be informally represented on the council 
such as partisan interests, individual interests, or corporatist judicial interests. The crucial 
difference between such interests and the bona fide interests of stakeholders is that the former 
do not share the aim of ensuring impartial justice. They pursue their own interests that are 
incompatible with the proper aims of the council to protect judicial accountability and judicial 
independence. In this sense, it is important to be aware of a local political context where there 
has been  
a breakdown in the representative base of Congress:… the subjugation of the legislator to 
the directives of the party, depriving him in the facts of his freedom to represent citizens; 
the abuse of inter-party agreements reached outside of the natural field of political 
discussion, which transform Congress into a mere ratifier of the decisions taken outside of 
its sphere; and the relationship of subordination that exist between the congressional 
majority and the head of the ruling party – usually the president of the Nation.94 
                                                 
94 Alfredo M. Vítolo, ‘La Crisis del Sistema Constitucional de Control del Poder’ in Víctor Bazán (Ed), Defensa de la 
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It is important therefore when assessing the work of councils, to identify the interests that 
councillors take into consideration in their decision making. This is based on a recognition that at 
the heart of the local debates around the composition of the council is who gets a voice in the 
actual decision making, and that is what will ultimately impact judicial independence and 
accountability either positively or negatively.  
 
The attempt to curtail such interests overtaking decision-making in judicial councils should not 
however necessarily lead to a rejection of all “political” interest. As noted above, the inclusion of 
a diversity of views in the council may help ensure a type of accountability that responds to users 
of judicial services and effectively tackles contextual challenges as they arise. This recognition is 
not, however, a rejection of a technical approach: for councillors to effectively rise to the 
challenges of judicial governance, an understanding of the work of the judiciary, the need to 
protect judicial independence and the need for accountability is necessary. Evidently a need to 
understand the rules and procedures governing process of selection and removals (that shall be 
discussed in the Section 3.4), as well as an understanding of the importance of due process and 
the need to uphold the rule of law (covered in Section 3.3) is also essential.  
 
This understanding of the role of councillors fits with the role and duties allocated to the JC in 
the process for removing a judge. As shall be seen in Section 3.4, the FJC is the body that receives 
complaints about judges from the public. It has some discretion over whether or not to accept 
the complaint and investigate it. If a complaint is investigated and potential grounds for removal 
are found, the council then decides whether or not to pursue impeachment proceedings against 
a judge before the FIJ. If it decides to go ahead with this, two councillors are then chosen to 
represent the FJC in what can be compared to a prosecutorial role before the FIJ: It is the Council 
that argues for the removal of the judge before a Jury. In this sense, the Council can be 
understood to be representing the views of the state, of the people, and its interest in upholding 
impartial, good quality justice.  
 
It is also important to reflect on the nature, composition, and role of the FIJ. The way it is 
composed gives us some immediate clues in this regard: jurors are selected randomly by way of 
                                                 
Constitución, Garantismo y Controles: Libro en Reconocimiento al Dr Germán J Bidart Campos (Ediar 2003) 197. 
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a raffle and a new jury is selected every 6 months. The Jury is made up in equal parts of judges, 
lawyers, and legislators, but given that they are not elected, cannot be said to represent the 
interests of their sectors in the same manner as councillors. The incorporation of various 
stakeholders in the jury in this case is rather an attempt to ensure a fair trial by ensuring a variety 
of viewpoints reflecting the variety of viewpoints of stakeholders in justice. This is clear not only 
from the way they are elected, but also from the nature of the duties assigned to them: they are 
essential judges of judges in a trial for the removal of a judge. Their role is to consider the 
evidence before them and decide whether or not it merits a removal, considering both the views 
of the council arguing for the removal and the judge’s defence.  
 
Table 1 below sets out the history of the composition of the FJC and the FIJ, including the initial 
composition in 1997, and the current composition following the 2006 reform. It also sets out a 
change that was made to the composition in 2013 as described in Section 2.2.4 below, but that 
was never implemented as it was immediately declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
The composition of the Commission for Discipline and Accusation (CDA) is also included. As shall 
be seen in Section 3.4, the CDA is one of the internal commissions of the FJC that is responsible 
for investigating complaints against judges and therefore plays a crucial role in the removals 
process.  
 
Table 1: Composition of the JC, the CDA, and the IJ at the Federal Level 
 1997-2006 2006-present 2013 (declared 
unconstitutional)  
Judicial Council  19 councillors  
President of the 
Supreme Court plus 
4 federal judges elected 
by the D’Hondt method 
by their peers. To 
include judges from the 
interior, judges of first 
instance, and appeal 
court judges. 
 
4 congressmen/women 
(2 from the majority 
political party, 1 from 
the first minority, 1 
13 councillors 
3 federal judges elected 
by the D’Hondt method 
by their peers. To include 
judges from the interior, 
judges of first instance, 
and appeal court judges. 
 
 
 
 
3 congressmen/women 
(2 from the majority 
political party, 1 from the 
first minority) 
19 councillors  
3 federal judges, 
‘elected by the people 
of the nation by way of 
universal suffrage’ (2 
representatives from 
the winning list, from 
the list in second place) 
 
 
 
3 congressmen/women 
(2 from the majority 
political party, 1 from 
the first minority) 
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from the second 
minority) 
 
4 senators (2 from the 
majority political party, 
1 from the first 
minority, 1 from the 
second minority) 
 
4 lawyers (registered as 
federal lawyers, 
including lawyers from 
the interior, elected by 
the D’Hondt method by 
their peers) 
 
 
 
1 representative of the 
Executive  
 
1 academic (Professor 
of Law at a National 
University, elected by 
peers)  
 
 
 
 
 
3 senators (2 from the 
majority political party, 1 
from the first minority) 
 
 
 
2 lawyers (registered as 
federal lawyers, including 
1 lawyer resident in the 
interior, elected by their 
peers) 
 
 
 
 
1 representative of the 
Executive  
 
1 academic (Professor of 
Law at a National 
University with a ‘well-
known and prestigious 
career’, elected by an 
absolute majority of the 
members of the National 
Inter-University Council)  
 
 
 
 
3 senators (2 from the 
majority political party, 
1 from the first 
minority) 
 
 
3 lawyers (registered as 
federal lawyers, ‘elected 
by the people of the 
nation by way of 
universal suffrage’. 2 
representatives from 
the winning list, 2 from 
the list in second place) 
 
1 representative of the 
Executive  
 
6 academics with an 
‘ample and well-known 
career’, from any 
academic discipline 
officially recognised, 
‘elected by the people 
of the nation by way of 
universal suffrage’. 4 
representatives from 
the winning list, 2 from 
the list in second place 
Commission for 
Discipline and 
Accusations  
Commission for 
Accusations 
Composed of a majority 
of congressmen/women 
9 councillors 
2 judges 
2 congressmen/women 
2 senators 
1 lawyer 
1 academic 
1 representative of the 
executive 
All councillors will be 
elected by the plenary of 
the JC for a period of one 
year, and can be re-
elected once. 
 
11 councillors 
2 judges 
3 legislators 
2 lawyers 
3 academics 
1 representative of the 
executive 
Impeachment 
Jury 
9 jurors 
3 judges (one Supreme 
Court Justice elected by 
7 jurors 
2 appeal-court judges 
(one from the interior, 
No modification 
Page 46 of 366 
 
peers, 2 appeal court 
judges elected by peers 
 
2 Senators (one from 
the political majority, 
one from the first 
minority) 
 
1 congressman/woman 
elected by majority of 
votes 
 
 
3 federally-registered 
lawyers, 2 
representatives of the 
Federal Law Society, 
one representing the 
Law Society of the 
Federal Capital 
 
one from the Federal 
Capital) 
 
2 Senators (one from the 
political majority, one 
from the first minority) 
 
 
2 congressmen/women 
(one from the political 
majority, one from the 
first minority) 
 
1 federally-registered 
lawyer (who fulfils the 
criteria to be a judge of 
the Supreme Court) 
 
 
2.2.3 Continued Lack of Judicial Independence Following the Introduction of the FJC 
 
Although there are some disparities between the statistics available on the state of the judiciary 
in 2014, there was a general consensus that corruption and a lack of independence were 
problematic. The statistics are all on a national level, and therefore give us a broad indication of 
the state of the judiciary in Argentina, without highlighting any differences that are likely to exist 
between the judiciary at the federal and provincial levels.95 Argentina scored 2.6 out of 7 for 
judicial independence in the 2012 Global Competitiveness Index, ranking 133rd out of 144 
countries.96 According to Transparency International’s 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, 65% of 
respondents in Argentina viewed their judiciary as ‘corrupt’ or ‘extremely corrupt’.97 This figure 
                                                 
95 Differences in levels of judicial independence in the three jurisdictions studied here, and the impact this may 
have on removals processes is explored further in the findings chapters 5, 6, and 7, using the data collected by 
way of interviews.  
96 Klaus Schwab (ed) The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013: Full Data Edition (The Global Benchmarking 
Network, World Economic Forum 2012) 91, <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2012-
2013/> accessed 20 Aril 2019. 
97 Transparency International, ‘Global Corruption Barometer 2013: National Results for Argentina’ 
<www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=argentina> accessed 20 April 2019; Deborah Hardoon and 
Finn Heinrich, Global Corruption Barometer 2013 (Transparency International 2013) 35; the complete data set 
for the 2010/11 Global Corruption Barometer (tabs 1b and 1c) downloaded from 
<www.transparency.org/gcb201011/in_detail> accessed 20 April 2019. 
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was up by 10% from the 2010 Global Corruption Barometer, where 55% of respondents in 
Argentina viewed their judiciary as corrupt. On a scale from 1 to 5 (5 being highly corrupt), the 
perception in 2012 was that the level of corruption in the judiciary was 3.9, an increase from 3.7 
in 2010.  
 
However, in the Rule of Law Index prepared by The World Justice Project, Argentina scored 0.63 
on a scale from 0 to 1 for ‘government officials in the judicial branch do not use public office for 
private gain’.98 This difference with Transparency International’s findings may reflect a difference 
that the WJP draws between corruption of the justice system on the one hand, and a justice 
system free of improper government influence on the other. Therefore, in the same study, 
Argentina scored 0.62 for ‘civil justice is free of corruption’, but only 0.45 for ‘civil justice is free 
of improper government influence’. In terms of criminal justice, it scored 0.59 for ‘criminal system 
is impartial’, 0.59 for ‘criminal system is free of corruption’, 0.58 for ‘due process of law and rights 
of the accused’, and only 0.46 for ‘criminal system is free of improper government influence’. 
Whilst clearly corruption appears to be a problem,99 from these indices, independence from 
government appears to be at the heart of the issue.  
 
This distrust of the courts should be understood within the context of broader distrust of the 
government in general. Argentina scored 1.7 out of 7 for ‘public trust in politicians’ in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2012-13, ranking 143rd out of 144 countries.100 
This is particularly relevant given Argentina’s political system that had been described as ‘hyper-
presidentialism’ with fears being voice of an executive that was attempting to accumulate 
power.101 In this regard, the results of the WJP Rule of Law Index 2012-2013 are also instructive. 
                                                 
98 ‘The Rule of Law Index 2012-2013 Dataset’ (The World Justice Project, 2012-13) downloaded from 
<http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index> on 21 July 2013. The World Justice Project, The Rule of Law 
Index 2012-2013, 
<https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_Index_Report_2012.pdf> 20 April 2019. 
99 These statistics are aggregated indicators of corruption that consider a range of primary sources with weighted 
results and estimated error margins. Although the helpfulness of these indicators is not doubted, they have 
been criticised for potentially being too far removed from reality. See for example: M Bertrand and S 
Mullainathan, ‘Do People Mean What They Say?: Implications For Subjective Survey Data’ (2001) 91(2) 
American Economic Review 67; D Kaufmann, A Kraay and M Mastruzzi, ‘Measuring Corruption: Myths and 
Realities’ (2006) September Vol Development Outreach 124. 
100 Schwab (n 96). 
101 Paul C Sondrol, ‘Intellectuals, Political Culture and the Roots of the Authoritarian Presidency in 
Latin America’ (1990) 3(4) Governance 416; Carlos Santiago Nino, ‘El Hiper-Presidencialismo Argentino y las 
Concepciones de la Democracia’ in Carlos Santiago Nino and others, El Presidencialismo Puesto a Prueba 
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Argentina scored 0.46 out of 1 for ‘limited government powers’.102 Breaking this data down 
further, Argentina scored only 0.26 for ‘government officials are sanctioned for misconduct’, and 
0.39 for ‘government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary’, although it appears that 
government powers are limited slightly more by independent auditing, the legislature, and non-
governmental checks (it scored around the 0.5 mark for these three criteria).103  
 
In spite of this, there have been examples of the judiciary, and in particular the Federal Supreme 
Court, standing up to the executive. One such high profile case with particular relevance here is 
the dispute between the government and media conglomerate Clarín Group (Clarín) about a Law 
on Audiovisual Communication Services (‘Media Law’)104 that was passed in 2009. The Media Law 
purportedly promoted fair competition and plurality of opinion in the media industry by way of 
its antitrust provisions, limiting the number of radio and television licenses that a private or not-
for-profit entity can hold.105 It also put in place a ban on owning both a satellite broadcast channel 
and a nation-wide cable-distribution network.106  
 
Clarín, who are critical of the government in their reporting, argued that the law was directly 
aimed at shutting it down107 and giving the government undue control over the media.108 This 
                                                 
(Centro de Estudios Constitucionales 1992); Matthew S Shugart and Scott Mainwaring, ‘Presidentialism and 
Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate’ in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S Shugart 
(eds), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (CUP 1997); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Diane A Desierto and 
Natalia Volosin, ‘Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers Without Checks and Balances in Argentina and 
the Philippines’ (2011) 29(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law. 
102 Mark David Agrast and others, WJP Rule of Law Index 2012-2013 (The World Justice Project 2012-13) 61. 
103 ‘The Rule of Law Index 2012-2013 dataset’ (The World Justice Project 2012-13) downloaded from 
<http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index> 21 July 2013. 
104 Law 26,522, Regúlanse los Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual en todo el ámbito territorial de la República 
Argentina (BO del 10/10/2009). 
105 Article 45(1)(c), Law 26,522.  
106 Article 45(1)(a), Law 26,522. 
107 Michael Warren, ‘Argentina Gives Opposition Media Dec 7 Deadline’ Huffington Post (Buenos Aires, 22 
September 2012) <www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120922/lt-argentina-media-law/> accessed 7 
December 2012; Editorial, ‘Argentina’s Media: Messenger Shot – The Government Prepares to Grab a Television 
Empire’ The Economist (Buenos Aires, 1 December 2012) <www.economist.com/news/americas/21567387-
government-prepares-grab-television-empire-messenger-shot> accessed 22 July 2013; Jude Webber, ‘Argentina 
Starts Break Up of Clarín’ Financial Times (Buenos Aires, 17 December 2012) <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b6084f4a-
4876-11e2-a6b3-00144feab49a.html#axzz2RlbmjADp> accessed 27 April 2013; See also 
<www.grupoclarin.com/escalada.html> accessed 23 July 2013, which is a page on Clarín Group’s website 
entitled ‘La Escalada Oficial Contra Los Medios’. It presents a very detailed timeline of the dispute between 
Clarín and the government from 2008 to 2014.  
108 It would not be first time that a private journalistic entity is taken over by the Argentine government: Peron’s 
government put pressure on La Prensa, one of the most widely circulated daily newspaper of the time, and 
ultimately seized it in April 1951, returning it to its original owners only five years later when its readership had 
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was particularly so ahead of the 2015 presidential elections, when, rumour had it, President 
Fernández wanted to modify the constitution in order to permit her to run for president for the 
third time consecutively.109 Clarín also argued that the limits established in the law were 
discriminatory as they did not apply to state-owned broadcasting entities. The law was also to 
apply retroactively, which Clarín argued was unconstitutional. Clarín secured an injunction to 
delay the application of the law to them until its constitutionality was decided.110 The 
government, who claimed that Clarín were trying to buy time and continued influence over public 
opinion in the run-up to the next elections, fought the injunction and the issue was taken to the 
Supreme Court.111 Significant government pressure was publicly placed on judges, and pro-
government civil society campaigners threatened to occupy the courts were they to rule in favour 
of the injunction.112  
 
The case gave rise to many problems in the judiciary with the first judge, Raúl Tettamanti, 
resigning under pressure from the government,113 and the second judge, Roberto Torti, being 
taken off the case for alleged bias against the government.114 An investigation by the Inter 
American Press Association concluded that the government was arbitrarily awarding lucrative 
publicity contracts to pro-government media,115 that the government was involved in 
                                                 
been largely lost. See ‘Our History’ La Prensa <www.laprensa.com.ar/historia.aspx> accessed 27 July 2013.  
109 La Nación, ‘Cristina Quiere el Poder Total y si Pudiera, la Recontra Re-Reelección’ La Nación (2 March 2013) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/1559510-larreta> accessed 27 July 2013.  
110 Adrián Ventura, ‘Suspendió un Juez la Aplicación de la Ley de Medios’ La Nación (17 December 2009) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/suspendio-un-juez-la-aplicacion-de-la-ley-de-medios-nid1212619> accessed 23 
August 2019.  
111 Grupo Clarín SA y Otros s/ Medidas Cautelares, Fallos 335:705. For a timeline of all of the judicial decisions 
leading up to this Supreme Court Decision, see Centro de Información Judicial, ‘Ley de Medios: La Corte Precisó 
el Plazo de Vigencia de la Medida que Suspendió el Article 161’ (Centro de Información Judicial, 23 May 2012) 
<www.cij.gov.ar/nota-9152-Ley-de-medios--la-Corte-precis--el-plazo-de-vigencia-de-la-medida-que-suspendi--
el-art-culo-161.html> accessed 23 August 2019. The application injunction was subsequently further extended 
until the Supreme Court issued their final ruling on the constitutionality of the media law; La Nación, ‘La 
Cámara Extendió la Cautelar en Favor del Grupo Clarín Hasta que Haya “Sentencia Definitiva”’ La Nación (6 
December 2012) <www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/la-camara-extendio-la-cautelar-en-favor-del-grupo-clarin-
hasta-que-haya-sentencia-definitiva-nid1534053> accessed 23 August 2019. 
112 La Gaceta, ‘Los Jueces de la Corte son Presionables’ La Gaceta (10 January 2013) 
<www.lagaceta.com/nota/528584/politica/jueces-corte-son-presionableshtml> accessed 24 July 2013.  
113 La Nación, ‘Bajo Presión Oficial, Se Fue El Juez Que Debía Resolver El Caso Clarín’ La Nación (10 October 2012) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/1515820-bajo-presion-oficial-se-fue-el-juez-que-debia-resolver-el-caso-clarin> accessed 
1 August 2013.  
114 Public Relations Secretary of the President of the Nation, ‘Ley de Medios: Alak anunció que el Estado recusará al 
juez Roberto Torti’ Sala de Prensa (12 October 2012) <www.prensa.argentina.ar/2012/10/12/34926-ley-de-
medios-alak-anuncio-que-el-estado-recusara-al-juez-roberto-torti.php> accessed 1 August 2013.  
115 Despite a 2009 Supreme Court ruling against the government for bias in allocating ads: Committee to Protect 
Journalists, ‘Supreme Court Tells Argentina to Avoid Bias in Allocating Ads’ (Committee to Protect Journalists, 
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propaganda to discredit independent media outlets, and that the legislature was involved in 
putting pressure on the judiciary to uphold the government’s position in its legal battles with 
Clarín.116  
 
It should be noted that the text of the Media Law was celebrated by many as exemplary for the 
protection and diversification of free speech.117 As was the case with the introduction of the FJC, 
the problem was not the text of the law itself but a fear that it would be abused as an instrument 
of power, in this case to eliminate dissident voices. The Media Law was ultimately declared 
constitutional by the Supreme Court, although the ruling did highlight the need to protect the 
ownership rights of license holders by way of indemnification, as well as underlying the need for 
the law to be applied in an independent manner that respects equality and due process.118  
 
2.2.4 The “Democratisation” of the Judiciary  
 
In 2013, in the context of the confrontation between the judiciary and the executive over the 
Clarín case, a six-bill package was submitted to Congress by President Fernández with a proposal 
to make substantial changes to the judiciary and the FJC.119 The bills were quickly approved by 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate120 due to the majority that Fernández’s Front for Victory 
                                                 
New York, 4 March 2011) <http://cpj.org/2012/02/attacks-on-the-press-in-2011-argentina.php> accessed 22 
July 2013. See also Editorial Perfil SA y otro c/ EN Jefatura Gabinete de Ministros SMC s/ Amparo Ley 16.986, 
Fallos 334: 109. 
116 Resolución ‘Argentina I’, Asamblea 2013, Reunión de Medio Año, Puebla, México (Sociedad Interamericana de 
Prensa) <www.sipiapa.org/asamblea/argentina-i-34/> accessed 23 July 2013; Resolución ‘Argentina II’, 
Asamblea 2013, Reunión de Medio Año, Puebla, México (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) 
<www.sipiapa.org/asamblea/argentina-ii-37/> accessed 23 July 2013.  
117 It was hailed a ‘very good’ law that should serve as a ‘model’ for the rest of Latin America and the world by UN 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression and opinion at the 
time, Frank la Rue. Télam, ‘Para la ONU, la Ley de Medios argentina "es una de las más avanzadas del 
continente"’ (Youtube, 15 October 2012) <https://youtu.be/OKyUd7rfXvE> accessed 23 August 2019.  
118 Grupo Clarín SA y otros c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional y otro s/acción meramente declarativa, Fallos: 336:1774. 
119 The President announced this in an official statement held at the Casa Rosada in Buenos Aires on 8 April 2013. 
See La Nación, ‘La Presidenta Anunció la Reforma Judicial: “No Es Politización de la Justicia”’ La Nación (8 April 
2013) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1570790-la-presidenta-anuncia-el-proyecto-de-reforma-judicial> accessed 21 July 
2013.  
120 Law 26,854, Medidas Cautelares en las causas en las que es parte o interviene el estado Nacional. Procesos 
excluidos (BO del 30/04/2013); Law 26.853, Créanse Cámaras Federales de Casación (BO del 17/05/2013); Law 
26,857, Ética en el ejercicio de la función pública (BO del 23/05/2013); and Law 26,856, Justicia, Publicación 
Integra de Acordadas y Resoluciones, (BO del 23/05/2013); Law 26.855, Consejo de la Magistratura (BO del 
27/05/2013); Law 26,861, Justicia, Ingreso Democrático e Igualitario de Personal (BO del 03/06/2013). See also 
La Nación, ‘Diputados Aprobó Tres Proyectos Complementarios de la Reforma Judicial’ La Nación (17 April 2013) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/1573773-diputados-reforma-judicial> accessed 21 July 2013; La Nación, ‘Escándalo, 
Gritos y Forcejos en la Aprobación de la Reforma del Consejo de la Magistratura en Diputados’ La Nación (25 
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held at the time in both houses.121 The new laws made sweeping changes to the FJC with the aim 
of “democratising” the judiciary, using low levels of trust in the judiciary to claim that it was out 
of touch with Argentine society.122 The new laws also changed the composition of the FJC to 19 
members, including 3 judges, 3 federal lawyers, 6 academics (not necessarily legal academics), 6 
legislators and a representative of the executive. The biggest novelty however was that the 
councillors that are judges, federal lawyers and academics, would be elected by direct universal 
suffrage at the same time as the presidential elections, and that councillors would therefore have 
to be backed by a political party.123  
 
These changes meant that in almost all cases, the majority of the FJC would be of the same 
political party as the President, which critics argued gave the Fernández government undue 
powers over the make-up of the FJC and therefore the judiciary.124 The reforms were heavily 
criticised by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,125 who 
stated that the provisions of the proposals that provide for partisan election of councillors are 
contrary to Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights126 that sets out 
the right to a fair trial, and to the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.127 The 
                                                 
April 2013) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1576086-diputados-media-sancion-consejo-de-la-magistratura> accessed 
21 July 2013; La Nación, ‘El Kirchnerismo Logró Aprobar la Ley que Reforma el Consejo de la Magistratura’ La 
Nación (8 May 2013) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1579972-sesion-en-el-senado-por-la-reforma-judicial> accessed 
21 July 2013.  
121 La Nación, ‘Trámite Exprés: el Kirchnerismo Aprobó el Blanqueo y la Reforma Judicial en 50 días’ La Nación (30 
May 2013) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1586871-tramite-expres-el-kirchnerismo-aprobo-el-blanqueo-y-la-reforma-
judicial-en-50-dias> accessed 22 July 2013.  
122 President Fernández, ‘Plan Para la Democratización de la Justicia’ (Casa Rosada, Presidencia de la Nación, 9 April 
2013) <www.casarosada.gob.ar/informacion/archivo/26421-plan-para-la-democratizacion-de-la-
justiciapalabras-de-al-presidenta> accessed 1 September 2019.  
123 Articles 2 and 4, Law 26,855, Consejo de la Magistratura (BO del 27/05/ 2013). 
124 Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia, ‘Reforma Consejo de la Magistratura’ ACIJ (19 April 2013) 
<http://acij.org.ar/blog/2013/04/19/reforma-consejo-de-la-magistratura-2/> accessed 1 May 2014; Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Argentina: Reject Interference with Judicial Independence’ (HRW 24 April 2014) 
<www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/24/argentina-reject-interference-judicial-independence> accessed 1 September 
2019; International Bar Association, ‘Argentina’s Controversial Judicial Reform of Great Concern to IBAHRI’ (IBA 
18 June 2013) <www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=fc38cc3e-9897-46e7-b754-03820effbb33> 
accessed 1 September 2019; The Economist, ‘Power in Argentina: Now for the Courts – Cristina Fernández Tries 
to Tame an Independent Corner of Government’ The Economist (Buenos Aires, 27 April 2013) 
<www.economist.com/news/americas/21576722-cristina-fern-ndez-tries-tame-independent-corner-
government-now-courts> accessed 21 July 2013. 
125 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Argentina/Judicial Reform: UN Expert Calls 
for Guarantees and Respect for the Independence of the Judiciary’ (Press Release, Geneva, 30 April 2013) 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13275&LangID=E> accessed 21 July 2013.  
126 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 
UNTS 407, entered into force 23 March 1976. 
127 United Nations Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, GA Res 40/32, UN GAOR 40th Sess, Supp 
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Argentine government responded that the Special Rapporteur’s comments had been made 
before she received a reply from the Argentine government, and claimed that her conclusions 
showed ‘ignorance or political partisanship’.128   
 
A representative for one of the main opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies (the CC ARI), 
Elisa Carrió, went as far as to claim that if the new laws were enforced, they would change the 
nature of the country from a republic to a ‘constitutional dictatorship’ and that it would be ‘the 
end of the rule of law’.129 She appealed to the OAS to review the matter.130 The Association of 
Magistrates and Civil Servants of the National Judiciary filed a writ of amparo before the court of 
the national electoral assembly for unconstitutionality of some of the new laws.131 In addition, 
many other judges’ and lawyers’ groups also brought claims before various courts requesting 
declarations of unconstitutionality and injunctions prohibiting the application of the laws, in 
particular law 26,855 that changed the composition of the FJC.132  
 
The courts ultimately declared four of the articles of law 26,855, along with decree 577/13, 
unconstitutional.133 The changes to the composition of the FJC and the ways in which councillors 
were to be elected were therefore never enforced. Whilst this outcome protected the FJC in this 
                                                 
No 53, at 205, UN Doc A/40/53 (1985) and GA Res 40/146, UN GAOR 40th Sess, Supp No 53 at 254, UN Doc 
A/40/53(1985). 
128 MercoPress, ‘Argentina Openly Clashes with UN Over the Judicial Reform; Calls Rapporteur “Ignorant”’ 
MercoPress (Montevideo, 1 May 2013) < http://en.mercopress.com/2013/05/01/argentina-openly-clashes-
with-un-over-the-judicial-reform-calls-rapporteur-ignorant> accessed 21 July 2013.  
129 Elisa Carrió, Speech to the Chamber of Deputies on 23 April 2013 (Todo Noticias, 23 April 2013) 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=IyaKH9CDK6o> accessed 3 August 2019.  
130 Elisa Carrió, Letter to the Secretary General of the Organisation of American States, Mr José Miguel Insulza (22 
April 2013) downloaded from <www.scribd.com/doc/137534890/Escrito-Ante-La-Oea-23-04-13#download> on 
21 July 2013. See also La Nación, ‘Elisa Carrió Denunció Ante la OEA que la “Institucionalidad Democratica” Está 
en Peligro’ La Nación (23 April 2013) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1575489-elisa-carrio-denuncio-ante-la-oea-que-la-
institucionalidad-democratica-esta-en-peligro> accessed 28 July 2019.  
131 Luis Maria Cabral and Gregorio Corach, ‘Comunicado No 087/2013’ (Asociación de Magistrados y Funcionarios 
de la Justicia Nacional, Buenos Aires, 27 May 2013) <www.amfjn.org.ar/comunicados/comunicado-n%C2%BA-
0872013> accessed 21 July 2013.  
132 La Nación, ‘Presentan por lo Menos 16 Acciones Judiciales Contra la Reforma del Consejo’ La Nación (28 May 
2013) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1586191-presentan-por-lo-menos-16-acciones-judiciales-contra-la-reforma-del-
consejo> accessed 22 July 2013; Adrián Ventura, ‘Se Multiplican los Fallos en Contra de la Reforma del Consejo 
de la Magistratura’ La Nación (6 June 2013) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1589096-se-multiplican-los-fallos-en-
contra-de-la-reforma-del-consejo-de-la-magistratura> accessed 3 August 2019.  
133 Rizzo, Jorge Gabriel (apoderado Lista 3 Gente de Derecho) s/ acción de amparo c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 
Fallos: 336:760. See also Centro de Información Judicial, ‘Reforma Judicial: Fallos de la Jueza Federal María 
Servini de Cubría’ (Centro de Información Judicial, 11 June 2013) <https://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-11636-Reforma-
judicial--fallos-de-la-jueza-federal -Maria-Servini-de-Cubria.html> accessed 23 August 2019 for the text of the 
original lower-court decision in this case.  
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instance, it should be noted that Justice Zaffaroni controversially voted against the 
unconstitutionality of law 26,855. His reasons were that the constitutional provisions regulating 
the FJC had been drafted hastily and were vague thus allowing for any de jure government to 
make changes. He therefore did not deem the changes unconstitutional, but stressed the need 
for a rethink of the constitutional provisions regulating the FJC in order to protect it from future 
attacks of this kind.134   
 
2.2.5 The Removal and Lack of Removal of Judges  
Within this context of attempts to bring the FJC under government control, it is interesting to 
look at the achievements of the FJC, as it could be argued that its controversy and the 
government’s attempts to control it meant that it was, to some degree at least, effectively 
protecting the processes from the legislature and the executive.135 The statistics show that 
between 1999 and 2013, the CDA proposed the removal of 39 judges, 17 of whom were 
ultimately removed by the FIJ and 9 of whom resigned upon the FJC deciding to bring proceedings 
before the FIJ.136 Of the remainder, 8 proposals were rejected by the plenary of the FJC and 5 
were rejected by the FIJ.137 This can be compared to a total of 24 impeachment proceedings 
against federal judges in the national Congress between 1853 and 2016, resulting in 18 removals 
and 6 acquittals, and 12 impeachment proceedings against judges during the de facto regimes 
(1966-1973 and 1976-1983), resulting in 9 removals and 3 acquittals.138  
These statistics, however, cannot tell us much about the efficiency of the removals process as 
they do not give any indication as to whether the removals processes that did take place were 
fair, or whether there are other judges who should be removed but are being protected. It is 
however notable that of the 22 judges that the FJC accused before the FIJ between 1999 and 
2013, 16 were before the 2006 reform of the FJC, and only 6 were between 2006 and 2014, 
                                                 
134 ibid. 
135 Jan van Zyl Smit, Judicial Appointments in Latin America: The Implications of Tenure and Appointments Processes 
(Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law 2016), para 121.  
136 Consejo de la Magistratura, Poder Judicial de la Nación, ‘Memoria Anual 2013’ (Consejo de la Magistratura) 
<www.consejomagistratura.gov.ar/biblioteca_digital/memorias/Memoria%202013.pdf> accessed 23 August 
2019. 
137 ibid.  
138 Alfonso Santiago, ‘Estudio Sobre la Remoción de Jueces Federales en la Argentina’ (Universidad Austral 2016) 
<www.austral.edu.ar/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Informe-Completo-Jueces-en-el-Banquillo.pdf> accessed 
23 August 2019. 
Page 54 of 366 
 
indicating that it may have become more difficult to achieve a consensus in the plenary of the 
FJC about the need to remove a judge under the new composition of the FJC following the 2006 
reform.139 This warrants further investigation as where it is due to corrupt judges being 
protected, or a lack of efficient investigations, it would be detrimental to judicial independence 
and accountability.  
Within this context is should be highlighted that the media and non-governmental organisations 
have publicly highlighted several cases of high profile judges that were suspected of corruption 
escaping removals proceedings. The most well-known example of this is Oyarbide, a (now 
former) judge at the Federal Criminal and Correctional Court, who presided over many high 
profile cases of public sector corruption. He was appointed in the early 1990s by former President 
Menem, and was accused of covering up public sector corruption first by the Menem and then 
the Kirchner governments. He amassed 47 complaints against him for malperformance, but the 
complaints against him in the FJC never proceeded to a removals process before an IJ. 
One complaint was even made to the FJC by the Federal Court of Appeal who had removed 
Oyarbide from a money laundering case in 2014. In that case, Oyarbide had dismissed the 
allegations against some of the accused of laundering profits made from the illegal sale of 
medication, and linked to the financing of the 2007 electoral campaigns of the Frente para la 
Victoria party, even though the case had been passed onto another judge that was investigating 
connected cases.140 Oyarbide was also called into question for the speed at which he ruled in 
favour of the Kirchners in a case for illicit enrichment, and has subsequently claimed that he was 
pressured by an ex-spy and a member of the National General Audit Office.  
 
The controversy surrounding Oyarbide has a long history: before the FJC took over the removals 
processes, the Congress decided to request Oyarbide’s removal in an impeachment process 
before the legislature, but the Senate voted – in a secret session on the evening of the 11 
September 2001 – to dismiss this request.141 The so-called “Spartacus” case involved Oyarbide 
                                                 
139 ibid.  
140 La Nación, ‘La Cámara Federal Denunció al Juez Norberto Oyarbide y lo Separó de la Investigación de la Mafia de 
los Medicamentos’ La Nación (2 September 2014) <www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/la-camara-federal -denuncio-
al-juez-norberto-oyarbide-y-lo-separo-de-la-investigacion-de-la-mafia-de-los-medicamentos-nid1723805> 
accessed 11 June 2019. 
141 Daniel Santoro, ‘La Protección Política al Magistrado Más Polémico: Oyarbide, el Juez que Exhibe el Récord de 
Pedidos de Destitución’ Clarín (2 September 2014) <www.clarin.com/opinion/oyarbide-
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being secretly filmed at a gay brothel in Buenos Aires, and claims that he was paid for facilitating 
police protection for the brothel.142 Ultimately, in April 2016, Oyarbide resigned, purportedly 
within an hour of hearing that the CDA planned to present a motion to start removals 
proceedings against him to the plenary of the FJC.143 In 2016 he was investigated for illicit 
enrichment.144  
 
Whilst the case of Oyarbide does not tell us whether other judges are being protected against 
removal, the fact that it can occur so publicly in a high profile case of a judge suspected of 
covering up governmental corruption is alarming and raises questions about whether or not the 
removals process is protecting judicial independence and accountability in practice.  
 
2.3 The Creation of the ACBA Judiciary 
 
The ACBA had historically been run as a municipality under national law, and all legal matters 
were resolved by the national courts. The Mayor of Buenos Aires was appointed directly by the 
President of the Nation, and whilst there was a small City Council, it did not have the same power 
or status as provincial legislatures. Buenos Aires gained greater autonomy under the 1994 
constitution,145 which lead to the setting up of an autonomous government,146 and the adoption 
of its own constitution in 1996. The autonomy of the City was however limited by the so-called 
                                                 
pedidos_de_juicio_politico-denuncias_0_r1GZpgccDXe.html> accessed 3 August 2019; Hernán Cappiello, ‘Piden 
Reflotar la Causa de Spartacus’ La Nación (8 April 2014) <www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/piden-reflotar-la-causa-
de-spartacus-nid1678965> accessed 22 April 2019.  
142 Infobae, ‘Piden que Oyarbide Vaya a Juicio Político por la Causa “Spartacus”’ Infobae (24 April 2014) 
<www.infobae.com/2014/04/24/1559588-piden-que-oyarbide-vaya-juicio-politico-la-causa-spartacus/> 
accessed 22 April 2019.  
143 Lucio Fernández Moores, ‘Turbulencias en la Justicia: Renunció Oyarbide, el Más Cuestionado de los Jueces 
Federales’ Clarín (7 April 2017) <www.clarin.com/politica/renuncio-oyarbide-cuestionado-jueces-federal 
es_0_EJ_BZsJJ-.html> accessed 20 April 2019; Clarín, ‘Decisión: Macri le Aceptó la Renuncia a Oyarbide’ Clarín 
(14 April 2016) <www.clarin.com/politica/Macri-acepto-renuncia-Oyarbide_0_EyGpWkdyW.html> accessed 21 
April 2019.  
144 ‘Imputaron a Oyarbide por Presunto Enriquecimiento Ilícito’ Clarín (12 October 2016) 
<www.clarin.com/politica/Imputaron-Oyarbide-presunto-enriquecimiento-ilicito_0_rycbcynC.html> accessed 
21 April 2019.  
145 Article 129, Const Nacional (Arg). 
146 Law 24,620, known as the ‘Snopek law’, permitted the election of the new head of government and a 60-
member assembly. The assembly met for the first time on 2 August 1996 and declared themselves a 
Constitutional Convention which resulted in the adoption of the Constitution of the City of Buenos Aires on the 
1 October 1996. Law 24,620, Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Elecciones/Estatuto Organizativo (BO del 04/01/1996). 
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‘Cafiero’ law 24,588 of 1995.147 It limited, amongst other things, the city’s legal competencies 
relating to the police, transport, the port, property, and the judiciary.  
 
The jurisdiction of the ACBA judiciary is therefore currently limited to a narrow area of law, and 
the ACBA judiciary is made up of only two branches: the criminal, misdemeanours and petty 
offences courts,148 and the administrative and tax courts. The criminal, misdemeanours and petty 
offences courts are made up of thirty-one courts of first instance, and an appeal court made up 
of nine judges, and three divisions. The administrative and tax courts are made up of twenty-four 
courts of first instance, and an appeal court also made up of nine judges and three divisions.149 
The ACBA judiciary is headed by the Superior Court of Justice which is made up of five justices.150 
 
The ACBA constitution also create the ACBA JC and IJ. Its JC has similar functions to the FJC,151 
but a different composition, being made up of only nine councillors: three representatives of the 
ACBA legislature, 3 ACBA judges, and 3 ACBA-registered lawyers. In contrast to the FJC, there are 
no academics or representatives of the executive. The ACBA IJ is also made up of nine jurors: 3 
legislators, 3 lawyer, and 3 judges, including 1 member of the ACBA Superior Court of Justice. The 
balanced design of the ACBA JC, allowing for equal representation from the three relevant 
sectors, and without any representative of the executive is a sign of the political will that existed 
at the time to design modern and effective institutions.  
 
At the time the interviews for this thesis were conducted, Mauricio Macri (who subsequently 
went on to serve as President of the Nation from 2015 to 2019) was the Governor of the ACBA. 
His PRO party held 28 of the 60 seats in the ACBA legislature at the time. Under his governorship 
                                                 
147 The law was named after Senator Antonio Cafiero who proposed this legislation. Law 24,588, Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires: Intereses del Estado Nacional (BO del 30/11/1995). 
148 Note however that the jurisdiction for hearing criminal cases has only been partially transferred to the ACBA 
judiciary, with the national courts still hearing some criminal cases that take place in the ACBA territory. The 
jurisdiction of the ACBA criminal courts has been widened piece by piece by way of Transferal Conventions 
signed with the national executive in 2000, 2006, and 20011.   
149 See Poder Judicial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Consejo de la Magistratura, ‘Estructura del Poder Judicial, Guía 
del Poder Judicial’ (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Consejo de la Magistratura) 
<https://guiajudicial.jusbaires.gob.ar/s3/estructura-del-poder-judicial> accessed 17 April 2019.  
150 See Tribunal Superior de Justicia, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires <www.tsjbaires.gov.ar/> accessed 17 April 
2019.  
151 In contrast to the FJC, the ACBA JC also participates in the selection and removal of prosecutors, court officials, 
and court employees. See article 116 of the Const. ACBA and article 114, Const Nacional (Arg).  
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there appeared to be a continued desire to foster modern and effective institutions, including 
innovative changes being made to the judiciary at the time.  
 
Looking at the track record of the ACBA JC up until 2014 however does not provide many clues 
as to the efficiency of the institution and fairness of the removals processes.  There had only been 
two removals proceedings against judges before the ACBA IJ. The first case was against Judge 
Gallardo, who had issued an injunction preventing the local government from going ahead with 
the construction of apartment blocks in a park in the city. When that injunction was overturned 
on appeal, the prosecutor filed a complaint against judge Gallardo. The judge, who had also ruled 
against the interests of the local government on other occasions, argued that the removals 
proceedings were politically motivated. The proceedings were however declared invalid on the 
first day of the IJ hearing because the legal time limit for commencing such proceedings had been 
superseded.152 
 
The second case was against Judge Parrilli, who was removed by the jury. Her removal was 
controversial, however the main controversy centred not around whether the procedure had 
been fair or whether the jury had been impartial, but rather on the question of what amounts to 
grounds for removal. Judge Parrilli was removed for insulting two employees of the Agency for 
Transport and Transit Control, working in the documentation control booths at the public office 
that deals with traffic offences.  
 
The interaction was caught on CCTV, and the judge, whose car had been towed as she had parked 
illegally, can be heard directing several insults and threats at the employees, including: “I am a 
judge, they towed my car whilst I was at a hearing”; “I need my car now because I am working”; 
“I do not have to pay, as I have never paid in my life”; and “come here, the person in control here 
is me”. The judge also called one of the employees “stupid”. Judge Parrilli then spoke to a 
Controller of Offenses and was excused from paying the fine. She returned to speak to the two 
employees, presenting the required documentation, and proceeded to insult them further with 
                                                 
152 La Nación, ‘Archivaron el Proceso Contra el Juez Gallardo’ La Nación (3 February 2006) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/archivaron-el-proceso-contra-el-juez-gallardo-nid777713> accessed 1 
September 2019; Clarín, El Juicio Político al Juez Gallardo Se Cayó Poco Después de Comenzar’ Clarín (3 
February 2006) <www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores/juicio-politico-juez-gallardo-cayo-despues-
comenzar_0_BJ5XfX8JAFe.html> accessed 1 September 2019.   
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comments including: “I should give you a slap, I want to leave now! A slap for making me waste 
time. Hurry!”; “better not come to my court because I will send you to prison for eight months”; 
and a racial slur, “all morochas,153 they didn’t contract one blonde!”154 
 
The grounds for removing a judge are discussed in Section 3.3, however for now it is important 
to note that the removal of judge Parilli leaves questions as to whether or not political 
considerations played a role in the decision to remove her open. Given the balanced composition 
of the ACBA JC, it also raises questions about whether the same result would have been reached 
if no politicians were on the council, and whether or not that would have better protected judicial 
independence.  
 
2.3.2 The Nature and Composition of the ACBA Judicial Council  
The ACBA Consitution explicitly includes the JC as part of the judiciary155 thereby avoiding the 
debate that had taken place at the Federal level as to the nature of the institution. On its 
institutional website, the ACBA council describes itself – using very similar wording to the 
functions ascribed to it by Article 1 of the Law 31156 - as the permanent administrative body of 
the judiciary, responsible for the selection of judges. It describes its function as ‘ensuring the 
independence of the judiciary, guaranteeing the efficient provision of the service of 
administration of justice, promote the optimal level of its members, and achieve the satisfaction 
of social demands about the jurisdictional function of the state’.157  
 
The ACBA JC is established by article 115 of the ACBA Constitution,158 which states that the ACBA 
JC shall be made up of nine members representing the legislature, the judiciary, and lawyers in 
equal parts. It has five commissions, including the CDA.159 According to article 121, the ACBA IJ is 
                                                 
153 Morocha is a Spanish term that literally means “dark woman”, and can refer to hair or skin colour.  
154 All facts and quotes in this paragraph were taken from the Decision of the ACBA Jury in this case (Expte N 
1/2009 “SCD s/ denuncia efectuada por el señor Ministro de Justicia y Seguridad del GCBA”) of the 5 January 
2010, and published on the website of the Centro de Información Judicial. See <https://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-
3239-Se-conocieron-los-fundamentos-de-la-destituci-n-de-Parrilli.html> accessed 1 November 2018. 
155 Article 107, Constitución de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (BOCBA del 10/10/1996). 
156 Ley Orgánica del Consejo de la Magistratura No 31 (BOCBA 475 del 29/06/1998). 
157 Consejo de la Magistratura, Poder Judicial de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, ‘Misiones y Funciones’ 
(Poder Judicial de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires) 
<https://consejo.jusbaires.gob.ar/institucional/misiones-y-funciones> accessed 6 March 2019. 
158 Constitución de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (BOCBA 47 del 10/10/1996).  
159 The other four commissions are: Judicial Administration, Management and Modernization; Institutional 
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also made up of nine members representing legislators, lawyers and judges in equal parts. One 
of the judges on the IJ must be a member of the ACBA Supreme Court (and will be President of 
the Jury), and all members are selected by way of a raffle from a list of twenty-four members 
elected by their peers as specified in Table 2 below. This is different from the IJ at the federal 
level where members are raffled from a list of all lawyers and judges at the federal level in the 
country. The composition of the CDA is also balance. It is made up of three councillors: one judge 
councillor, one lawyer councillor, and one legislator councillor, who are appointed to the 
Commission for one year,160  
                                                 
Strengthening and Strategic Planning; Selection of Judges and Prosecutors; and Transfer from the Ordinary 
National Judiciary to the ACBA Judiciary.  
160 Article 14, Reglamento Interno del Plenario y las Comisiones Del Consejo de la Magistratura de la CABA. 
Approved by Resolución No 260/2004 (BOCBA del 26/04/2004). 
Page 60 of 366 
 
Table 2: Composition of the JC, the CDA, and the IJ at the ACBA Level 
Judicial Council Commission for Discipline  
and Accusations 
Impeachment Jury 
9 councillors 
 
3 representatives of the 
legislature (cannot be 
legislators currently in office; 
must be lawyers or ‘possess 
special aptitude’ for the role, 
and fulfil the criteria to be a 
congressman/woman)161 
 
3 ACBA judges (who have 
been judges for at least 2 
years,162 and are not members 
of the Superior Court of the 
ACBA) 
 
3 lawyers (who have been 
lawyers for at least 8 years, are 
resident and registered as 
lawyers in the ACBA)163 
 
Councillors serve for four years 
and cannot be re-elected 
within a period of four years 
after their mandate 
terminates.  
2 councillors 
 
1 judge 
1 lawyer 
1 legislator 
 
Elected for a period of one 
year, and can be re-elected. 
9 jurors 
 
3 legislators 
3 lawyers 
3 judges (1 member of the 
ACBA Superior Court) 
 
Selected by way of a raffle 
when the JC decides to proceed 
with an accusation of a judge, 
from a list of 24 members 
made up of 2 members of the 
ACBA Supreme Court, 8 
legislators, 6 judges, and 8 
lawyers.  
 
Judges of Supreme Court 
elected by a majority of their 
peers for a period of four years 
(and can be re-elected).  
 
The other judges need to have 
been judges for at least 4 
years, and are elected by a 
direct, secret, and obligatory 
vote of all judges of first and 
second instance, using a 
system of proportional 
representation, for a period of 
four years.  
 
Legislators elected by 2/3rds of 
their peers, and remain jurors 
during their term in office.  
 
Lawyers need to have been 
lawyers for at least 7 years, be 
resident in and registered as 
lawyers in ACBA. Elected by 
their peers in direct, secret, 
and obligatory votes using a 
system of proportional 
representation, for a period of 
four years.  
                                                 
161 Article 4, Ley Orgánica del Consejo de la Magistratura No 31.  
162 Article 5, Ley Orgánica del Consejo de la Magistratura No 31. 
163 Article 6, Ley Orgánica del Consejo de la Magistratura No 31. 
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2.4 The Introduction of an Impeachment Jury in the province of Tucuman 
 
Tucuman has a long institutional history, having hosted the Congress of Tucuman that declared 
the independence of the United Provinces of South America from the Spanish empire in 1816. In 
2014, the province was headed by Governor José Alperovich, a Kirchnerist who held office for 
three terms from 2003 to 2015. From 2011 to 2015, Alperovich’s party held an overwhelming 
majority of 42 of 49 seats in the provincial legislature. Jose Alperovich’s wife, Beatriz Rojkés was 
a national deputy for the Kirchners’ Front for Victory party from 2005 to 2009, and a national 
senator from 2009 to 2014. From 2011 to 2014 she was the Provisional President of the national 
Senate, which made her third in the line of succession to the national presidency. Alperovich, 
was known to be a ‘man very close the Casa Rosada’, the presidential palace, and faced many 
allegations of corruption and nepotism. A 2012 editorial in La Nación, a leading national 
newspaper, reported on the nepotism present in Alperovich’s administration: his sister-in-law, 
two brothers-in-law, nephew, son-in-law, various cousins, and niece, all worked for the provincial 
government.164 
 
The provincial judiciary of Tucuman is divided into four centres: the main one located in the 
capital of the province, the city of San Miguel de Tucuman, one in the town of Concepción, and 
two smaller centres in Monteros and La Banda del Rio Salí.165 The process for the removal of a 
judge in the province was historically conducted in the legislature by way of impeachment.166 In 
2006, a controversial and far-reaching reform of the provincial constitution created an IJ to 
                                                 
164 La Nación, ‘Nepotismo Para Todos’ La Nación (27 June 2012) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/editoriales/nepotismo-para-todos-nid1493678> accessed 18 April 2019. The 
title of this article, ‘Nepotism for Everyone’ is a play on the phrase ‘Football for Everyone’ which was a nation-
wide Argentinean television program that, under President Fernández, broadcast first division and other 
matches for free, after the Argentinean government purchased the rights to broadcast the games. The show 
was criticised for being used for presidential advertising. See La Nación, ‘La Publicidad del Futbol Para Todos, El 
Verdadero Beneficio Para El Gobierno’ La Nación (27 June 2014) <www.lanacion.com.ar/deportes/futbol/la-
publicidad-del-futbol-para-todos-el-verdadero-beneficio-para-el-gobierno-nid1713597> accessed 1 September 
2019.  
165 For lists of the courts, judges, court officials, court employees, and prosecutors working at the provincial level, 
see Poder Judicial Tucumán, ‘Guía Judicial’ (Poder Judicial Tucumán) <www.jusTucumán.gov.ar/guia-judicial>, 
accessed 17 April 2019.  
166 Although the de facto governments of the Argentinean Revolution and the National Reorganisation Process had 
also created Impeachment Juries: Félix A Montilla Zavalía, Historia del Poder Judicial de Tucumán 1950-2005 
(Poder Judicial de Tucumán 2007) 86 and 146. 
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decide on the removal of judges.167 Complaints against judges are still received and investigated 
by the Permanent Impeachment Committee (PIC) of the provincial legislature, but where the PIC 
decides to proceed with an impeachment hearing, the case is brought before the TIJ, with the 
legislative committee acting as a prosecutor. The 2006 constitutional reform also created a 
provincial JC,168 but it only plays a role in the selection, not the removal, of judges.169  
 
The TIJ has been highly controversial since its introduction,170 and was subject to several 
modifications.171 The constitutionality of the composition of the jury was challenged by the Bar 
Association of Tucuman, who lost their case before the Administrative Court of Appeal and the 
provincial Supreme Court.172 Since the interviews for this thesis were conducted in 2014, the IJ 
was subject to further reform in 2017 that was again challenged, this time by the Association of 
Judges of Tucuman. The provincial Supreme Court declared the modified article 28 of law 8734 
unconstitutional insofar as it set out that judges subject to proceedings before the IJ would be 
automatically suspended.173 This was the first time the provincial Supreme Court agreed with a 
challenge to the controversial new regime for the selection and removal of judges. 
 
                                                 
167 The process for the impeachment of provincial Supreme Court justices was also modified by this reform, 
requiring only 2/3rds of the votes of the legislature to impeach a justice, whereas ¾ of the vote are required to 
impeach the Governor.  
168 There had previously been a JC, from 1991 to 2003, which worked only as an advisory body to the provincial 
legislature in its selection of judges.  
169 See Consejo Asesor de la Magistratura de Tucumán <http://camTucumán.gob.ar/web/> accessed 17 April 2019. 
The CAM started working on the 30 October of 2009, and is regulated by Article 101, Const Prov Tuc.  
170 Félix Alberto Montilla Zavalía, ‘La Suspensión de los Magistrados Judiciales Sujetos a Jurado de Enjuiciamiento: 
Comentario a Propósito de un Fallo de la Corte Suprema de Tucumán’ (2017) El Derecho, Diario de Doctrina y 
Jurisprudencia, No 14291 <www.elderecho.com.ar/includes/pdf/diarios/2017/10/20102017.pdf> accessed 17 
April 2019.  
171 See Law 7977, Regula el Enjuiciamiento de los Miembros del Poder Judicial no Sometidos a Juicio Político (BOT 
del 31/12/2007); Law 7978, Convocatoria a todos los abogados para la elección de un representante titular y un 
suplente destinados a integrar el Jurado de Enjuiciamiento (BOT del 03/01/2008); Law 8176, Modifica el 
Artículo 1 de la Ley 7978 (BOT del 16/04/2009), Ley 8199, Enjuiciamiento a los miembros de los Ministerios 
Fiscal y Pupilar y Magistrados del Poder Judicial no sometidos a Juicio Político (BOT del 12/08/2009); Law 8734, 
El Proceso de enjuiciamiento ante la Comisión Permanente de Juicio Político y el Jurado de Enjuiciamiento (BOT 
del 20/11/2014); and more recently, Law 8966, Modifica la Ley No 8734 de Regulación del Proceso de Jurado de 
Enjuiciamiento (BOT del 04/01/2017). 
172 Colegio de Abogados de Tucumán vs Honorable Convención Constituyente de Tucumán s/ inconstitucionalidad, 
CSJTuc, 888/2008.    
173 This provision was deemed unconstitutional because under article 47 of the Constitution of Tucumán, those 
subject to impeachment proceedings before the legislature cannot be suspended in their function during the 
process, and that this should also apply to the impeachment of lower-court judges given that according to 
article 131 of the provincial constitution, the process for the removal of judges of the inferior courts will ‘be 
subject to the bases for impeachment established in the constitution’. See Colegio de Abogados de Tucumán vs 
Provincia de Tucumán s/Acción Declarativa de Inconstitucionalidad, CSJTuc, 22/08/2017. 
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At the time the research for this thesis was being conducted, no judges had been removed by the 
newly created TIJ. Removals proceedings had however been controversially started against three 
criminal court judges, in what was deemed by many to be a politically motivated trial. The three 
judges faced public criticism from Governor Alperovich and the President Fernández when they 
acquitted 13 people for the alleged kidnapping and forced prostitution of María de los Angeles 
“Marita” Verón. 174 Marita’s case had created controversy on a national and international level. 
The mother of Marita, Susana Trimarco, led a huge public campaign for justice over many years 
that resulted in the release of many women that had been forced into prostitution, but Marita 
has still not been found. Ms Trimarco was even awarded the US Secretary of State International 
Women of Courage award in 2007 for her actions against human trafficking.175 The judges 
however acquitted the 13 accused due to a lack of sufficient evidence.176  
 
President Fernández openly supported Susana Trimarco and publicly condemned the verdict.177 
Upon a complaint by Susana Trimarco to the PIC of the Tucuman legislature, a decision was 
reached to start removals proceedings against the three judges before the TIJ.178 The judges had 
the proceedings suspended by the provincial Supreme Court by way of an injunction.179 Two of 
the judges handed in their resignations requesting retirement, claiming that the removals 
process was akin to a ‘public lynching’.180 Governor Alperovich, rejected the resignations from 
                                                 
174 Iñigo David y otros s/ Privación Ilegítima de la Libertad y Promoción de la Prostitución en Concurso Víctima, 
María de los Ángeles Verón, Sala II de la Cámara en lo Penal de la Provincia de Tucumán, 23554/2002. 
175 US Department of State, ‘Archive: Secretary’s International Women of Courage Award: Honorees’ (US 
Department of State) <http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/wi/iwoc/c21757.htm> accessed 3 August 2019. 
176 Centro de Información Judicial, ‘Caso Marita Verón: El Tribunal Absolvió a Todos los Acusados’ (Centro de 
Información Judicial, 11 December 2012) <www.cij.gov.ar/nota-10440-Caso-Marita-Veron--el-tribunal-absolvio-
a-todos-los-acusados.html> accessed 3 August 2019; José Ignacio Sbrocco, ‘Conmoción: Sin Culpable en el 
Juicio por Marita Verón’ La Nación (12 December 2012) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1536071-conmocion-sin-
culpables-en-el-juicio-por-marita-veron> accessed 3 August 2019.  
177 Lucas Radicella, ‘President Fernández Attacks Justice System After Marita Verón Ruling’ The Argentina 
Independent (12 December 2012) 
<www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/newsfromargentina/president-fernandez-attacks-justice-
system-after-marita-veron-ruling/> accessed 21 July 2013. 
178 Carlos Varela Alvarez, Jose D’Antona, and Carlos Garmendia, ‘Jucio Político: Comunicado de Prensa’ (El Caso 
Marita Verón, 27 December 2012) <http://casoveron.org.ar/2012/12/27/juicio-politico-comunicado-de-
prensa/> accessed 21 July 2013. 
179 José Ignacio Sbrocco, ‘Suspenden la Destitución de los Jueces del Caso Verón’ La Nación (Tucumán, 5 April 2013) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/1569716-suspenden-la-destitucion-de-los-jueces-del-caso-veron> accessed 3 August 
2019. 
180 La Gaceta, ‘Otro Juez del Caso Verón Renunció, Pero el Gobierno No Le Aceptaría la Dimisión’ La Gaceta (25 
April 2013) <www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/542249/politica/otro-juez-caso-veron-renuncio-pero-gobierno-no-le-
aceptaria-dimision.html> accessed 3 August 2019. 
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both judges, but that decision was overturned by the administrative courts who ruled in favour 
of the judges in two separate proceedings.181 The third, younger judge was still fighting the case 
at the time the interviews for this thesis were conducted, but ultimately managed to have the 
proceedings against him further suspended in 2016 whilst he brought a case before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.182  
 
In order to understand the controversy surrounding the creation of the TIJ and the proceedings 
against the judges of the Marita Veron case, it is important to recognise the context of a 
governing political party with an overwhelming majority in the legislature, combined with a 
history of the executive interfering in the judicial function in the province. Just before the TIJ was 
introduced, another judge, Judge Freidenberg, had been wrongly removed in January of 2006 
under the old system by the legislature. At that time, Alperovich’s governing party also held a 
majority in the parliament, and in that case, and there was also public and political pressure to 
remove Judge Freidenberg, as was subsequently the case with the Verón judges.  
 
Judge Freidenberg had given a man a life-sentence for murder, and in accordance with the law 
had signed an authorization for the man to be driven to his house for four hours to see his family 
and then be brought back to the prison. The man was poorly surveilled during this time and 
escaped, and the prison only declared he was missing four days later. This lead to accusations 
that the judge had been corrupted, and ultimately resulted in her removal. She appealed her case 
before the provincial and national supreme courts, and the Federal Supreme Court ultimately 
ruled that the process for her removal had violated principles of judicial independence and 
ordered that the provincial court review her appeal.183 She was reinstated as a judge at the end 
of 2009.184  
 
                                                 
181 La Gaceta, ‘Declaran Nulo un Decreto de Alperovich en Contra del Juez Piedrabuena’ La Gaceta (3 July 2013) 
<www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/550988/declaran-nulo-decreto-alperovich-contra-juez-piedrabuena.html> 
accessed 28 July 2019. 
182 Contexto, ‘El Único Juez en Actividad del Caso Verón Podrá Seguir Ejerciendo su Cargo’ Contexto (27 August 
2016) <www.contextotucuman.com/nota/54386/el-unico-juez-en-actividad-del-caso-veron-podra-seguir-
ejerciendo-su-cargo.html> accessed 20 September 2019. 
183 Freidenberg de Ferreyra, Alicia Beatriz c/Honorable Legislatura de Tucumán, Fallos: 331:1755. 
184 Freidenberg, Alicia vs Estado Provincial (Honorable Legislatura) s/ Acción de Amparo, CSJTuc, 30/10/2009. 
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2.4.2 The Nature and Composition of the Tucuman PIC 
The PIC is made up of twelve legislators,185 elected annually by the provincial legislature by way 
of a nominal vote.186 Any other legislator is allowed to attend the meetings of the PIC and has 
the right to be heard, but not to vote.187 The power to remove judges is in the hands of the 
provincial IJ,188 however the composition is different to that of the IJ at the federal level. Under 
article 126 of the provincial constitution, the TIJ is made up of eight members: five representative 
of the legislature,189 one representative from the executive,190 one member of the provincial 
Supreme Court,191 and one provincial lawyer.192 Members are elected for two years, and can be 
re-elected once.193 
 
Table 3: Composition of the PIC and the IJ in the Province of Tucuman 
 
Permanent Impeachment Commission of the 
Provincial Legislature 
Impeachment Jury 
 
12 legislators elected by the legislature in a 
nominal vote (by a simple majority of the votes, 
with a quorum of half plus one of all legislators) 
 
8 jurors 
 
5 representatives of the legislature 
 
1 representative of the executive (selected by 
the Governor of the province) 
 
1 member of the Tucuman Supreme Court 
(selected by peers) 
 
1 lawyer (resident in and registered as a lawyer 
in Tucuman, fulfil the conditions to be a 
member of the Supreme Court of Tucuman, 
elected by peers by way of a direct, secret and 
obligatory vote) 
 
 
                                                 
185Article 48, Const Prov Tuc.  
186 Article 61, Reglamento del Honorable Legislatura de la Provincia de Tucumán (Reglamento Leg Tuc).  
187 Article 70, Reglamento Leg Tuc. 
188 Article 125, Const Prov Tuc. 
189 Who are chosen in the same way as the members of the Impeachment Commission are chosen: Article 127(1) 
Const Prov Tuc. 
190 Chosen by the Governor of the Province: Article 127(2) Const Prov Tuc. 
191 Chosen by the Provincial Supreme Court: Article 127(3) Const. Prov. Tuc. 
192 Chosen by way of a direct, secret, and obligatory vote of all of those authorized to practise law in the provincial 
jurisdiction: Article 127(4) Const Prov Tuc. Under Article 126 Const Prov Tuc, the lawyers must fulfil the legal 
conditions to be a member of the Supreme Court.  
193 Article 128 Const Prov Tuc. Where their mandate ends during an impeachment proceeding, they shall stay in 
their posts until the procedure has finished.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
Judicial Councils were introduced at both the Federal and ACBA levels for the explicit purpose of 
increasing and protecting judicial independence vis-à-vis the executive. At the Federal level this 
was an attempt upon the return to democracy of reducing the executive’s longstanding influence 
over the judiciary, by entrusting the administration of justice and the appointment and removal 
of judges to an external body, the FJC. The FIJ was created to add an additional layer of 
independence in the process for the removal of a judge, to avoid political motivated removals.  
 
In the ACBA, the JC and IJ were created in order to manage a brand new judiciary. The driving 
force behind the reforms was a desire for autonomy from the federal government, and this was 
translated into a desire to create modern and efficient institutions as a counterpoint to the old 
and burdened federal system. The focus of the power play is not between the various institutions 
of the new ACBA government, rather of the ACBA institutions as a whole trying to break free and 
obtain more power from the federal government.  The ACBA JC is tasked with managing the 
transition of judicial powers from the federal to the local level, and of creating a strong 
institutional identity for the new judiciary in an attempt to strengthen the ACBA institutions.  
 
As shall be discussed further in Chapter 3, the introduction of both of these JCs was based on an 
assumption that judicial independence and accountability would be served by creating an 
independent institution with a focused role and streamlined procedures for the appointment and 
removal of judges. It was hoped that this ‘tecnification’ of these processes would prevent the 
appointment and removal of judges from being influenced by partisan politics and would reduce 
the control the executive had over these processes. However, continued controversy about 
removals and civil society concerns about lack of removals raises questions about whether or not 
this goal has been achieved.   
 
At the Federal level, since the introduction of the JC there have been continued debate and 
controversy about the ideal composition of the council, with several changes being made over 
the years that reflected attempts by the government to gain more power over the council. Whilst 
the debate around the composition of the council revolves around questions of maintaining a 
separation of powers and determining who is most qualified to undertake the work carried out 
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by the JC, Hammergren has convincingly argued that the reason for the interest in the 
composition of the council in Latin American countries is that interest groups are competing for 
a seat around the table. These interest groups are not necessarily a reflection of the different 
sectors officially represented on the council, rather are the ‘old vested interests’, such as political 
parties that want to maintain control over ‘their judges’. 
 
This raises important questions about the duties of councillors, and whose interests, if any, they 
should represent when making decisions about the appointment and removal of judges. The key 
to protecting judicial independence and accountability is to make a clear distinction between 
representing the interests that various stakeholders in the justice system have in an efficient and 
fair judiciary, and the representation of partisan, individual, and judicial corporatist interests. The 
latter cannot be equated with an interest to protect judicial independence and accountability 
which as shall be seen in Chapter 3 is key to maintaining fair and efficient removals processes.   
 
In contrast to the Federal and ACBA levels, complaints against judges in the province of Tucuman 
are still received and investigated by the legislature’s Permanent Impeachment Commission. 
Amid a history of the executive violating judicial independence, an independent Impeachment 
Jury was created in 2006 to lend more independence to the decision to remove a judge. The IJ 
however is made up of a majority of politicians, and therefore has not been deemed a very 
credible by local legal commentators.  
 
In addition, at the time the research for this thesis was conducted in 2014, the TIJ had never 
actually functioned, highlighting the amount of power that lies with the legislature at the first 
stage of the process. Given that the leading political party at the time held a large majority of the 
seats on the legislature, it appears to give the executive a clear opportunity to exert control over 
the functioning of the PIC. It therefore will be interesting to compare the functioning of the 
supposedly neutral JCs at the Federal and ACBA levels with this political PIC in Tucuman, to see 
whether and under what circumstances JCs can actually better shield removals processes from 
partisan politics.  
 
  
Page 68 of 366 
 
Chapter 3: Protecting Judicial Independence in Judicial Removals 
Processes 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Having set out the political context in which JCs and IJs were introduced, and the controversies 
surrounding their composition in Chapter 2, this chapter narrows the focus down to the process 
for the removal of a judge and considering how judicial independence can be protected 
throughout the process.  Section 3.2 starts by considering what is meant by the term judicial 
independence. Building on the context set out in Chapter 2, it looks at how the introduction of a 
JC was intended to promote judicial independence, and considers what was understood by the 
term ‘judicial independence’ in the local context at the time. Given that the removals process 
fulfils an accountability function, consideration is also given to whether there is an inherent 
tension between judicial accountability and judicial independence. It is argued that the right kind 
of accountability can protect, rather than threaten, judicial independence. 
 
Section 3.3 then takes a look at the extent to which removals processes are political in nature 
and what this means in terms of when and how judges can be removed, and what they can be 
removed for. Whilst acknowledging the political nature of the decision to remove a judge, it is 
argued that in order to protect judicial independence, there are certain legal limits that need to 
be adhered to. The international legal framework on judicial independence and judicial removals 
is therefore considered to establish that a judge should never be removed for the content of his 
judicial ruling, and that due process requirements must be adhered to in the process for the 
removal of a judge.  
 
Section 3.5 then turns to the details of the procedure for judicial removals in the three 
jurisdictions being studied. The law is set out as it was at the time the interviews for this thesis 
were conducted in 2014. Section 3.5 then evaluates some of the potential problems arising out 
of the regulation of these processes to be kept in mind during the subsequent evaluation of these 
processes in this thesis. The analysis of the removals process in this chapter aims to identity the 
way in which removals processes should work in order to achieve their stated aims of protecting 
judicial independence. This will enable a comparison with the empirical findings in the second 
half of this thesis. 
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3.2 Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence has been established as a prerequisite for the enforcement of several 
international human rights treaties, and is therefore recognised as ‘international custom and a 
general principle of law recognised by the international community’.194 Indeed, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council has stated that ‘an independent judiciary… is essential to the full 
and non-discriminatory realisation of human rights instruments and indispensable to the process 
of democracy’.195 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, both ratified 
by Argentina, recognise judicial independence (in Articles 14 and 13 respectively).  
 
At a regional level, Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights states that ‘every 
person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable rime, by a 
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law’.196 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has confirmed that judicial independence is ‘one of the basic 
pillars of the guarantees of due process…. [and] results necessary for the protection of 
fundamental rights’.197 It has also confirmed that ‘the independence of the judiciary shall be 
guaranteed by the State and… it is the duty of all governmental or other institutions to respect 
and observe the independence of the judiciary’.198 Given these international norms, and as shall 
be explored further in Section 3.3, there is a clear duty on the Argentine government to protect 
judicial independence.  
 
                                                 
194 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers – Guarantees of Judicial 
Independence/Major Developments in International Justice, Human Rights Council, 11th Session, UN Doc 
A/HRC/11/41 (2009), para 14. 
195 Preamble, Res 15/3, Human Rights Council, 15th Session (Agenda Item 3), UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/3 (2010). See 
also Res 12/3, Human Rights Council, 12th Session (Agenda Item 3), UN Doc A/HRC/RES/12/3 (2009); UN 
Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2004/33: Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and 
Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers, 19 April 2004, E/CN.4 RES/2004/33; UN Commission on Human 
Rights, Resolution 2003/43: Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the 
Independence of Lawyers, 23 April 2003, E/CN.4/RES/2003/43. 
196 This echoes Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that ‘everyone is entitled in 
full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him’: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 Dec 
1948) UNGA Res 217 A (III)(1948).  
197 Reverón Trujillo v Venezuela, IACHR (30/06/2009) Series C No 197, para 68. 
198 Constitutional Court v Peru, IACHR (31/01/2001) Series C No 71, para 73. 
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3.2.1 The Role of Judicial Councils  
Given that the FJC was intended to enhance judicial independence,199 it is important to reflect 
on what judicial independence means, and in particular, what it was understood to mean in the 
Argentine context at the time. As noted by Roth, judicial independence has a fundamentally 
negative connotation, of the absence of undue interferences in the judicial task.200 These 
interferences can arise from a variety of sources. In addition to interference from the executive, 
Fiss additionally identifies interference by the parties to a legal proceeding, and by one judge on 
another judge as potentially impacting judicial independence.201 Gargarella adds what he calls 
‘public clamour’ as a source of pressure,202 as well as the dependency judges may have on the 
internal bureaucracy of their courts.203 
  
This negative description of judicial independence, of a judiciary free from undue influences, 
nevertheless leaves many questions open about what an independent judiciary should look like. 
Where a judiciary is free from undue influences and yet is marked by a slow judicial process, and 
populated by an elite of judges that care more about protecting their own status than justice, 
that is clearly not the form of independence envisioned by best practice. That type of 
independent judiciary is locally portrayed as ‘corporatism’ in the judiciary, or as the judiciary 
being ‘too independent’.204 Ironically, a judiciary that is out of touch with the needs of the people 
in this way will only serve to increase criticism, making it susceptible to further advances from 
political powers.  
 
The question of what judicial independence should ideally look like has therefore often been 
framed in terms of what ‘degree’ of judicial independence is desirable. Garoupa and Ginsburg 
                                                 
199 See Section 2.2.1. 
200 Laura C Roth ‘Acerca de la Independencia Judicial en Argentina: La Creación del Consejo de la Magistratura y su 
Desempeño Entre 1994 y 2006’ (2007) 47(186) Desarrollo Económico 285, 291. 
201 Owen M Fiss, ‘The Right Degree of Independence’ in Irwin P Stotzky, Transition to Democracy in Latin America: 
The Role of the Judiciary (Westview Press 1993) 55-56. 
202 See also Irving R Kaufman, ‘Chilling Judicial Independence’ (1979) 88(4) The Yale Law Journal 681, who cites 
Judge William Cranch saying ‘”in dangerous times”…it “becomes the duty of the Judiciary calmly to poise the 
scales of justice, unmoved by the armed power, undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude”’. This quote is 
taken from the dissenting opinion of Judge Cranch in an unnamed case as cited in Charles Warren, the Supreme 
Court in United States History (Little Brown and Company 1926). 
203 Roberto Gargarella, ‘La Justicia Dependiente de la Política. El Caso Argentino’ in Roberto Gargarella (ed), La 
Justicia Frente Al Gobierno (Ariel 1996) 249. 
204 Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence’ (2009) 
57(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 103, 106. 
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point out that there is no universal optimal degree of judicial independence, and that the 
contextual realities – whether a judiciary is heavily politicized, or whether it is isolated from 
society in its independence – will form the basis of the corresponding degree of independence 
(more independence or less independence than the status quo respectively) being demanded in 
a society at any given point in time.205 Fiss frames this idea as judicial independence being 
something that should be ‘optimised’ rather than ‘maximised’.206 
 
Framing the same idea in a different way, Roth helpfully draws a distinction between 
‘independence’ and ‘isolationism’, or ‘corporatism’:207 What differentiates them is that the 
former is not an aim in its own right, but rather a tool to help accomplish a series of aims,208 such 
as providing fair and impartial justice. A corporatist judiciary on the other hand, may be 
independent, but does not necessarily pursue the aim of providing quality judicial services. 
Indeed, looking at international principles on judicial independence, judicial independence is 
recognised as fundamental for the rule of law and fair and impartial justice systems;209 in other 
words, as a tool to achieve these aims.  
 
Looking at judicial independence in the light of its raison d’être makes it easier to envisage what 
judicial independence should look like. A key element of the aim is the provision of impartial 
justice,210 of impartial individual judges who will rule on a case without regard to the wishes of 
politicians, the parties to a case, other judges, or public clamour. In this sense, independence and 
impartiality are not the same thing on a conceptual level. A judge may be dependent on 
                                                 
205 Although it is understood ‘that there is a limit to how far one can move in either direction [politicization of 
judiciary or judicialization of politics] within democracies’: Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 203)120. 
206 Fiss (n 201). 
207 Roth (n 200200) 291. 
208 See also Stephen B Burbank and Barry Friedman, ‘Reconsidering Judicial Independence’ in Stephen B Burbank 
and Barry Friedman (eds), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Sage 2002) 9, 
who argue that judicial independence is not an end in itself but rather a means to an end.  
209 United Nations Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, GA Res 40/32, UN GAOR 40th Sess, Supp 
No 53, at 205, UN Doc A/40/53 (1985) and GA Res 40/146, UN GAOR 40th Sess, Supp No 53 at 254, UN Doc 
A/40/53(1985); International Association of Judges, The Universal Charter of the Judge (IAJ 1999); and UN 
ECOSOC, Basic Principles of Judicial Conduct, E/Res/2006/23 (27 July 2006), recognising the Bangalore Principle 
of Judicial Conduct as representing a further development of, and as being complementary to, the UN Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. 
210 This was set clearly stated by the Supreme Court as early as 1969 in the case of the impeachment of Judge 
Carlos Arigos (Fallos 274:415): ‘the ultimate aim of the independence of judges is to achieve an impartial 
administration of justice’. See also Margaret Popkin, ‘Fortalecer la Independencia Judicial’ in Luis Pasara (ed), La 
Experiencia Latinoamericana en Reforma de Justicia (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas UNAM 2004): 
‘judicial independence should be understood as the precondition for impartiality’. 
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politicians, for example where they control his salary or career, or may lose his de facto 
independence by accepting a bribe from one of the parties to a case, however, theoretically, that 
judge could still choose to deliver an impartial ruling. On the flip side, a judiciary may be 
institutionally independent and yet a judge may still choose to deliver a partial ruling.  
 
Protecting judges’ independence in the hope that this will encourage impartiality may therefore 
not be enough. As explained by Hammergren, ‘an independent institution can hardly be equated 
with a collection of freely acting individuals. At the very least, it requires its own leadership and 
values with which members identify, spontaneously or because of some power of 
enforcement.’211 Gil Lavedra explains this from an institutional perspective: that the separation 
of powers is ‘insufficient to guarantee the independence of the powers. Independence requires 
that the judiciary exercises self-governance’.212 Again, this makes sense in light of the raison 
d’être of judicial independence: a degree of institutionalisation is necessary to direct judges as to 
the aims and vision they should be working towards.  
 
In order to understand the intentions of the JC in Argentina and the degree or form of judicial 
independence it envisaged, it is important to understand the constitutional role the judiciary 
plays in Argentina, and how the JC fits into that puzzle. The division of powers in the Argentinean 
Constitution reflects the Constitution of the USA, in that, amongst other similarities, the judiciary 
is designed and structured as one of the three powers of the state.213 The judiciary has the power 
to rule on the constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature, and generally has more freedom 
to decide on cases than continental European judges who are rather seen as administrators of 
justice with more limited scope of legal interpretation. Within this constitutional framework 
therefore, the autonomy and independence of the judiciary in Argentina is important not least 
so that the judiciary can fulfil its role as a counterweight to the other two powers. Given the 
presidential system, the judiciary also needs to have the independence to check the power of the 
powerful executive. 
 
                                                 
211 Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America (Rule of Law Series, 
Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Number 28, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2002) 19.  
212 Ricardo Gil Lavedra, ‘La Independencia del Poder Judicial y el Consejo de la Magistratura’ (1996) Aportes Para el 
Estado y la Administración Gubernamental Edn 7. 
213 Roth (n 200) 287. 
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Garoupa and Ginsburg note that ‘judicial councils are bodies that are designed to insulate the 
functions of appointment, promotion, and discipline of judges from the partisan political process 
while ensuring some level of accountability’.214 The way in which JCs are designed in different 
countries around the world reflects the degree of judicial independence called for in each 
context.215 In contexts of a high politicisation of the judiciary, there may be a strong demand for 
increased judicial independence, whereas in contexts of high judicialization of politics, there may 
be a demand to balance independence with accountability.216 Garoupa and Ginsburg assume that 
countries which include a majority of judges on their JC have a strong desire for increased judicial 
independence, whereas ‘if judges are a minority on the council, the assumption is that the council 
is a device to try to constrain the judges and render them more accountable’.217  
 
In Argentina, whilst the main aim of the FJC was the enhancement of judicial independence, 
judges did not make up the majority of the council in any of its formations since it began working 
in 1998. Indeed, there was a debate in Argentina at the time of the creation of the council as to 
its suitability for the Argentinean constitutional model.218 The debate was essentially whether 
the JC could fulfil the aim of securing the independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive. It 
was noted that JCs originated in continental Europe – first in Italy, then in France and Spain – 
where the JCs overtook functions that had previously been exercised by the legislature and the 
government, thereby strengthening the judiciary. Spota argued that in Argentina, taking away 
[management] power from the Supreme Court and giving it to the JC only served to weaken the 
judiciary.219 Lavedra however argued that the creation of the JC nevertheless reaffirms the 
independence of the judiciary as it also diminishes the influence of the other two powers in the 
selection and removal of judges, and due to the independent, autonomous and self-governing 
nature of the council.220  
                                                 
214 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204) 106. 
215 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204204) 119: Figure 1 nicely summarises this into a diagram.  
216 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204) 119 
217 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204)121. 
218 Roth (n 200) 288. 
219 Alberto Spota, ‘Colisión de Intereses Jurídicos en el Consejo de la Magistratura: Análisis Crítico del Proyecto 
Aprobado en el Saneado en Marzo de 1996’ (Comunicación del académico Dr Alberto Antonio Spota en la 
sesión privada de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, el 22 de mayo 1996). The Supreme 
Court lost control over the administrative and financial aspects of the administration of the judiciary. See also 
Daniel Alberto Sabsay and José Miguel Onaindia, La Constitución de los Argentinos: Análisis y Comentario de su 
Texto Luego de la Reforma del 1994 (7th edn, Errepar 2009) 384. 
220 Gil Lavedra (n 212).  
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Hammergren, speaking about Latin America in general, explains the that paradox ‘of increasing 
judicial independence by taking power away from their supreme courts’ can be explained by 
looking at what ills the councils were intended to address, specifically what was meant by a lack 
of independence in the local context at the time. In Europe, JCs were designed to strengthen 
judicial independence from an institutional, separation of powers perspective. In Latin America, 
however, as discussed in Chapter 2 above, the lack of judicial independence rather referred to a 
lack of individual independence of judges at the time of deciding cases. Looking at the pre-
existing problems with judicial independence in the region that the councils were meant to 
address, Hammergren explains ‘external manipulation of appointments lessened organizational 
control over individual employees’, which lead to judiciaries plagued by systems of internal and 
external patronage, opportunistic personnel at all levels, and poorly trained, ethically 
questionable judges.221   
 
This resulted in judiciaries that were ‘permeable to external interventions of all types’, including 
collusion with political elites, and judgements which ‘would be more influenced by some kind of 
external or internal pressure rather than the dictates of the law’.222 The problem was not de jure 
independence, as many judiciaries in Latin America legally speaking enjoyed a great deal of 
independence, but rather a lack of a responsible use of that independence.223 In other words, 
‘insufficient independence’ in Latin America ‘referred to the individual judges’ presumed 
susceptibility to the influence of the variety of actors involved in their initial appointments, 
promotions, or retention of their positions…. This was less a battle of institutions than an effort 
to reduce institutional permeability to the disruptive impact of factions and clientilism’.224  
 
Hammergren frames this as a problem of ‘insufficient or perverse institutionalisation’ in 
judiciaries not ‘capable of enforcing common rules of conduct among its members’.225 Faced with 
this challenge, taking powers away from Supreme Courts that were ineffective at governance and 
                                                 
221 Hammergren (n 211211) 16. 
222 Hammergren (n 211) 17. 
223 Hammergren (n 211) 7: ‘Latin Americans were concerned about a dysfunctional judiciary, one delivering services 
that were predictable only in their poor quality and inadequate quantity.’ 
224 Hammergren (n 211211) 7. 
225 Hammergren (n 211) 17. 
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vesting that power in a council is more understandable.226 Hammergren however also notes that 
courts did frequently attempt to resist this shift of power but did not have enough of a voice, 
particularly in light of their damaged reputations, to prevent this change.227 This corporatist 
resistance to the work of the JC may be another interest affecting its work in practice.  
 
However, in spite of the attempt to improve judicial independence by introducing judicial 
councils, there is no evidence that JCs do actually improve independence. Garoupa and Ginsburg 
muse that the reason for the persistence of JCs, ‘notwithstanding little support for claims that 
they enhance independence’,228 is because ‘the council itself promises that no one institution 
can easily dominate the judiciary’ given that they ‘involve actors from multiple different 
arenas’:229 they ‘allow a wide number of stakeholders to participate in discussions of judicial 
governance’.230 The councils therefore ‘provide an arena for competition and the eternal struggle 
to calibrate independence and accountability'.231 Whilst this dispersal of power over the judiciary 
may appear beneficial, Hammergren explains that in Latin America, there was a ‘lack of clarity as 
to how the council were supposed to achieve’ the goals of judicial independence and improving 
judicial performance and administrative management.232  
 
3.2.2 The Importance of Judicial Accountability 
Given the context of a history of the judiciary being subservient to the executive power, and the 
desire to strengthen the judiciary to be an effective counterweight to the political branches of 
government, it can be easy to equate any type of judicial accountability with a threat to judicial 
independence.233 Accountability and independence can be seen as competing ends, and 
therefore attempts to render the judiciary accountable, including through disciplinary actions 
against judges, face resistance from the judiciary. Ironically, however, a lack of responsiveness 
and appropriate accountability may lead to more pressure for political accountability: 
                                                 
226 Hammergren (n 211211) 17. 
227 Hammergren (n 211211211) 15. 
228 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204204) 131. 
229 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204204204) 130. 
230 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204204204) 131. 
231 ibid. 
232 Hammergren (n 211211) 15. 
233 According to Hammergren, there is ‘a regionwide… notion of independence that finds performance monitoring 
a threat to both its individual and institutional variations’: Hammergren (n 211211) 22. 
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‘appropriate inter-branch accountability is essential if potentially inappropriate inter-branch 
accountability is to be avoided.’234 In its commentary on the Bangalore Principles on Judicial 
Conduct, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime agrees that ‘if the judiciary fails or neglects to assume 
responsibility for ensuring that its members maintain the high standards of judicial conduct 
expected of them, public opinion and political expediency may lead the other two branches of 
government to intervene’.235 
 
Where accountability is embraced by the judiciary, therefore, they will be less susceptible to the 
type of criticism used to demand political accountability. As Kaufman puts it, ‘the commitment 
to the rule of law… is the principal justification for according judges their independence’.236 To 
paraphrase Onora O’Neill, the judiciary need to demonstrate this trustworthiness before they 
will be trusted.237 In essence, ‘the judiciary needs more judges…. For whom reasonable processes 
and institutions of accountability are viewed not as obstructions but, like the law itself, as “those 
wise restraints that make us free”’.238 
 
The problem with an independent but unaccountable judiciary is that it may lead to the judicial 
corporatism described in Section 3.2.1 above, where judges have little reason to consider the 
needs of those they serve, and or to ensure the quality and impartiality of the judicial services 
they provide. An unaccountable judiciary may be detached from societal needs in the best-case 
scenario, and corrupt or permeable to outside influence in their decision-making in the worst 
case.239 A lack of judicial accountability can therefore be harmful to the provision of impartial 
                                                 
234 Stephen B Burbank, ‘Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations’ [2007] 95 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 909, 912. 
235 Point 16, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Commentary on the Bangalore Principle of Judicial 
Conduct’ (September 2007), 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/publications/Otherpublications/Commentry_on_the_Bangalore_
principles_of_Judicial_Conduct.pdf> accessed 10 May 2020 
236 Kaufman (n 202202) 689. 
237 Onora O’Neill, ‘A Question of Trust’ (The Reith Lectures, BBC Radio 4 2002) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00ghvd8> accessed 24 March 2019. 
238 Burbank (n 234) 926. Burbank quotes language that is part of the citation read by the President of Harvard 
University in conferring the J.D. degree at commencement. See Marvin Hightower, ‘The Spirit and Spectacle of 
Harvard Commencement’ <www.harvard.edu/on-campus/commencement/spirit-commencement> accessed 16 
February 2019. 
239 Lord Acton’s oft-cited dictum ‘power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ may be relevant here. 
Indeed, Klitgaard has argued, applying Lord Acton’s dictum in a more precise fashion, that corruption occurs 
where there is a monopoly on services, room for discretion on the part of the person or organisation providing 
those services, and no accountability. See Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (University of California 
Press 1988). See also Betram I Spector, Detecting Corruption in Developing Countries: Identifying 
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justice, the end that judicial independence is meant to achieve. Indeed, Garoupa and Ginsburg 
suggest that an ideal balance would be a strong but accountable judiciary.240 Unfortunately, they 
also recognise that ‘those who emphasize judicial independence too often do not articulate the 
need for accountability, which provides the crucial other side of the proverbial coin’.241   
 
The pre-existing condition of the judiciary and local demands should not be ignored when 
analysing the best balance between independence and accountability so as to achieve the aim of 
judicial independence and impartial justice.242 If the local challenges are not addressed in 
attempts at judicial reform or strengthening the judiciary, the aim is unlikely to be met. It is 
perhaps helpful in understanding the role accountability can play, to understand judicial 
independence and the provision of quality and impartial justice not as a static end goal, but rather 
a state of affairs that requires constant monitoring so that problems can be identified and the 
ever-evolving factors affecting it juggled to provide a stable balance.  
 
As Garoupa and Ginsburg note, the balance between independence and accountability is a 
constantly moving target, depending on the contextual needs for more of one or the other. 
Looking then at the Federal Argentine context, a context of high public mistrust in the judiciary, 
high perceived judicial corruption, and a demand for less impunity for people in a position of 
power, it becomes clear that there is a demand for increased judicial accountability. This should 
not be translated as an opportunity or need for politicians to exert control over the judiciary, but 
rather for accountability in the sense that the judiciary is held to account for the provision of 
impartial justice. 
  
Consistent with this view on the importance of accountability for ensuring judicial independence, 
Hammergren places accountability within the framework of management of the judiciary, and 
judicial governance: managing the staff of the judiciary to make sure the vision for the judiciary 
                                                 
Causes/Strategies for Action (Kumarian Press 2012) 5, which also emphasises the importance of accountability 
as corruption is bred where ‘the corruptors believe that no one is “watching the store”’. 
240 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204204) 131: ‘We introduce the notion of the politically accountable but strong 
judiciary. In many ways this ideal type is more desirable than the conventional view that judicial independence 
is an unqualified good.’ 
241 Garoupa and Ginsburg (n 204) 131. 
242 Marcos Zunino, ‘Releasing Transitional Justice from the Technical Asylum: Judicial Reform in Guatemala seen 
through Technē and Phronēsis’ (2011) 5 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 99.  
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is fulfilled. She frames it as a necessary way of ensuring that the services provided by the judiciary 
are honest, impartial, and to best of their abilities. She notes that if judicial performance is to be 
improved, there is a need for a clear definition of the behavioural changes being sought along 
with training, a means of measuring and monitoring behaviour, as well as effective disciplinary 
mechanisms to handle abuses.  
 
This technical and ‘forensic’ type of accountability would allow for little discretion on the part of 
whoever it is implementing it, and therefore its success it not so much ‘a question of who is in 
charge, but rather how performance and its improvement are conceptualized’.243 It is however, 
nonetheless important to look at who is in charge of the removals process in order to attempt to 
avoid any abuse of powers, and to ensure that judicial accountability works together with 
independence to secure the same goal: ‘proper regard for the other side of the coin – that is, for 
judicial independence – requires that accountability not entail influence that is deemed to be 
undue.’244 Where those holding the judiciary to account abuse accountability mechanisms, both 
judicial independence and the goal of impartial justice will suffer. Instead, accountability and 
independence should be seen as complementary means to achieving the same aim.245  
 
It is helpful to recognise inappropriate forms of accountability and the threats that they pose so 
that they may be avoided. Accountability is inappropriate when it intrudes in the judicial function 
or otherwise creates a dependency of judges that may result in impartial decision-making. In this 
regard, ‘the agency theory of judicial accountability [that would hold judges “accountable” as 
policy agents]… is not only irreconcilable with traditional notions of judicial independence; it is 
subversive of norms of respect and mutual accommodation that are essential to productive inter-
branch relations’.246 In the light of public calls for accountability and political calls for the 
‘democratisation’ of the Argentine judiciary, it is important that the need for this balance and 
restraint is recognised, as ‘if those on the front lines of the current war on courts…succeeded in 
                                                 
243 Hammergren (n 211204211) 22.  
244 Burbank (n 234) 912-913. 
245 Stefan Voigt, ‘The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability: Cross-Country Evidence’ (2008) European Journal 
of Law and Economics 95.  
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persuading the public to view judges as policy agents and courts as part of ordinary politics, it 
might be impossible to return to the status quo ante’.247 
 
As with independence, accountability ‘must be conceived in relation to other actors’248 However, 
the difference between the more ‘forensic’ type of accountability outlined above, and ‘agent’ 
style accountability, is that under the later, the agent is accountable to someone who has the 
right to set the standards by which he is judged.249 This would lead to precisely the situation that 
judiciary in Argentina is trying to rectify: politically compliant, partial justice.250 In the context of 
a high popular demand for judicial accountability (such as in Argentina), it is important to 
remember that agent-style accountability will not have the desired effect.  
 
As Kaufman convincingly argues, within a context of political criticism of the judiciary,  ‘the 
modern judge, no less than his predecessors, must act independently if he is to perform the 
function we demand of him, and he must feel secure that such action will not lead to his own 
downfall.’ He reminds us that the aim of judicial independence is to ensure impartial justice: ‘It 
is essential to remember that provisions protecting judicial tenure were “not created for the 
benefit of the judges, but for the benefit of the judged”’.251 This, Kaufman argues, is more, not 
less important in a context of the high judicialization of politics: it is ‘more crucial than ever that 
judicial independence be preserved’ as we are relying on the courts to protect our affirmative 
rights.252  
 
It is worth noting that concerns about the effects of accountability mechanisms, performance 
indicators, and exacting standards are not reserved to the judiciary. Fears of strict standards 
being abused to file politically motivated complaints against public officials, and of the complaint 
                                                 
247 Burbank (n 234238) 914. 
248 Burbank (n 234244) 912. 
249 For an interesting more general discussion of these two types of accountability, see Jeremy Waldron, 
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itself – regardless of its outcome – being used as political leverage, are voiced in the other 
branches of government in other Latin American countries.253 Further afield, Baroness Onora 
O’Neill frequently speaks about the mistrust of accountability among all types of professionals 
and public servants (including for example healthcare professionals, the police, and teachers) in 
the UK. She points to several problems with current forms of accountability which lead her to the 
conclusion that this mistrust may not be entirely misplaced, but emphasises that this does not 
mean that accountability should be rejected entirely, but rather that the right type of 
accountability procedures should be put in place. In particular, she takes issue with aims being 
reduced to targets and prescribed procedures as ‘undermin[ing] both professional judgement 
and institutional autonomy’ as ‘professionals and public servants understandably end up 
responding to requirements and targets and not only to those whom they are supposed to serve’. 
This in turn, she argues ‘damage[s] rather than repair[s] trust’ in these institutions. Instead, she 
explains that better accountability probably ‘requires more attention to good governance and 
fewer fantasies about total control’. 254 
 
That idea that good accountability focuses on good governance echoes Hammergren’s argument 
about the role of JCs and judicial disciplinary procedures in Latin America: disciplinary and 
removals processes are a way to hold judges to account for the standards of impartiality expected 
of them, and a degree of institutionalisation and governance strategy is necessary to keep this 
focus. Accountability is not a threat to judicial independence, and it can work together with 
independence to help achieve the aim of impartial justice. Indeed, there were high hopes in the 
legal community of lawyers and academics in Argentina that the adoption of a special procedure 
and institutions for the purposes of judicial removal may make it easier to remove ‘judges whose 
good conduct has been compromised’, and that the ‘adoption of a specific system can turn out 
                                                 
253 On behalf of the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, I participated in a conference in Costa Rica on the Rule of 
Law. One session looked at the benefits and challenges of potentially introducing a ‘Judge Over Your Shoulder’-
type manual for public officials in Costa Rica. Conference participants voiced concerns that such a manual 
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Alliance, ‘Rule of Law Conference: December Agenda’ (ROL Conference, San José, Costa Rica, 7 December 
2016), <http://rolalliance.org/2016-conference/> accessed 28 July 2019. 
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to be ideal to resolve the transcendental problem that affects the credibility of the judicial 
body’.255  
 
In light of this hope that the removals process will work as a process to hold judges accountable 
to standards of impartiality and help root out the judges that may be permeable to external 
influences, the next Section (3.3) further considers the nature of the removals process and the 
importance of such processes adhering to national and international standards of judicial 
independence and due process in order to ensure that this form of accountability is used 
correctly as a tool to protect the fair and impartial provision of judicial services and is not abused 
as a way to undermine judicial independence.   
 
Research on how removals processes can impact on judicial independence and indeed the rule 
of law is not very abundant, and complicated by the fact that differences in historical and political 
contexts may require different processes so that local challenges to independence and 
accountability are addressed.256 However, three overarching potential issues can be identified as 
potentially being problematic in judicial removals : a lack of clarity on what constitutes grounds 
for removal (considered in Section 3.3.1), those in charge of the removals procedure acting 
according to undue interests (Section 3.3.2), and a failure to ensure that due process is protected 
throughout the removal process (Section 3.3.3).  
  
                                                 
255 Daniel Alberto Sabsay and José Miguel Onaindia, La Constitución de los Argentinos: Análisis y Comentario de su 
Texto Luego de la Reforma de 1994 (7th Edn, Errepar 2009) 387. 
256 The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, part of the British Institute for International and Comparative Law, is 
currently running a UK AHRC-funded research project on ‘Special Processes for the Reassessment and Removal 
of Judges in Constitutional Transitions’, led by Dr Jan van Zyl Smit, Professor Christina Murray, and Dr Marcos 
Zunino. See here for details and publications: <www.biicl.org/bingham-centre/projects/judiciarytransitions> 
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3.3 The Nature of the Removals Process  
The process for the removal of judges in Argentina has its origins in a number of legal 
traditions.257 During colonial times, prior to the 1819 Argentine Constitution, the local laws 
contained provisions for juicio de residencia (trial of residence) which was a routine procedure 
whereby public official’s performance was subjected to scrutiny upon the termination of their 
term in office.258 Between 1860 and 1994, lower-court judges could be subject to impeachment 
by the Senate, upon an accusation by the Congress.259 The Constitutional provisions regulating 
these impeachment proceedings (Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution at the time) were similar 
to the impeachment provisions in the Constitution of the United States, which in turn originated 
from the impeachment proceedings conducted by the British parliament and the House of Lords.  
 
The nature of these impeachment proceedings, however, differed between jurisdictions: In 
Britain, the power of the parliament to impeach public officials arose out of a struggle to assert 
parliamentary supremacy in the face of powers held by the Crown. The British parliament used 
these proceedings not only to impeach public officials but also to impose sanctions. When the 
Constitution of the United States of America was drafted, however, the power of the legislature 
to impeach public officials had to be modified in accordance with the republican ideal of 
separation of powers. There was a fear that if the Senate was given the powers to impose criminal 
sanctions as part of impeachment proceedings, in the case that the Senate absolved an official 
from responsibility, he could not be tried again in the criminal courts in line with the principle of 
ne bis in idem. Such a situation may lead to the impunity of public officials that had committed a 
crime.260 It was therefore decided that in accordance with the separation of powers, the power 
to impose criminal sanctions should remain exclusively with the criminal courts, and the only 
consequence of impeachment proceedings would be the removal from office.  
 
                                                 
257 Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni and Guido Risso, ‘Inhabilitación y Juicio Político en Argentina’ in Eduardo Ferrer Mac-
Gregor and Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea (eds), La Ciencia del Derecho Procesal Constitucional: Estudios en 
Homenaje a Héctor Fix-Zamudio en sus Cincuenta Años como Investigador del Derecho (Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 2008) 717-721. 
258 Silvina Smietniansky, ‘El Juicio de Residencia Como Ritual Político en la Colonia (Gobernación de Tucumán, Siglo 
XVIII)’ (2007) 15 Memoria Americana: Cuadernos de Etnohistoria 71. 
259 Zaffaroni and Risso (n 257Error! Bookmark not defined.) 718. 
260 Zaffaroni and Risso (n 257257) 719-720. 
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Impeachment proceedings in Argentina were designed in the same way, in order to preserve the 
separation of powers.261 In essence, impeachment proceedings ‘should function exclusively as a 
means of political control’, as a ‘guarantee of the functioning of the body’.262 However, a 
controversy remained over whether impeachment proceedings were political or legal in nature. 
Article 52 of the Constitution (now Article 60) read:  
 
Its decision will not have any effect other than the removal of the accused, and may 
declare him unable to occupy any employment of honour, confidence, or salaried by the 
nation. But the condemned party will nevertheless remain subject to accusation, trial, and 
punishment in conformity with the laws before the ordinary courts. 
 
In principle, impeachment ‘is a mechanism of institutional remediation, intended to remove 
judges and public officials who are not suitable to perform the duties of public office’, and in this 
sense it is inherently political in nature:263 ‘It is insisted upon that the principle aim of this type 
of process is of institutional character, and it is no more than to protect and ensure the good 
functioning of the public power’.264 However, the fact that impeachment may bring with it the 
criminal sanction of barring an official (potentially for life)265 from public office, led 
                                                 
261 Rafael Bielsa, Derecho Constitucional (3rd edn, Roque Depalma 1959) note 2, 596. 
262 Zaffaroni and Risso (n 257Error! Bookmark not defined.) 719. 
263 Bielsa explains that ‘in a state regulated by a constitution that establishes a representative and republican 
government, all those that exercise public functions answer for their actions carried out as part of those, that is 
to say, the answer for the abuse of their mandate, not in the sense of civil law but in of public law’: Bielsa (n 
261) 595. González Calderón also argues that ‘one must always have present that the trial is political, although 
this should not be understood as an incentive to separate it from the permanent dictates of reason and of 
justice, nor to use it as an ignoble weapon of opposition or of vengeance if the charges that are made are not 
sufficiently proven’: Juan A González Calderón, Curso de derecho constitucional (6th edn, Depalma 1981) 506, 
translation my own. See also: Juan B Alberdi, Estudios Políticos: Obras Selectas, Tomo XVII (Librería “La 
Facultad” de Juan Roldán 1920) 201-202; Segundo V Linares Quintana, Tratado de la Ciencia del Derecho 
Constitucional Argentino y Comparado (Alfa 1956) 173; and Gregorio Badeni, Tratado de Derecho 
Constitucional, Tomo II (La Ley 2004) 1170. 
264 Zaffaroni and Risso (n 257257) 721. See Urdamz y Compañia vs Ezequiel Ramos Mexia, por danos y perjuicios; 
sobre procedencia del recurso extraordinario, Fallos 113: 317, where the Supreme Court explained that 
impeachment proceedings ‘amount to an exception afforded to certain public officials for reasons for public 
order, relating to the regular operation of the government created by the fundamental law, or consecrates as it 
has been correctly said, a guarantee of good government, established to defend the principle of authority’. 
Translation my own.  
265 For an argument that this provision is unconstitutional and therefore obsolete see Zaffaroni and Risso (n 257). 
Zaffaroni and Risso argue that the provision that allows the Senate to impose criminal sanctions violates a 
number of principles all linked to the right to due process in criminal law proceedings, such as right to an trial 
before independent judges, the imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of behaviour that is not 
necessarily a crime, the prohibition on life sentences in the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and 
the lack of a right of appeal of the Senate’s decision, and the imposition of arbitrary punishment.  
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commentators, before the 1994 Constitution, to classify impeachment proceedings as ‘mixed 
political-legal’.266  
 
The 1994 Constitution, however, entrusted the procedure for the removal of lower-court judges 
to the JC and the IJ in ‘what can be called a judicialization of the procedure for the removal of 
judges of inferior instances’.267 However, according to Article 115 of the Constitution, the only 
effect of a decision by the IJ will be to remove the accused from public office, thereby removing 
the dilemma present in Article 60 for these proceedings, and indicating the political nature of the 
process. Nevertheless, the allocation of this function to a JC and an IJ, clearly aimed at 
depoliticizing the process in the sense of reducing the influence of party politics. It therefore 
aimed at making the proceedings more ‘technical’ or ‘legal’ in the sense of ensuring due process 
(as shall be discussed further in Section 3.3.1 below), and ensuring that decisions are made in the 
interests of ensuring quality judicial services, not on the basis of other interests. However, within 
these technical limitations, the decision is still ultimately political in nature.   
 
Another consequence of the removal of a judge, however, is that the judge is not entitled to the 
state pension usually afforded to judges,268 the only exception being where the removal is due 
to physical or psychological inability.269 In the cases of Marquevich270 and Boggiano,271 judges 
who had been removed argued that this provision was unconstitutional given that Article 60 of 
the National Constitution states that the only effect of the removals process shall be the removal 
of the judge. This argument was however rejected by the Supreme Court in these cases, stating 
that the reason for affording judges state pensions is to protect judicial independence, and that 
it would be contradictory to afford judge that have violated that standard the same benefit. There 
still however remains some controversy around the fact that judges who resign before a decision 
is reached by the IJ are still entitled to a state pension. Whilst these judges can be subject to 
                                                 
266 Néstor P Sagüés, Elementos de Derecho Constitucional (3rd edn, Astrea 2001) 688-689. 
267 Adriana Tettamanti de Ramella, ‘Juicio Político: ¿Mecanismo de Control o Factor d Distorsión?’ in Jorge Horacio 
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269 Artice 30, Law 24,018.  
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criminal law proceedings, the standard of proof in criminal investigations is stricter, and in many 
cases the truth is never revealed and these judges are criticised for being able to act with 
impunity. This is, however, a problem linked to the inefficiency of the criminal law system,272 not 
the removals processes.  
 
3.3.1 Grounds for Removal 
 
The political nature of the decision to remove a judge is important to remember when looking at 
the grounds on which a judge can be removed. The law on this varies slightly in the three 
jurisdictions being studied here. Starting with the Federal level, Article 110 of the Constitution 
states that ‘the judges of the Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the Nation will maintain 
their employment whilst their good conduct lasts’.273 This is understood by constitutionalists as 
being a guarantee of ‘immobility’, or life tenure, designed to protect judicial independence.274 
This provision is similar to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution of the USA which states that 
‘Judges… shall hold their offices during good behaviour’. This has raised questions, in the USA, as 
to whether this provision allows for the removal of a judge when they do not have ‘good 
behaviour’.275 Due however to problems surrounding the uncertainty of interpretation of that 
phrase, and the fact that a separate article of the constitution specifically outlines on what 
grounds a judge can be removed, that theory was widely rejected.276  
 
Article 115 of the Argentine Constitution states that ‘the judges of the lower-courts of the Nation 
will be removed on the grounds set out in Article 53,277 by an IJ integrated by legislators, judges 
and lawyers enrolled in the federal registry’. Article 53, which sets out the grounds for 
impeachment of the President, Vice-President, the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers, ministers, 
                                                 
272 Leandro Giannini, ‘Las Lecciones Que Deja el “Caso Oyarbide”’ El Dia (28 April 2016) 
<www.eldia.com/nota/2016-4-28-las-lecciones-que-deja-el-caso-oyarbide> accessed 24 August 2019.  
273 It continues: ‘and will receive for their services a compensation that will be determined by law, and which will 
not be able to be diminished in any way, whilst they remain in their posts’.  
274 Sabsay and Onaindia (n 255) 337. 
275 See for example Raoul Berger, ‘Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behaviour” Tenure’ (1970) 79(8) The Yale Law 
Journal 1475. 
276 Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions (1970) 39 Fordham Law Rev, 51; 
Charles Morgan Jr et al, ‘Impeachment: An Historical Overview’ (1974) 5 Seton Hall Law Review 689, 710. 
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and members of the Supreme Court, lists these grounds as: ‘malperformance278 or for a crime 
committed in the exercise of their functions; or for common crimes’.279 There are three questions 
that arise from this provision: How can the JC or the IJ determine if a crime has been committed? 
What constitutes ‘malperformance’? and what is meant by ‘in the exercise of their functions’?  
 
Looking at these in turn, the fact that the grounds for impeachment include ‘crimes’ appears to 
be in contradiction of the recognition, described above, that only the criminal courts can judge 
crimes. This apparent contradiction is present in the Constitution of the USA and was inherited 
by the Argentinean Constitution.280 As Argentinean Supreme Court Justice Zaffaroni explains, this 
constitutional provision can only be interpreted to mean the ‘presumption of crimes, and not 
crimes in the strict sense’.281 Zaffaroni explains that if there were the need to wait until the 
criminal courts decide on the commission of a crime before proceeding with impeachment 
proceedings, ‘impeachment would never be viable’.282  
 
Zaffaroni however also points out that there may be a contradiction where an official is 
impeached for the presumption of a crime, if criminal courts subsequently rule that there was no 
crime committed. He concludes that strictly speaking, ‘the only ground which can give way to a 
removal is malperformance’, which in itself then may or may not give way to the presumption 
that a crime was committed.283 This is, he argues, the only way to ensure to separation of powers 
that entrusts judging crimes to the courts: ‘malperformance does not need to build upon the 
substantiation of a crime, even where its presumption arises as a result of it’.284 
 
The Argentineans copied the catch-all phrase ‘malperformance’ from the Colombians, who use 
it as the only grounds for removal.285 What can be deemed to be ‘malperformance’ therefore, is 
                                                 
278 After some consideration, I have translated the term mal desempeño as ‘malperformance’. I have chosen this 
term both as it is the literal translation, and to avoid confusion with other legal concepts such as ‘misconduct’ 
which may be understood differently in different jurisdictions. 
279 The term ‘common crimes’ refers to crimes regulated by the Criminal Code, as oppose to those set out in other 
laws. See J Martínez, 'Delito Común' (Enciclopedia Jurídica Argentina 2017) 
<https://argentina.leyderecho.org/delito-comun/> accessed 4 March 2019. 
280 Zaffaroni and Risso (n 257) 722. 
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extremely important. Article 25 of Law 24,937 provides a non-exhaustive list of what may 
constitute malperformance:  
 
inexcusable lack of knowledge of the law; repeated unfulfilment of the Constitution, legal 
or regulatory norms; gross negligence in the exercise of his functions; carrying out acts of 
manifest arbitrariness in the exercise of his functions; grave disorders in personal conduct; 
the abandon of his functions; the repeated application of disciplinary sanctions; and 
supervening physical or psychological inability to exercise his functions.286 
 
This clearly leaves those in charge of removals processes with a degree of discretion in 
determining what constitutes ‘malperformance’. Indeed, the term has been recognised as a 
‘”indeterminate legal concept” that needs to be specified case by case’,287 thereby purposely 
leaving a margin of discretion in its interpretation, which is in line with the political nature of the 
decision to remove a judge.  
 
The concept of ‘malperformance’ has therefore been defined only in an abstract way in the 
literature, as it would be impossible to attempt to list all circumstances that would fall within its 
ambit. Interestingly is has been characterised as being the counterpoint to the ‘good conduct’ 
provision contained in the constitution.288 The requirement contained in Article 16 of the national 
constitutions that public sector officials should be fit for their role,289 has also been considered 
relevant in interpreting the term ‘malperformance’.290 ‘In essence’, summarises Linares 
Quintana, malperformance ‘comprises exercise of a public function in a manner that is contrary 
to the public interest and benefit, on the fringes of reason, prudence, discernment and good 
judgement’.291 Bielsa agrees that malperformance ‘incorporates a lack of fitness [for office] that 
is not only professional or technical, but also moral, such as ineptitude, moral insolvency, all of 
which constitute damage to the function, that is the management of the general interest of the 
                                                 
286 Law 24,937, Consejo de la Magistratura: Creación y Funcionamiento (BO del 06/01/1998); Translation my own. 
287 Jurado de Enjuiciamiento de Magistrados, Causa No 1/2009, SCD s/Denuncia, Magistrada Rosa Elsa Parrilli OJ 8 
(BOCBA del 14/01/2010) 11.  
288 ibid. 
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nation. The public function, its efficiency, its reputation, its integral authority is essential’.292 This, 
however, does not translate into a toleration of a lack of due process or that arbitrariness is 
acceptable: ‘the discretion can apply to the evaluation of the conduct, but not in the facts that 
are alleged, because these need to be proved in order for the grounds for removal to be given.’293 
 
The grounds for removal refer to the conduct of a judge ‘in the exercise of their functions’. This 
implies that a judge cannot be removed for conduct in their personal life that does not affect the 
exercise of their functions, unless is falls under the category of ‘grave disorders of personal 
conduct’, although this leaves room for doubt as to what conduct can come under review. What 
is clear, however, and as shall be discussed further in Section 3.3.2, is that ‘in the exercise of their 
functions’ should not be interpreted to mean that judgement can be passed on the content of a 
judicial ruling. That power to review judgements lays exclusively with the courts.  
 
At the ACBA level, the provisions are largely the same as at the Federal level, with the main 
difference being that some of the grounds for removal contained in laws at the Federal level are 
included in the constitution at the ACBA level. Article 122 of the ACBA Constitution therefore lists 
the grounds for removal as: ‘commission of wilful criminal acts, malperformance, gross 
negligence, slowness in the exercise of his functions, inexcusable lack of knowledge of the law, 
and physical or psychological disability’.294 Whilst this provision also includes the catch-all phrase 
‘malperformance’, it specifically list gross negligence and physical or psychological disability as 
separate grounds for removal whereas at the Federal level those grounds were listed as examples 
of malperformance in the legislation cited above. ‘Slowness in the exercise of his functions’ and 
‘inexcusable lack of knowledge of the law’ are grounds that are not specifically listed at the 
Federal level, however may fall under the Federal category of ‘abandon of functions’, or may 
otherwise be deemed to constitute malperformance.  
 
Whilst the greater specificity of the ACBA constitutional provision therefore appears to provide 
more certainty as to the grounds for removal, the provisions are open to the same degree of 
                                                 
292 Rafael Bielsa, Derecho Constitucional (3rd edn, Roque Depalma 1959) 599-600. 
293 María Angélica Gelli, Constitución de la Nación Argentina Comentada y Concordada (La Ley 2005) 559. See also 
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discretion, in particular in relation to what constitutes ‘malperformance’. In this regard, it should 
be noted that as the ACBA Constitution took this terminology from the national constitution, 
removals proceedings at the ACBA level have looked at the interpretation of this term at the 
Federal level and even in other provinces when using it as grounds for removal.295 
 
The structure of the provisions on the removal of judges in Tucuman more closely mirrors the 
Federal laws. Article 112 of the Provincial Constitution of Tucuman states that judges shall remain 
in their posts ‘whilst their good conduct lasts’. Judges can be removed for the reasons set out in 
article 47 of the Provincial Constitution: ‘crimes committed in carrying out official functions, 
common crimes, and a failure to carry out official duties’.296 Article 4 of Law 8,199 that sets out 
the process for removing a judge, provides a non-exhaustive list of what is understood to be ‘a 
failure to carry out official duties’, another catch-all phrase resembling ‘malperformance’ at the 
Federal level:  
Where [the judge]: 
1. Demonstrates inexcusable ignorance or negligence in the exercise of his functions; 
2. Fails to carry out the duties inherent to the post in an unjustified manner; 
3. Delays his rulings with respect to the issues submitted for his decision or opinion in an 
unjustified manner, without the quantity of work providing an excuse; 
4. Manifest acts of partiality; 
5. Repetition of irregularities in proceedings; 
6. Active or concealed activities of party politics; 
7. A lack of independence manifested in the observance of influences detrimental to the 
dignity and authority of the functions of his post; 
8. Acquisition of obligations with litigants or professionals connected to him by virtue of the 
exercise of his functions; 
9. Personally exercises trade or a business. 
Law 8,199 then goes on in its Article 5 to specify that judges can be removed for either not 
fulfilling the conditions that the Constitution or laws establish for the exercise of his post, or 
supervening physical or psychological inability. 
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The breadth of the grounds for removal and lack of certainty as to its ambit could be seen to be 
a danger for judicial independence, and certainly appears to be in stark contrast to guidance on 
the grounds for removal provided in other regions, such as the guidance on judicial independence 
provided by the Council of Europe, which states that a judge should only be removed ‘in cases of 
serious breaches of disciplinary or criminal provisions established by law, or where the judge can 
no longer perform judicial functions’.297  Such grounds, the Council of Europe recommends, 
‘should be defined in precise terms by the law’.298  
 
Whilst some degree of discretion in defining ‘malperformance’ is consistent with the political 
nature of the decision to remove a judge and the constitutional role of judge in Argentina as 
discussed in Section 3.2.1, further guidance, clarity and certainty would be beneficial to the 
protection of judicial independence. Indeed, Principle 18 of the UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary states that ‘judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only 
for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders then unfit to discharge their duties’, and 
Principle 19 goes on to specify that whether or not judges have displayed such behaviour shall 
be determined ‘in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct’.299 
 
What this discretion in deciding on the removal of judges makes clear is that it increases the 
already existent need for absolute transparency in removals proceedings, to be carried out in line 
with clear pre-defined rules and in accordance with due process requirements, to ensure that 
such discretion cannot be abused to the detriment of judicial independence. In this sense, the 
best practices from other regions are certainly instructive. In addition, it is important to define 
the limits within which the discretion to remove a judge must act: that is, that this discretion 
must under no circumstances impinge upon or negatively affect judicial independence. In this 
respect, international best practice can also be a helpful guide.  
 
                                                 
297 Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Judges: 
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3.3.2 Removals and Interferences in the Judicial Function  
 
The process for the removal of a judge would infringe on judicial independence where a 
disciplinary panel revises the substantive content of a legal ruling made by a judge. This is the 
case for two reasons: first from an institutional perspective, the power to revise judicial decisions 
lays exclusively with the judiciary; and secondly because it would impact the impartiality of 
individual judges. If the way a judge choses to decide may affect whether or not he is removed, 
judges may rule to appease certain interests in order not to be removed. This therefore goes to 
the very heart of the protection of judicial independence and is a clear limit on the functioning 
and discretion of any judicial disciplinary body.  
 
This principle has been recognised internationally. The Council of Europe in its Recommendation 
No R (94)12, Principle I (2)(a)(i) provides that ‘decisions of judges should not be the subject of 
any revision outside the appeals procedures as provided for by law’. The Consultative Council of 
European Judges (CCJE) has also states that ‘court inspection systems, in the countries where 
they exist, should not concern themselves with the merits or the correctness of decisions’   
recognising that judges need to be able to focus solely on ‘the proper performance of their role, 
which is to come to a carefully considered decision in keeping with the interests of those seeking 
justice’.300 The CCJE’s Magna Carta of Judges also recognizes that ‘judicial independence shall be 
guaranteed in respect of… [the] discipline… of the judiciary.’301 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established the same principle. In the 2001 case 
of Constitutional Court v Peru, it stated that impeachment proceedings cannot be used against 
judges ‘to control the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal, nor to exercise 
pressure against its magistrates, because that would constitute… an illegitimate interference in 
the function of the judges, which would debilitate the democratic system of government’.302 In 
the 2008 case of Apitz Barbera et al v Venezuela, judges were removed for purported judicial 
error, following the overturning of their judgement by a higher court. The IACHR ruled that this 
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did not constitute a valid grounds for removal, and endangered judicial independence given that 
judges need to be able to decide cases independently, without regard to how their decision may 
be perceived by a higher court.303 In the 2009 case of Reverón Trujillo,304 adopting principles 2, 3 
and 4 of the UN Basic Principle on the Independence of the Judiciary, it stated that judges should 
decide cases ‘without any undue restriction, and without influences, incentives, pressures, 
threats, or interference, be it direct or indirect, from any sectors or for any reason’.  
 
There is however one exception to this rule that is generally recognised. As set out in by the 
Council of Europe: ‘The interpretation of the law, assessment of facts or weighing of evidence 
carried out by judges to determine cases should not give rise to civil or disciplinary liability, except 
in cases of malice and gross negligence.’305 This makes sense in the context, for example, of a 
suspicion that a judge was bribed to rule in favour of one of the litigants. Whilst the proper course 
for the litigant to take in order to remedy this wrong is an appeal, a separate or parallel 
disciplinary procedure would be beneficial to upholding the integrity of the judiciary. A failure to 
consider relevant evidence or a lack of reasoning in the decision could then, in addition to other 
evidence, be very relevant information for a disciplinary committee. Alternatively where a 
judgement cites legal provisions incorrectly or makes other inexcusable mistakes, a complaint 
based on gross negligence may be warranted, and would require a disciplinary committee to 
review the judge’s decision.  
 
The important distinction between a disciplinary body reviewing a judicial decision for gross 
negligence or malice, and a court reviewing a judicial decision on appeal is that the former is 
looking at the decision in order to assess the judge’s conduct and knowledge of the law, whilst 
the latter reviews judicial reasoning in light of its consistency with the law, therefore carrying out 
the function of interpreting the law that is the exclusive jurisdiction of the judiciary. Removals 
processes therefore can hold a judge accountable for the way in which they carry out their 
function and make decisions in light of standards of judicial quality and impartiality. Judges 
should not be held accountable for their rulings as policy-agents.  
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This has been recognized in Argentina as far back as 1969. The Supreme Court stated that in order 
to protect the independence of judges, and therefore the impartiality of justice, judges should 
have ‘full liberty of deliberation and decision’, and that this would ‘be affected if judges would 
be exposed to the risk of being removed for the only fact that the considerations published in 
their rulings can be objected, in so far – of course – they do not constitute crimes prohibited by 
law or translate moral or intellectual ineptitude that disable the performance their duties’.306 
 
This rule that judges cannot be removed for the content of their decisions has been reiterated 
on several occasions and was clearly expressed recently by the Superior Tribunal of Tucuman, 
following guidance from the national Supreme Court, in the 2009 ruling in the case of  the 
removal of Judge Freidenberg: ‘The ample rule of exclusivity in the political evaluation of the 
conduct of judges must harmonise with the immovability that the Carta Magna itself guarantees 
members of the provincial judiciary.’307 On these grounds, the Superior Tribunal concluded that 
the members of the judiciary ‘cannot be removed for a mere disconformity with the content of 
its decisions’.308 However, the need to look to judicial decisions as proof of malperformance in 
some cases has also been recognised. In the accusation against the former Supreme Court Judge 
Boggiano, it was argued that ‘in impeachment proceedings, the content of a ruling is not analysed 
juridically, rather the ruling is studied as an object or instrument of the malperformance of a 
magistrate’.309 
 
3.3.3 Due Process Requirements  
 
The political nature of the decision to remove a judge does not exempt it from needing to comply 
with due process requirements:310 ‘the political character attributed to this procedure does not 
reflect an agonal conception of politics, but rather high architectural politics, that is subject to 
the rule of the law.’311 The powers of the state are legally regulated by the constitution and the 
principle of the rule of law. Any political acts of government, including impeachment or removals 
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proceedings, therefore need to conform to constitutional norms. Indeed the very fact that 
removals proceedings derive from the constitution ‘means that it cannot travel down arbitrary 
political paths, but rather in conformity with legal precepts’.312 Due process requirements 
therefore ensure that the removal process fulfils its intended purpose of guaranteeing the proper 
functioning of the state, and protects it from arbitrary decisions based on other political, partisan, 
or particularistic criteria.  
 
The need for removals processes to ensure due process is recognised internationally. Principle 
17 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary states that ‘a charge or 
complaint made against a judge… shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an 
appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing.’313 The UN Human Rights 
Committee has also stated that ‘judges may be dismissed only… in accordance with fair 
procedures ensuring objectivity and impartiality set out in the constitution or the law’.314 The 
Council of Europe has stated that disciplinary ‘proceedings should be conducted by an 
independent authority or a court with all the guarantees of a fair trial and provide the judge with 
the right to challenge the decision and sanction. Disciplinary sanctions should be 
proportionate’.315  
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has repeatedly found that the dismissal of 
judges without regard to due process rights and the right to defence violates the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).316 Notably, the IACHR ruled that this was even the case in 
the dismissal of temporary judges, stating that the lack of tenure for temporary judges fails to 
guarantee judicial independence and is therefore in violation of the ACHR.317 In one such case, 
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the IACHR ruled that the removal of twenty-seven judges of the Supreme Court of Ecuador in by 
the National Congress in 2004 was in violation of due process requirement. In that case, the 
judges had not been notified of the hearing in the Congress and were granted no opportunity to 
defend themselves. Additionally, their removal was the result of a political bargain in the context 
of threats of impeachment against the President of Ecuador, and used the excuse that the judges 
had been wrongly appointed as grounds to remove them. The court did not consider this proper 
grounds for removal as there was no consideration of the conduct of the judges, and the 
constitutional court failed to provide the judges with any means of redress.   
 
The Council of Europe recommends that ‘the law provide for appropriate procedures to ensure 
that judges in question are given at least all the due process requirements of the Convention’, 
specifying that this should include ‘that the cases should be heard within a reasonable time and 
that they should have a right to answer any charges’.318 The European Network of Councils for 
the Judiciary (ENCJ) emphasizes the need for proceedings to be conducted in a reasonable time, 
stating that ‘the Council should ensure the efficient and transparent management and processing 
of complaints, which should be dealt with efficiently. Lengthy investigations, which could 
negatively impact upon the career of a judge, should be avoided’.319 In order for this to be 
achieved the ENCJ recommends that ‘each Council should have its own guidelines or standards 
in relation to discipline, clearly outlining disciplinary procedures and penalties’.320   
 
The Council of Europe also establishes that disciplinary ‘decisions shall be controlled by a superior 
judicial organ’.321 The CCJE has also reiterated this on many occasions, explaining that ‘the 
arrangements regarding disciplinary proceedings in each country should be such as to allow an 
appeal from the initial disciplinary body (whether that is itself an authority, tribunal or court) to 
                                                 
318 Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, 
Efficiency and Role of Judges, No R (94)12, Principle VI-3. 
319 European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, ‘Recommendations on Councils for the Judiciary in Europe, 
Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011’ (2011) Recommendation 3.12. 
320 ibid. 
321 Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, 
Efficiency and Role of Judges, No R (94)12, Principle VI-3. 
Page 96 of 366 
 
a court’.322 Fundamental Principle number 6 of the CCJE’s Magna Carta of Judges also reflects 
this, specifying the need for ‘the possibility of recourse before a court’.323 
 
However, it is important to note that due process requirements do not only apply to the form of 
the proceedings and the judge’s right of defence; ‘legitimacy and reasonability are standards of 
evaluation that cannot be absent from impeachment proceedings’.324 This has also been 
confirmed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that has stated, referring specifically to 
impeachment proceedings: ‘the Court deems it necessary to recall that every person subject to 
a trial of any nature before a body of the state must be afforded the guarantee that said body is 
competent, independent, and impartial, and acts in accordance with the legal process foreseen 
for the acceptance and resolution of the case submitted to it’.325  
 
In this vein, the Consultative Council of European Judges also specifies that it is important that 
disciplinary matters are fulfilled in an independent manner.326 The ENCJ further emphasises the 
importance of disciplinary proceedings being ‘assigned to a body that is entirely free from 
political interference or influence’,327 being careful to note that proceedings should also not be 
influenced by ‘motivations of self-interest, self protection or self referencing’ on the part of the 
judiciary.328  
 
The right to due process and the right to defence are protected under article 18 of the Argentine 
Constitution. Whilst these rights were originally conceived within the framework of criminal law 
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proceedings, they have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to apply to all types of judicial or 
administrative processes.329 The Supreme Court has explained that ‘the condition of being a body 
that applied the constitution which applies to those who have the duty to impart justice in a 
republican system – even in the case of impeachment – is inextricably linked to the obligation to 
preserve the guarantees of due process’.330  
 
Under Article 115 of the Constitution, the decisions of the FIJ are not appealable. The Supreme 
Court has however allowed appeals for ‘grave violations of form’,331 where the violation of the 
right of defence was sufficiently grave to alter the nature of the process.332 The Supreme Court 
has also ruled that the impeachment of provincial judges by a body external to the provincial 
judiciary can be revised by the courts, and that court decisions in such cases can be appealed to 
the national Supreme Court.333 In order for this rule to be upheld, it has been argued that 
decisions by impeachment juries to remove a judge must be revisable by the courts, not only in 
terms of whether or not due process was ensured, but also in terms of whether the grounds for 
the removal violate the principle that judges cannot be removed for the content of their rulings, 
and therefore whether the decision endangers judicial independence.334  
 
In addition to affording judges their individual rights to a fair trial, due process is also necessary 
from the institutional perspective of maintaining both judicial independence and accountability. 
This cuts both ways: where removals processes are carried out in accordance with due process 
guarantees, it will help ensure both that judges are not unduly removed, which would affect 
judicial independence, but also that judges are not unduly protected, which would affect judicial 
accountability. This in turn will also help maintain the public’s trust in the process, and 
consequently, in the judiciary.  
                                                 
329 Provincia de Santiago del Estero v Enrique N Compagno, Fallos 198:78; López Osvaldo Antonio (ex Cabo 
Primero), Fallos 310:1797; Adriana Tettamanti de Ramella, ‘Homenaje a la Constitución Nacional. Evocación de 
los Objetivos del Preámbulo Desde una Perspectiva Jurisprudencial’ (2005) Revista Jurídica de la Universidad de 
Ciencias Empresariales y Sociales 224.  
330 ATE San Juan, Secretario General Héctor Sánchez s/ juicio político- inconstitucionalidad, Fallos 317: 885. 
331 German J Bidart Campos, El Derecho Constitucional del Poder (Ediar 1967) 386-387. See also Zaffaroni and Risso 
(n 257Error! Bookmark not defined.) 272. 
332 Nicosia, Alberto Oscar, Fallos 316: 2940. See also Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, Secretaria de 
Jurisprudencia, Recurso Extraordinario y Recurso de Queja: Parte 1 (CSJN 2011) 111-131; Tettamanti de Ramella 
(n 267). 
333 Graffigna Latino, Carlos y otros, Fallos 308:961. 
334 Carmen Fontán, ‘Juicio Político y Control de Razonabilidad’ (2010) La Ley Sup Const, 12. 
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3.4 The Procedure for Removing a Judge  
3.4.1 Procedure at the Federal Level  
Any person who knows of an act or omission that may constitute grounds for the removal of a 
judge can file a complaint before the FJC.335 All complaints need to be made in writing, and the 
signed original brought to the Front Desk of the FJC in Buenos Aires.336 Anonymous complaints 
are not allowed under any circumstances,337 and whilst there are no very strict requirement as 
to how a complaint must be set out, the law does prescribe what points must be covered in the 
complaint.338 These include the personal details and ID of the person making the complaint, his 
contact details, the name of the judge being complained about and which court he works in, a 
complete recount of the facts that lead to the complaint, specification of the charges being made, 
and the evidence that the complainant is relying on to prove the facts. Where the complainant is 
in possession of that evidence, he must submit it with the complaint. If not, he must ‘indicate 
with precision the place in which it can be found and/or the person who has it in their control’.339 
 
The General Secretariat of the FJC registers and opens a file for the complaint, which is sent to 
the President of the FJC, who then sends the file to the CDA.340 Where the complaint does not 
fulfil the requirements set out above, the President of the Commission can give the complainant 
three days to modify the complaint. 341 If this does not happen the Commission will propose to 
the plenary of the FJC to reject the complaint ‘in limine’.342 The Commission may also propose to 
immediately reject the complaint where it is ‘manifestly inadmissible, or when in the opinion of 
the Commission it only manifests a mere disagreement with the content of a judicial ruling’.343 
The plenary can decide to reject a complaint in limine by a majority of the councillors present at 
the meeting, as long as there is a quorum of a minimum of seven councillors.344 
                                                 
335 Article 2, Reglamento de la Comisión de Disciplina y Acusación (Reglamento CDA), approved by Resolución CM 
98/2207 (BO del 28/03/2007). 
336 Article 4, Reglamento CDA.  
337 ibid. 
338 Article 5, Reglamento CDA. 
339 Article 5, Reglamento CDA. 
340 Article 6, Reglamento CDA. 
341 Article 7, Reglamento CDA. 
342 Articles 7 and 8, Reglamento CDA. 
343 Article 8, Reglamento CDA. 
344 Article 9, Law 24,937, Consejo de la Magistratura: Creación y Funcionamiento (BO del 06/01/1998) (Law 
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If a complaint is accepted, it is assigned a ‘Reporting Councillor’,345 by way of a public raffle.346 
The Reporting Councillor may then also propose that the complaint is rejected at the first 
Commission meeting after the allocation of the file.347 The judge in question will also be notified 
of the complaint and provided with a period of twenty days within which to submit a written 
defence and provide evidence.348 The Commission will then collect all of the evidence that it 
deems relevant, and the evidence that the judge has requested they collect.349 This may include 
the collection of oral testimony.350 Except in cases where it would put the objective of the 
collection of evidence at risk, the judge has the right to be present during all oral testimony, and 
ask the witness any questions he deems pertinent.351 The Commission also has the power to 
request any relevant documentation or information from judges, authorities or any other legal 
or physical persons, as well as to request information from the relevant judge in any criminal 
proceedings into the same facts. 352 
 
Once all of the evidence has been collected, the Reporting Councillor presents the Commission 
with a proposed decision, either to recommend the rejection of the complaint to the plenary of 
the JC, or to proceed further with the investigation.353 The Commission must decide on the 
proposal by the Reporting Councillor within the next four Commission meetings.354 Where to 
Commission resolved to continue investigations, a date and time will be fixed for the judge to 
appear in person and provide an oral defence.355 The judge will be provided with at least ten 
days’ notice of the hearing, and will be provided with a synthesis of the alleged facts, the 
provisional particulars of the charges against him, and a summary of the evidence, which will also 
                                                 
24,937). 
345 Consejero informante in Spanish.  
346 Article 10, Reglamento CDA. 
347 ibid. 
348 Article 11, Reglamento CDA. 
349 Article 15, Reglamento CDA. 
350 Article 17, Reglamento CDA. 
351 ibid. 
352 Article 16, Reglamento CDA. 
353 Article 19, Reglamento CDA. 
354 idib. 
355 Article 20, Reglamento CDA. 
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be made available to him in their entirety.356 The judge has the right to request the collection of 
further evidence relating to any new facts or situations not previously known to him.357 
 
Within a period of twenty days following this hearing and the collection of any further evidence 
requested by the judge, the councillor appointed by the Commission to do so must put together 
a proposed Decision in order to propose to the plenary of the JC to either reject the complaint, 
impose a disciplinary sanction, or open a process for the removal of the judge before an IJ.358 The 
vote of two thirds of councillors present at the meeting is needed to open a removals process 
before a jury.359 The plenary is only allowed to make the decision to open removal proceedings 
within three years of the complaint against the judge being filed,360 and the decision cannot be 
appealed in any way.361 Where the plenary decides to open removals proceedings, two 
councillors will be appointed by the plenary to accuse the judge before the IJ.362 The FJC must 
immediately communicate its decision to open a removals process against a judge to the 
government.363  
 
The IJ in charge of the removals process364 is composed of seven members, including two judges 
(both appeal court judges, one from Buenos Aires, the other from the Federal courts of the 
“interior” of the country), four legislators (two senators, and two from congress, in each case one 
representing the majority party and the other the first minority), and one federal lawyer.365 
Members are elected by way of a public raffle every six months.366 The Jury only becomes active 
                                                 
356 ibid. 
357 Article 21, Reglamento CDA. 
358 Article 22, Reglamento CDA, and Article 14, Law 24,937. 
359 Article 7(7), Law 24937 as modified by Article 3 of Law 26080. Note that in 2013, Law 26,855 modified this 
provision to require only an absolute majority of votes for the opening of a removals process, however 
according to Article 29 of the same law, that provision was subject to the changes in the composition of the FJC 
coming into force, and as those were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case of Rizzo, the 
modifications never came into force. 
360 ibid. 
361 ibid. 
362 Article 22, Reglamento CDA. 
363 Article 14, Law 24,937. 
364 Article 15, Const Nacional (Arg).  
365 Article 22, Law 24,937. 
366 Article 22, Law 24,937. 
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once the plenary of the FJC decides to open removals proceedings,367 and from that point 
onwards, members remain on the jury for the duration of the trial of the judge in question.368  
 
Proceedings before the IJ are oral and public, and must ensure the right of defence of the judge 
in question.369 Proceedings cannot be interrupted or suspended, except in extraordinary or 
unpredictable circumstances that make it necessary.370 Once the judge has been notified of the 
accusation (within ten days of it being approved and sent the IJ),371 there is a period of thirty days 
for the production of evidence.372 Both parties can offer evidence under the rules of the National 
Code for Criminal Procedure, and evidence that is considered ‘misleading or merely dilatory’ can 
be rejected.373 Within a maximum of thirty days of all of the evidence having been presented, 
the JC, followed immediately by the accused judge, will orally present a final report.374 The Jury 
will then meet in order to deliberate the matter and must reach a decision within a maximum 
period of twenty days.375 A vote of two thirds of the members of the IJ is necessary to remove a 
judge.376 
 
  
  
                                                 
367 Article 1, Reglamento Procesal del Jurado de Enjuiciamiento de los Magistrados, approved by Resolución 26/99 
(BO del 26/04/1999) (Reglamento Jurado). 
368 Article 23, Law 24,937. In addition, no person can be a member of the jury more than once.  
369 Article 25, Law 24,937. 
370 Article 26(5), Law 24,937. 
371 Article 26(2), Law 24,937. 
372 Article 26(3), Law 24,937. This period may be extended by a maximum of fifteen days on a vote of the majority 
of the jurors following an express and justified request.  
373 Article 26(4), Law 24,937. 
374 Article 26(6), Law 24,937. 
375 Article 26(7), Law 24,937.  
376 Article 25, Law 24,937. 
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Figure 1: The Process for the Removal of Federal Judges 
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3.4.2 Procedure at the ACBA Level377 
The procedure at the ACBA level is similar, but there are some important differences. Any citizen 
who knows of grounds for the removal of a judge can formulate a complaint before the JC.378 
Complaints must be made in writing, and the original copy, along with a copy, presented to the 
front desk of the JC.379 The copy is stamped and returned to the complainant, along with a 
notification that he must ratify his complaint in person within two days.380 Complaints cannot be 
anonymous,381 and must additionally specify who the complaint is about, the facts and 
circumstances that lead to the complaint being made, the charges being made, as well as to set 
out the proof of the facts.382 If the complainant has the proof in his possession, he must attach it 
to the complaint; if not, he needs to ‘indicate with precision, the place it can be found and/or the 
person who has it.383 Once a complaint is filed, the complainant is not part of any of the further 
proceedings, but does have the right to be notified of the end result.384 
Within 24 hours of being received by the Front Desk, complaints are sent to the CDA,385 where 
they are registered in detail.386 The Secretary of the CDA then immediately informs the President 
of the JC of the complaint.387 The President of the Commission then informs the rest of the 
members of the Commission.388 The Commission is made up of three councillors: one judge 
councillor, one lawyer councillor, and one legislator councillor, who are appointed to the 
Commission for one year,389 and meet on a weekly basis.390 The President of the Commission can 
                                                 
377 As previously stated, the law set out here is as it stood at the time the interviews for this thesis were conducted 
in 2014. The regulation of the removals process was substituted in 2018 by Reglamento Disciplinario del Poder 
Judicial de la CABA Excluido el Tribunal Superior de Justicia y los Empleados y Funcionarios del Ministerio 
Publico, approved by Resolución CM 19/2018 (BOCBA del 08/03/2018). 
378 Article 17, Law 54, Jurado de Enjuiciamiento y Procedimiento de Remoción de Magistrados e Integrantes del 
Ministerio Publico de la CABA (BOCBA del 19/08/1998) (Law 54).  
379 Article 3, Reglamento Disciplinario para Magistrados e Integrantes del Ministerio Público, approved by 
Resolución 272 CMCABA/08 (BOCBA del 13/05/2008) (Reglamento Disciplinario CABA). 
380 ibid. However, the CDA may choose to investigate a complaint even where it is not ratified if it deems the facts 
to be credible: Article 4, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
381 Although the CDA and plenary may choose to investigate an anonymous complaint where they deem it to be 
merited. Article 3, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
382 Article 3, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
383 Article 3(e), Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
384 Article 2, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
385 Article 39(1), Ley Orgánica del Consejo de la Magistratura No 31 (BOCBA del 29/06/1998) (Law 31). 
386 Article 4, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
387 ibid. 
388 Article 4, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
389 Article 14, Reglamento Plenario y Comisiones. 
390 Article 17, Reglamento Plenario y Comisiones. 
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require the complainant to clarify or correct the complaint where it is unclear or does not fulfil 
the requirements.391 The Commission then has ten days to take preliminary measures to clarify 
the facts, including summoning the judge to provide more details.392  
 
Once these initial measures have been taken, the Commission will either proceed to propose that 
the plenary rejects the complaint where it is ‘manifestly inadmissible’,393 or it will resolve to 
continue the process.394 Where the facts are not grounds for removal under article 122 of the 
ACBA Constitution, but constitute a disciplinary offence, the Commission can instead pursue the 
relevant disciplinary proceedings.395 Where the Commission choses to continue the process, the 
judge will be notified of the existence of the process, and the content of the complaint against 
him.396 The Commission must then summon the judge to provide a defence, including 
documental evidence, within five days.397  
 
The Commission then has five days to provide the plenary with justified opinion, proposing either 
to accuse the judge before a jury, to dismiss the complaint, or to pursue disciplinary action 
against the judge.398 The decision to accuse a judge before an IJ requires a quorum of seven 
councillors, and a favourable vote from two thirds of the total number of councillors (six votes 
out of nine).399 The sessions of the plenary of the JC are public.400 If the plenary decides to accuse 
the judge before the IJ, they must, in the same resolution, appoint one Councillor who will pursue 
the accusation.401 
 
Once the Plenary of the JC decides to open removals proceedings, the members of an IJ are 
assigned by way of a raffle within three days.402 The judge must be notified of the opening of a 
                                                 
391 Article 3, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
392 Article 6, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
393 Article 8(a), Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
394 Article 8(c), Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
395 Article 8(b), Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
396 Article 8(d), Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
397 Article 10, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
398 Article 11, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
399 Article 22(b), Law 31. 
400 Article 6, Reglamento Plenario y Comisiones. 
401 Article 12, Reglamento Disciplinario CABA. 
402 Article 13, Law 54.  
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removals process and informed of the date and location of the raffle.403 The raffle is conducted 
before the President of the JC, and the nominees must be notified within three days.404 The judge 
must also be notified of the result of the raffle.405 The IJ is made up of nine members, of which 
three are legislators, three are lawyers, and three are judges, one of which is a member of the 
ACBA Supreme Court and acts as President of the Jury.406 
 
The proceedings before the IJ are oral and public and duly guarantee the right of defence of the 
accused.407 The accusation needs to be filed within five days of the formation of the IJ, and must 
be duly founded, contain the relevant facts, and offer sufficient proof of those facts.408 The judge 
is then sent the accusation along with all of the documentation and has a period of ten days to 
submit his own evidence.409 This evidence is in turn provided to the accusers, and the Jury has 
five days to decide on the admissibility of the evidence.410 Once all of the evidence has been 
submitted, the Jury sets a date for the oral debate, which must be within a maximum of twenty 
days.411  
 
The oral hearing must be carried out on consecutive days until it is finished,412 and allow the 
judge to be heard and provide for the opportunity for all of the evidence to be heard.413 Where 
the evidence was submitted in writing prior to the hearing, it is read aloud.414 Once all of the 
evidence has been heard, the accusation and defence both make their statements.415 The 
content of the whole hearing is documented.416 Once the closing statements have been heard, 
the Jury must immediately start their private deliberations, 417 and must issue its verdict within a 
                                                 
403 ibid. 
404 Article 14, Law 54. 
405 Article 14 Law 54. 
406 Article 2, Law 54. These members are selected by way of a raffle from a list of 24 members which includes two 
members of the ACBA Supreme Court, eight legislators, six judges, and eight lawyers. These members are 
elected by their peers for a period of four years and can be re-elected. See Articles 3-12.  
407 Article 18, Law 54. 
408 Article 19, Law 54. 
409 Article 20, Law 54. 
410 Article 21, Law 54. 
411 ibid. 
412 Article 23, Law 54. 
413 Article 22, Law 54. 
414 ibid. 
415 ibid. 
416 Article 24, Law 54. 
417 Article 26, Law 54. 
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period of forty-eight hours.418 The jury can only decide to either reject the accusation or to 
remove the judge from his post, with no other consequences. For a judge to be removed, a 
minimum of five votes is necessary.419  
 
The process at the ACBA level is therefore more tightly regulated than at the federal level in 
terms of how much time each step can take. There is a short timeframe in which the ACBA CDA 
must decide to accept or reject complaints, which does not exist at the federal level. The ACBA 
CDA must also provide the plenary with a decision as to whether to accuse the judge or reject a 
complaint within five days of receiving a judge’s defence, whereas the timeframe stipulated at 
the Federal level is less precise, specifying only that the Reporting Councillor suggest a resolution 
to the CDA within twenty days of all evidence being collected. There is however no time limit for 
how long the collection of evidence can take at the federal level.  
 
This may be due to another big difference between the two jurisdictions: all evidence collected 
by the ACBA CDA is documental, whereas the federal CDA must hear a judge’s oral defence and 
can collect oral testimony. Both approaches may have advantages: a more rigorous investigation 
process early on at the federal level may protect a judge from unnecessary proceedings before a 
jury, however by entrusting the evaluation of oral evidence to a jury at the ACBA level, due 
process may be better protected. The success of these different models in practice will be 
illustrated in the findings chapter of this thesis (4, 5, and 6).  
                                                 
418 Article 27, Law 54. 
419 Article 27, Law 54, and Article 123, ACBA Constitution.  
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Figure 2: The Process for the Removal of ACBA Judges 
 
 
 
3.4.3 Procedure in Tucuman  
Complaints must be made in writing to the PIC of the provincial legislature and contain the 
information prescribed by the law,420 including the personal details of the person making the 
complaint, his contact details, the name of the judge being complained about, a recount of the 
facts that lead to the complaint, specification of causes for removal being invoked, and the 
evidence that the complainant is relying on to prove the facts. Where the complainant is in 
possession of that evidence, he must submit it with the complaint. If not, he must ‘indicate with 
precision the place in which it can be found’. The details of proposed witnesses must also be 
provided.  
 
                                                 
420 Article 6, Law 8199, Enjuiciamiento a los miembros de los Ministerios Fiscal y Pupilar y Magistrados del Poder 
Judicial no sometidos a Juicio Político (BOT del 12/08/2009) (Law 8199). 
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Complaints can be made by ‘any resident of the province’, the provincial Supreme Court, and the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office.421 Complaints need to be presented to the secretariat of the 
legislature of Tucuman, who will then forward them to the PIC within two days.422 The 
Commission will then request the complainant to ratify the complaint within two days, giving him 
a second opportunity to do so where necessary.423 The Commission may also request that the 
complainant expands on the complaint.  
 
Once a complaint has been ratified, the Commission has fifteen days to review the complaint, 
and to decide, by a vote of two thirds of the total of its members, that the issue on which the 
complaint is based ‘deserves to be addressed’, in which case it will notify the legislature of its 
decision within two days.424 If the complaint is ‘manifestly unfounded, false, malicious, or 
reckless, or is based in facts that do not constitute grounds that… authorize the process’, then 
the Commission will stipulate the archiving of the action.425  
 
Where the Commission archives a complaint, either because the complaint it not ratified, or for 
one of the grounds set out above, the Commission must inform the Legislature of this within two 
days, and the legislature has the authority, by a vote of two thirds of present members, to impose 
a fine on the complainant of up to seventy-five percent of his monthly wages.426 That fine will be 
given either to the accused (where a complaint is not ratified), or to the library of the legislature 
(where it is archived following the consideration of the Commission).427  
 
Once a complaint has been accepted by the Commission, the judge is notified within two days,428 
and given fifteen days to respond.429 The response must contain the judge’s defence to each of 
the accusations against him, evidence, including the details of proposed witnesses, and where 
the documentation can be found.430 The Commission then has twenty days to consider the 
                                                 
421 Article 129, Const Prov Tuc.  
422 Article 7, Law 8199. Where the complaint does not fulfil the requirements prescribed by law, the Commission 
will give the complainant two days to rectify the complaint, or declare it inadmissible.  
423 Article 9, Law 8199. 
424 Article 10, Law 8199. 
425 ibid. 
426 Articles 9 and 10, Law 8199.  
427 Article 9, Law 8199. 
428 Under Article 124(4) Const Prov Tuc, the judge has the right to know about the complaint.  
429 Article 11, Law 8199.  
430 Article 12, Law 8199.  
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judge’s response, and to decide to open removals proceedings before an IJ.431 The Commission 
has the authority to broaden the facts and the grounds of the accusation, until they decide to 
open proceedings before an IJ.432  
 
The Commission also has broad powers to collect evidence: under Article 124(3) of the provincial 
constitution, ‘the commission will have the faculty to call witnesses of any category and even 
that of compelling them where necessary, receive their statements and make use of all legal 
means for the clarification of the facts being investigated’. The accused judge in turn, has the 
right to be heard, to offer evidence, and to question any witnesses that provide a statement.433 
 
A vote of two thirds of the members of the PIC is necessary to open impeachment proceedings 
before an IJ.434 Where the Commission decides to make a formal accusation, the judge must be 
notified within twenty-four hours.435 If a judge resigns, the action is ended, and where the 
Commission suspects that a crime has been committed by the judge, it must remit the file to the 
judiciary.436 
 
Article 47 of the provincial constitution stipulates that those subject to impeachment 
proceedings cannot be suspended from their office during the proceedings. Under Article 131 of 
the provincial constitution, the impeachment procedure for judges will be the same as for other 
officials unless specified. Once the IJ receives the accusation, it must fix a date and time to hear 
the accusation, which must take place within two days. The judge will be summoned to attend. 
Once all of the evidence has been heard, the Jury will set a date, within five working days, to hear 
the parties’ arguments about the merit of the evidence.437  
 
The members of the jury will then, within two working days, have a private session to discuss the 
merits of the case.438 Their deliberations cannot exceed five consecutive days.439 Once they have 
                                                 
431 Article 13, Law 8199.  
432 Article 14, Law 8199.  
433 Article 124(4), Const Prov Tuc. 
434 Article 48 and 124(5), Const Prov Tuc. 
435 Article 13, Law 8199.  
436 Article 14, Law 8199.  
437 Article 20, Law 8199.  
438 Article 21, Law 8199.  
439 Article 21, Law 8199. 
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finished their deliberations, a public session will be convened within two working days to declare 
the final resolution by way of a roll call vote.440 The President of the Jury will ask each member 
of the jury to vote yes or no with respect to each charge.441 
 
The whole process before the IJ must not take more than ninety days.442 The Jury can decide 
either to remove the judge, to absolve him, or to remit the file to the Supreme Court of the 
province to consider lesser disciplinary sanctions.443 A vote of two thirds of the members of the 
IJ are necessary for a judge to be ‘declared guilty’.444 The provincial constitution explicitly 
stipulates that ‘the decision will not have any effect other than to remove the accused and may 
declare him unable to hold any position of honour or on a salary from the province’.445 It also 
specifies that ‘the ruling of the IJ cannot be appealed and not subject to revision by the 
judiciary’.446 
 
The procedure is therefore more streamlined than at the Federal and ACBA level as the legislative 
committee carries out all of the investigations and makes all of the decisions, whilst at the Federal 
and ACBA level those responsibilities are divided between CDA and the plenary of the JC. This 
may have the advantage of avoiding the slow and difficult decision-making process of a larger 
body such as the legislature which historically made the process very slow and inefficient. 
However, it may also make it easier to bring a judge before a jury, which may have repercussions 
in terms of judicial independence. The procedure in Tucuman, like at the ACBA level, has tight 
timeframes for every step in the process, which may also improve the efficiency of the process 
and avoid investigations hanging over a judge for long periods of time. How this procedure works 
in practice shall be further explored in Chapter 5 where the interviews with stakeholders in this 
process shall be analysed.   
                                                 
440 Article 21, Law 8199.  
441 Article 21, Law 8199.  
442 Article 23, Law 8199. The legislative recess and court holidays do not apply to the IJ.  
443 Article 22, Law 8199, and Article 130, Const Prov Tuc. 
444 Article 130, Const Prov Tuc. 
445 Article 130, Const Prov Tuc. 
446 Article 130, Const Prov Tuc. 
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Figure 3: Process for the Removal of Judges of the Provincial Judiciary of Tucuman 
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3.5 Potential Problems with the Removals Process  
The introduction of law 26,080 changing the composition of the FJC to the current composition, 
lead commentators to criticise what they saw as ‘a real advance of the governing party over the 
independence of the institution’.447 It was noted that the current composition ‘allows the 
majoritarian political sector to prevail over the others, affecting in this way the independence of 
the judiciary of the Nation, a fact that is seen by the public opinion and by analysts as one of the 
biggest shortcomings of our political system’.448 The FJC has also been criticised for its ‘slowness 
and the suspicions of partiality that society has about it’.449 
 
This criticism is based on the number of councillors that represent the political branches of 
government, and in particular the number of councillors that belong to the governing political 
party. The criticism is therefore rooted in an assumption that these councillors will use their 
position on the council to advance partisan, or other improper interests. Roth identifies this 
composition as creating the potential for the governing party to engage in ‘behaviour that is 
harmful for the independence of the judiciary’, but also points out that corporativist behaviour 
by judges may also be harmful.450 This leads Roth to conclude that the proper functioning of the 
FJC will be dependent not only on the regulatory framework, but also on ‘the role of the 
actors’.451 The challenge, as Tettamanti puts it, is ‘therefore, that the institutional practice does 
not rebuff the constitutional intent, and that politics is not placed as an impassable barrier before 
law and justice, with the aim that impeachment functions as an efficient system of control and 
not as a distorting factor in the delicate and fragile equilibrium of the powers’.452 
 
Hammergren however points out that ‘in the arguments over who should oversee the 
administrative apparatus, the quality of the apparatus itself has unfortunately tended to be 
overlooked’.453 Indeed, beyond fears of the influence of partisan politics over the removals 
process, Gutiérrez Salazar identifies some practical and legal problems that could potentially 
                                                 
447 Sabsay and Onaindia (n 255) 392. 
448 Sabsay and Onaindia (n 255) 390. 
449 Sabsay and Onaindia (n 255255) 392. 
450 Roth (n 200200) 286. 
451 Roth (n 200) 286. 
452 Tettamanti de Ramella (n 267267) 1027. 
453 Hammergren (n 211) 23. 
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arise within the disciplinary process itself. 454 He argues that the fact that complaints cannot be 
made anonymously may deter some (particularly those working in the judiciary) from making 
complaints, and that the multiple legal requirements that a complaint must fulfil, such as 
formulating a legal charge against the judge, require some legal knowledge or training that may 
deter non-lawyers from making a complaint.455 In terms of due process guarantees for the judge, 
Gutiérrez Salazar points out that the great margin of discretion the Commission has in managing 
the procedure means that the judge being investigated may face uncertainty.456  
 
Gutiérrez Salazar also points out that as the decision of the CDA are not appealable, this may 
limit the ability of the judge to adequately defend himself, for example where the Commission 
refuses to admit evidence requested by the judge.457 He also signals that the ability of the 
Commission to preclude the judge being investigated from the hearing where evidence against 
him is presented (where his knowledge of this could put at risk the objective of the measure) is 
unfair for the judge as he does not have the opportunity to question the reach and probatory 
value of this evidence.458 There is also the danger that the process ‘exercises such a weighty 
pressure [on the judge] that is causes [his] resignation’.459 Whilst this achieves the institutional 
aim of displacing the judge, it does not ensure, by way of due process, that it is for the right 
reasons, and robs the judge of any recourse or reparations for any undue pressure.  
 
These potential problems may in practice link to problems with impartial decision-making in line 
with partisan interests. It may however also very simply occur where those in charge of 
disciplinary processes do not have enough knowledge of legal processes and principles. There 
are also several more mundane challenges that may also require overcoming, such as ‘the 
deadlock of collegial decision making by nonadministrators characterizing council… 
leadership’.460 Implicit in this is also the dangers of those running the council not being skilled in 
                                                 
454 Miguel Ángel Gutiérrez Salazar, La Facultad Disciplinaria del Consejo de la Judicatura Federal en México 
(Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 2018) 116 -117. Gutiérrez 
Salazar includes this brief analysis based on a reading of the legal provisions regulating the judicial disciplinary 
procedure as part of a comparison with the process in Mexico that is his main focus.  
455 ibid. 
456 ibid. 
457 ibid. 
458 ibid. 
459 Tettamanti de Ramella (n 267) 1026. 
460 Hammergren (n 211211) 24. 
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organisation and administration which may have important consequences on the work of the 
council. Hammergren argues that for a council to work efficiently, there is therefore a need for 
enough resources and technically trained, full-time staff.461 
 
In contrast, the composition of the ACBA JC is more balanced with seemingly less opportunity for 
the process to be affected by partisan interests. However, it is still an external body made up 
members who are not trained to undertake the task of managing removals processes, and in this 
respect some of the same challenges as at the federal level may present themselves. Due to the 
process being conducted by a legislative committee, the process in Tucuman is most obviously 
susceptible to partisan influence. Nevertheless, whether or not these various compositions 
translate into actual pressure from political parties being exerted in practice will be discussed in 
the findings chapters of this thesis (5, 6 and 7).  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The introduction of the JCs and IJs intended to remove, or lessen, the influence of partisan 
politics, and in particular of the governing political party, on removals processes, and to entrust 
this function to bodies that could be impartial and efficient. This, it was hoped, would both make 
it easier to remove judges who should be removed, and protect judges where there are no 
grounds for removal. This would have the dual function of protecting judicial independence 
through due process guarantees, whilst also ensuring effective judicial accountability. The aim of 
both judicial independence and accountability are to safe-guard the provision of quality and 
impartial judicial decision making, and the process for the removal of judges should not 
therefore, technically, negatively impact on judicial independence.  
 
This ‘technification’ of the removals process by entrusting it to a JC and IJ, however, does not 
mean that the process is not still inherently political. The only consequence of a removals process 
is the removal of the judge from office, and he remains subject to civil and criminal liability in the 
normal courts where relevant. The aim of the process is to ensure the quality of judicial services 
by removing those that do not meet the standards of office. The decision as to whether or not 
the judiciary meets these standards allows the councillors and the IJ some level of discretion, 
                                                 
461 Hammergren (n 211211) 27-29. 
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which is the political component of the process. Political in this sense however refers to a 
representative group of people representing their interest in the provision of independent, 
impartial and quality justice, and does not refer to the competitive politics between political 
parties.  
 
Decision made in the removals process should be taken with regard to due process guarantees 
and with a view to protecting judicial independence and accountability. The focus of due process 
guarantees is predominantly on ensuring that the final decision to remove a judge is not made 
without a fair trial, and that there is a right of appeal. However, in order for judicial independence 
to be protected, the importance of ensuring that the investigations and trial are not too lengthy, 
and that the disciplinary body is independent and that the process as a whole complies with the 
standards of legitimacy and reasonability have also been recognised. 
 
Where partisan or other external interests influence decisions in the process, this may be 
problematic for both judicial independence and accountability. Whether or not JCs succeed to 
protect the process from partisan politics in practice is therefore a central question that was 
addressed in the interviews with stakeholders in the removals process conducted for this thesis, 
although precautions were taken to allow for the identification of other problematic factors. 
What was discussed in these interviews and how these interviews were conducted shall be set 
out in the next chapter, with the findings from these interviews being set out in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds upon the research design outlined in Chapter 1 and the conceptual framework 
set out in Chapter 2 to explain how the research for this thesis was conducted. The chapter starts 
by explaining how participants were chosen (Section 4.2), and who was interviewed (Table 4). 
Section 4.3 then sets out how the interviews were conducted, explaining they were conducted 
face-to-face (Section 4.3.1) and one-to-one (Section 4.3.2). The practical details such as location 
are also explained (Section 4.3.3), as well as how long the interviews were (Section 4.3.4), how 
they were recorded (Section 4.3.5), and how ethical considerations were addressed (Section 
4.3.6). Section 4.4 then explains the content of the interviews, first setting out the reasons for 
conducting interviews of a semi-structured nature (Section 4.4.1), and then describing how the 
interview questions were identified using a Case Study Protocol (Appendix E) and Interview 
Schedules (Appendix D). Section 4.5 explains how the interviews were transcribed (Section 4.5.1), 
coded using Nvivo (Section 4.5.3), and analysed (Section 4.5.4).  
 
4.2 Identification of Research Participants 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of how various contextual factors affect judicial 
removals processes in practice, qualitative data in the form of interviews with stakeholders in 
the removals process was sought. The data sought, therefore, was not intended to be 
representative of all removals processes conducted to date, nor of the views of all of the 
categories of participants interviewed, but rather indicative of the factors that may affect 
removals processes and the way in which they impact judicial independence. To this end, in-
depth interviews were conducted with thirty-six participants: 17 whose work related mainly to 
the federal level, 7 whose work related mainly to the ACBA, and 11 whose work related mainly 
to Tucuman. In order to maximise the value of the data, efforts were made to gather the views 
of a wide range of participants, and to conduct the interviews in a way that allowed for each 
participants views to be explored in detail.  
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4.2.1 Categories of Participants 
In order to encourage open and honest dialogue, all participants were promised anonymity. To 
this end, the names of the participants do not appear in this thesis, nor are the full interview 
transcripts included as this may identify the participants. Given that this thesis does not examine 
individual cases of judicial removals but rather looks at the processes on a conceptual level, the 
inclusion of participants’ names is not necessary. The focus on concepts instead of individual 
cases and experiences allows for the effective extrapolation of findings that have wider 
applicability and relevance.  
 
In order to provide transparency about the data, and to effectively analyse the various points of 
view, participants were however categorised by type and assigned a corresponding code that is 
used when quoting them throughout this thesis. Participants were first categorised according to 
which jurisdiction they work in. Thereafter, they were categorised in terms of the type of 
stakeholder in the removals process they represent: 1. Those potentially subject to the judicial 
removals processes being studied, i.e. lower-court judges from the three jurisdictions; 2. Those 
who conduct judicial disciplinary processes, i.e. councillors, employees or advisors to the JCs, 
legislative committees, and impeachment juries; and 3. Those who file complaints against judges 
or otherwise have an interest in certain judges being investigated. For this latter category, it 
made sense to target lawyers given that they frequently deal with the courts, have an 
understanding of the importance of judicial independence, and may at some point in their career 
consider filing a complaint against a judge. Lawyers who were known to have experience or 
knowledge of the removals process were sough, including lawyers who were known to have filed 
complaints, and lawyers working for NGOs that monitor judicial independence.  
 
Where possible, a range of opinions were also sought within each of these sub-categories. A 
combination of lawyers in private practice, prosecutors, and lawyers working for NGO were 
therefore interviewed. Both judges who had been subject to removals processes and those who 
had not were also interviewed. This had the benefit of gaining the opinion of those who have 
first-hand experience of the process whilst also balancing out any bias they may hold with the 
opinion of those who have no direct experience of the process, but who have an interest in the 
fairness of the proceedings given that it affects the integrity of their institution, and that it may 
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affect them directly at some point in their career. Five of the fifteen judges interviewed had been 
subject to removals processes that had resulted in either a resignation or a removal. This however 
does not necessarily mean that the other judges did not have any experience of the removals 
process; the majority of complaints investigated by a JC or PIC do not end in the removal or 
resignation of the judge in question. Of the ten sitting judges that I interviewed, four voluntarily 
told me that they had experienced having a complaint filed against them.462 This means that at 
least nine of the fifteen judges interviewed had some experience of the process.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4 below, at least one person from each of the sub-categories in each 
jurisdiction was interviewed, ensuring a diversity of perspective from the point of view of various 
stakeholders in each jurisdiction. It should however be noted that these categories and sub-
categories are artificial to some extent given that many of the participants had during the course 
of their careers fit into a number of these categories.463 The majority of judges that I interviewed 
had previously worked as lawyers and therefore were familiar with the other side of the fence so 
to speak. Many of the people working for the JCs had also at some point worked as lawyers or 
judges. Some of the former judges had returned to working in private practice. Additionally, some 
of the lawyers and judges had also in the past served on JCs, or had served as elected politicians. 
Some had played a key role in the drafting of laws relating to the court proceedings, anti-
corruption, and the creation of the ACBA jurisdiction. Many of the participants in all categories 
also taught law at local universities.  
 
In addition, many lawyers working in Buenos Aires, both in private practice and for NGOs, were 
able to comment on both the federal and ACBA jurisdictions. Where this was the case, the 
interviews focused mainly on the federal level as this is where the bulk of their experience lay, 
and therefore these lawyers have been classified as ‘federal lawyers’, however, they were also 
asked about and provided valuable commentary on the differences between the federal and 
ACBA levels. All of the participants interviewed specifically about the ACBA level were also able 
                                                 
462 I did not specifically ask whether or not judges had experienced complaints being filed against them as it was 
not the purpose of the interview to gain personal experiences, and I did not feel that it was necessary to ask 
intrusive questions about this. It is possible that some of the other judges that did not volunteer this 
information also have had complaints filed against them.  
463 The in-depth nature of the interviews allowed to draw on any relevant participant knowledge and experience, 
although in order to ensure a range of perspectives were represented overall, questions were focused on the 
category assigned to each participant as shall be discussed further in Section 4.4 below.  
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to provide some commentary on the federal level. In addition, some participants at the federal 
and ACBA levels were able to provide some minor commentary about the province of Tucuman, 
and some of the participants from the province of Tucuman were able to provide valuable 
commentary about the federal level.  
 
The flexible and in-depth nature of the interviews allowed for these diverse experiences to be 
effectively explored. Participants were nevertheless assigned to the categories that reflected the 
most relevant experience of the participants. As shall be explained in Section 4.4, interview 
questions were also tailored to these roles. Therefore, when interviewing former judges that had 
been subject to a removals process, they have been classified as ‘former judges’, as this is the 
most relevant categorisation for this study. Even if they were practising as lawyers at the time of 
the interviews, they were asked for their perspectives as former judges who have experienced 
the removals processes, not as litigants who may consider filing a complaint against a judge. 
Similarly, where lawyers or judges who were councillors of a JC were interviewed, they have been 
classified as ‘councillors’ and asked questions that reflect their experience working in the council, 
rather than as judges or lawyers. The past roles of each individual participant have not been 
provided as it is likely that this would identify them.   
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Table 4: Table of Participants Interviewed 
 Judges/Former 
Judges (15) 
 
Lawyers (13) Judicial Councils (8) 
Federal Level 
(18) 
2 sitting judges 
2 former judges 
1 provincial judge 
who was a 
representative of a 
national associations 
of judges 
 
1 federal prosecutor 
2 lawyers in private 
practice 
4 lawyers working 
for NGO 
 
2 councillors (of 13) 
1 advisor working for 
the CDA 
2 advisors working 
for the Council 
1 Jury employee 
 
ACBA Level (7) 
 
5 sitting judges 1 city prosecutor 
 
1 councillor (of 9) 
 
Province of 
Tucuman (11) 
2 former judges 
3 sitting judges 
 
1 legislator 
1 lawyer working for 
a local NGO 
1 member of the 
judicial disciplinary 
committee of the 
local law society 
1 lawyer in private 
practice  
1 court secretary 
 
1 person from the PIC 
 
In addition to the diversity of views that came with interviewing different stakeholders, further 
diversity was also actively sought. This included diversity in life experience as well as views held.  
Insofar as possible, the diversity of participants in terms of age, number of years of relevant 
professional experience, and gender were sought.464 Of these, gender is the easiest to measure: 
twenty-nine men and eight women were interviewed. There are at least two women represented 
in each jurisdiction, and two subcategories: judges and those working for a JC. No female lawyers 
were interviewed.465 In terms of age, whilst participants were not asked to provide their date of 
birth, enough information on the participants was gathered to deduce that on one end of the 
scale, a participant in their early thirties was interviewed, and on the other end of the scale, there 
                                                 
464 This was achieved by asking to be put in contact with a range of people through the snowballing technique 
described in Section 4.2.2 below. Whilst I could not have complete control of the characteristics of the people 
referred to me, I could help my contacts identify participants that would be useful to me by describing the type 
of participant I wanted to be put in touch with.  
465 The opportunity simply did not arise as I was not put in touch with any female lawyers via the snowballing 
technique described in Section 4.2.2. 
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was a participant in their late seventies. Between these two extremes, there was diversity in the 
age and experience of the remaining participants. 
 
More importantly, a diversity in opinion, regardless of categorisation, was sought. This included 
both views on the nature of judicial accountability – whether participants felt the judiciary should 
be self-governing, or whether they should be held accountable by an outside institution such as 
the JC – and political views or affiliations. This was more difficult to evaluate given that a 
participant’s opinion could not be reliably known before being interviewed, and also because 
participants were not asked to specifically identify, nor were they subsequently categorised, into 
crude political classifications. Rather, the subtleties of each opinion were taken into account on 
their own merits during the analysis of the collected data. Nevertheless, an attempt was made 
during the process of identifying participants to reach participants of different opinions, and I 
continued collecting data until satisfied that a range of opinions had been collected. I was 
satisfied that data saturation had been reached once I had interviewed at least one participant 
from each category in each jurisdiction, when I felt that I had gained an insight into the issues 
from the perspective of each stakeholder and from various points of view which became clear 
when the same opinions started to be voiced over and over again and I was no longer collecting 
new points of view.466  
 
4.2.2 Identifying Participants: the Snowballing Technique  
Participants were identified by word of mouth through a network of personal and professional 
contacts. As a first step, I identified relevant first-degree contacts in my personal and professional 
networks. This included anyone with ties to Argentina who was likely to know judges or lawyers, 
and who I felt knew me and understood my research well enough to be willing to introduce me 
to their contacts. Eleven first-degree contacts were identified, nine of whom were Argentinean. 
Many were professional contacts that I had made whilst working at law firms in Barcelona and 
London. Three of them were lawyers/academics that I had met through my doctoral research, 
                                                 
466 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (4th Edn, Sage Publications 2015) 300-301. 
Patton explains that it is important to purposefully seek the opinion of a variety of categories of participants in 
addition to looking for data saturation, to avoid a situation where data saturation is reached from the 
perspective of only one group of people. See also YS Lincoln and EG Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (Sage 1985) 202. 
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who did not know me well but with who I had discussed my research and whom saw value in it. 
The remainder were personal contacts.  
 
I did not interview any of these eleven first-degree contacts given that these contacts did not 
have any knowledge or experience of the judicial removals process: most of them were either 
not legal professionals or not living in Argentina at the time. The two first-degree contacts that 
were lawyers practising in Argentina told me that they did not have any knowledge or experience 
of the judicial removals process. Instead, using a snowballing technique, my participants put me 
in contact with contacts of theirs that they felt may be interesting for me to interview, or who 
may in turn be able to put me in touch with people who it would be interesting for me to 
interview. The participants therefore were made up of thirteen second degree contacts, eighteen 
third-degree contacts, four fourth degree contacts, and one fifth degree contact. Participants 
themselves often referred me on to other potential participants: seven participants referred me 
to other people who I also ended up interviewing. This number, however, does not mean much 
as many other participants also offered to refer me to people but I refused because they were 
offering to refer me to someone I had already interviewed/been put in touch with. 
 
With a couple of exceptions, my first degree contacts did not know each other, which was 
beneficial for me as I was able to tap into a number of different social circles. In particular, I knew 
that two of my contacts had been actively involved in the UCR opposition party, and that one of 
my participants came from a family that had been actively involved in Kirchnerist politics, which 
I hoped would help ensure some diversity in opinion in the people they referred me to. Helpfully 
in this regard, one participant that I interviewed referred me to two further participants, telling 
me that he had specifically chosen two people with very different views on the judiciary (although 
he did not tell me what these were, nor who held which views). I nevertheless found that the 
legal world in Argentina appears to be small and I quickly found that I was being referred to the 
same people over and over again by many different sources. On two occasions this was helpful 
as I had not had any luck getting hold of the participant through the first channel, but was more 
successful through the second.  
 
The use of the snowballing technique for identifying participants had various benefits. First of all, 
given that I was living in England at the time, and had never lived in Argentina, it would have 
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been challenging to identify relevant participants and to get them to agree to be interviewed, 
from afar. The snowballing technique therefore allowed me to tap into many networks beyond 
my own limited contacts. This also allowed for the inclusion of the broad range of people and 
opinions sought, as explained in Section 4.2.1 above. Secondly, given the important and sensitive 
nature of the topic being discussed, and that I was a complete outsider in all respects,467 I felt 
that it was more likely that participants would agree to be interviewed if I was vouched for by 
someone they know. This may, I felt, have helped them feel that they could trust me with their 
experiences and opinions, and protect their anonymity.  
 
Therefore, it was beneficial to be referred to participants by first- degree contacts who could 
vouch for my professionalism, or other participants who had already met me and been 
interviewed by me. In this respect, it was useful that a large majority of my first degree contacts 
knew me well, and were able to vouch for both my trustworthiness and my professional abilities. 
It was also helpful that my first degree contacts are highly regarded individuals, many of them 
legal professionals themselves. Others had worked in politics on the national level, or were the 
sons and daughters of people of considerable repute. 
  
The importance of trust appeared to be confirmed by my experience contacting potential 
participants. I found that everyone that I was referred to directly by my first degree contacts or 
by other participants agreed to be interviewed by me. In cases where I was referred by a first-
degree contact to someone who in turn referred me to someone else (ie third degree contacts), 
my success rate was still very good, but one person refused to be interviewed.468 Where the chain 
grew longer and I attempted to contact fourth or fifth degree contacts, I found that there were 
some people who I could not get hold of; in most cases as they simply did not answer the 
telephone. I chose not to insist further in many of these cases given that I had already obtained 
sufficient participants by that time.  
  
                                                 
467 See Patton (n 466) 480-483 on the challenges of cross-cultural interviewing, including the need to respect 
differing norms and values, and not assume the right to ask intrusive questions.  
468 In that particular case, I sent a third-degree contact information about my study, including the participant 
information sheet, but he refused on the basis that he did not agree with the methodology that I was using to 
study the topic. He set out the approach he thought I should be taking – essentially a philosophical analysis of 
the polarization of politics as the underlying problem – in an email. I had been warned by my second-degree 
contact that this may happen due to the strong views this person apparently holds. 
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A third benefit of using the snowballing technique was that my personal experience of the 
Argentinean culture, and anecdotal evidence from other researchers that had conducted 
interviews in Latin America, suggested that it would be very difficult to obtain responses from 
potential participants without a personal connection or being able to go and see them in person 
and introduce yourself. This again was evidenced in my experience by the difficulty I had getting 
a response from fourth or fifth degree contacts. 
  
I however believe that an additional reason for the success of the snowballing technique in this 
study was because my contacts (at all degrees) believed my research to be relevant and 
necessary. This was partially due to purposefully approaching people who I believed had some 
knowledge of or connection to the legal world in Argentina. Additionally, I was lucky that at the 
time I conducted the interviews, there had been a great deal of front-cover news about the JC, 
judicial corruption, and of judicial independence being threatened by the government. Many of 
my contacts explicitly told me that they were very pleased that someone was researching this 
topic. Some also said that they were pleased that I was a researcher from abroad as they hoped 
that my work may bring some international exposure to what was happening.  
 
Being in Argentina at the time of the interviews had the benefit of making access to participants 
easier. I was based in Buenos Aires for roughly six weeks, and flew out to Tucuman for just over 
a week at the end of my stay. During the first two to three weeks in Argentina, I was invited to 
have coffee with many of my first and second-degree contacts, which gave them an opportunity 
to meet me and discuss my research before referring me to potential participants or further 
relevant contacts. I found that people generally were more responsive to phone calls than to 
emails, and it was very helpful that I had a local phone number that they could call me back on. 
This initial period was therefore also useful in terms of settling in, and buying a local phone and 
SIM card. I also took the opportunity to familiarise myself more with the local context by dropping 
in on the vote that lawyers of Buenos Aires were holding to vote for a new representative on the 
FJC, and by attending some legal seminars at the University of Buenos Aires, and one of the local 
law societies.  
 
The first interview took place after roughly two weeks of meeting first and second degree 
contacts for coffee, and calling and emailing the people they put me in touch with. From that 
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point onwards, interviews were conducted on an almost daily basis. Frequently, several 
interviews were conducted in one day, with four interviews being the maximum. Being on the 
ground had the benefit of being able to be available for interview at short notice. Participants 
seemed reluctant to arrange interviews in advance, but many would call up to say “I have some 
time today around X o’clock, can you pop by then?” On another occasion, I went to introduce 
myself to a second-degree contact who walked me over to a participant’s office who agreed to 
be interviewed on the spot. Arranging a time and date for a skype interview from a distance may 
have been significantly more challenging.  
 
4.3 Conducting Interviews  
4.3.1 Face-to-face Interviews in Spanish 
The large majority of interviews were individual, face-to-face interviews conducted in Argentina, 
and only where this was not possible were Skype or telephone calls used as an alternative. 
Therefore, thirty-two of the thirty-six participants were interviewed face-to-face, thirty-one of 
those in Argentina and one in the UK, and four were interviewed via Skype or telephone calls.469  
 
All interviews were conducted in Spanish. Whilst I am fluent in Spanish and felt comfortable with 
legal terminology and local accents, this nevertheless carried some challenges given that I am not 
a native speaker.470 In particular, given the semi-structured nature of the interviews, I had to 
think on my feet as the conversations progressed. However, my participants were understanding 
of this and asked for clarification where they did not fully understand a question. In addition, the 
relatively simple and open-ended nature of the questions asked (as discussed in Section 4.4.2 
above) meant that participants frequently took the question as a mere starting point and 
expanded on their answers with information they found relevant to the topics at hand. Any 
challenges I faced conducting these interviews in Spanish were undoubtedly offset by the fact 
that participants were able to express themselves precisely in their own language, and the insight 
                                                 
469 These were the last interviews to be conducted after I had returned to England, upon identifying a couple of gaps 
in my data. In particular, I wanted to speak to more ACBA judges and lawyers working for NGOs, as I felt that I 
had not yet reached data saturation in these categories.  
470 Spanish is the fourth language I learned to speak. I learnt whilst working as an intern at a Spanish law firm in 
Barcelona for three years. That experience introduced me to a lot of legal terminology in Spanish, and in addition, 
I have a high level of familiarity with Argentinean accents, expressions, cultural references, and slang.  
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I gained into what was happening in practice by hearing the words used to describe what was 
happening locally.471  
 
In addition to conducting the interviews in Spanish, conducting them in person made it possible 
to build a better rapport with participants than would have otherwise been the case.472 Making 
the effort to fly half way across the world to conduct this research demonstrated to participants 
both that I was serious about the research, and that I was serious about wanting to understand 
what was happening on the ground.473 Given the sensitive nature of the topic, it was also 
important that participants could see who I am.474  
 
Given the semi-structure design of the interviews, it was important to make the participant 
comfortable and to engage in a deep conversation rather than a structured answers and 
questions type interview. Being face to face allowed me to use my body language to demonstrate 
that I was relaxed, had time, and interested in what the participants were saying. It also facilitated 
gaging participants’ reactions to questions, and their willingness to answer questions, which then 
allowed me to rephrase or redirect the conversation as necessary.475  
 
Being face to face also avoided some of the difficulties associated with other methods. Had 
interviews been conducted via a video-call facility such as Skype, the benefits of seeing the other 
person may have been mimicked to some extent, but given the sensitive nature of the topics 
being discussed, participants may have been reluctant to agree to this for fear of being video-
recorded. Being face-to-face, I could visibly demonstrate when and how I was recording the 
interview (Section 4.3.5). Being face to face also helped build trust as it they could see that I was 
alone and that no-one else was listening in to our conversation. Similarly, I could see whether or 
not other people were present in the room at the time of the interview (Section 4.3.2).  
                                                 
471 See Patton (n 466) 481 on the importance of overcoming language barriers when conducting cross-cultural 
interviews.  
472 For a consideration of any bias that I may have brought to the research process by conducting these interviews 
myself, see my Critical Self-Reflection in Appendix H. 
473 This ‘commitment to get close’ shows a ‘commitment to represent the participants in their own terms’: John 
Loftland, Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis (1971 Wadsworth) 4. 
474 See Patton (n 466) 457 who explains that it is important to build a rapport with participants, and to demonstrate 
your neutrality and willingness to understand their perspectives, in order for them to trust you and be open 
with you.  
475 Patton (n 466466) 457-463. 
Page 127 of 366 
 
 
On a more practical note, obtaining a high quality audio recording of a face-to-face conversation 
for the purposes of my own analysis was much easier than recording a telephone or skype 
conversation (see Section 4.3.5 below for details of how the interviews were recorded). 
Telephone and internet calls also come with connectivity issues, and a dropped connection could 
potentially be disruptive to a serious conversation.  
 
4.3.2 One-to-one Interviews  
Interviews were conducted individually in order to allow enough time for each participant to fully 
explain his or her views, and in order to allow for a conversational interview (Section 4.4.1), 
where follow questions could be asked and the ideas voiced by the participant fully explored. In 
addition, given the sensitive nature of the topics being discussed and in line with the policy of 
keeping participants anonymous, conducting the interviews individually, it was hoped, would 
encourage the participants to express their views freely.  
 
In two cases, participants suggested that I interviewed them together with another participant 
at the same time (four participants in total). I accepted this proposition in both cases as in both 
cases the topics under discussion were very important to the participants, and I was happy to 
accommodate their wishes if they felt more comfortable being interviewed together. In one of 
these cases the two participants in question had shared similar experiences and it therefore was 
also beneficial from a research perspective to interview them together both to avoid repetition 
and as between them they fact-checked what they were telling me and reminded each other of 
details they may otherwise have forgotten. They were not hesitant to voice any disagreement on 
individual points between them, and therefore interviewing them together did not appear to 
have any major drawbacks.    
 
In order to allow the participants to freely express their views, I preferred to interview 
participants whilst there was no one else present who was purposely listening in on the 
interview. Nevertheless, where it was made clear to me either explicitly or implicitly that the 
participant felt more comfortable with someone else in the room, I did not question their wishes. 
In one case therefore, a participant’s office assistant was present, and in four cases participants’ 
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families were present for all or part of the interviews. In none of these cases did these people 
interrupt the interview, and the participants did not appear to hold back in voicing their opinions.  
 
4.3.3 Location of Interviews 
The large majority of interviews were conducted in Argentina: twenty interviews (with twenty-
one participants) were conducted in Buenos Aires, and nine interviews (with ten participants) in 
Tucuman. In addition, one participant was interviewed in person in the UK, and four interviews 
were conducted via Skype/telephone.  
 
I let my participants chose where and when they wished to be interviewed. The large majority 
(twenty-five participants) invited me to their offices. Of those twenty-five, I interviewed nineteen 
in their own private office, three in a meeting room, and three in semi-private offices. I was 
unsure about the actual level of privacy in the private offices and meeting rooms; in some offices, 
it felt like the noise travelled easily between rooms, in others that did not appear to be the case. 
In quite a few cases, the participant’s secretary entered the room at some point during the 
interview (with or without knocking), either to put away some files, to offer us coffee, or to give 
the participant some information (that someone had called and left a message, for example). I 
told participants before the interview that I would stop the recording whenever they wished. In 
many interviews I therefore briefly paused the recording for the participant to quickly answer 
the phone, or to have a brief exchange with their secretary (which they invariably did in front of 
me and which in all cases they kept very brief).  
 
In the three semi-private offices that I was in, it was clear that other people in the offices could 
either hear or see us, although everyone seemed to be going about their business, there was 
quite a lot of noise, and no-one was noticeably paying attention to us. In all three cases I felt 
slightly uncomfortable with the situation as I was unsure whether or not the participants were 
comfortable answering my questions openly. I kept two of these interviews short, finishing one 
after only fifteen minutes and the other at roughly thirty minutes. In these cases, I felt that I 
probably would not have been able to get much more useful information had I continued. 
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 In the third case, the interview was with a key participant whose views represented an important 
contribution to the research and I therefore chose not to cut the interview short and instead 
asked about all of the topics on my Interview Schedule. As the participant appeared slightly 
uncomfortable expressing her views on the subject, I gave her the opportunity to cut the 
interview short by asking whether I was taking too much of her time, but she insisted that it was 
no problem and that I should continue, and when I decided to wrap up the interview, she also 
asked if I was sure I had all of the information I needed. The participants answers were however 
relatively short and as I was not successful in gaining any further detail with follow up questions, 
I decided to wrap up the interview at about forty minutes.  
 
Of the remainder, I interviewed three people in public cafes (two in Buenos Aires, one in the UK), 
four people at their homes, and as mentioned above, four via Skype/telephone, calling the 
participants either at their office or at their home. The background noise at cafes proved to be 
slightly distracting, but no-one around us in any of the cafes appeared to be paying any attention 
to us and the participants in all cases appeared to be very comfortable speaking freely.  
 
4.3.4 Length of Interviews 
The interviews were designed to take roughly forty-five minutes, although the actual length 
depended on how much the participants wished to share with me. I informed participants that 
the interviews would take roughly fort-five minutes, and where the conversations were going 
well, I brought up the time after forty-five minutes and gaged their reactions as to whether I 
should wrap up or whether they were happy speaking for longer, or indeed wished to continue 
sharing their views and experiences with me. In some cases, participants had informed me prior 
to the interview that they only had thirty minutes and in those cases I managed to cover all of 
the interview topics in that time – given that the participants in these cases were aware of giving 
me less time than I had anticipated, I feel that they made a point of giving me concise answers.  
 
The interviews took on average fifty-one minutes with the shortest interview being fifteen 
minutes, and the longest seventy-seven minutes. As can be seen in the table below, there was a 
variety of interview lengths across all jurisdictions and participant categories. The amount of data 
collected was therefore fairly equal across the various categories.   
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Table 5: Length of Interviews 
Number of Interviews Under 30 min. 30-40 min. 40-50 min. 50-65 min. 65+ min. 
At the Federal Level 1 3 4 7 2 
At the ACBA Level 0 2 2 2 1 
For Tucuman 0 2 2 4 2 
With Judges 0 2 4 6 3 
With Lawyers 0 4 2 5 1 
With JC/LC Members 1 1 2 2 1 
Total  1 7 8 13 5 
 
4.3.5 Audio Recording 
As explained above, creating a good rapport with my participants was important and I therefore 
did not want to be distracted by taking notes. I also felt that interviewing in a foreign language 
required my full concentration on the conversation. I audio-recorded every interview so that I 
could listen back over the interviews and transcribe them at a later stage. Prior to starting the 
audio recordings, I introduced myself to my participants, made some small talk, and got the 
Consent Form signed, all of which helped build a rapport. I tried not to start any discussion about 
the topics to be covered in the interviews before turning the recorders on, and in most cases 
succeeded to do so. In a couple of cases, participants started chatting about relevant topics 
before I had a chance to turn the recorders on. Where this occurred, I interrupted by explaining 
that it was important for me to record what they were saying and asked if they mind if I turn the 
recorders on. In the majority of cases this was not an issue and once the recording started we 
went back over what had been said before the recorder was turned on. There was only one case 
where I noticed that a participant wanted to talk to me off-record prior to the interview, and in 
this case the participant was a lot less forthcoming once the recorders had been turned on. The 
participant in question held strong views and I believe was worried about being identified on the 
basis of these views, thereby undermining anonymity.  
 
In case there were any technical problems with any one of the audio recordings, I recorded each 
interview using two digital voice recorders. I chose Sony IC Recorder models had built-in stereo 
microphones, noise-cut functions, and importantly, slots for removable micro-SD cards. I 
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recorded all of my interviews directly onto micro-SD cards (not onto the recording device itself), 
and at the end of every interview I removed the micro-SD cards and stored them in a secure 
pocket in my trousers. I did this so that in the event that I was robbed and my voice recorders 
were taken, I would not lose any data and no data would be made available to third parties. 
Armed robberies were deemed to be a moderate risk in Argentina by my insurance company, 
and indeed, I was unlucky enough to be the victim of an armed robbery before I even had the 
chance to conduct any interviews. My back up recorder was taken, and I had to purchase a new 
one. The only similar model that I could get in Buenos Aires unfortunately only had a mono 
microphone, but did have a slot for micro SD cards. The quality of recording on my main recorder 
is noticeably better than the substitute back-up recorder (less background noise), but the 
recordings from both devices are still clear enough to be used. It was useful to have the back-up 
as one of my recorders failed to record one interview for unknown reasons. I chose to record in 
MP3 format (not in LPCM), as the files are a lot smaller, and recording in MP3 uses up the battery 
on the recorders more slowly. This was a good decision given that I was frequently out all day 
and conducted up to four interviews a day. It was therefore important that the battery lasted 
long enough to record all interviews. 
 
Every evening, I transferred all of the MP3 recordings to my password-protected personal laptop, 
and made back-up copies on two password protected external hard-drives. I did not upload any 
recordings onto any internet storage spaces, and I did not send any recordings to my supervisors 
(or anyone else) via e-mail. Instead, upon my return to the UK, the IT department at the university 
created a secure-access file on the university network that my supervisors and I could access, and 
I uploaded the recordings onto that file. This also ensured that I complied with my university’s 
regulations as to the storage of research materials.  
 
For the few interviews that I conducted over Skype, I used a programme called MP3 Skype 
Recorder as a primary recording, and as a backup, I placed my Sony voice recorders next to my 
laptop to capture the sound. The MP3 Skype Recorder was not entirely reliable: It worked for 
three interviews, but scrambled the fourth recording. The quality of the back-up recordings of 
these skype interviews are not great, but useable.  
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4.3.6 Ethical Considerations 
Before traveling to Argentina, I obtained a Favourable Ethical Opinion from the University of 
Surrey’s Ethics Committee for conducting this research (Appendix A). In line with what I set out 
for the Ethics Committee, I took a series of measures to ensure that I conducted the interviews 
in an ethical manner. As part of my submission to the Ethics Committee, I submitted a risk 
assessment that detailed possible risks that the research posed to both the participants and to 
myself, and described what I did to mitigate those risks.  
 
Prior to each interview, I provided each participant with a Participant Information Sheet 
(Appendix B) and a Participant Consent Form (Appendix C), both in Spanish and that had been 
approved by the University’s Ethic Committee. The Information Sheet explained the purpose of 
the research and what participation would involve. It also set out the possible disadvantages and 
benefits of participating, as well as explicitly setting out the voluntary nature of participation, 
including the fact that at any time during or after the interview, the participant may choose to 
withdraw from the study without giving any explanation, and that as long as the research had 
not already been published, the data from the interview in that case would be deleted and not 
used. The Information Sheet also set out my contact details and the contact details of my 
supervisors and the Head of the Law School at Surrey University in case the participant wished 
to report any complaints or concerns. It also explained who had organised and funded the 
research.  
 
In the majority of cases, I sent participants the Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form 
by e-mail prior to meeting for the interview. This of course was not possible in the cases that the 
opportunity suddenly arose to interview a participant on the spot without prior notice. I had 
printed Information Sheets and Consent Forms with me at all times and in the majority of cases, 
participants read or re-read the Information Sheet in my presence before starting the interview.  
Prior to conducting interviews, participants were also provided a printed copy of the Consent 
Form which had 7 boxes for the participant to consent to seven different statements, and was 
then signed and dated by both the participant and myself. In short, the participants confirmed:476  
- That they were voluntarily taking part in the study; 
                                                 
476 For the original wording in English and Spanish, please refer to the exemplary Consent Form in Appendix C.  
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- That they had read and understood the Information Sheet and had any questions 
answered; 
- To fully co-operate with the researcher; 
- That their personal data (ie. recordings and transcripts of their interviews) could be used 
in the way outlined in the Information Sheet; 
- That they consented to being anonymously quoted in publications arising out of the 
research;  
- That they understood that they are free to withdraw from the study at all times; 
- That they had read and understood the consent form.  
All participants agreed to all of these terms. I drafted the Consent Form, Information Sheet, and 
Risk Assessment based on templates provided by the University’s Ethics Committee. I felt that 
being able to provide the participants with official and approved documents, with the university’s 
seal and contact details on it, helped create a sense of professionalism and trustworthiness. 
Many participants actually commented that they were impressed by the professionalism with 
which the interviews were conducted, referring in part to the Information Sheets and Consent 
Forms.  
 
In terms of ethical concerns, I wanted to make sure that no one provided me information that is 
not public and that would either incriminate themselves or someone else. It was also important 
to ensure that neither my participants nor any third parties would suffer any professional or 
personal repercussions due to my research. Finally, I wanted to make sure that no one’s physical 
safety would be threatened or put in danger. Whilst I estimated that the probability of any of 
these things happening, even if I did not take any precautions at all, was low, I did not wish to 
take any risks and therefore took the following precautions. 
 
The interviews were designed to discuss the topics in an abstract way. The purpose of the 
research is not to obtain information about cases of judges being corrupted, protected, or 
removed for political reasons, but rather to gain an understanding of the challenges facing the 
removals process in practice on a conceptual level. A hypothetical case was therefore used to 
discuss the removals process, and participants were not directly asked about their own 
experiences or other real cases. Participants were asked not to discuss real cases, or to limit 
Page 134 of 366 
 
discussions to what was already public knowledge, or to information that would not incriminate 
themselves or anyone else. Where participants chose to share their own personal experiences, 
or mentioned other cases by way of examples, I made sure to anonymise any quotes where 
necessary, both in order to protect the anonymity of participants, and to avoid any blaming and 
shaming about individual cases.  
 
The anonymity of participants also ensures that participants will not face any repercussions for 
the views shared.477 Participants were therefore asked not to refer to themselves by name or to 
provide too much information that may identify them during the interview. Some participants 
did not seem concerned about maintaining their anonymity and mentioned their name and 
experience freely. In such cases I anonymised any text that I quoted and avoided quoting 
passages that would identify the participant in question. As an extra precaution, I anonymised 
the file names of the recordings and the transcripts, using the participant’s code, and separately 
presented my supervisors and examiners with a list of names and the allocated codes. I also 
password protected all transcript documents saved on my personal laptop and external storage 
devices so that in the unlikely event a third party gets hold of the files, access would be blocked.  
I also promised my participants that the interviews would be confidential: I will not publish the 
recordings of the interview, nor the full transcripts of the interviews. Relevant parts of the 
interviews are quoted anonymously. This is to avoid identifying the participants on the basis of 
their range of opinions or the knowledge and experiences they shared.  
 
A final ethical consideration was to ensure the integrity of the data collected, to ensure that 
participants did not simply voice the opinions that they thought I wanted to hear. Whilst the 
highly professional profile of my participants made this unlikely, as an additional precaution, 
participation was voluntary and participants were not provided any compensation. The 
Participation Information Sheets (Appendix B) did specify that the participants will not benefit 
directly from the experience, but that the interviews were an opportunity for them to shed light 
on removals processes thus contributing to international academic research and raising 
awareness of the Argentine experience abroad.478 Based on this, the anonymity, and the abstract 
                                                 
477 I had specified to the participants that the only people who would have access to their names, other than 
myself, would be my PhD supervisors and my PhD examiners. 
478 Patton (n 466466) 500-501 speaks of showing reciprocity for the value that participants provide.  
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nature of the interviews, I do not believe that I gave participants any reason to provide untrue or 
misleading information.  
 
4.4 Content of Interviews 
4.4.1 Semi-structured Nature of Interviews 
I chose to use semi-structured interviews for a number of reasons. First and foremost, given that 
the purpose of conducting the interviews was to gain an understanding of what is happening in 
practice, it would not have been possible to foresee all relevant factors. I needed to have the 
flexibility to follow leads and uncover new information. In addition, given the opportunity to 
speak to people with such a rich source of experience and knowledge, it would have been a great 
shame to miss out on obtaining this in-depth data. What happens in practice is not in small 
measure impacted by the views and understandings of those involved in the processes under 
study, and therefore gaining an insight into the ways in which the process was being understood 
and viewed by those that are part of it was a crucial part of the research.  
 
 In addition, all of my participants were older and more experienced than I, highly educated, very 
articulate, and held positions of considerable authority. I felt that in order for them to trust me 
as a researcher, it was important that I demonstrated that I was interested in understanding their 
perspective and experience by actively listening and exploring those topics that they deemed 
important. Indeed, it was clear that participants were keen to share their opinions with me. In 
some cases my participants started talking as soon as I pressed the record button, before I had 
the chance to ask any questions. The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed me to 
incorporate these opinions into the natural flow of the conversation, and to pick up on points of 
interest, ask follow up questions, and interject with questions to re-direct the conversation to 
topics of interest where the conversation strayed.  
 
Given the complex nature of the topics being discussed, I also wanted to allow my participants 
some time to reflect on the questions I asked. If I cut them off too quickly, I may have missed out 
on useful data. Indeed, I found that participants frequently started their answers by setting out 
the basics, such as the legal framework (which I already knew, and they knew that I already 
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knew), but by doing so, they triggered other thoughts which they then went on to explain. 
Rushing them would not have allowed for this process of reflection. This was also useful to gage 
the participant’s level of detailed knowledge on the topic at hand (it was clear that some were 
more familiar with the particulars of the legal framework than others), and to establish some of 
the assumptions the participants was working under.  
 
The use of open questions that is characteristic of semi-structured interviews479 also worked very 
well given the sensitive nature of the topics under discussion, on two counts. First, I did not want 
to suggest that there may be problems with the removals process in practice. I wanted to see 
whether or not the participants would bring up issues of their own accord. By asking open 
questions about how things unfold in practice, I was given them the freedom to bring up any 
issues if and when they deemed necessary.480 Second, I was aware that people of different 
political persuasions may identify different issues. By asking open questions, I was maintaining 
my neutrality which helped both to establish trust with all participants, and to allow participants 
to explain their perspective without putting them on the defensive.481  
 
The use of semi-structured instead of unstructured interviews was equally important. The 
purpose of interviewing different categories of participants was to be able to compare and 
contrast their answers. In order to do so, it was important to ensure that broadly the same topics 
were covered in each interview. The intention behind the interviews was also to source fairly 
specific information on disciplinary processes.482 By having an interview schedule listing out a 
couple of main questions, I could ensure that I would cover the desired topics, and obtain 
answers to my questions.483   
                                                 
479 Contrast with closed, fixed-response interviews where respondents choose from response categories that are 
fixed by the researcher in advance: Patton (n 466466) 438. 
480 Patton (n 466) 446.  
481 Michael Patton suggests that researchers approach qualitative enquiry with ‘empathic neutrality’: ‘understanding 
a person’s situation and perspective without judging the person – and communicating that understanding with 
authenticity to build rapport, trust, and openness’. He goes on to explain that ‘neutrality can actually facilitate 
rapport and help build a relationship that supports empathy by disciplining the researcher to be open to the other 
person and non-judgmental in that openness’. Patton (n 466466) 57 and 59.  
482 Patton (n 466466) 436 classifies this as ‘pragmatic interview’, which ask ‘straightforward questions about real-
world issues aimed at getting straightforward answers that can yield practical and useful insights’. See also ET 
Stringer, Action Research (3rd edn, Sage 2007).  
483 Patton (n 466) 438: this makes data collection ‘somewhat systematic’ and ‘increases the comprehensiveness of 
the data’.  
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4.4.2 Interview Schedule  
A set of Interview Schedules were designed with a basic outline of the topics to be covered 
(Appendix D). These topics were the same in all interviews, but the focus was modified to reflect 
the experience of individual participants according to their categorization.484 Therefore, lawyers, 
for example, were asked what factors they would take into consideration when deciding whether 
or not to file a complaint against a judge, whereas judges were asked their opinion on the fact 
that anyone can file a complaint against a judge, and how this interacts with the principle of 
judicial independence in practice. Five different Interview Schedules were designed: one for 
lawyers, including those working for NGOs, one for judges and former judges, and three for 
members of the FJC, the ACBA JC, and the PIC in Tucuman.  
 
The interviews were designed to have two parts. The first part of the interview looked at the 
removals process step by step. Participants were told to imagine a hypothetical case of a 
complaint being filed against a judge, and were asked about what they believe would happen to 
the case at each stage of the process.485 The main steps in the process that participants at the 
Federal and ACBA levels – allowing for the differences in the process set out in Figures 1 and 2 - 
were asked about are illustrated in Figure 4 below. The main steps of the process in Tucuman 
can be seen in Figure 3 above, but in essence also comprise of the same main steps: a complaint 
is made, its admissibility is decided, it is investigated, and there is a vote to proceed to a jury.  
Figure 4: Main Steps in a Removals Process before a JC  
 
 
Discussing a hypothetical case had the benefit of allowing for questions to be asked in a simple, 
neutral and open-ended manner. Participants were free to raise any issues that they felt affected 
                                                 
484 Patton (n 466) 439 explains the benefit of using a Schedule in order to maintain a conversational style that 
provides the freedom to explore new topics that arise whilst maintaining the focus on particular predetermined 
topics.   
485 Patton (n 466466) 458-459 describes the use of simulation questions in order to ‘help the interviewee hone in 
on relevant responses’ and provide rich and detailed descriptions.  
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the process at each stage, without these being suggested to them. This allowed for new issues 
and alternative explanations to surface, and ensured that the data collected was not biased 
towards the issues that had previously been identified as potentially relevant, or that had been 
relevant only in any one particular case.  
 
The second part of the interviews was a set of questions about the broader context. These 
questions were initially designed as icebreaker questions, but after the first couple of interviews 
I changed the order of the questions and decided to start first with the hypothetical case before 
moving on to some more abstract questions as a way of wrapping up the conversation. This 
worked better as the hypothetical case was a more structured way to start the conversation and 
once it had got going, it was easier to introduce more open-ended questions about the context, 
which could be tied back to the preceding discussion more easily. 
 
The contextual questions used recent events as a starting point for asking about general threats 
to judicial independence, and participants’ views on the nature and function of the JC in 
protecting judicial independence. Therefore, participants were asked their opinion on the 2013 
judicial reform, and on the calls for the “democratisation” of the judiciary. In addition, as a way 
of opening up a discussion on the judiciary’s willingness to be held accountable, and how this 
interacts with judicial independence, participants were asked about transparency in the judiciary.  
 
In order to ensure that the main points of interest were addressed, a number of prompts were 
listed under each question in each Interview Schedule which served as a checklist of topics to be 
covered. It was also intended to be used as follow-up questions to encourage participants to give 
more details. In the majority of cases this was not necessary as most participants gave full 
answers to the initial questions, and the conversation naturally developed in most cases to cover 
the topics listed in the prompts. 
  
In order to ensure that the data collected served to answer the research question of this thesis, 
a Case Study Protocol was created (see Appendix D), which sets out the list of detailed questions 
that the data should address. These are phrased as research questions for the researcher to 
answer with the data once it has been collected. The Interview Schedules were drawn up with 
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reference to these questions, to ensure that the relevant data is collected. The difference is that 
the question in the Interview Schedule are phrased as questions addressed to the participants.  
 
4.5 Analysis of Interviews 
4.5.1 Transcriptions  
To ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of participants, I transcribed the audio-recordings 
of the interviews myself. I used Express Scribe Transcription Software to listen to the recordings, 
and a foot pedal to help with the transcription process. Each participant was given a code and 
the transcripts were named using these codes correspondingly. As shown in Table 5 below, the 
codes participants were given reflected their categorization. Each participant was also given a 
number. Therefore the first federal judge interviewed was given the code FJ1, the second FJ2, 
and so on. These codes are used when quoting participants in this thesis. For ease of reference, 
line numbers are also used when referencing interview transcripts. This is for the sole benefit of 
my PhD supervisors and PhD examiners, as due to confidentiality reasons (Section 4.3.6 above), 
the full transcripts will not be published. 
Table 6: List of Participant Codes  
FJ Federal Judges (former and current) 
BAJ Judges of the ACBA (former and current) 
TJ Judges of the province of Tucuman (former and current) 
FL Lawyers working at the federal level 
BAL Lawyers working at the ACBA level 
TL Lawyers working in the province of Tucuman 
FO Lawyers working for NGOs at the federal level  
TO Lawyers working for NGOs at the provincial level in Tucuman 
FJC Members of the FJC and the FIJ 
BAJC Members of the ACBA JC 
TLC Members of the legislative committee (PIC) of the province of Tucuman 
 
In a couple of cases, participants used gestures to express themselves. I did not take any 
observation notes of such expressions as I had purposely decided not to take any notes during 
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the interviews as I wanted to extend my undivided attention to my participants (as discussed in 
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 above). Such gestures were however infrequent, and the participants in 
these cases mostly simultaneously expressed themselves in words.  
 
There were some words in the audio recording that I could not make out, mostly where two 
people were speaking at once (which happened more often in the interviews with more than one 
participant). Occasionally this was also due to background noise, or poor recording quality. Given 
that Spanish is not my mother-tongue, I also feel that it was more challenging for me to recognise 
words that were not easy to make out. In such cases, I used a filler – ‘kkk’ – in the transcripts to 
denote words that I could not understand. This allowed me to complete the transcripts quicker 
and without losing the flow of the conversation. It also meant I could go back over problem spots 
at a later stage by quickly searching for ‘kkk’. In many cases when I went back over the recordings 
at a later date, and with the context of the full transcripts, I could identify words more readily, 
but in cases where I could not make out what was being said, I left ‘kkk’ in the transcripts.  
 
4.5.2 Translation of Data  
Any quotes taken from the interview transcript and included in this thesis have been translated 
into English. All translations are my own, and I created a glossary of translated terms (Appendix 
G) which sets out how I have translated commonly used terms. By using this glossary throughout 
the translation process, I also ensured consistency in my translations. Where a particular legal 
term in Spanish has no satisfactory English translation, I left the Spanish term in italics, and 
provided an explanation of the term in a footnote. Explanations have also been provided where 
any translation requires clarification.  
 
4.5.3 Coding of Data using Nvivo  
All interview transcripts were uploaded to and analysed using Nvivo. The transcripts were first 
coded, categorising relevant parts of the interviews according to their content. Subsequently, 
simple Nvivo searches allowed me to bring up all data that had been coded under any given topic. 
I could also narrow down the data, to see for example, only what judges said about X or only 
what people from Tucuman said about Y. These functions in Nvivo were a useful tool to bring all 
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relevant data into one place making it easier to identify similarities and differences in the 
opinions on each topic between participants. Bringing all relevant data in to one place also made 
it easier to identify any inconsistencies or contradictions in the views of any participant.  
 
Some codes were identified prior to starting the analysis process, others arose from the data 
collected. The Case Study Protocol (Appendix E) was initially used to identify a list of codes 
(Appendix F); the data was therefore essentially categorised according to the questions and 
themes listed in the Case Study Protocol. The codes were organised hierarchically so that an 
initial over-arching theme was then divided into several sub-categories, which themselves were 
divided into further subcategories, and so on, up to six layers. Where a part of the data was coded 
to a sub-category, it would automatically also be coded at to the relevant overarching categories. 
This was beneficial during analysis as I could chose to bring up data on only a specific sub-
category, or on an overarching category.  
 
Three overarching categories were identified: data on how the judicial removals process works 
in practice; data on impact of the removals process on judicial independence (including judges 
views on judicial independence and accountability, generally); and data on the context of 
external pressure on the judiciary. The first category was broken down into the various steps in 
the removals process, as well as some additional themes such as ‘judge’s right of defence’, and 
‘practical problems with process’. In order to ensure that less expected or contradictory data was 
not missed, codes were also created for ‘other factors affecting process’ and ‘positive views of 
the process’.  
 
Any text could be coded to more than one category, and would therefore appear in searches 
relating to either. This was frequently the case where for example a whole paragraph touched 
on many topics. It was often preferable to code the entire paragraph to several codes than to try 
to break it down into pieces, as the various part of the answers may not have made sense without 
the context of the whole answer. Most of the new codes that arose from the data were sub-
categories of the initial codes identified. So for example, under the originally identified code 
‘whether or not to make a complaint against a judge’, several different reasons for not making a 
complaint arose from the various interviews, and therefore sub-codes such as ‘fear of retaliation 
from judge’, ‘no belief in system’, and ‘time/money/effort’ were created. This allowed me to 
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quickly see the data on each sub-category as well seeing it all together in terms of reasons to 
make or not make a complaint.  
 
One new over-arching category was also created, which did not directly respond to any of the 
questions asked in the Case Study Protocol, but which helped to organise the data which was not 
obviously directly relevant, yet still about the topics under discussion. The category was 
‘historical/legal analysis of participant’ and included data such as participants discussing previous 
systems of judicial removals, a legal analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions, and the 
political theory and context behind the introduction of the JC in Argentina. Coding this data 
meant allowed it to be easily accessed should it be of interest at any point during the analysis.  
 
4.5.4 Analysis of Content    
Coding the interview transcripts facilitated the analysis process by allowing different categories 
of data to be easily separated and accessed. The way the analysis was conducted and written up 
therefore reflects the way the data was coded. The analysis first looks at the data on the judicial 
removals process in practice, separately looking at the data at each step in the process to identify 
problems with the process at each stage (Chapter 5 and 6). Whilst this data touches on the ways 
in which contextual challenges influence the process, the main focus is the process itself. The 
data on the context itself, not directly linked to the way it affects a particular stage in the process, 
is analysed separately in Chapter 7. 
  
The first stage of the analysis, of the removals process itself, is divided into two parts: Chapter 5 
discusses the removals processes conducted by JCs at the federal and ACBA levels, and Chapter 
6 considers the removals process as conducted by a legislative committee in Tucuman. Separately 
analysing the process as conducted by JCs and without a JC, allows for an in-depth picture of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each process to be built. The similarities and differences can then 
be compared to address the question of whether the JC model is more successful at protecting 
judicial independence in judicial removals process than where the process is entrusted to the 
legislature.  
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The Federal and ACBA levels are considered together in Chapter 5 given the similarities in the 
two processes, both conducted by JCs. For each step in the process, the data about the Federal 
level is considered first, followed by a short consideration of any differences present at the ACBA 
level and insofar as possible, the reason for any differences. In this way each jurisdiction is 
analysed individually, however an overall conclusion can be drawn about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the JC model.  
 
The analysis of the various stages of the removals process focus on identifying aspects of the 
process that may be affecting judicial independence. However, the analysis goes beyond this by 
identifying what interests other than the protection of judicial independence and accountability 
affect the process, and providing an insight into why and how. In this way, external factors and 
the way that they impact the success of judicial removals processes are identified. This will then 
serve as a basis for a conceptual analysis of where and why the JC model can successfully protect 
judicial independence in judicial removals processes, and what challenges it faces.  
 
The data is presented from the viewpoint of the various participants, using quotes from the 
interview transcripts where helpful, and identifying participants by their code (see Section 4.5.1). 
These views are compared and contrasted to build an overall picture of what is happening in 
practice that considers the views of a variety of stakeholders. The fact that questions about the 
removals process were asked in a neutral manner, as explained in Section 4.4.2 above, also 
allowed for the identification of data that supports alternative theories, including data on what 
is working well and the ways in which judicial independence is being protected throughout the 
process, as well as the identification of factors other than the influence of external interests that 
may be causing problems in practice, such as lack of resources, training, and difficulties relating 
to the collegial nature of decision making throughout the processes.  
 
Chapter 7 explores the context in which the judicial removals processes take place. The chapter 
presents the views shared by participants on the ways in which judicial independence and 
accountability are viewed by politicians, judges, and civil society, and how this translates into 
contextual challenges such as the government’s attitude towards the judiciary, judges’ attitudes 
toward accountability, and civil society’s interest and understanding in the topic. The political 
context in each jurisdiction is different and therefore considered separately in the chapter. 
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However some contextual factors such as the effect of the media on judicial independence and 
accountability, and media and societal overview of judicial removals processes, are considered 
jointly. Cultural factors alluded to by participants are also covered jointly.  
 
The concluding chapter (Chapter 8) then builds upon the analysis of the preceding three chapters 
to reflect on whether judicial independence is protected in judicial removals processes entrusted 
to a JC. This starts with a consideration of how what is happening in practice in light of the nature 
of judicial removals processes discussed in Chapter 3, in particular to what extent the political 
influence over the process is an acceptable part of judicial accountability, and to what extent it 
is detrimental to judicial independence. This reflection compares the role the JC should play in 
theory with the role it is fulfilling in practice to identify any problems, based on the understanding 
of judicial independence outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Chapter 8 also compares the findings for the Tucuman level with the findings for the Federal and 
ACBA level, thereby identifying the strengths of the JC model in protecting judicial independence 
compared to a judicial removals process managed by the legislature. By contrasting the 
experience of the three jurisdiction, it will also consider to what extent the success of the JC 
model is context dependent, and to what extent differences in the composition of the JC or the 
regulation of the judicial removals processes impact on its success. The limitations of the data 
collected for this study are also discussed as well as the questions arising out the findings and 
possibilities for further research.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
A broad range of participants were interviewed in each of the three jurisdictions under study, 
including at least one participant from each category of stakeholder in the process: current and 
former judges, lawyers working in private practice and for NGOs that do work related to judicial 
independence, and members of the relevant JCs, legislative committees, and impeachment 
juries. A range of ages, professional experience, gender, and views were also obtained. This not 
only resulted in a wide variety of views being explored, but also allowed for breadth in the factors 
being raised.   
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The Interviews were conducted one-to-one, in person in Argentina, and in Spanish. Interviews 
were on average 51 minutes long but timing varied according to need. This all set the stage for 
the participants to be able to and feel comfortable expressing their views fully and in their own 
language. The semi-structured nature of the interviews also allowed for the full exploration of 
new themes are they arose, whilst Interview Schedules set out a basic set of questions to be 
explored in order to provide the interview with some structure and ensure that important 
themes were touch upon. This resulted in rich data on the removals process, far beyond what 
could have resulted from a pure legal analysis of the regulatory framework.  
 
Questions about how the judicial removals process was conducted in practice were asked in a 
simple and neutral manner: participants were taken step by step through a hypothetical case and 
asked how they believe it would progress at each stage. This ensured that participants were free 
to raise the factors they considered pertinent. It also allowed data on what is working well to 
surface, ensuring a neutral evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the process. Questions 
about the context were also asked in a neutral manner, which ensured that participants with a 
range of views were comfortable expressing their ideas. 
 
All 34 interviews were audio recorded, and the resulting transcripts – approximately 250,000 
words of data - were coded using Nvivo. A list of Codes was initially created from the Case Study 
Protocol, so that the data collected could be coded in terms of which aspects of the research 
question it answered. In addition, where new themes arose out of the data, new codes were 
created, most commonly sub-categories of existing codes. The coded data was then analysed and 
the findings set out in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The way these chapters are structured reflects the 
way the interview questions were conducted, in that the data on the judicial removals process is 
considered first, looking at the process as conducted by JCs in Chapter 5 and as conducted by a 
legislative committee in Chapter 6. The data on contextual challenges is analysed separately in 
Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes with a comparative analysis that allows conclusions to be drawn 
about whether entrusting judicial removals processes to a JC helps protect judicial independence.  
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Chapter 5: Research Findings and Discussion (Part 1): Judicial Removals 
Processes for Federal and ACBA Judges 
5.1 Introduction 
The question this thesis seeks to answer is whether JCs are successful in protecting judicial 
independence throughout the judicial removals procedure.486 This chapter uses the data 
collected through in-depth one-to-one interviews with various stakeholders in the removals 
process at the Federal and ACBA levels, the two jurisdictions where the process is conducted by 
a JC. Chapter 5 then separately examines the process in the province of Tucuman where the 
process is conducted by a legislative committee instead. The process is examined step by step in 
both chapters, starting with the decision to file a complaint about a judge, looking at the 
investigation into the complaint by the JCs or legislative committee, and ending with the trial of 
the judge before an IJ. Both chapters draw on the perspectives of the various stakeholders 
interviewed to examine what appears to be working and what problems are encountered in 
practice. It also identifying the stages of the process that may be affected by external interests, 
and examining the nature of this influence and its effect on the process and on judicial 
independence. As previously explained, this study does not aim to measure the prevalence of 
any problems, but rather it seeks to gain an in-depth understanding of their nature. Chapter 6 
then separately analyses participants’ insights into the context within removals processes work, 
and how it may be affecting removals and judicial independence.  
 
Due to the promised anonymity of all participants, all quotes taken from interviews and included 
in this chapter are referenced by the code given to each individual participant (see Table 4 in 
Section 4.2.1 for the list of codes). For example, Interview FJ1 indicates the interview with Federal 
Judge Number 1.487 Participants are also referred to as ‘(s)he’, as revealing their gender may 
undermine anonymity. In each section, the Federal level is considered first, with any differences 
at the ACBA level noted thereafter. Where there are no big differences, the data from the two 
jurisdictions are considered together.  
 
                                                 
486 See Section 1.2.  
487 The line numbers refer to the line numbers in the original Spanish transcripts of the interviews, and are for the 
benefit of the author’s PhD supervisors and examiners who have full access to the interview transcripts. In order 
to protect the identity of participants, the full transcripts are not publicly available.  
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5.2 Filing of Complaints 
5.2.1 The Decision to File a Complaint 
Most of the lawyers interviewed were asked whether or not they believe lawyers would file a 
complaint against a judge before the JC if they suspected judicial corruption or judicial 
malperformance.488 They were also asked what factors a lawyer might consider before filing such 
a complaint. The answer was the same across the board: they believed that not many lawyers 
would file a complaint.489 Some exceptions were however pointed out. FL3 explained that 
prosecutors have an obligation, as public sector employees, to report any suspected judicial 
misconduct, although (s)he did not say whether or not prosecutors tend do so in practice.490 FO3, 
FO4, and FL2 noted that they personally would file a complaint in the right circumstances, or that 
they have indeed filed complaints in the past, but that they do not believe that they represent 
the majority of lawyers, because they work for NGOs that specialise in protecting judicial 
independence, or otherwise feel particularly strongly about such issues.491  
 
Several reasons were given for the perceived reluctance of lawyers to file complaints against 
judges, however all of them ultimately amount to a lack of faith in the FJC. The most frequently 
raised factor,492 remembering that complaints cannot be made anonymously, was that lawyers 
have a “fear of retaliation, of vengeance in some way by judges”.493 Second, lawyers would only 
have this fear if they believe that it is likely that a judge will not be removed even if a complaint 
is filed and there is due cause for a removal. As BAL1 put it: “it is probable that… – if the judge is 
not removed, which is the most likely – that [the lawyer filing the complaint] will have another 
case before that court. Consequently, they will resist [filing a complaint]”.494 It was also noted 
that this fear of retaliation by a judge is legitimate in a context where judges have a great deal of 
discretion over the administration of cases, for example having the ability to delay a case for as 
                                                 
488 See Section 3.3.1 for grounds for removal. 
489 Interview BAL1, line 38; Interview FL2, lines 139-141; Interview FO1, line 27; Interview FO3, lines 58-71; Interview 
FO2, lines 82-83; Interview FL3, lines 48-51. 
490 Interview FL3, lines 47-48 and 54-57. 
491 Interview FO3, lines 31-36; Interview FO4, lines 32-33; Interview FL2, lines 11-14. 
492 Interview BAL1, lines 40-43; Interview FL3, lines 49-54; Interview FO1, lines 37-52; Interview FO2, lines 80-83; 
Interview FO3, lines 67-68. 
493 Interview FO3, line 67. 
494 Interview BAL1, lines 41-43. 
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long as they like, so that “if judges decide to make life difficult for lawyers, it is very easy” for 
them to do so.495 
 
FO1 explained that what exacerbates this problem is that the “judicial world is small”,496 and that 
many lawyers find themselves frequently litigating in front of the same judges. It was noted that 
this is particularly the case in the provinces, where there are usually only a small handful of 
federal judges.497 In the case of Tucuman where there are only two federal judges, if you file a 
complaint against one of them, you would be “left with the option of litigating in front of [the 
other] one only”.498 In addition, it was noted that there is a widely-held “belief that there is a 
kind of judicial family or judicial corporation, whereby a judge who sees that another judge has 
been reported, has a tendency not to deal with the requests of the lawyer who filed the 
complaint with the same objectivity” as they usually would.499 Therefore, lawyers not only fear 
retaliation from the judge they filed the complaint against, but also from other judges who they 
believe wish to protect this “judicial corporation”500 as well.  
 
It is also worth remembering, as BAL1 pointed out, that “the process that may result in the 
removal of a judge does not affect the decision”501 the judge made, and therefore “the 
mechanism for filing a complaint against a judges cannot be, [and] never is, an instrument to 
modify an unfavourable decision”.502 There is therefore not much motivation for a lawyer to file 
a complaint against a judge as it will not benefit their case directly. It was noted that there are 
some “brave” 503 lawyers who do file complaints, and that these “tend to be lawyers who are very 
much fighters, very conflictive lawyers… who are used to fighting a lot with the judiciary”.504 
However, when I interviewed FL2 who is famed for having filed many complaints, (s)he told me 
that whilst (s)he had high hopes when the JC was first introduced, “lately, I have filed much fewer 
                                                 
495 Interview FO3, lines 76-81. 
496 Interview FO1, line 39. 
497 Interview FO1, lines 43-47; Interview FL3, lines 49-51. 
498 Interview FL3, line 51. 
499 Interview FL3, lines 52-54. The concern that other judges would punish lawyers for reporting their colleagues 
was also voiced in Interview FO3, lines 74-75, and Interview FO1, lines 39-43. 
500 Ibid. See also Section 7.5 for further discussion.  
501 Interview BAL1, lines 45-46. 
502 Interview BAL1, lines 46-48. 
503 Interview FO2, line 79. 
504 Interview FO3, lines 69-71. 
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complaints, all of us have filed much fewer complaints… because of the high level of disrepute of 
the Council”.505 
 
As will become apparent in the remainder of this chapter, the underlying reason for lawyers’ lack 
of trust in the JC – the reason they believe complaints will not be properly investigated- is that 
“with the years, one realises that there are certain judges who are protected”,506 and that in the 
case of a “judge [who is] very committed, dependent, and supported by a government… with 
difficulty anything important will happen with the complaint”.507 FO3 therefore explained that 
the decision of whether or not to file a complaint is very carefully considered, as “the inversion 
of time, energy, resources, and even public exposure which is implicated in filing a complaint, will 
not have any… correlation with the possibility that anything important happens”508 with the 
complaint and judge in question.  
 
FO3 identified two cases in which (s)he believe that a complaint would still be filed, or in which 
(s)he would file a complaint. The first is where “lawyers have established some kind of personal 
fight with these judges” and who “felt personally attacked or encumbered by the judges, or felt 
that the judges acted in a way that was very incorrect in one of their clients’ cases”,509 and 
therefore have less to lose. The second case is where the misconduct is deemed to “compromise 
very important values of the institutional system”.510 In essence, “the more serious or more 
important the violation of certain principles is, the more likely that a complaint would be filed 
anyway, even if the chances are very low [that the complaint will be properly investigated]”.511 
 
5.2.2 Obtaining Evidence of Judicial Malperformance 
FJC4 explained that “the only thing that the complainant does is to file a complaint and say where 
the evidence will be. Thereafter, it is the Commission who should take all of the procedural steps 
to obtain that evidence”.512 Whilst at first sight this makes it sound easy to file a complaint, it still 
                                                 
505 Interview FL2, lines 139-142. 
506 Interview FO2, lines 83-84. 
507 Interview FO3, lines 43-44. 
508 Interview FO3, lines 44-47. 
509 Interview FO3, lines 62-65. 
510 Interview FO3, line 38. 
511 Interview FO3, lines 53-55. 
512 Interview FJC4, lines 244-246. 
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requires the complainant to know of the existence of and, according to the law, “precise” location 
of that evidence.513 BAJC1 was more direct, saying “he who alleges an act, should prove it”, and 
that “the complainant needs to prove the malpractice of the judge”.514 The difficulty in proving 
allegations was however recognised by BAJC1’s who opined that, “in doubt, it is always 
preferable to investigate” as the grounds for removal “are quite difficult, not only to analyse, but 
also to prove”.515 BAJC1 did not however say whether it was common practice in the Council to 
investigate complaints when in doubt. 
 
FO4 also expressed doubt that the Council would gather evidence, even if a complainant 
indicated where it could be found: Although the JC has the faculty to obtain evidence, the 
“[Federal] JC works in a way that is… sub-optimal”.516 In essence, FO4 believed that in order to 
have a chance for the Council to take a complaint seriously, a complainant would need to provide 
as much evidence as possible himself. FO4 explained that “filing a complaint against a judge 
without enough evidence –no… I know that the Council would not gather it, although they could, 
it’s very unlikely they would do so”.517 “The only thing a lawyer can do”, according to FO4, “is to 
try to make his complaint in the most consistent, intense and well-founded way possible”,518 so 
that it is harder for the complaint to be ignored.  
 
It may, however, be difficult for complainants to have or to be able to point to evidence. As FO1 
put it “if there are suspicions that the judge made a deal with one of the parties… you won’t see 
it by looking at the case file”.519 The type of evidence that you will need in order to prove 
corruption, (s)he argued, will be rather along the lines of “wiretap recordings… register of calls… 
telephone calls...”,520 which are difficult for a complainant to obtain or even to know the 
                                                 
513 Article 5(e), Reglamento de la Comisión de Disciplina y Acusación, approved by Resolución 98/2207 del Consejo 
de la Magistratura (BO del 28/03/2007). This provision states that complaints should contain a set of minimum 
requirements, including “the offering of cited evidence to accredit the facts. Where this is documental evidence 
that is in the possession of the complainant, it should be attached to the complaint. Where this is not the case, [the 
complainant] will indicate with precision where it is and/or the person who has it in his possession.” Translation my 
own. 
514 Interview BAJC1, lines 52-53. 
515 Interview BAJC1, lines 75-76. 
516 Interview FO4, lines 35-36. 
517 Interview FO4, lines 35-38. 
518 Interview FO3, lines 93-95. 
519 Interview FO1, lines 344-345.  
520 Interview FO1, lines 346-347. 
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existence of. FJ5 however disagreed: “if a judge commits a barbarity in a case, in the end, that 
barbarity will appear in the decision in some way”.521 The difficulty with this however is the rule 
that the content of judicial decisions should not be reviewed in removal processes, as shall be 
discussed further in Section 4.4.1 below.  
 
If a complainant is lucky enough for there to be a criminal proceeding into the same facts, there 
is the possibility that the criminal court or prosecutors in that case could pass evidence to the 
JC.522 However,FO3 explained that due to the slow working of the criminal justice system, 
particularly in cases of corruption, and the protection often afforded to judges, it is unlikely that 
there would be a criminal case underway or that any useful evidence would have been collected 
as part of such a case.523 The result is that “we have had many suspicions of corruption many 
time, and nevertheless, no… we don’t file a complaint because we often don’t have sufficient 
elements in order to even if you like bring the minimum for that suspicion to have foundations 
and for it to succeed”.524 In such cases, FO1 felt that it is better not to file a complaint and hope 
to collect more evidence than for the case to publicly fail.525  
 
It is also worth noting that judges are required to file a yearly declaration of assets.526 Several 
judges explained that this new legislation had been properly enforced, and that they are 
reminded every year of the need to file their declarations.527 In some cases, this may prove to be 
a useful tool for lawyers wishing to prove corruption, however whether this is the case remains 
to be seen. FL2 said two complaints had been filed against judges for possible illicit enrichment, 
and neither was successful.528  
 
                                                 
521 Interview FJ5, lines 313-314. 
522 Interview FO1, lines 350-351. 
523 Interview FO3, lines 287-298. 
524 Interview FO1, lines 30-33. 
525 Interview FO1, lines 33-35. 
526 Articles 4-11, Law 25,188, Ética en el Ejercicio de la Función Pública (BO del 01/11/1999). 
527 Interview FJ1, lines 416-442; Interview FJ3, lines 219-228; Interview FJ4, lines 179-199; Interview BAJ3, lines 348-
373; Interview BAJ4, lines 344-362. 
528 Interview FL2, lines 95-97. 
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5.2.3 Who Files Complaints and Who Has Complaints Filed Against Them  
Despite the apparent hesitancy of lawyers to file complaints, FJC2 said the FJC receives “loads” 
of complaints:529 roughly three hundred complaints against judges a year, for the few years 
leading up to the time of the interviews.530 In addition, although the judges interviewed were not 
asked whether or not they had had any complaints filed against them, many of them voluntarily 
explained that they had had complaints filed against them.531 There was only one judge, of the 
ACBA, who explicitly stated that (s)he had never received a complaint,532 although (s)he had only 
been a judge for a couple of years. FJC1 explained that complaints are not always made by 
individuals; appeal courts sometimes file complaints where they suspect malperformance.533 
NGOs also file complaints, as do lawyers, prison inmates, politicians, prosecutors, legal advisors, 
and even JC councillors themselves.534 Both FJC2 and judges however highlighted that the bulk 
of complaints are filed by the losing party in a case, unhappy with the outcome,535 or “cheeky” 
lawyers who want to “confirm to their clients why it did not go well for them in court”.536   
 
BAJ3 explained that where a judge’s decision is revoked by a higher court, people feel legitimized 
to file a complaint.537 This is problematic because complaints should only be made about 
suspected malperformance, not simply on the basis of disagreeing with a judge’s decision. As 
BAJ2 put it, “it is one thing that [someone] doesn’t like my judicial reasoning, and another thing 
that I sidestep legal rules in deciding cases”, and the former is not a reason to file a complaint.538 
However, given the discussion above regarding the difficulty obtaining evidence, it may be 
difficult to distinguish between complainants who genuinely suspect malperformance and 
complainants who are simply unhappy with a judge’s decision, as a lack of evidence does not 
necessarily equate with the latter.   
                                                 
529 Interview FJC2, line 77. 
530 Interview FJC1, line 452; Interview FJC3, lines 266-267. 
531 Interview FJ1, lines 216-217; Interview FJ2, lines 35-36; Interview FJ4, lines 35-37; Interview FJ5, lines 31-32; 
Interview BAJ3, lines 197-198; Interview BAJ4, lines 128-129. 
532 Interview BAJ5, lines 54-55. 
533 Interview FJC1, lines 23-26. 
534 Interview FJC1, lines 27-36 and lines 131-135. In terms of councillors filing complaints, see also Interview FJC2, 
lines 88-91: It was explained that “previously [councillors] did it more. Now not so much anymore.” 
535 Interview FJ2, lines 17-24; Interview FJ3, lines 28-29; Interview FJ4, lines 18-19 speaks of complaints that are not 
filed in a very serious, professional manner; Interview BAJ3, lines 9-10. 
536 Interview FJC2, lines 80-84. 
537 Interview BAJ3, lines 22-26. 
538 Interview BAJ2, lines 60-62. 
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Some complaints appear to be malicious rather than misguided: Four judges complained that 
lawyers threaten judges with filing complaints if a case does not proceed as they wish, or that 
they file complaints with a view to putting pressure on judges to decide in their favour.539 These 
would be empty threats if such complaints were rejected by the JC. However where judges fear 
that such complaints would be pursued (as shall be discussed below in Section 4.3), this may be 
problematic as the threats become credible. 
 
According to FJC1 and FJC2, politicians, mostly congressmen and women,540 make up another 
group of complainants.541 This may be where something that happened in a court case becomes 
“notorious”,542 and politicians “interiorize the topic, and present a complaint by virtue of this”.543 
BAJ4 also explained that politicians will often make complaints about a judge if they have been 
adversely affected by his or her decision.544 FJ5 agreed that where “we had some topic that could 
involve the government… then the system was one of systematic complaints”.545 FJC3 confirmed 
that “those judges who emit decisions which do not please the executive power, have complaints 
filed against them, many [of them based on] issues which cannot be proven, but which are 
nevertheless said, and this generates a lot of anxiety among judge, because… [they] receive a 
message saying: depending on how you decide, you may have a complaint in process, where 
defending themselves, for a judge, is extremely preoccupying”.546 BAJ4 was also careful to note 
that not only government officials, but also powerful economic actors may also file complaints 
against a judge where the judge rules against their interest.547 
 
FJC3 also explained that politicians may use complaints against judges as a strategy to place 
pressure on them in the long-term, not only in a single case: One of the “practices that is not 
explicit but that can be seen to have a political content to domesticate a judge…” is to “make any 
                                                 
539 Interview BAJ5, lines 82-85; Interview FJ2, lines 24-29; Interview FJ3, lines 25-30; Interview FJ4, lines 18-21. 
540 Interview FJC2, line 93. 
541 Interview FJC1, line 33; Interview FJC2, line 92-93.  
542 See a discussion of the role the media plays in the discipline of judges in Section 6.7.  
543 Interview FJC1, lines 34-35. 
544 Interview BAJ4, lines 154-157. 
545 Interview FJ5, lines 302-304. See also Interview FJ4, lines 40-47. 
546 Interview FJC3, lines 290-295. 
547 Interview BAJ4, lines 154-157. 
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old complaint and keep it in the freezer”.548 This practice of keeping complaints against judges 
open in the Council can be used as a threat against a judge: either rule in our favour or we will 
open up this investigation into you.  
 
These political complaints are sometimes made by “lawyers related to a political sector”,549 some 
of whom are “chronic complainants”.550 BAJ4 explained that in the ACBA such complaints are 
also made by prosecutors as, although prosecutors are part of the judicial branch of the ACBA, 
the Prosecutor General is elected by the legislative branch, and at the time of the interviews the 
Prosecutor General was a former legislator of the ruling party.551 BAJ4 argued that “therefore, 
there is a clear party line in the public prosecutor’s office, and frequently these prosecutors make 
complaints that are in line with the politics of the governing party”.552 
 
Despite these problems, the large majority of the judges interviewed clearly stated that they 
believe that it is positive to have legislation that allows anyone to easily file a complaint against 
a judge.553 FJ5 was the only judge to qualify this saying that “it is not good… that the complainant 
does not assume any responsibility for irresponsible complaints…. [the complainant] should 
assume the costs and possibly indemnify a judge who has been unfairly accused”.554 The 
importance of the JC’s role in deciding whether or not to admit and investigate complaints to 
avoid any adverse effects on judicial independence was however highlighted as shall be seen 
below.  
 
                                                 
548 Interview FJC3, lines 268-271. 
549 Interview FJC2, lines 83-84. 
550 Interview FJC2, line 84.  
551 Interview BAJ4, lines 314-317. 
552 Interview BAJ4, lines 317-320. 
553 Interview FJ1, lines 138-139; Interview FJ2, lines 15-17; Interview FJ3, lines 12-15; Interview FJ4, lines 16-17; 
Interview FJ5, line 8; Interview BAJ1, line 10; Interview BAJ2, lines 42-51; Interview BAJ4, lines 36-45; Interview 
BAJ5, lines 43-47; Interview TJ2, lines 84-83; Interview TJ3+4, line 15; Interview TJ5, line 164. The interviews 
with the remaining judges did not develop in the same way and therefore this issue was not explicitly discussed.  
554 Interview FJ5, lines 8-14. 
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5.3 The Admissibility of Complaints 
5.3.1 The Admissibility of Complaints 
Upon receiving a complaint, the JC assesses its admissibility and can either accept it and start the 
process of notifying the judge of the complaint, investigating, and requiring him/her to testify, or 
it can reject the complaint in limine (essentially declaring it inadmissible). As detailed in Section 
2.6, the JC has a wide range of discretion over this decision, and not under any legal obligation 
to provide an explanation. Based on the interview data, the way in which this decision is taken in 
practice appears to be controversial and problematic.  
 
BAJ4 and BAL1 explained that it is good that the JC has the ability to reject complaints in limine.555 
As FJ4 stated, if “there is a proper functioning and serious[ness] on the part of the JC”, “that is to 
say that it really filters the complaints that do not have much foundations”,556 then the Council 
will be protecting judicial independence. As FJ5 explained, the JC should automatically reject any 
complaints that are based on a mere disagreement with a judge’s decision, and that it should 
“declare when a complaint is manifestly unfounded”.557  
 
FJC3 agreed that if “the only thing” that a complaint “manifests is a disconformity with the 
decision of a judges”,558 that is a reason to reject the complaint in limine. “What we investigate 
is the conduct of the judge, not the legal content of the decision”,559(s)he said, adding that “the 
legal error of the judge has to be very shameful in order to go into this topic”.560 BAJC1 also stated 
that: “if a complaint against a judge is simply because someone did not like the content of his/her 
decision, that complaint, in general, is rejected in limine”.561 FJC1 also explained that “in an 
important measure”, the Commission proposes to reject complaints in limine, adding that “often, 
the judge doesn’t even realise [that there is a complaint against him/her] as the complaints are 
so unfounded” that they are rejected.562 FJC2 said that (s)he would estimate that 80% of 
                                                 
555 Interview BAJ4, lines 137-140; Interview BAL1, lines 80-83. 
556 Interview FJ4, lines 27-28. The word translated here as ‘foundations’ was asidero in Spanish, which literally 
translated means ‘grip’, as in something to hold on to. 
557 Interview FJ5, lines 14-15. 
558 Interview FJC3, line 64. 
559 Interview FJC3, lines 66-67. 
560 Interview FJC3, lines 67-68. 
561 Interview BAJC1, lines 65-66. 
562 Interview FJC1, 111-115. 
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complaints end up being rejected, usually as they are unfounded.563 Indeed, two of the judges I 
spoke to said that they had had complaints against them which were rejected in limine.564  
 
However, the JC should be very careful not to reject complaints where complainants point to a 
judge’s decision in order to demonstrate what they believe may be a case of judicial corruption. 
As FL3 pointed out, the Supreme Court jurisprudence on this clearly states that “a judge is not 
judged for his decisions, except when from the same the Commission of a crime can be deduced, 
for example when a judge evaluated evidence in an incorrect manner, or used some element to 
direct his decision without respecting the criteria for objectivity and adherence to the law that 
should prevail when rendering a judgement”.565 A misapplication of this norm by the JC whereby 
any reference to a judicial ruling is automatically rejected may result in complaints based on 
genuine suspicions of misconduct being rejected. 
 
Indeed, FL2 who has experience of filing complaints before the JC seemed to indicate that this 
happens. In FL2’s opinion, “one of the worst… habits that has established itself since the JC was 
created…. Is that judges cannot be judged in the JC for the content of their decisions”.566 FL2 
explained that not looking at judges’ decisions is a “terrible limitation and an absurd limitation 
because of course there are debatable judicial decisions when a judge faced with solution A 
instead decides for solution B based on some grounds that are different to what should have 
been according to my preferences. But when there is a difference between A and Z, not between 
A and B, it is because the judge wanted to cover up something”.567 In this regard, FJ1 also raised 
an interesting point about the difficulty of defending against complaints without referencing the 
content of a judge’s decision: “whilst the right of defence is guaranteed formally… what can I say 
that is different from the basis of my decision?”568 
 
                                                 
563 Interview FJC2, lines 265-268. The phrase translated here as ‘unfounded’ was no tiene entidad in Spanish, which 
literally means ‘does not have entity’ in the sense of substance or basis.  
564 Interview BAJ4, line 132; Interview BAJ3, line 197. Two more judges said they had experienced complaints, 
without specifying whether they had been rejected in limine: Interview FJ2, lines 35-39; Interview FJ4, line 18. 
565 Interview FL3, lines 35-40. 
566 Interview FL2, lines 15-17. 
567 Interview FL2, lines 17-21. 
568 Interview FJ1, lines 214-217. 
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It is possible that the JC could use the excuse of not wanting to review judicial decisions in cases 
where it wishes to protect a judge from an investigation. In this sense, FO3 explained that the 
decision of whether or not to accept a complaint is made “on the basis of criteria which are not 
public”.569 Instead, these criteria “related to the conveniences, negotiations and agreements” 
between councillors.570 FJ1 also highlighted that some complaints are “rejected very quickly”,571 
raising doubts about whether the Council had adequate time to evaluate the complaint or 
whether they simply rejected it due to wishing to protect the judge in question. FO4 however 
noted, that in “important” cases, the JC does provide an adequate justification for rejecting a 
complaint, and that they do not simply reject it without any explanation.572 
 
FO3 explained that “it is impossible to anticipate whether or not a complaint will be accepted 
based on objective criteria on the seriousness of the issue or even the quality of the accused 
judge”:573 the decision of whether to admit or reject a complaint is “absolutely capricious” and 
therefore “a serious issue may be declared inadmissible, or a trivial issue may be declared 
admissible”.574 FJ1 explained that “if [they] want to annoy the judge, they call on him/her to make 
a declaration without the need to judge him/her, but it’s already like submitting him/her to the 
disciplinary process”.575 Where this is the case, FJ1 explained, “all complaints against judges are 
processed.”576 FJ4 agreed that “the Council doesn’t filter [complaints], therefore, they send us 
the complaint, we have to defend ourselves, and well, only then the Council starts to filter”.577 
FJ1 said that the last time (s)he was sent a complaint and requested to provide a defence, a 
councillor informally told him/her “don’t worry”. Of course, the judge wanted to know why (s)he 
should need to defend him/herself against a complaint that was implausible and should have 
been rejected outright.578 
 
                                                 
569 Interview FO3, line 87. 
570 Interview FO3, lines 88-90. 
571 Interview FJ1, lines 149-150. 
572 Interview FO4, lines 138-139. 
573 Interview FO3, lines 88-90. 
574 Interview FO3, lines 91-93. 
575 Interview FJ1, lines 147-149. 
576 Interview FJ1, lines 56-58. See also Interview FJ2, line 32.  
577 Interview FJ4, lines 28-29. See also FJ1, lines 172-179. 
578 Interview FJ1, lines 172-179. 
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Complaints may therefore be accepted on the basis of who the judge in question is. FJ5 explained 
that (s)he cannot recall any “case in which a complaint against a judge, for a topic of public 
notoriety, was rejected in limine”.579 FO1 gave the example of a complaint which an NGO had 
filed which the JC basically ignored for over three years before finally accepting the complaint, 
notifying the judge and asking him/her to testify. According to the FO1, around the time of the 
acceptance, “the judge in question, in his actions, affected the government in certain 
circumstances”.580  
 
FJ5 also noted that “depending on who file complaints… complaints go through the whole 
process or are rejected”.581 This could be where there is “some question of notoriety, some artist 
which complains and therefore they investigate the judge straight away”.582 Indeed, FJ5 said that 
(s)he had experienced a complaint being made by someone famous and “linked to the 
government”, and that this complaint was accepted within the hour.583 The Council only 
dismissed that complaint two years later.584 FJ5 added that “if your run-of-the-mill neighbour 
makes a complaint about a judge… who is not deciding transcendental issues - these are the cases 
that get rejected in limine”.585  
 
5.3.2 How the Decision to Accept or Reject a Complaint is Reached 
As BAL1 explained, “the process of elaboration of a case within the [Federal] Council is reasonably 
good. What is very politicised and the fruit of negotiations, is the decision process”.586 It is 
therefore worth looking more closely at who is making the decision about the admissibility of 
complaints and how it is reached.587 It is an important decision given that the there is no way for 
it to be reviewed by another body, although there is the possibility to appeal a decision to the 
Council itself.588  
                                                 
579 Interview FJ5, lines 584-585. 
580 Interview FO1, lines 61-66. 
581 Interview FJ5, lines 29-30. 
582 Interview FJ1, line 64-65. 
583 Interview FJ5, lines 31-89. 
584 Interview FJ5, lines 47-48. 
585 Interview FJ5, lines 48-50. 
586 Interview BAL1, lines 71-73. 
587 Interview BAL1, lines 83-86. 
588 These presentaciones posteriores allow the plenary of the JC to review a decision that has already been made 
and appealed. 
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Once a complaint is delivered to the front desk of the FJC (which FJC1 explained had exceptionally 
long opening hours), it is sent to the CDA, where all new complaints get assigned to one of the 
nine councillors that make up the Commission at their weekly meeting.589 If there are nine new 
complaints in a week, each councillor will take one complaint. This Reporting Councillor takes the 
lead on the case, and can then propose that the complaint is either accepted or rejected at the 
next meeting. Any other councillor, however, “can get involved in the file and propose 
measures”.590 The Reporting Councillor therefore does not have any real decisional power over 
a case; the practice of appointing each case to a councillor appears rather to be a practical 
measure to balance the workload between councillors, and to make sure that no files get 
forgotten. Once the Commission has decided on the admissibility of a complaint, the decision 
gets passed onto the plenary of the JC which makes the final decision. 
 
Therefore, as FO3 explained, the acceptance or rejections of a complaint is therefore a game of 
numbers, with certain interests gaining enough votes to hold veto powers.591 FJC1 however 
pointed out that “the relationship of majorities and minorities is different” in the Commission 
and in the plenary.592 Therefore, “for example, in the Commission, one group may have the 
majority… but when it passes to the plenary, the majority which it has in the Commission, it may 
or may not have in the plenary”.593 Whilst the ultimate power to accept or reject a complaint is 
held by the plenary of the JC, they can only decide this once the Commission puts forward a 
proposal. The Commission therefore holds a significant amount of power, as if it does not wish 
to propose that a complaint is rejected in limine, the JC as a whole will not get a chance to make 
that decision.   
 
The crucial question then is: what majorities and minorities are formed in making such decisions 
and why? The role partisan political plays in plenary decisions will be discussed below. For the 
councillors that are legislators, and for the representative from the executive, these alliances are 
clear, however when there is a vote in the JC that the political parties are interested in, they will 
                                                 
589 Interview FJC1, lines 7-72. 
590 Interview FJC1, line 76. 
591 Interview FO3, lines 100-102. 
592 Interview FJC1, line 185. 
593 Interview FJC1, lines 186-189. 
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try to get as many of the other councillors as possible to vote in their favour. Votes become a 
show-down of political strength, and the other councillors – the lawyers, the academics, and the 
judges, end up aligning with one side or the other. 
  
These alliances are fairly fixed in the case of some councillors who publicly align themselves with 
a political party.594 In the case of other councillors, these alliances may change somewhat from 
vote to vote. FO3 explained that those Councillors that tend to vote with the opposition, act in a 
less concerted fashion than those supporting the governing party, which means that the main 
political force acting as a veto power was the pro-governing party.595 The only times the 
opposition will act as a group is where a judge “perhaps is being persecuted by the 
representatives of the governing party”, in which case the opposition will group together to 
defend that judge.596  
 
Another point of contention is who holds the presidency of the CDA. The president is elected by 
the members of the commission. Whilst the president of the commission can only hold this 
position for two years, FJC3 noted that everything “is set up very well” by interest groups who 
ensure that the presidency stays with councillors supporting their interests, and that they 
“change between each other”.597The president has a fair amount of control of the day-to-day 
running of the commission, including setting the agenda for the weekly meetings, and has some 
degree of power over choosing the technical staff that will help advise the commission.598  
 
FJC3 explained that in the four years leading up the date of the interview, “the presidents [of the 
commission] have always been from the Frente para la Victoria”.599 This gives them control of 
the agenda of the commission, and “the commission they have a majority of five members from 
the Frente para la Victoria, so they politically manage [it].”600 The government also had a majority 
in the plenary at the time of the interviews.601 That meant that it was also possible for them to 
                                                 
594 Interview FJC4, lines 95-97. 
595 Interview FO3, lines 100-118. 
596 Interview FO3, lines 112-116. 
597 Interview FJC3, lines 286-290. 
598 Interview FJC3, lines 288-290. 
599 Interview FJC3, lines 280-281. 
600 Interview FJC3, lines 282-284. 
601 Interview FJ1, lines 142-144. 
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reject complaints against judges they wish to protect. However, they did not have the two-thirds 
majority in order to accuse a judge before an IJ. This meant that complaints can get the votes 
from the governing party to be accepted in the CDA, but not to go to an IJ, and those complaints 
end up circling the Council for years.602 
 
The other group whose interests can be seen influencing the JC is the “judicial corporation”: FO3 
explained that many judge councillors act in concert to “protect judges in general terms”.603 
Whilst judges make up four of the thirteen councillors and cannot therefore form a majority, they 
still represent an important block of votes, particularly in forming the one third of votes necessary 
to protect a judge from proceedings before the IJ. In particular, judges have “the possibility to 
act as a whole” at the time where complaints are rejected, in order to protect judges that they 
may feel are being persecuted. 604  
 
It is however also important to note that this politicisation and judicial protectionism does not 
affect all cases before the FJC. FJC2 explained that where a judge is “too, eh… bad”,605 in “serious” 
cases,606 everyone in the Council “quickly agrees” that the complaint should be investigated and 
the judge is accused before an IJ.607 However, it is worth looking at what this really means. It 
could be that this is simply in cases where no political party has any interest in protecting the 
judge in question, and nor do the judges. Or it could be that this occurs in cases where there is a 
lot of very clear evidence of the malperformance in question, such as where a judge is caught on 
camera, in which case, any sector that defends the judge would lose a lot of credibility. However, 
cases of malperformance that might be just as bad, but where the evidence is not public, may 
allow groups to –to some extent credibly- protect that judge from investigations.  
 
5.3.3 The Acceptance and Rejection of Complaints in the ACBA JC  
The issues described above as affecting the admission of complaints in the FJC do not appear to 
affect the ACBA JC to the same degree. BAJ4 explained that “none of my colleagues have 
                                                 
602 Interview FJ5, lines 588-592. 
603 Interview FO3, lines 109-110. 
604 Interview FO3, line 112. 
605 Interview FJC2, lines 42-43. 
606 Interview FJC2, lines 53-57. 
607 Interview FJC2, lines 42-43 and 53-57. 
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mentioned having a complaint opened against them on purpose or for some disciplinary 
purpose”.608 BAJ2 agreed that this is used less in the ACBA JC than in the FJC.609 BAJ3 and BAJ5 
also did not mentioned complaints being opened against judges for political reasons. BAJ1 
however explained that “there have been cases of express rejections or express admissions” of 
complaints, where there are political motivations in place.610  
 
It seems then that political alliances have not infiltrated the ACBA JC to the extent of being able 
to frequently form a majority which allows complaints to be accepted for political reasons. One 
possible explanation for this is the composition of the ACBA JC. There is an equal representation 
of lawyers, judges, and politicians in both the plenary and the CDA. Another possible explanation 
is that there is not as much political interest in doing so, and that less politically motivated 
complaints are filed.  
 
BAJ1 however noted that whilst partisan politics may not play as great a role, “politics in the 
broadest sense” still plays a main role in the decision making as the majorities necessary to 
continue with an investigation are formed.611 Therefore, as BAJ4 put it, it is “the responsibility of 
the councillors” to decisions are reached fairly.612 BAJ1 also noted that judicial corporatism, “of 
judges defending themselves” play a big role in deciding the admissibility of complaints.613 In this 
vein, the fact that the Commission is presided by a lawyer has caused some controversy among 
judges who feel that the president of this committee should be a judge.614  
 
5.4 How Complaints are Investigated 
Given that it is the CDA that deals with the investigations, the factors affecting decision-making 
in the investigation process are therefore largely the same as those outlined above as affecting 
the decision of whether to accept or reject a complaint. In order to better understand the effect 
of this politicization of the decision making process on investigations, this section will look at its 
                                                 
608 Interview BAJ4, lines 163-164. Note that the word ‘disciplinary’ is used here in the sense of an attempt to 
control the judge’s decisions and compromise his or her impartiality.  
609 Interview BAJ2, lines 151-155. 
610 Interview BAJ1, line 78. 
611 Interview BAJ1, lines 35-37. 
612 Interview BAJ4, lines 145-146. 
613 Interview BAJ1, lines 29-32. 
614 Interview BAJ1, lines 130-131. 
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effect on the length of investigations, and on the extent to which a judge’s right of defence is 
protected.  
5.4.1 Length of Investigations 
FO1 explained that the main criteria for determining whether or not an investigation will advance 
or not is the “proximity or distance that a judge has circumstantially with a particular sector of 
power”.615 Only the complaints “which political groups have interest in moving along” get 
investigated explained FJ1.616 FO1 agreed, explaining that “the disciplinary processes for judges, 
in practice, advance to the rhythm of the political necessities of the different sectors of the 
Council”.617 So, “it is a priori, let’s say: first the decision is taken as to how much it will advance, 
and then it is defined how it will advance so that it is functional to that decision, and not the 
other way around as should be.”618 
 
Several participants explained that complaints against federal judges frequently get “shelved”:619 
very little is done on the case, and no resolutions are proposed to move the investigation along 
or to dismiss the case. FJ2 explained that this can work in two ways. Most commonly, if a judge 
has “had some kind of political friction with the government”, then the oficialistas (those who 
support the ruling political party) in the Council may say “we are going to shelve [this complaint]”, 
so that later on “when another silly complaint gets filed… this judge does not have one but two 
pending complaints”620 and this can be used to “influence”621 him/ her. Alternatively, if a judge 
is considered to be beneficial to the opposition party, councillors supporting that party may 
choose to “shelve” complaints, for a rainy day so to speak; If the judge in the future does 
something the party doesn’t like, they can disown the judge by turning around and saying “who 
                                                 
615 Interview FO1, lines 80-81. 
616 Interview FJ1, lines 56-58.  
617 Interview FO1, lines 59-61. 
618 Interview FO1, lines 152-157. 
619 Interview FJ1, lines 306-307; Interview FJC3, lines 268-271; Interview FL1, lines 143-147; Interview FO2, lines 
160-162. 
620 Interview FJ2, lines 240-242. Note that the word used in Spanish translated here as ‘shelve’ was cajonear, which 
literally means ‘to put in a drawer’. Essentially, this means to put something to one side in order to deal with it 
at a later date – to put on the backburner may be a similar although not exact translation into English as the 
Spanish word can have a negative connotation depending on the context. Other phrases used to mean the 
same thing in Spanish are to ‘put in the freezer’, or to ‘sit on top of the file’. 
621 Interview FJ2, line 251. 
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is judge X? Look at the number of complaints (s)he has!”,622 even if they are for things which 
“should be rejected in limine”.623  
 
Participants FL3, FO1, and FO3 compared the shelving of complaints to “a sort of sword of 
Damocles which hangs over the head of some judges who do not have ties [to the governing 
party]”,624 and that “during this time with an open investigation, the judge tends to feel that he 
does not have sufficient independence or liberty to emit a decision which is not to the liking of 
the political power, because this investigation can advance in great bounds with the purpose of 
achieving his possible displacement”.625 FJC3 confirmed that this happens: “a complaint is made, 
it is left without being processed, and then when someone needs something which this judge is 
deciding, [the judge] knows that if (s)he doesn’t decide how they want, they will activate the 
complaint”.626 “It has transformed into a permanent instability” explained FJ1,627 adding that 
“sometimes complaints are asleep two, three, four years, and the judge who knows that the 
complaint doesn’t have any foundation, doesn’t have the tranquillity of knowing that it was 
rejected”.628  
 
FJC4 also explained another reason for delays in processing a case: as the president of the CDA 
was aligned with the governing party, he would not place a case on the agenda, and the 
Commission would not send a file to the plenary, until agreements have been reached and he 
knows what the outcome in the plenary will be: “until agreements have been obtained, or 
knowing that there will not be any agreement, he leaves [the file] there”, without giving the 
plenary the chance to make a decision.629 FL2 also alluded to a similar phenomenon, saying “the 
first thing which sometimes happens [in the Commission] is that they never meet! That is to say 
this is a way of doing party politics within the JC”.630 Alternatively, explained FL2, if a Reporting 
                                                 
622 Interview FJ2, lines 252-253. 
623 Interview FJ2, lines 249-250. 
624 The term translated here as ‘not supportive of’ was no son afines in Spanish, which literally means ‘do not have 
ties/links’ or ‘are not associated/connected’. 
625 Interview FL3, lines 124-129; Interview FO1, lines 12-13; Interview FO3, lines 130-133. 
626 Interview FJC3, lines 275-277. 
627 Interview FJ1, line 58. 
628 Interview FJ1, lines 60-61. The word translated here as ‘foundations’ was asidero in Spanish, which literally 
translated means ‘grip’, as in something to hold on to.  
629 Interview FJC4, lines 187-197. 
630 Interview FL2, lines 110-112. 
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Councillor is appointment and wants to propose to accuse [Judge] Fulano Mulgano,631 “if the 
commission meets [but] doesn’t obtain the necessary votes, the topic dies in the commission and 
doesn’t go to the plenary”.632  
 
FJ1 also explained that this shelving of complaints can be used in in a third way: “If they want to 
protect someone” from further investigations.633 FJ2, FL1, and FO1 gave the example of Federal 
Judge Oyarbide.634 Oyarbide was one of twelve judges of the Federal Criminal and Correctional 
Court – “they call them the twelve apostles” said FO1, “because these twelve people have a lot 
of power” as they are the ones to investigates corruption cases against government officials.635 
According to FO1, many, but not all, of these judges “tend to accompany the government of the 
day”, and two of these judges in particular – Oyarbide and Bonadio – have been heavily criticised 
by the opposition as responding to the interests of the governing party.636  
 
In recent times, however, Bonadio has ruled against the governing party and has now fallen under 
the protection of the opposition.637 As both parties had an interest in protecting one of these 
two judges, there appeared to be a “pseudo-pact of impunity” between the parties where they 
decided to “accept both complaints, and not advance [with the investigations] in either”.638 That 
way, “publicly, it appeared as though the JC is pursuing disciplinary proceedings against both, but 
in practice, that’s as far as it went and it is likely that’s as far as it will go”.639 This demonstrates 
that whilst the game of numbers and voting is usually a fight between different interests in the 
Council, “sometimes they cede this fight and make pacts of give and take”.640 FJ1 did add that 
(s)he understood that this had been improving in recent years; that the JC had been trying to 
process the backlog of cases.641 This may be in part, according to FJ1 because “judges have been 
                                                 
631 Fulano Mulgano is a made-up name to designate a hypothetical person, akin to Joe Bloggs in English.  
632 Interview FL2, lines 116-117. 
633 Interview FJ1, lines 143-144. 
634 Interview FJ2, lines 132-163; Interview FL1, lines 146-147; Interview FO1, lines 201-229. 
635 Interview FO1, lines 204-205. 
636 Interview FO1, lines 210-212. 
637 FO1 noted that a judge can be protected by one political sector at one point in time and persecuted by them at 
a later date, depending on how useful that judge is to that sector at any given point in time and how he rules in 
cases that affect them (Interview FO1, lines 81-86).  
638 Interview FO1, lines 218-220. 
639 Interview FO1, lines 220-222. 
640 Interview FO1, lines 228-229. 
641 Interview FJ1, lines 153-158. 
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insisting and protesting, and above all the Associations of Magistrates has been taking care of 
this”.642 
 
Within the array of competing interests exercising pressure on cases before the JC, it is however 
important not to forget that there may additionally be practical factors that can also affect 
investigations. FJ3 explained that whilst complaints are sometimes shelved “so that the judge is 
put in a position of vulnerability”, there are also cases where investigations are stalled “because 
there is no time, because there is a lot of work, because they are left for later”.643 Whilst such 
cases may not be stalled for ulterior motives, a judge with a pending case – for whatever reason 
– may still feel the unease of the complaint not being dismissed, and of course it is possible that 
it may later be activated when a political interest in the judge concerned arises.  
 
5.4.2 The Judge’s Right of Defence  
FO1 explained that the “formal” part of the process – “of notifying the judge of the complaint, of 
requesting his/her defence” – “that part is carried out”.644 This also seems to be the case in terms 
of keeping the judge informed about the status of the complaint, and providing the judge access 
to the case-file and the evidence against him. The “files are public” explained FJC1.645 “Judges 
can come or they can nominate an authorized person to come and look at the files”,646 and “many 
[judges] appoint advisory lawyers”.647 FJ1 agreed that an accused judge “can always inform 
him/herself”648 about the status of the complaint against him, and that “no-one will refuse”649 
such requests.650 FJ3 also explained that whilst as far as (s)he knows, the Council provides all 
relevant information to judges, where there are problems, if they “resort to organisations of the 
association of judges, this is usually… surmounted.”651 (S)he did however explain that if a judge 
does not actively request information, “information is limited”, but that “if the judge protests 
                                                 
642 Interview FJ1, lines 160-165. 
643 Interview FJ3, lines 106-108. 
644 Interview FO1, lines 151-152. 
645 Interview FJC1, lines 28-29. 
646 Interview FJC1, lines 210-211. 
647 Interview FJC1, line 212. 
648 Interview FJ1, line 184. 
649 Interview FJ1, line 184. 
650 Interview FJ2, lines 128-129. 
651 Interview FJ3, lines 125-127. 
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or… if the association steps in” such problems are resolved.652 This transparency makes sense 
given the context set out in the rest of this chapter: if judges were not aware of complaints and 
investigations against them, they could not be used to place pressure on judges.  
 
However, “what has to do with… collecting sufficient evidence in a timely manner, that varies in 
accordance with how much calling there is in the different political sectors of the Council to 
advance the complaint” explained FO1.653 FO2 who had acted in legal representation of a judge 
in disciplinary proceedings agreed:654 “There is a procedure by which they notify the judge of the 
existence of the complaint, they give him a deadline to present his deposition, and the judge 
does this, he deposes, but afterwards a great deal of time sometimes passes without anything 
being decided at all.”655 FO3 explained that “the rule about the procedure of the investigation 
are too general, and do not offer sufficient guarantees - not to the judge being investigated, not 
to the citizenry – that it will be carried out in the best possible timeframe”.656  
 
FIT1 explained that “what happens is that sometimes the treatment is not at all cordial”.657 (S)he 
explained that the Council is “an intermediary political instance, between impeachment658 and 
administration”,659 and that in the moment when councillors are investigating and questioning a 
judge, they “represent the people, they are annoyed, they want to insult the judge”.660 Whilst 
this portrayal of the JC as the prosecutor and the IJ as the court may be a suitable analogy, it is 
nevertheless problematic to think of the IJ as the judge’s opportunity to defend himself in the 
end, because as is demonstrated in this chapter, judicial independence may be impacted before 
a case even goes to a jury.  
 
                                                 
652 Interview FJ3, lines 130-132. 
653 Interview FO1, lines 152-154. 
654 Interview FO2, lines 23-26. 
655 Interview FO2, lines 157-160. 
656 Interview FO3, lines 143-145. 
657 Interview FIT1, line 595. 
658 The Spanish term translated here as ‘impeachment’ is juicio politico.  
659 Interview FIT1, lines 588-589. 
660 Interview FIT1, lines 591-592. 
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5.4.3 The Investigation of Complaints in the ACBA JC 
A different picture emerged when speaking to ACBA participants. BAJ1 and FL1 said that they did 
not know of any cases of complaints against judges being “shelved” in the ACBA JC.661 BAJ1 
explained that there was no “use of time in the sense of managing time as another tool of the 
process”.662 This fits in with what was seen above, that complaints generally do not get accepted 
for political reasons. FL1 confirmed this saying that the cases against judges in the ACBA JC are 
very limited, “and are always for judicial transgressions, but not for problems specifically of 
corruption or politics - that doesn’t exist”.663  
 
BAJ5 however did indicate that timing is nevertheless an issue as the JC is not under any pressure 
to investigate complaints quickly, and therefore some complaints get admitted and are not 
resolved for years which – whether or not this is done on purpose for any ulterior motives – can 
affect the independence of a judge.664 (S)he explained that “without wishing to justify it”, the 
Council, due to being a collegial body made up of the various groups of people, “has a manner of 
acting, a rhythm of acting, which is slow”. (S)he explained that the problem with this was that 
“from a technical, theoretical point of view, the right of a defence is affected… if it is prolonged 
in time”.665 BAJ5 however noted that it is important to determine the reasons investigations 
taking time, as “where the slowness is a product of some ulterior interests, it seems to me that, 
once again, there is a problem of the application of the norms, and not whether or not the time 
period allocated by law for investigations is duly reasonable or not”.666 In this sense, BAJ2 was of 
the opinion that due to the political nature of the body, “they are not investigations” 667 at all, as 
“politically… they already know where [they] want to go”.668  
 
                                                 
661 Interview BAJ1, line 75-78; Interview FL1, line 155. 
662 Interview BAJ1, line 79. 
663 Interview FL1, lines 153-155. 
664 Interview BAJ2, lines 135-139.  
665 Interview BAJ5, lines 185-187. 
666 Interview BAJ5, lines 194-196. 
667 Interview BAJ2, lines 141-145. 
668 Interview BAJ2, lines 147-148. 
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5.5 The Plenary Decision to Accuse a Judge  
5.5.1 How the Decision to Accuse a Judge is Reached by the Plenary  
The decision in the plenary about whether or not to proceed to a jury, depends on whether or 
not certain interest groups – political or other669 – can secure the two-thirds majority required 
to proceed to a jury.670 This majority can be difficult to achieve explained FJC2.671 Emphasizing 
the collective nature of the Council,672 FJC1 explained that “the system of functioning of the 
Council is a question of numbers”,673 and that “decisions need to be taken by a majority, and 
sometimes [councillors] need to form these majorities”,674 which may take several sessions. FJC4 
explained that between sessions, “sometimes they manage to reach an agreement”.675 However 
where not enough votes are collected to accuse the judge, a case may end up circulating around 
the Council for years, with proposals to accuse that keep on getting rejected.676  
 
Addressing how these majorities are formed, FJ5 explained that “the Council openly works as a 
political body”,677 specifying that the results of plenary decisions “has to do with the interests of 
the governing party”.678 BAL1 confirmed that “the functioning today, it not a professional 
functioning, it is a political functioning”:679 “it is the convenience or inconvenience for the 
political power that a judge is removed, or not removed”.680 However at the time of interviews, 
no political party or other interest group held this two-thirds majority in the Council,681 and 
therefore few cases had proceeded to a jury. In the words of FJ2:  
 
At the moment, neither the oficialistas nor the opposition have this two-thirds. Therefore, 
the biggest achievement that the so-called opposition sector has had is to prevent the 
                                                 
669 Interview FJC1, lines 367-368 refers to the “spirit of the body… that a judge can have”, ie the judicial 
corporation. 
670 Interview FJ1, lines 300-306.  
671 Interview FJC2, lines 97-100. 
672 Interview FJC1, lines 95, and 219-221. 
673 Interview FJC1, lines 180-181. 
674 Interview FJC1, lines 220-221. 
675 Interview FJC1, lines 222-225. 
676 Interview FJ5, lines 588-592. 
677 Interview FJ5, line 185. 
678 Interview FJ5, line 186. 
679 Interview BAL1, lines 124-125. 
680 Interview BAL1, lines 119-120. 
681 Interview FJ5, lines 187-188. 
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government from… being able to remove or sanction any judge. In turn, what the 
opposition has lost is the possibility to take initiative, so… to sanction those judges which 
should be sanctioned – which we have, and many!682 
 
However, as FJ1 explained, the governing party was only one vote short of having the automatic 
two-thirds majority needed to accuse a judge before a jury, which would bring them one step 
closer to being able to remove a judge at their will:  
 
“For a long time now, the independence of judges is dependent on one single vote, 
because the governing political party has all of the other [votes]. So the formula to be able 
to accuse [a judge] of two-thirds of the Council is dependent on one single vote, which is 
a grave risk at the moment.”683  
 
The governing party did hold, at the time, a majority of votes in the Council,684 which was enough 
to protect a judge and prevent a case from going before a jury,685 as it would not be possible for 
other councillors to obtain two-thirds of the votes in favour of accusing someone that the 
governing political party had chosen to protect. There are indeed “very famous cases in 
Argentina, of judges who carried out activities that are clearly scandalous, and which were not 
removed - notwithstanding that there is sufficient evidence, at least which the public opinion 
knows about – for clearly political reasons”,686 explained BAL1, most likely alluding to the cases 
of Judges Oyarbide and Bonadio described above.  
 
Whilst the current balance of power within the Council therefore meant that no interest group 
could single-handedly remove a judge at their will, by the same token it meant that it was possible 
for both parties to act as a veto power and to prevent cases from going before a jury therefore 
protecting judges from removal.687 “This equilibrium that exists at the moment, which results in 
                                                 
682 Interview FJ2, lines 100-105. 
683 Interview FJ1, lines 44-47. 
684 Interview FJC4, lines 4-7: “we have almost automatic majorities… the majority of decisions accompany the 
government, at least in the current [composition of the Council]”. 
685 Interview FJ1, lines 142-144. 
686 Interview BAL1, lines 120-123. 
687 See Interview FJ5, lines 188-189 on the veto power of the governing party.  
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them mutually blocking each other, means that no-one can advance either” explained FJ2.688 
FJC1 also confirmed that there are cases where “no resolution is taken” for a long period of time 
due to “political issues”, where “some do not want to assume the political cost of rejecting [a 
motion]”, and “on the other side neither do they have the votes to resolve”.689 FJC1 however 
added that this happens in “very particular” cases.690 FJC2 also agreed that in the cases where 
“they do not reach an agreement, do not achieve a consensus…. Things are not very clear, and 
there is always a political factor behind [it]”.691  
 
FJC1 however explained that sometimes where the two-thirds majority to accuse a judge before 
a jury is not achieved, the Commission then proposes to sanction the judge instead, which 
required a lower majority.692 FJC2 also noted that whether or not consensus can be reached is in 
no small measure due to the people who make up the Council at any point in time: “suddenly 
people come… which are not so polemic, not that combative, and can achieve consensus, and 
that can move things along, and others which, if you get a composition like this current one, no! 
It was not the case. It is very very divided, it was a struggle to get things done”.693 
 
FJC1 also explained that in trying to understand the various interests affecting decision-making 
in the plenary and the agreements reached between councillors, it is important to remember 
that the Council deals with many issues apart from judicial removals (such as the appointment of 
judges and the administration of the judiciary), “and often, political negotiations are not only in 
the disciplinary aspect, but rather can involve the same councillors which are in Discipline and 
Accusations, are also in another commission, and no councillor is in only one commission, by 
which I am saying that the political games are even larger” than interests surrounding the 
discipline of judges. 694 
 
The result of the interplay of all of these different interests is therefore that the JC “is often… 
stuck with the voting process… because of certain political issues, certain issues, ehm, 
                                                 
688 Interview FJ2, lines 118-119. 
689 Interview FJC1, lines 174-176. 
690 Interview FJC1, line 178. 
691 Interview FJC2, lines 55-56. 
692 Interview FJC1, lines 572-575. 
693 Interview FJC2, lines 20-23. 
694 Interview FJC1, lines 228-232. 
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controversies that are partisan, or who knows ideological, or maybe personal”.695 At the time of 
the interviews, FJC4 explained that “due to partisan politics”,696 the Council “is totally 
blocked”.697 FJC3 confirmed that what had happened was that the oficialismo had wanted to 
approve a list of three judges to be considered by the legislature for a judicial appointment, but 
“they did not get it, and therefore the result was that the Council was paralyzed. If you don’t 
want to approve this list, it won’t work anymore. And that’s how we were for one and a half 
years.”698 
 
“The best case” FJ3 explained laughing, “is the case in which there is no interest: therefore, when 
there is no interest, it is resolved according to the law”.699 However, “when there is interest, the 
game of strengths begin, to see who is stronger within this tension”.700 FO1 also noted that 
“There are a percentage of cases that are resolved in the way that all [cases] should be 
resolved”.701 “Why? Because it is a judge… whose actions do not affect either for good or for bad 
in the sectors of the Council… no-one has too much of an interest in protecting him, nor does 
anyone have too much of an interest in abusing it, and therefore in these cases, they analyse the 
facts and there everyone can dissent or not, in fact sometimes [Councillors] have differences of 
opinion, but that is normal…. Generally, [these cases] don’t occupy the spotlight, they do not 
have many repercussions.”702 However it only occurs in “some very special case”, explained FJ5 
that “everyone agrees to remove [a judge].703 FJC2 explained that it is “in the cases in which there 
were like… grave cases, they always reached an agreement”.704 
 
5.5.2 The Composition of the FJC  
Given the infiltration of party politics in the decision-making process of the plenary, there was 
some debate about the composition of the Council: whether changing the number of councillors, 
                                                 
695 Interview FIT1, lines 558-561. 
696 Interview FJC4, line 22. 
697 Interview FJC4, lines 3-4 and 22. 
698 Interview FJC3, lines 240-242. 
699 Interview FJ3, lines 144-145. 
700 Interview FJ3, lines 145-146. 
701 Interview FO1, lines 136-137. 
702 Interview FO1, lines 137-142. 
703 Interview FJ5, lines 203-204. 
704 Interview FJC2, lines 54-55.  
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or the ratio of judges to lawyers to politicians to academics will facilitate agreements or lower 
the influence of partisan politics in the decision-making process. FJ2 for example argued that the 
composition of the council should change, pointing out that the constitution clearly states that it 
should include “’representatives from the academic world’, in plural”, and that “nevertheless, in 
the current design, there is only one, which is clearly unconstitutional”.705 On the other hand, 
FJC4 argued that “by changing the majorities, we will not resolve anything”,706 as “the big 
problem that we have are the integrations”:707 “If I have representatives which have to do with 
the governing party, it doesn’t matter whether they are this or that, in that conformation, the 
outcome is that whoever has the political power, defines the voting [in the Council]”.708  
 
The problem with promising to vote along partisan lines, explained FJC4, is that in doing so “I am 
saying that I will not look at the files! I should look at the merit…. And I have to see whether a 
judge effectively has a case of malperformance to… exclude him, exonerate him from his post”.709  
FJ2 agreed, explaining that partisan politics played out along the lines of identity politics. (S)he 
explained that if a “bad” judge realises that there are grounds for him to be removed,  
 
the first thing he has to do, if it is the oficialismo that is persecuting him is make some 
resolution or make some kind of declaration of opposition, with which all of the opposition 
will defend him. Although he is a bad judge. Why? So that the oficialismo doesn’t remove 
him just for being opposition. So, like flags.710 
 
FJ1 agreed that the problem with partisan voting is a lack of consideration of the case at hand: “I 
will tell you something that is almost scandalous to say…I would even have the courage to say 
that it could be judged politically, but never along partisan lines”.711 (S)he explained further that: 
 
                                                 
705 Interview FJ2, lines 93-95. 
706 Interview FJC4, line 45. 
707 Interview FJC4, line 41. 
708 Interview FJC4, lines 50-52. 
709 Interview FJC4, lines 99-101. 
710 Interview FJ2, lines 159-162. See also Interview FJ5, lines 202-203: “When it is the oficialismo that wants to 
remove somebody, the opposition almost systematically comes out the defend him”. 
711 Interview FJ1, lines 275-276. 
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I think that if a judge, in his authentic ideology, does not coincide with the ideas put 
forward by the majority of society, he could be excluded [from being a judge] even if he 
does all of his hours, and does whatever you want. But this would be a real political trial. 
But NOT because he did not satisfy or no certain partisan interests. 712 
 
Along the same lines, FJ2 explained that “in reality, [councillors] should not be representatives 
of political parties. They should be representatives of the corporation that they will be a member 
of in the JC, that is to say lawyers or judges.” 713 “If, tomorrow, they say there needs to be 
representatives of Jessica” (s)he went on, “who will elect them? Jessica! Well, if there are 
representatives of the judiciary, I will elect them!”714 
 
FIT1 however argued that due to being a collegial body with so many important functions, “it is 
very difficult that [the JC] maintains itself totally aseptic to political issues, because it can be as 
aseptic as possible, but they aren’t the twelve apostles”.715 “It is not easy that they maintain 
independence” agreed FJC2, “because, especially the politicians come with a membership of a 
political party and here, they continue the same. A Radical will never feel Peronist. This (s)he 
maintains. The judges may have [independence], but judges… at a certain point get together and 
defend the body. The lawyers also have partisan connections and they do not change them”.716  
 
By way of example of this partisanship, FJ4 pointed to the then recent election of two members 
of the political group La Cámpora as councillors.717 These councillors, Julián Álvarez, the secretary 
for justice, and Eduardo de Pedro, a congressman from the governing Frente Para La Victoria 
party, are “two very important people, with a lot of power”,718 FJ4 explained. FJ2 also explained 
that the lawyer councillors, and to some degree the academic and judge councillors, do in 
practice publicly align themselves with partisan interests.719 “So, well”, BAL1 concluded, “this is 
                                                 
712 Interview FJ1, lines 278-282. 
713 Interview BAL1, lines 139-143. 
714 Interview FJ2, lines 550-552. 
715 Interview FIT1, lines 554-556. 
716 Interview FJC2, lines 110-114. 
717 See also Paz Rodriguez Niell, ‘La Cámpora Gana Espacio en el Consejo de la Magistratura’ La Nación (5 February 
2014) <www.lanacion.com.ar/1661415-la-campora-gana-espacio-en-el-consejo-de-la-magistratura> accessed 
27 July 2019. 
718 Interview FJ4, line 248. 
719 Interview FJ2, lines 91-93: “the point has been reached where the election of judge councillors has been 
politicized, the election of lawyer councillors has been politicized, and the election of academic councillors has 
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the way in which the political influence is guaranteed within the Council – with the designation 
of its members”.720 “It is not transformed, therefore, into an autonomous body with an 
independent functioning, rather it is a detachment, another arm of the governing party and of 
the opposition”.721 
 
 FJC1 offered a slightly more nuanced take on the same issue stating that whilst “as a rule”722 
councillors tend to represent the interests of the people that elected them (ie. lawyers represent 
lawyers, judges represent judges), 
 
what also happens is… for example, the lawyer can also have certain political connections, 
and also acts politically, not in function of lawyers, but also in function of a certain political 
party in which (s)he has political connections, and also this political party had a certain 
participation in the election of lawyers.723  
 
The result is that, “the different interests of the bodies in the structure [of the JC] can be seen 
clearly… in the decisions [the JC takes]”,724 “interests which the executive, the oficialismo, the 
oficialist legislators… can have”.725  
 
BAL1 pointed out that this phenomenon can even be seen by reading the news: When reporting 
on the election of Councillors of the JC, “all of the media…. report that a representative was 
elected… who responds to such and such political party; therefore the topic is very politicised”.726 
FL2 agreed, explaining that: 
 
If one follows the election these days of judges, lawyers, and members that will integrate 
the Council as of next year, one will find that the media say that the oficialismo and the 
                                                 
been politicized”. 
720 Interview BAL1, lines 139-143. See also Interview FJ3, lines 149-150; Interview FJ4, line 231. 
721 Interview BAL1, lines 129-131. 
722 Interview FJC1, lines 604-605. 
723 Interview FJC1, lines 605-609. 
724 Interview FJC1, lines 584-585. 
725 Interview FJC1, lines 585-586. 
726 Interview BAL1, lines 66-68. 
Page 176 of 366 
 
opposition are more or less tied, therefore translating into the language of party politics 
that which should not be in the language of party politics.727 
 
FJC4 explained that whilst lawyers run for election under the bander of “non-partisan political 
groups”,728 the problem is that lawyers will sometimes promise to vote along partisan lines. For 
example, “the councillor who will represent… the lawyers of the interior… already said that he 
will vote against the Ks”.729 The councillor also explained that those who elect a councillor will 
expect him or her to keep such promises. (S)he explained that in the past, one councillor had 
promised “‘I will never vote with the Ks.’ Yet she ended up voting [with them] on some judicial 
appointments, and therefore she betrayed those who elected her”.730 As a result, the group that 
councillor belonged to “lost three thousand votes” at the next round of elections for 
councillors.731 However not all Councillors are politicised. FJC4 explained that (s)he explicitly 
stated when running for election “that I will not vote either with one [political party] or the 
other”.732 FL1 also voiced some hopefulness in this regard: “I am in this sense a little bit 
innocent… but I believe in my colleagues…. I believe that they will not arrive at the Council… in 
order to do politics”.733 
 
In terms of judge Councillors, FJ2 explained that both then recently elected councillors were 
clearly aligned with a political party: “one is clearly oficialista, the other it seems is rather 
opposition”.734 One of them, the judge explained, in private even “boasts about the proximity” 
(s)he has with another one of the Councillors from the legislature, “so (s)he makes promises, so 
that they vote him/her, (s)he promises future [judicial] nominations”.735 FJC4 also spoke about 
the election of judge councillors in clearly partisan terms: “a judge is entering who apparently… 
would be in agreement with the government”736 (S)he explained that “one cannot say a priori, 
specifically with respect to judges… if they will vote with [the governing party]”.737 However, it is 
                                                 
727 Interview FL2, lines 46-49. 
728 Interview FJC4, lines 271-272. 
729 Interview FJC4, lines 96-97. 
730 Interview FJC4, lines 86-87. 
731 Interview FJC4, line 91. 
732 Interview FJC4, lines 79-80. 
733 Interview FL1, lines 180-188. 
734 Interview FJ2, lines 202-203. 
735 Interview FJ2, lines 187-191. 
736 Interview FJC4, lines 23-26. 
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possible to guess that this may occur “for who accompanies the judge”,738 and where, for 
example, a judge “is connected to, relates to what we call Justicia Legitima which is a group with 
a large Kirchnerist content”.739 
 
5.5.3 Plenary Decisions in the ACBA JC  
Whilst FJC saw periods of grip-lock in its decision-making, the ACBA JC “is quite a dynamic 
Council”:740 It is an “active body”,741 it is “constantly working”742 and the “processes for the 
removal of judges that took place were completed were not prolonged in time”.743 In short, “the 
local JC really functions much better [than the FJC], because it gets work done”.744 Participants 
pointed to the composition of the Council as the main reason for this: “The JC of the City, by 
having fewer members and a more homogeneous composition, can be managed better”;745 
“Here [in the ACBA JC], there is a basic equilibrium which is given in the integration, which is also 
reflected in the Commission [for Accusations and Discipline].”746  
 
Nevertheless, “it has its own difficulties… due to being a political body”.747 Political here referred 
to the nature of the composition and duties of the Council, and was not a reference to partisan 
politics. BAJC1 noted that despite the homogeneity in composition, lawyers, judges, and 
politicians have very different backgrounds and perspectives, and that therefore,  
 
the inter-relationship between such different interest groups is very difficult. That is, 
between the politicians, between the judges, and between the lawyers. Therefore, often 
agreements fail and it ends up being difficult to manage… with manage I mean to both 
remove and appoint judges.748  
 
                                                 
738 Interview FJC4, lines 72-73. 
739 Interview FJC4, lines 64-65. 
740 Interview BAJC1, line 125. 
741 Interview BAJC1, line 332. 
742 Interview BAJC1, line 331. 
743 Interview BAJC1, lines 330-331. 
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745 Interview BAJC1, lines 108-109. 
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Looking at each of these interest groups in turn, many participants highlighted the judicial 
corporatism present in the ACBA JC, which makes sense given that judges in that JC hold a larger 
percentage of the votes.. “Judges act… more on a corporative logic than a political logic”.749 “They 
are… corporative politics. Why? Because it is true that… except where there is a very grave issue, 
in the jury, the judges tend to defend the judges.”750 BAJ2 explained that judges chose to do this 
consciously because “as in the JC there is not a ground level minimally satisfied in terms of 
subjugation to the political power, the judicial power need to generate asystematic reactions”.751 
Essentially, the only way judges can maintain the independence of the judiciary in this face of 
control being exercised on them by an external political body, is to be more forceful in their 
resistance.  
 
Judge Councillors were generally not seen as representing partisan interests: “I think that the 
judges in the City, the great majority of judges – I don’t want to make an absolute generalization, 
because I don’t know it – but as I understand it, although we have our ideology, we do not use 
the judgeship as a mechanism to do party politics”752 However, “sometimes there are also judges 
whose decisions are more related to the governing party than others”.753  
 
However, BAJ1 explained that “lawyers will act a lot more in practice… with more political 
interests linked to party politics”.754 Therefore, in the “game of alliances”, the politicians and the 
lawyers end up confronting the judicial corporation, and “what prevails is the political”.755 BAJ4 
agreed that “when lawyers form lists to be elected, they have the support of political parties. 
Therefore there is an obviously large politicisation of the JC, because the members of the plenary 
respond to interests, or to the election itself of partisan interests”756 BAJ3 for example explained 
that the “presidency of the Public Society of Lawyers for all of the lawyers of the City… is in 
consonance with the party which at the moment governs the City, for example. So, well, it is not 
at all difficult to see how it works”.757 BAJ2 alluded to the same example, saying “if, for example, 
                                                 
749 Interview BAJ1, lines 101-103. 
750 Interview BAJC1, lines 89-92. 
751 Interview BAJ2, lines 428-430. 
752 Interview BAJ4, lines 181-183. 
753 Interview BAJC1, lines 92-93. 
754 Interview BAJ1, lines 103-107. 
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the representative from the Public Society of Lawyers, goes to the party meetings of the 
executive power, he is not the representative of the Public Society of Lawyers! If you follow my 
meaning”.758 BAJ4 did however qualify this by saying, “in the ACBA… even if they [councillors] 
respond to political interests, it is not… that clear. Sometimes it happens that they vote, not 
responding to political interests, or partisan interests”.759  
 
BAJ5 pointed out that this is problematic as councillors should “not use the excuse of a complaint, 
whether they like or don’t like the way a judge conducts himself, what they have to limit 
themselves to is to the facts of the complaint, and if in these facts, which may be about a case in 
particular, or about the general conduct of the judge… there is sufficient merit to bring charges 
against him in one of the situations foreseen by the norms for trial and removal”.760 
As BAJ3 explained:  
 
It would be ideal if politics sought the best, not what benefits that political party. But well, 
in reality, this does not happen, because they look for a judge not so much who will stand 
out in terms of aptitude, and who will be so ideal that he will be able if that party 
contravenes the law, resolve with the whole strength of the law, but they are not 
expecting that. They are expecting someone who is functional. It’s unfortunate.761 
 
As BAJ3 put it, unfortunately “partisan politics becomes involved everywhere, because these are 
all political bodies”.762  
 
In summary, “the sensation is that: judges who corporatize and lawyers who join the political. 
And that makes two thirds driven by politics, and one third driven by interests, where they are 
not exclusively interested in the truth of the accusation, but in a corporative defence of a 
colleague, and that is not good.”763 Of course, within the two thirds driven by politics, are 
Councillors from both political parties, therefore there is not the situation in ACBA, where one 
                                                 
758 Interview BAJ2, lines 201-203. 
759 Interview BAJ4, lines 488-492. 
760 Interview BAJ5, lines 227-231. 
761 Interview BAJ3, lines 140-144. 
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political party holds a majority. As one judge put it, “I don’t know if this [politicisation of the 
Council] necessarily translates into the discipline of judges”.764 Although this could theoretically 
be the case in the unlikely scenario that all three lawyers backed the same political party – 3 
lawyers plus 2 from the political majority equals 5 out of 9 Councillors, or where a judge votes 
along partisan lines, or happens to agree with one political party. “With five votes there is a kind 
of automatic vote whereby they achieve whatever they want”.765 “Today this one, tomorrow 
another, it is not that only one of them does it”.766 FL1 also explained that “the City [has] a more 
advanced constitution, and that was the spirit of the politicians of the city: to accompany the 
new process. That is why, I think, there was less politicization of the institutions”767 
 
Even if partisan politics does not influence the decision-making process in the ACBA to the same 
extent as on the federal level, BAJC1 still opined that “it seems to me that a process for the 
removal of a judge should be much less imbued with external factors”.768 BAJ5 explained that 
councillors should  
 
not use the excuse of a complaint, whether they like or don’t like the way a judge conducts 
himself, what they have to limit themselves to is to the facts of the complaint, and if in 
these facts, which may be about a case in particular, or about the general conduct of the 
judge… there is sufficient merit to bring charges against him in one of the situations 
foreseen by the norms for trial and removal.769  
 
BAJ1 agreed that what “would be ideal is that there would be more process in the sense of more, 
eh, more due process of law”770 
 
BAJC1 was nevertheless cautious to point out that this does not mean that politics should play 
no role in the process: “in fact, the JC is a political body…. [it] is integrated by judges, academics, 
                                                 
764 Interview BAJ4, lines 190-191. 
765 Interview BAJ3, line 158. 
766 Interview BAJ3, line 160. 
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769 Interview BAJ5, lines 227-231. 
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by politicians, yes? Therefore, obviously, it is a political body.”771 BAJ1 agreed that of course 
“politics” will affect the Council:  
 
I don’t believe that…. A process for the removal of a judge is exactly the same as a process 
where each and every one of the guarantees should be applied and where the content of 
politics should be as nullified as possible. I think that there is a political content in a process 
for removal which is ok that it is there. Because the process… aims essentially to see, not 
whether this man is guilty or innocent, rather whether or not he can keep on being a judge 
– which are two different things.772  
 
The concern therefore is the same broadly speaking as on the federal level: interests other than 
the pure protection of judicial independence and accountability affecting the decision making 
process. Whilst it seems that on the Federal level partisan politics plays a bigger role, at the ACBA 
level, there appears to be more push back from judges to any type of accountability to a political 
body such as the JC.  
 
5.6 Other Factors Affecting Proceedings in the JC  
As councillors, in particular those which are politicians, do not have much time to dedicate to the 
work of the JC, this causes problems in two ways: the work of the Council may be slow if 
councillors cannot attend important meetings;773 but also in terms of independence of the 
Council, where a councillor has a dual role as a politician, it may be harder to think or act in purely 
independent terms. FL1 also said that, in particular politician councillors often do not have the 
time to be present at the JC because they are in session in Congress or have other work.774 In 
FL1’s opinion, It should not be “the legislators themselves that [are represented in the Council], 
they should have elected someone on their behalf, to represent them”.775 (S)he explained that 
when legislator councillors do not attend the JC, as (s)he said happens frequently, then “the 
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Council stays put without doing the things it needs to do…. It is not possible to take decisions that 
require a special majority because they are not there, they are not present”.776  
 
FJ1 explained that as a result “the reality is that the Council is managed by their advisers, as one 
thing more [that they do], and with a very direct channel of communication between [that and] 
what is political interest”.777 FL1 explained that the work of the Council is “rigorous”, and that 
“they should be there every day”.778 Councillor FJC4 agreed: “they are very important positions 
and should be full-time positions”.779 (S)he agreed that the political Councillors “should be 
elected for the specific function of the Council, and not have two superimposed positions”,780 
otherwise “perhaps [they] have a superimposition of agenda, and therefore are neither here nor 
there”.781 
 
BAJ1 was of the opinion that the staff who advise councillors in the early stage of the process, 
when the decision whether or not to admit a complaint is being made, are not “neutral” enough. 
BAJ1 felt that that stage of the process should be more objective, and that discretion and politics 
currently play more of a role than they should.782 BAL1 agreed that the decision about 
admissibility should be carried out as professionally as possible.783 (S)he explained that the 
Commission would benefit from having a secretariat of staff with technical knowledge, and 
selected by way of an examination, who could deal with the day to day running of 
investigations.784  
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5.7 Proceedings before the Impeachment Jury  
5.7.1 The Federal Jury 
As set out in Section 2.6.2, where the plenary of the JC decide to proceed to a jury, one or two of 
the councillors of the FJC then act as prosecutors in a hearing before the IJ.785 The councillors are 
chosen by the plenary of the FJC and only councillors that voted for accusing the judge before a 
jury are eligible.786 The president of the CDA and the Reporting Councillor on the relevant case 
are often chosen, as they are deemed to have an in-depth understanding of the case.787 These 
councillors also continue to have the help of their advisors who also know the case from when it 
was being assessed by the Commission.788  
 
The FIJ has permanent staff, located in the FJC offices in Buenos Aires, who manage all of the 
administration including the appointment of the judge and lawyer jurors. This staff includes one 
secretary, a sub-secretary and an administrative team. The secretary is the only other person 
present during the private deliberations of the jury, and advises on the relevant norms and 
precedents. This is deemed necessary, particularly given the short time frame in which a decision 
has to be reached, as “often”, FIT1 explained, “[jurors] come without knowing what [the jury] is 
all about”.789 FJC1 agreed that the “administrative structure… guarantees that [the jury] functions 
adequately, because it is difficult to work if the members permanently change, and on top of 
that, many times do not have practical experience”.790 
 
Jurors are elected every six months, by way of a raffle. Electing jurors in this way, according to 
FIT1, “has its advantages and disadvantages”.791 For example, “the lawyer could be a person who 
has experience, or it could end up being that he is registered as a lawyer, as has happened, and 
that it has been years since he practiced [law]”.792 In the case of senators and congress(wo)men, 
there is also the possibility that they have less than six months left in office, and at the end of 
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their mandate, would need to be replaced by a substitute.793 The advantage is that the raffle is 
based on an algorithm created with the help of the I.T. team at the JC and Jury794 (and who are 
also “responsible for the I.T. system of the whole judiciary”),795 that was designed “to make it the 
most aseptic possible”.796 For this reason, there appears to be little opportunity for any external 
interests to affect the selection of jurors. The most time-consuming job was to tidy up the lists 
that are used for the raffles, to make sure that all eligible lawyers are on the list, and that none 
are on the list that are not eligible to be jurors.797 They also need to keep the list of judges 
updated to “so that we don’t raffle and a judge is chosen who has died or whatever” explained 
FIT1.798 
  
In terms of composition, FIT1 deemed it to be “multifarious”, that “the different sectors of society 
are represented”, however, (s)he was of the opinion that lawyers are under-represented in 
comparison to judges and politicians. There is currently only one lawyers representing all of the 
lawyers in the country on the jury, whereas FIT1 felt that “the representation of all of the lawyers 
would be necessary, so, one for the capital [city], who knows, in the same proportion as the 
judges”.799 However, participant FIT1 recognised the problem in adding one more juror is that 
you would then have an even number of jurors, which cannot be the case. “But well”, FIT1 
concluded, “an academic could be added, as is the case in the Council”.800 FIT1 explained that the 
advantage of lawyers on the jury was that lawyers have a knowledge of the law which is helpful 
given that the jury has to decide on legal issues following a legal process.801 Often the political 
jurors are not lawyers but rather architects or engineers, (s)he explained, which has the 
advantage of lending the process a “democratic sense.. and it is what makes it end up as more 
political, in the good sense of the word”.802 However, (s)he still felt that it would be useful to 
have more lawyers adding a more legal approach to the debate.  
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“The issue” in practice, however, explained BAL1 that defines whether proceedings before a jury 
will be fair and impartial “is the composition of the jury and that it doesn’t become politicised.”803 
In this regard, FJ1 explained that “the times that the IJ acted, in spite of strong political interests, 
in some cases they absolved and in others they condemned [the judge], this in an independent 
manner”.804 Participant FJ5 was also of the opinion that in the two cases that (s)he had personally 
followed, the jury “functioned well”,805 that “the trial was carried out very well”,806 but did point 
out that some (minority) votes did appear to be politically motivated, citing a case in which two 
jurors who were militants from the political youth group La Cámpora had voted in favour of 
removing a judge, and that those who had filed that complaint about the judge were also from 
La Cámpora.807 They were however in the minority, and in FJ5’s view the government “does not 
have the majority [in the jury], in contrast to what happens in the Council…. [and] this guarantees 
a certain degree of impartiality”.808 
 
In terms of the interests that the jurors may represent, FIT1 was quite clear that jurors are not in 
the jury in order to represent the interest of their sectors or political parties, but rather as 
independent people taken from a range of professions and backgrounds in order to represent 
the range of opinions in society:809 “it is a social trial, a trial by the society represented by all” 
(s)he explained.810 FIT1 also contrasted the situation at the time of the interviews, where the jury 
are selected “by chance”,811 to the situation in the past when jurors had been elected by their 
peers: “they literally represented the sector they came from” at that time (s)he pointed out.812  
 
In terms then of the independence of jurors, FIT1 explained that the Vice-President of the 
Supreme Court, Dr Highton at the time, swears the jurors in, and whilst doing so she gives a small 
talk in which 
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she repeats, quite a few times, that is it very important that it is understood that they will 
be … judges of judges, that they will have, for this… period, one of the highest and most 
delicate functions of the state, and that they [should] try therefore to detach themselves 
from the line, … the place they come from, to detach themselves from the idea – in order 
not to say ideology- of their profession, of their state, of their group, in order to try to… be 
the most independent possible, because in this case they all represent a sector obviously, 
but in this moment they are judges, and therefore they need to be independent.813  
 
FIT1 explained that due to the seriousness of the task entrusted to them, and the knowledge that 
their decisions are directly appealable to the Supreme Court, creates “a lot of fear”814 among 
jurors, as “putting a signature on the removal of a judge, which can thereafter be revised by the 
Supreme Court, and in certain cases may even be revised by some international court, puts things 
in perspective for you”.815 It is “the function itself that makes [jurors] have to do the right 
thing”;816 “it is not that they are good or bad, whether they convert themselves into good human 
beings” (s)he explained.817 FO1 echoed this sentiment explaining that “I would risk telling you 
that [the process before the jury] is better [than the process before the Council]. That this process 
is a bit more clean, maybe because it has a bigger responsibility, they feel that they are really 
judging a person… They are not exempt from interest, by no means, but I think that it is a bit 
more transparent”.818  
 
FIT1 explained that there may initially be preconceptions and sectorial loyalties among jurors. 
Indeed, “it is probably that there are preconceptions”819 as “prior to the judge reaching the stage 
of being accused, the media and public opinion already did their work”.820 However, FIT1 
explained that once the jury begins their work, there is a real conversation among jurors about 
the case, and as they start seeing the evidence and discussing the case, these preconceptions 
and loyalties get left behind. The first thing that the jury does, according to FIT1, is “to try to 
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break the sectorial ice: to say, ok, here we will all be like judges, all in our real knowledge, 
understanding, and our intimate conviction”.821 
 
FIT1 explained that given the huge amount of work that is required by the jury, “a lot of time 
passes very quickly”.822 (S)he added that no cases before the Jury to date had exceeded the six 
month time limit set by law.823 “There is a thing that is very important: we have from when [the 
case] starts until the end of the trial, we have only six months. Once the six months are up, it is 
finished and you cannot go back over the topic”.824 This short time period also helps keep 
everyone focused on reaching a decision, and “there is no time, practically, for a conflict” 
between jurors, “there is no time to get annoyed”.825  
 
FL1 also explained that as the Jury have a short time-period within which to resolve a case, “it is 
very difficult that they would attempt to hide or keep shelved a file”.826 The jury would be greatly 
exposed if a verdict is not reached due to the shelving of a case, (s)he explained: they would be 
“attacked from all sides”.827 (S)he added that “the media or society itself places pressure [on the 
jury] in such a way that it would be very hard that [the case] fails due a lapse of time”.828 FL3 
agreed, highlighting that “it is a public process, with which the jury would be left exposed in front 
of society if it passed a verdict that was illegal”.829 
 
The first stage of the process, explained FIT1, is that evidence is presented in writing, and the jury 
has to decide whether to admit or reject each piece of evidence.830 This stage usually takes almost 
two months according to FIT1,831 and “sometimes … the meetings are even done over the 
internet”, given that not all jurors will necessarily be located in Buenos Aires.832 Jurors are asked 
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to provide a private email address and materials are also disseminated and debated via email.833 
Once people are familiarised with the materials and “something is more or less ready”, a meeting 
is arranged where all jurors attend in person in Buenos Aires.834 “With the agendas [of the various 
jurors], this is quite complicated” to arrange, said FIT1, “therefore this is arranged with time. But 
we manage and it is done well”.835 What also facilitates this process is that every juror is entitled 
to appoint one advisor, who has the obligation to be present at the offices of the Jury.836 This 
means that these advisors “keep [everyone] informed of all news, [and] if a document enters, it 
is immediately distributed to everyone”.837  
 
FIT1 explained that this first stage requires a great deal of work as there is usually a lot of evidence 
to sift through.838 (S)he explained that “it is not usual that a judge is judged for a single event, for 
a single case. It can happen but the norm is that malperformance is a wide concept, therefore 
generally there are situations of irregularities in many cases, or in various situations, therefore a 
lot of evidence comes in”.839 In terms of which evidence is accepted, FIT1 explained that “an 
attempt is made for it to be as broad as possible, so that [the judge] has all of the right of defence 
like any accused”.840 
 
The second stage is the trial itself which takes place in Buenos Aires. In terms of the procedure 
followed by the jury, FIT1 explained that the criminal procedure is used “so that [the process] has 
a form, a form of proceeding, so that it has rules and clear norms”.841 Criminal procedure was 
used, FIT1 explained, as they use oral hearings like the Jury does.842 The jury hears oral evidence 
from witnesses for the defence and the accusation, and after both parties have questioned the 
witnesses, the members of the jury may ask the witnesses questions as well.843 
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FIT1 explained that as the jurors and their advisors at that stage have already been working 
together for almost two months, this stage is “more oiled”.844 Given that everyone “begins to 
know the case, the file”,845 therefore “the debate begins like with everyone knowing what [the 
case] will be about”.846 A president of the Jury is elected between the members, and that is the 
person who leads the debate.847 The trial is conducted over consecutive days, and “can last one 
week to fifteen days, approximately”.848 After the hearing each day, the jury retreats to a private 
room and discusses the evidence heard that day.849 “There is a lot of talking”,850 according to 
FIT1.  
 
It is by listening to the witness evidence in person that “all of these barriers of preconceptions 
start to fall”851 explained FIT1, “without exceptions”.852 That is when “healthy discussions 
start”,853 explained FIT1. This happens as “ideas start to change in accordance with what a 
witness said that we did not imagine (s)he would say”.854 “I have seen many times” explained 
participant FIT1, “that [jurors] still had preconceptions, or at that point it is not a preconception, 
rather a certain conviction… it was discussed, conversed, the situation was reviewed” and 
opinions changed.855 In the end, the jury agrees on a verdict “usually by majority and I would say 
more generally even by unanimity”.856 They may not agree “on all of the issues, but in those 
issues, issues which are principal in being able to remove a judge, they agree”.857 The jury “to 
date… always reached… from my point of view, a fair decision”,858 and “I say this consciously”859 
said FIT1.  
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One thing that helps promote a sensible discussion about the case among jurors, according to 
FIT1, is that the whole hearing is recorded and simultaneously transcribed by a specialised team 
from the National Congress.860 The transcripts from the morning are made available by the 
afternoon, and the transcripts from the afternoon are available the next morning. That way, 
when the jury discusses the evidence, they can go back over witness evidence word for word to 
avoid any false recollections of what was said.861 The transcripts also become part of the file and 
therefore can be used in case of an appeal to the Supreme Court.  
 
The hearing is also public and open to the media and anyone else who wishes to attend. FIT1 
nevertheless explained that no cameras are allowed in the room where the trial takes place, to 
avoid witnesses being “bothered” by the cameras as they are “invasive”.862 The hearing is 
however simultaneously streamed to a screen outside the room, where media with cameras are 
allowed.863 With respect to whether the jurors are swayed by media or public opinion, FIT1 
conceded that “it’s difficult… emotionally, it is a weight”.864 (S)he explained that this is 
particularly the case for lawyers who are not used to making decisions that are publicly 
scrutinised: “I have sometimes seen the lawyers being overwhelmed”,865 (s)he explained. The 
judges and politicians, however, are quite used to this pressure, (s)he added.866 Nevertheless, “I 
have never seen that they are led astray”:867 after a while, “the fear and pressure levels and 
disappears, I would say almost absolutely.”868  
 
When asked whether jurors speak to the media during the trial, FIT1 explained that “I think no… 
because one of the first things that is discussed… and that we agree on really is absolute 
discretion, and absolute silence”,869 particularly as the final document starts getting drawn up. “I 
can only recall one single incident…. [where] the decision [of the jury] was anticipated before it 
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was released”,870 (s)he explained. “What is discussed within the jury, as far as I know, has never 
been leaked, and by no means in the public opinion”.871 
 
“It happened various times” that the judge in question resigns before the jury reaches a verdict, 
said FIT1.872 When asked why this is the case, FIT1 explained that “I think that it is because once 
a stage is reached… of gathering the evidence… the evidence, and the strength of the evidence 
is seen, and they start to see that, whether of their own decision or on the recommendation of 
their lawyers” what the outcome is likely to be.873 FL1 agreed that “they see the evidence that is 
coming and they will go, no?”.874 FJC1 explained that judges resign where they “see that the 
result will be negative”,875 although (s)he did not specify if this was due to the weight of the 
evidence or due to other factors. “Generally the resignation is accepted” added FIT1, although 
there were cases where resignations were rejected, or never accepted, by the executive.876 “For 
us, for the jury, for the state, the way in which a judge is separated [from his post] is the same, 
whether we dismiss him, or because he decides to go”.877 
 
The majority of cases that go before a jury do end in the removal of the judge in question:878 “I 
would say that in around 30% [of cases] it was decided not to remove [the judge]” claimed 
FIT1.879 However, (s)he also pointed out that it is relevant to take into consideration that in the 
cases where a judge was removed, “there is a large percentage in which of 6 acts, [the judge] was 
removed for only 2 of them”.880 FJ3 said that (s)he believes that the majority of those cases “they 
were well removed, with transparent processes, with the possibility to defend themselves, to 
offer evidence, to question evidence and to appeal”.881 
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FJC1 was of the opinion that the reason that the majority of cases before a jury end in removals 
is because “the actors are the same to a large extent” as those in the Council:882 “even if they are 
not the same legislators, they belong to the same blocks”.883 In addition, FJC1 explained, for the 
Council to be able to accuse a judge before a jury “generally…. They need some contribution from 
the judges…. [and] there are also judges on the jury”.884 The only vote which is “more malleable” 
is that of the lawyer “because there is not an esprit de corps as a legislator or a judge may have”, 
(s)he explained.885 FJC1 pointed out that this can be seen in the fact that “all accusation that were 
decided by unanimity [in the JC] resulted in the removal [of the judge]. Because afterwards the 
same blocks of legislators, judges, respected the decision which was taken in the JC”.886 This lead 
to some scepticism by FL2 who explained: “all of the JC does not give me the sensation of 
impartiality, in its different instances, the Commissions, the plenary, the Impeachment Tribunal, 
the whole, no? That Fulano is correct, that Mengano887 is correct, does not make the whole for 
me…. The whole does not deserve to be judged as impartial and objective”.888 
 
When evaluating the cases which ended in the removal of a judge, FO1 explained that “it is a very 
small universe to analyse” given that only a very small handful of cases end up before a jury.889 
This was echoed by FO2 who said “I don’t know whether I have a good response to give you 
[about the fairness and impartiality of proceedings before a jury] because there are so few cases 
that reach [the jury]”.890 (S)he continued to explain that the only cases that reach the jury are 
cases where “politics had not intervened in the case”,891 which were cases of “pure 
malperformance”,892 citing the example of a judge who, it had been proved, had contracted a 
lawyer to write his rulings for him.893 FO4 agreed stating that cases only reach the jury “because 
there is a lot of evidence”,894 and “a political will to remove him”.895  
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FJ2 however was of the opinion the process before the jury would only be fair and impartial “is 
there is no political component involved” in the case.896 FO3 pointed out that only cases “where 
the structure of impunity, of protection, and of corporate vetoes have been got over” can 
proceed to a jury,897 which means that it is “more likely that for some reason [there is] a decision 
to play with the cards on the table”.898 (S)he also pointed out that given that cases before the 
jury are “very rare, they tend to generate a lot of interest from the public opinion, and therefore 
there is a relevant public scrutiny of the case”,899 which may leave it to being “much more fair 
and impartial than all of the other previous steps [in the process]”.900 These two factors, “the fact 
that the bodies have fallen, the fact that the public opinion is active”, combined with legal 
guarantees that allow the judge to have an “intense” capacity for defending himself, “are some 
more or less adequate guarantees” that the process will be fair and impartial.901  
 
In addition to looking at the impartiality of jurors, another point to note is the independence of 
the jury as an institution. The jury is located in Buenos Aires in the same building as the JC, and 
according to FIT1, “the relationship with the Council is very fluid”.902 Whilst FIT1 insisted that the 
jury’s independence vis-à-vis the JC “is absolute”,903 (s)he pointed out that “the budget of the 
jury is dependent on the Council, because the Council manages and has [control of] all of the 
budgetary administration…. by law”.904 FIT1 explained that in practice when the jury needs 
something or makes a request, the Council “immediately” provide the jury what they need.905 
“What are they going to say?” participant FIT1 explained laughing, “that you didn’t fire that judge 
from last year, this year we won’t give you a budget?”.906 “That doesn’t exist” (s)he explained.907 
“The Council has never caused us an issue”:908 “In this [respect], there is no problem”.909 
                                                 
896 Interview FJ2, lines 257-263. 
897 Interview FO3, lines 260-261. 
898 Interview FO3, lines 261-262. 
899 Interview FO3, lines 256-257. 
900 Interview FO3, line 255.  
901 Interview FO3, lines 269-271. 
902 Interview FIT1, line 510. 
903 Interview FIT1, lines 514-515. 
904 Interview FIT1, lines 516-518. 
905 Interview FIT1, lines 520-521. 
906 Interview FIT1, lines 521-522. 
907 Interview FIT1, line 522. 
908 Interview FIT1, line 531. 
909 Interview FIT1, line 534. 
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However, from the point of view of “ethical thoroughness, It would be good for the jury to have 
its own administration”.910 “It is strange” FIT1 explained “that an institution in which they are 
prosecutors and we are judges, that we economically depend on them, that’s all”.911 
 
5.7.2 The ACBA Jury 
BAJC1 explained that it is difficult to pass judgement on the ACBA jury, as there had only been 
two cases of judges coming before a jury;912 “I would be giving you an opinion with little 
authority” agreed BAJ1,913 but did add that “I know of only one case in the ACBA of the removal 
of a judge, and I think that is was fair and impartial”.914 BAJ2 agreed that it was difficult to form 
an opinion, saying that whilst in the case of the removal of Judge Parrilli the decision may have 
been impartial, “it seems to me to be a case from which it is very difficult to extract a rule”.915 
Judge Parrilli had been caught on camera whilst she acted in a way that was deemed by a Jury to 
be inappropriate for a judge, and this evidence was widely disseminated in the media. “It is as if 
they film me saying “I am going to rob a supermarket” if you follow my meaning” explained 
BAJ2.916  
 
The controversy surrounding the removal of Judge Parilli, however, centred not on whether the 
procedure had been fair or impartial, but rather whether her conduct merited removal. Whilst 
all participants that brought up the case of Judge Parrilli agreed that her conduct was “very bad… 
doubly so if you are a judge”,917 and that she should have been sanctioned for this conduct,918 
not all participants agreed that her actions constituted grounds for removal. BAJ3 argued that as 
she was running an errand in her personal life and was not at that moment acting in her capacity 
as a judge, her behaviour could not be ground for removal.919 “They did not have a single case in 
                                                 
910 Interview FIT1, lines 523-524. 
911 Interview FIT1, lines 535-536. 
912 Interview BAJC1, line 159. 
913 Interview BAJ1, line 226. 
914 Interview BAJ1, lines 214-215. 
915 Interview BAJ2, lines 336-337. 
916 Interview BAJ2, line 334. 
917 Interview BAJ3, lines 119-120. 
918 Interview BAJ3, lines 121-122; Interview BAJ4, lines 292-293. 
919 Interview BAJ3, lines 109-128. 
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which as a judge she had not been a fair judge” BAJ3 added.920 BAJ4 was also of the opinion that 
“there were no grounds for removal” in this case.921  
 
BAJ4 did however explain that “I can understand that someone may think the contrary”;922 that 
(s)he believes that this is a genuine disagreement over the law on this point, and that “it does 
not seem to me to be a case where…. really the opening of this case was a clear attempt to 
discipline this judge”.923 BAJ3 however disagreed, saying that “as usual, politics stuck its nose 
in”.924 Given that “people are very happy”925 that a judge was removed, and that the media 
portrayal of events was very negative, politics “used this to show: well, we have one! Look how 
great we are, that we sacked a judge”.926 BAJ4 did concede that there was “a sensation that 
[there was] a social pressure, and this translated into a political pressure, for the judge to be 
removed”.927 BAJC1 was the most direct in this respect stating that judge Parrilli “was removed, 
in my opinion, unfairly, because I think that the pressure from the media, and there are the 
political influences, were extremely unfavourable”.928  
 
BAJ2 however disagreed, pointing out that “there was nothing [in this case] in favour of political 
pressure. That is to say, everyone was aligned… the political power, civil society… everyone 
wanted the same”.929 In order to measure the independence of a process, you need to look at 
cases “when there are different interests” at play, BAJ2 argued.930 What BAJ2 perhaps meant was 
that this was not a case where the councillors had to withstand pressure from opinions different 
to their own, rather they all genuinely agreed that she should be removed.  
 
Nevertheless, participants deemed both cases at the ACBA level to have been conducted 
according to the procedure set out in the law: “it seems that the procedural rules are respected” 
                                                 
920 Interview BAJ3, line 118. 
921 Interview BAJ4, line 253. 
922 Interview BAJ4, line 254. 
923 Interview BAJ4, lines 256-258. 
924 Interview BAJ3, lines 110-111. The Spanish expression used here was meter la cola which literally means to put 
one’s tail into someone else’s business.  
925 Interview BAJ3, line 123. 
926 Interview BAJ3, lines 124-125. 
927 Interview BAJ4, lines 291-292. 
928 Interview BAJC1, lines 165-167. 
929 Interview BAJ2, lines 338-340. 
930 Interview BAJ2, lines 340-341. 
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explained BAJ4.931 As evidence of this, BAJ4 cited the case against Judge Gallardo that was closed 
due to procedural issues:932 the time-limit of 60 days from the date of the complaint to the JC 
accusing a judge had been exceeded. BAJ4 also explained that “both accused were permitted to 
produce evidence quite freely”.933  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The main threat to judicial independence at the Federal level at the time the FJC was introduced 
(as discussed in Section 3.2) was the influence of various interest groups over the judiciary. The 
findings of this chapter unfortunately show that these interests have infiltrated the FJC, with the 
majority of councillors at the time the interviews for this thesis were conducted aligning 
themselves with the partisan interests of the governing political party. The decisions of 
councillors therefore do not represent sectorial interests and perspectives on upholding good 
quality and impartial judicial services, but are taken in line with partisan, corporate, or other 
external interests wherever there is an interest in the outcome of a complaint. Even those 
councillors who act independently may rally together with councillors from the opposition party 
to prevent abuse by the councillors voting in line with the interests of the governing party. 
  
In practice, therefore, the election of new councillors from any sector is marred in competition 
between interest groups trying to elect a councillor who will serve their interests. The multi-
sectorial composition of the council has therefore only partially succeeded in preventing 
decisions about removals being made based purely on political or corporatist interests. The fact 
that several interests, formal and informal, are represented on the council turns all decisions into 
a game of numbers and strategic voting.  
 
At the time of the interviews, the balance of power in both the FJC plenary and the CDA meant 
that the governing party had control over which complaints to accept and which to reject in 
limine, and could therefore project ‘their’ judges, and start investigations against other judges 
based on politically motivated complaints. This had the serious knock-on effect of encouraging 
                                                 
931 Interview BAJ4, line 288. 
932 Interview BAJ4, lines 286-287. 
933 Interview BAJ4, lines 285-286. 
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politically motivated complaints, and dissuading complaints against judges that are known to be 
protected by the governing party.  
 
No interest group at the time had the two-thirds majority required to start removals proceedings 
before the FIJ, therefore protecting judges from politically motivated trials, however both the 
governing and opposition parties had enough votes to be able to block a trial from going forward, 
therefore protecting judge from removal where they wish to do so. In addition, due to the 
difficulty of obtaining this decision in the plenary, investigations were frequently strung out until 
such time that the votes could be gathered to proceed. Even in cases that did not have sufficient 
merit or votes to proceed before a jury, voting on rejecting the complaint would be put off so 
that the fact of an open investigation against a judge could be leveraged to place pressure on the 
judge in question. It is important to note that as councillors vote along partisan and not sectorial 
lines, this balance of power in the FJC changes over time, and can alter the consequences noted 
here.  
 
There is therefore only a very small number of complaints that proceed to a trial before the FIJ: 
only cases where a judge is not protected by any interests get through to this stage. This can 
happen where the evidence of malperformance is so strong that no one wants to pay the political 
price of protecting the judge, or where a judge is simply not of political interest. The findings in 
this chapter suggest that the jury is competent, independent, and that due process is guaranteed 
throughout the trial. In practice, decisions can also be appealed to the Supreme Court. The cases 
where judges have been removed therefore appear to comply with national and international 
norms on the judge’s right of defence and to a fair trial before an independent body.  
 
There also appears to be compliance with the rule that judges cannot be removed for the content 
of their rulings, and this is safe-guarded by the ability to appeal a decision to the Supreme Court. 
The only criticism that did surface of removals is questions about the extent to which the jury 
may be influenced by media and public pressure. It was suggested that the jurys’ decisions may 
simply reflect the pre-existing consensus in the various sectors represented on the 
appropriateness of the judge’s actions. In so far as this does not impact on the independent 
evaluation of the evidence and other due process guarantees, this may simply be a reflection of 
the political nature of the decision. Where such consensus is however impacted by a desire to 
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avoid media and public pressure, the independence of the decision may come under threat. The 
problem in such cases however is not the nature of the jury or the procedure for removals, but 
rather the damaged reputation of the judiciary. The reasons for this shall be further explored in 
Chapter 7.  
 
The findings in this chapter demonstrate however that despite protecting judges against arbitrary 
removals, the removals process at the Federal level is nevertheless damaging to judicial 
independence in many of the cases that do not reach the jury. The rejection of complaints against 
judges protected by the governing party as well as the protection of judges by both political 
parties from removals proceedings before a jury as damaging to judicial accountability, thereby 
failing to address potential cases of judicial impartiality which is damaging to judicial 
independence. In addition, lengthy and sometimes politically motivated investigations against 
judges at the early stages of the process are a source of anxiety for judges which may also 
undermine judicial independence. This finding supports the recommendations from several 
European bodies that disciplinary investigations should not be lengthy in order to prevent them 
having a damaging effect on judicial independence.  
 
The findings at the ACBA level differ to the findings at the Federal level in some important 
respects, including a more regulated time frame that makes it harder for investigations to be kept 
open for long periods of time, therefore better protecting due process in this crucial aspect. Most 
significantly however is that the ACBA JC does not appear to be infiltrated by partisan interests 
in the same way as at the Federal level. The reason for this difference may be partially because 
the more equal composition of both the JC plenary and the CDA makes it harder for any political 
party to gain any significant power over decisions, however before extracting any conclusions 
about the benefits of certain compositions over others, it is also important to note that 
contextual factors may be partially be the reason for the difference.  
 
The findings of this chapter suggest that it is possible that the ACBA government did not have as 
much interest as the Federal government to control the judiciary. This is intuitively logical given 
that there a cross-partisan desire to protect and strengthen the newly created ACBA institutions, 
that fewer sensitive issues were being handled by the ACBA, and that the judiciary is not 
tarnished with a bad reputation that could lead to pressure on the government to hold judges 
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accountable.934 The newly appointed judiciary at the ACBA level may also be less susceptible to 
influence and less infiltrated with interests, and therefore politicians may not have ‘their’ judges 
to protect.   
 
That is not to say that there is no competition between different interests within the ACBA JC, 
and that strategic decisions are not taken. The power struggle within the ACBA JC was not 
between political parties, rather between politics on the one hand and the judiciary on the other. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that a majority of judges at the ACBA level believe that any 
form of political accountability is inherently damaging to judicial independence and that judges 
should have greater, if not total, control over the removals process in accordance with 
international best practice. It is possible that this belief may result in councillors that represent 
the judiciary in the JC protecting judges at all costs, without proper regard to the merits of a 
complaint. This is potentially damaging to judicial accountability and may lead to the intimidation 
of judges that do not agree with this view, which is problematic for internal independence.  
 
On the other hand, it was argued that it is necessary to protect judges from decisions about 
removals that are political. Whilst in the case of the one removal that had taken place the judge 
was not removed due to the way in which she had ruled in any cases, there was public and 
political pressure to remove an unpopular judge and a lack of consensus as to whether the her 
actions could constitute grounds for removal, although it should be noted that the debate about 
her removal did revolve around her fitness for the role of a judge. There does nevertheless 
appear to be a need for greater clarity on the grounds to remove a judge. The lack of support for 
the JC and lack of agreement as to the nature of the removals process may also be damaging to 
the integrity of the institution, and the legitimacy of the process and needs to be addressed.  
 
Beyond these power struggles within JCs, the findings set out in this chapter also demonstrate 
that there are other factors that appear to be aggravating the problem, including the fact that 
politician councillors have little time for their work at the JC and are frequently absent from 
meetings making it difficult to reach agreements or move forward with cases. In addition, in their 
absence, their political advisors pick up a lot of the day to day running of cases, which creates an 
                                                 
934 See Section 7.7 for further consideration.  
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additional political influence on cases. There is also a lack of specialised, trained staff managing 
the administration of cases, which could lend the process more professionalism. Whilst these 
factors appear as rather minor practical issues, they are noteworthy both because they may 
impact in a very direct way on the competence and independence of JCs, and because they 
present the opportunity for clear and relatively simple improvements to be made to JCs.   
 
Ultimately, whilst it is positive that judges cannot ultimately be removed for partisan reasons, 
the success of the judicial removals process in protecting judicial independence needs to be 
viewed as a whole, and it is not sufficient for the only safe-guard to be an impartial jury that 
protects judges at the very last stage of the process. The JC acts as the ultimate arbiter of the 
fate of an overwhelming majority of complaints and is therefore responsible for any pressure 
placed on judges due to investigations, and as well as for the failure to investigate complaints for 
partisan or corporatist reasons. Even at the ACBA level where partisan interests do not exert 
control over the process, there is also a need for a clearer understanding of the role of councillors 
and that the nature of the decisions that they take can be political, but should not be partisan or 
strategic.   
 
Having evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the JCs model, Chapter 5 will go on to evaluate 
the data about the removals process in practice in Tucuman, where a legislative committee is in 
charge of the initial stage of the process. This will provide a basis for further understanding the 
strengths of the JC model in relation to the process being conducted without a JC. Chapter 6 will 
then go on to further explore some of the contextual factors affecting removals processes at all 
three levels to further understand some of the local challenges facing the process and any model 
that aims to overcome them. The chapter lays out the contextual factors raised by participants, 
and includes a consideration of the attitudes held by the government and the judiciary to judicial 
accountability, and a general lack of institutionalisation affecting all local institutions, as well as 
the role – both positive and negative – that the media and civil society play in removals processes. 
Chapter 7 then concludes by drawing all of these observations together to evaluate the extent to 
which JCs protect judicial independence in removals processes.  
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Chapter 6: Research Findings and Discussion: Judicial Removals Process 
for Tucuman Judges 
6.1 Introduction 
The question this research seeks to answer is whether JCs are successful in protecting judicial 
independence throughout the judicial removals procedure. A particular focus has been placed 
on whether they can adequately address the challenges to judicial independence present in the 
local context, namely   whether interests other than the protection of judicial independence and 
accountability can affect the process. Chapter 4 therefore looked at the process as conducted by 
the FJC and the ACBA JC to identify the strengths and weaknesses of these processes in practice, 
and the nature and effect of any external interests. This chapter looks at a third jurisdiction, the 
province of Tucuman, where the initial stage of the removals process is not conducted by a JC 
but rather by a legislative commission. Gaining a deeper understanding of the successes and 
challenges facing a removals processes conducted by a legislative committee allows for a 
comparison with the strengths and weaknesses of the JC model in order to assess whether the 
JC model does in fact better protect judicial independence. Tucuman was chosen as a province 
with a history of the local government attempting to interfere with the judiciary; the challenges 
of this context allows to test the strength of the removals process in place..  
 
This chapter is based on interviews with eleven stakeholders in the removals process in Tucuman, 
including three current judges, two former judges, a participant from the PIC, and a legislator 
who was not a member of the PIC. The four remaining participants were lawyers, including a 
lawyer who works for a local NGO, a court relator,935 and two lawyers from private practice who 
between them have experience working for the Tucuman Law Society’s Judicial Impeachment 
Committee,936 pursuing the removal of judges, and pursuing anti-corruption initiatives. Judges 
TJ3 and TJ4 were interviewed together and due to a difficulty determining who said what from 
the audio recording, all quotes from them shall be attributed to TJ3+4, identifying where there 
was any disagreements between them where necessary.  
 
                                                 
935 This is a legal secretary who assists judges with research and drafting judgements. Many judges are relators 
before becoming judges.  
936 See Section 7.8.1 for a consideration of the role of this Committee. 
Page 202 of 366 
 
6.2 Admission, Investigation, and Accusation by the Permanent Impeachment 
Commission of the Legislature  
The PIC is a permanent commission of the unicameral provincial legislature that receives and 
investigates complaints against provincial judges. This commission of twelve legislators then also 
decides whether to accuse the judge before an IJ. Given that, at the time of the interviews, the 
governing party held an “overwhelming”937 majority of forty-two of the forty-nine legislators in 
Tucuman,938 the process had the potential to be heavily affected by the governing party. 
However, the participant from the PIC, TLC1, was of the opinion that the legislative commission 
“has been functioning quite well”, and that “on the national level is it like it is much more 
politicised…. the political side of the impeachment is much more exposed”.939 As shall be 
examined in this section, there are some interesting reasons for this difference in opinion. This 
section will evaluate the process step by step starting with the filing of complaints in Section 
5.2.1, the Comission’s decision on admissibility in Section 5.2.2, the investigations conducted by 
the Commission in 5.2.3, and concluding with a discussion of due process guarantees in practice 
in Section 5.2.4 and the transparency of proceedings in Section 5.2.5. Section 5.3 will then 
consider proceedings before the IJ.  
 
6.2.1 The Filing of Complaints 
6.2.1.1 The Decision to File a Complaint 
In terms of whether or not lawyers in Tucuman would make a complaint against a judge they 
suspected of corruption, similar concerns were voiced as on the federal level although these 
concerns appeared to be more severe in Tucuman. TL1 explained that “very few lawyers” would 
make a complaint.940 TO1 added that “I do not believe that your average citizen would present a 
complaint in an uninformed manner”, 941 as “it is very difficult to think that [the PIC] will remove 
                                                 
937 Interview TL4, line 75, and Interview TJ3+4, lines 68-69: all three participants used the same word – abrumadora 
in Spanish – to describe this majority.  
938 Interview TL3, lines 86-89. 
939 Interview TLC1, lines 305-306. 
940 Interview TL1, line 17. TL1 explained that there were approximately 5,000 active lawyers in Tucumán at the time 
of the interview. TL1 was part of the Impeachment Commission of the Society of Lawyers of Tucumán, which 
also receives complaints about judges in proceedings that are parallel to those conducted by the PIC (see 
Section 6.8.1). TL1 explains that the Law Society received on average roughly 2 complaints a month, but that 
not all of these merit investigation or potential impeachment. See lines 19-22. 
941 Interview TO1, lines 73-75. 
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someone who may be protected… by the government”.942 TO1 explained that therefore, “if I 
want to initiate impeachment proceedings against a judge, I will think about… whether this serves 
the government”.943  
 
TO1 explained that judges are protected in many cases: “there is a common view… [that is] 
exaggerated, but has some glint of reality, that the majority of the judiciary is susceptible to be 
controlled by the government”.944 TO1 also explained that if someone wanted to know whether 
or not a judge was protected by the government, “there is a lot of information off the record 
circulating”:945 “It is not very hard to know which judge acted in some way, which, as a minimum 
is suspected of favouring the government. And it is easy to know which judge puts a distance 
[between him/herself and the government]”.946 
 
Beyond the likelihood of being accepted, TO1 also explained that making a complaint “has a very 
high juridical cost” for any NGO (or lawyer for that matter) that files a complaint, given that “is it 
a small province”. 947 TO1 explained that the chance of “retaliation… is very high, whist we know 
that the outcome is highly likely to be negative, therefore the trade-off is not” worth it.948 TO1 
indicated that if a lawyer attempted to pursue a complaint about corruption, the nature of this 
retaliation may be dramatic, such as treats to make not only the professional life of the lawyer, 
but also of those close to him difficult if he chooses to pursue the complaint.949  
 
TL1 also noted that some lawyers may decide not to file a complaint, either due to fear or 
apathy,950 or because they feel that they may have been complicit at some point if they did not 
challenge the judge’s behaviour during the trial. TL1 explained that a not insignificant number of 
                                                 
942 Interview TO1, lines 34-35. 
943 Interview TO1, lines 57-59. 
944 Interview TO1, lines 68-69. 
945 Interview TO1, lines 73-78. The term ‘off the record’ was spoken in English.  
946 Interview TO1, lines 81-83. See also lines 69-72: “what one does know, it is very very well known, which judges 
do not do it [ie do not do favours for the government]. Because every time there is a sentences against the 
government, there is a lot of publicity, therefore one really knows who the judges are…that will say no to the 
government”. 
947 Interview TO1, lines 140-141. 
948 Interview TO1, lines 146-148.  
949 Interview TO1, lines 149-156. 
950 Interview TL1, lines 22-23. See also lines 24-26: “a sort of abandon… of intimidation, to say well, it will take me a 
lot of time, I will let it pass and continue and try to achieve that the law is applied using other tools”. 
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lawyers believe that “if a lawyer consents the wrong of a judge, the bad conduct in the application 
of the law, if the lawyer consents to it, he cannot report the judge” or request impeachment.951  
 
6.2.1.2 Who Files Complaints and Who Has Complaints Filed Against Them  
TLC1 was not able to provide any statistics on how many complaints the commission receives per 
year and how many of those are rejected as that information, according to TLC1, is not 
“systematised”.952 (S)he did however explain, as a way of gauging the level of activity of the 
commission, that as at the date of the interview (17 October 2014), the commission had passed 
365 resolutions in total since 1991, pointing out that there may be more than one resolution on 
any given case so this is not necessarily indicative of the number of cases that have come before 
the commission.953 Doing the math that would be on average 15-16 resolutions a year, which, 
again, does not necessarily mean 15-16 individual complaints. The number of complaints 
therefore indeed appears to be fairly low compared to the federal level, even taking into account 
the smaller judiciary it oversees.  
 
TLC1, TJ1, TJ2, and TJ3+4 explained that complaints tend to be filed by individuals:954 “generally 
people who have been adversely affected, or who feel wronged. Victims of crimes and perhaps 
[those] adversely affected by judicial decisions I think are the majority”.955 TJ3+4 added that 
these individuals are usually advised by a lawyer, whose name however does not often appear 
on the complaint.956 TJ1 also explained that those who file complaints do not always ratify them 
when called upon by the Commission to do so.957 TJ1 clarified that “in Tucuman, there is an 
enormous easiness in making accusations, in saying things, in launching insults958 to say it in 
common terms. People easily do that, no? Therefore sometimes people present things and then 
                                                 
951 Interview TL1, lines 28-30. TL1 argued that this was an incorrect view, that a lawyer has an obligation to report 
bad judicial conduct, or at the very least inform his client of it so that the client is aware of all of the possibilities 
available in defending his rights: see lines 30-39. 
952 Interview TLC1, lines 360-363. 
953 Interview TLC1, lines 373-376. 
954 Interview TLC1, line 9; Interview TJ1, lines- 161-162; Interview TJ3+4, lines 38-39. 
955 Interview TJ2, lines 211-213. 
956 Interview TJ3+4, lines 38-43. 
957 Interview TJ1, lines 171-174. When the PIC received a complaint, the first thing they do is to request that the 
complainant ratifies the complaint. If they do not do so, it is as if the complaint had never been filed and the 
Commission does not proceed to either admit it or reject it.  
958 The Spanish term used here was lanzar brulotes which literally translated means to throw firecrackers, and is an 
expression that means to speak or write obscenities.  
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do not ratify”.959 TLC1 confirmed that this does happen, but not in that many cases,960 explaining 
that when people do not ratify the first time around, the commission sends them a second 
request to do so.961 
 
TJ1 explained that this happens because sometimes simply making a complaint was enough to 
fulfil the aims of some complainants who use it as a “type of coercion”, as they got it “published 
in the newspaper, got publicity”.962 TL4 agreed that “many times [a complaint] is used as a 
mechanism to put pressure on judges”.963 TLC1 confirmed that generally people do not ratify 
their complaint “when it is a manoeuvre aimed at achieving something at the judicial level, when 
it is a strategy”.964 TLC1 also explained that how much information complainants typically provide 
“varies in accordance with whether it is a serious complaint or a complaint aimed at generating 
some judicial consequence”.965  
 
TL2 also explained that “there are many citizens who can act inspired by resentment, or by 
misguidance, or because… they felt their interests affected by a certain sentence, resort to 
impeachment as an element of pressure”.966 TJ2 however reasoned that “probably the victims, 
the people who feel injured… [use the process] with good faith, but sometimes they do not have 
objectivity”.967 TJ3+4 however explained that even in such circumstances, they file complaints 
“with so much hate, that they do not wait for the resolution of the appeal to the provincial or 
national Supreme Court, but rather immediately makes a complaint requesting impeachment 
when they are not in agreement with the [ruling]”.968    
 
Additionally, TO1 explained that another portion of complaints are made for political reasons:  
“certain sector of the press, both the main press as well as the alternative press, oppose the 
government a lot”,969 and therefore “reporting a judge for corruption, has a very good media 
                                                 
959 Interview TJ1, lines 176-179. 
960 Interview TLC1, lines 229-231, and lines 236-237. 
961 Interview TLC1, lines 236-237. 
962 Interview TJ1, lines 179-181. 
963 Interview TL4, lines 24-28. 
964 Interview TLC1, lines 233-234. 
965 Interview TLC1, lines 68-69. 
966 Interview TL2, lines 347-349. 
967 Interview TJ2, lines 224-225. 
968 Interview TJ3+4, lines 17-20. 
969 Interview TO1, lines 29-30. 
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impact, which can help your own interests if you are a political party in the opposition [as] it 
delegitimises the image of the government”.970 TL4 agreed that “the politicians also play their 
game of being the opposition… in order to be in the media, be in the newspapers”.971 TJ2 also 
agreed that whilst opposition politicians “often [file complaints] in good faith, they often to it to 
obtain a political advantage…. Not because they are interested in things working well”.972 In other 
words, explained TJ2, “not always using the mechanism correctly, but rather to other ends”.973 
TO1 however also explained that an NGO may decide to report a judge with the aim of “doing 
blame and shaming”, even where they know that it is unlikely that the judge will be removed.974 
 
As at the federal level then, it seems that genuine suspicions of malperformance often do not get 
reported, due to a feeling that it is pointless to report protected judges. Complaints do also get 
filed where a party to a case does not agree with the ruling of a judge. Many complaints are also 
filed strategically in order to either place pressure on the judge in a case or to draw media 
attention to the issue being complained about. The difference with the federal level is that in 
Tucuman simply filing a complaint, even where it is not ratified or accepted, appears to already 
serve these purposes.  
 
6.2.2 The Acceptance or Rejection of Complaints by the PIC 
TLC1 explained that the majority of complaints the commission receives get rejected.975 This was 
confirmed by TJ1 that who explained that “in the cases that I have seen the Commission act, the 
truth is that many of these [complaints] were rejected”.976 TL4 was also of the opinion the “it 
seems to me that they are quite restrictive in the legislature in the moment of accepting or 
rejecting [complaints]”.977 TJ2 agreed that “the majority of cases are rejected in limine; that is 
the truth”.978 TLC1 explained that this is due to “the criteria of the commission to not interfere 
in the judiciary if the configuration of a cause for impeachment is not clear”.979 TL3 agreed that 
                                                 
970 Interview TO1, lines 31-33. 
971 Interview TL4, lines 98-99. 
972 Interview TJ2, lines 215-218. 
973 Interview TJ2, lines 216-217.   
974 Interview TO1, lines 33-34. The term ‘blame and shaming’ was spoken in English.  
975 Interview TLC1, lines 11-12. 
976 Interview TJ1, lines 220-222. See also lines 243-248, and lines 399-400. 
977 Interview TL4, lines 28-29. 
978 Interview TJ2, line 238. 
979 Interview TLC1, lines 13-14. See also lines 365-369 where this statement is repeated. 
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“disagreements with the [judge’s] ruling are not admitted either by regulation or in practice by 
the Commission”.980  
 
TL2 was of the opinion that in theory it is good that the Commission has the possibility to reject 
complaints in limine, “as a tool to avoid excesses on the part of the complainant”, to filter out 
complaints intended to affect judicial independence, or which mistakenly see the impeachment 
process as another appeal of a decision they did not like. However, as at the federal level, there 
may be a further explanation for the rejection of complaints. TL4 explained that “one can… say 
or sense… that the oficialismo is protecting, in quotation marks, this judge, therefore they reject 
[a complaint]”.981 TJ2 agreed that “if someone is… protected… by the government, they will try 
to save him, to protect him”.982 TO1 also added that “I do not believe that the government would 
risk an advance in the admissibility of a complaint, if it is a case of great relevance to the 
government…. For the much that they have society against them [they would say] we close it 
here”.983 TJ5 also commented that “coincidentally, those judges who have bad conduct, I have 
never seen them being submitted to a juicio politico”. 984  
 
TL3 gave an example of a complaint filed against a judge that was rejected in limine by the 
Commission: the “judge acted with a matrix, a system of acquittals in all cases connected to the 
political power…. Since [the judge] assumed his role, in all of the cases where there is some 
element… which connects [to] the political power and the family of the government, the judge 
resolved in a quick manner”.985 The complaint was filed alongside a wide array of evidence, but 
was rejected in limine by the Commission.986 TL2 also agreed that “in the last ten years, we saw 
this process in which those who were addicted judges,987 and where there was sufficient grounds 
to at the least open an investigation, to see what the judge did, and [the commission] rejected 
                                                 
980 Interview TL3, lines 21-23. 
981 Interview TL4, lines 78-79. 
982 Interview TJ2, lines 146-147. 
983 Interview TO1, lines 126-130. 
984 Interview TJ5, lines 348-350. 
985 Interview TL3, lines 127-131. 
986 Ibid. 
987 This term, jueces adictos in Spanish, is used to refer to judges who rule in accordance with what the political 
power wants them to rule. Addicted refers to addicted to the political power, in the sense that they are 
dependent on it.  
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[the complaints] in limine”.988 TL3 explained that the Commission gives “very poor… almost 
inexistent” reasons for such rejections.989  
 
When asked what factors the Commission takes into consideration when accepting or rejecting 
a complaint, TLC1 explained that the grounds for impeachment are listed in the provincial 
constitution, and that the regulation then sets out the formal requirements of a complaint.990 
TLC1 explained that based on this “an analysis is done to see whether the reasons [for 
impeachment] put in the complaint merit the continuation of the process”.991 TLC1 explained 
that this is generally a quick and simple process: “it is like, if there is an element, well a copy is 
sent to the accused for him to provide reasons to drop the charge”.992  
 
Other participants however disagreed. TL3 explained that this decision was heavily influenced by 
the “enormous imbalance of political representation” in the Commission.993 TJ1 explained that 
the Commission “acted”, as in accepted and investigated, “in cases which were of political 
interest”.994 TJ2 agreed, explaining that this decision is made “by automatic political majority, in 
accordance with the interests of the government of the day”.995 TJ5 also said that the factors 
taken into consideration in making this decision are “exclusively political”.996 TL2 also explained 
that complaints were brought against “judges which they should have rejected in limine”.997 TL4 
agreed that “they sometimes bring [investigations] against judges who really have nothing to do 
with [such complaints]… or at least where the complaint is not very well founded”.998  
 
TL2 clarified that “when [the process is] tainted999 by politics…. it is used depending on who is 
the accused”.1000 Indeed, TJ2 explained that where “a judge is intervening in a case which 
                                                 
988 Interview TL2, lines 338-341. 
989 Interview TL3, lines 136-137. 
990 Interview TLC1, lines 31-64. 
991 Interview TLC1, lines 75-76. 
992 Interview TLC1, lines 196-197. 
993 Interview TL3, lines 83-89. 
994 Interview TJ1, line 222. 
995 Interview TJ2, line 121. 
996 Interview TJ5, line 220. 
997 Interview TL2, lines 342-343. 
998 Interview TL4, lines 100-102. 
999 The term used here is Spanish was viciado, which means vitiated, corrupted, tainted, or ruined.  
1000 Interview TL2, lines 364-365. 
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compromises the interests of the government, which involves a public official with ties to the 
government, a legislator with ties to the government, they will try to remove [the judge]”.1001 TL4 
agreed that in such cases there is “like a systematic attack”.1002 TJ1 gave the example of a judge 
who had issued a freezing injunction against a bank.1003 The bank filed a complaint against the 
judge, and “because it was the bank where all of the official deposits were, very friends… of the 
power, therefore… they opened a removals process against this judge”.1004  
 
When asked what politicians may have against a judge which may motivate them to investigate 
him/her, TL1 responded “decisions and investigations that (s)he carried out; small things.”1005 
TL1 went on to explain that this has been the case “since… politics, in the last twenty years, got 
mixed up with gangs of the mafia, of football, and of drug trafficking”.1006 TL1 clarified that in 
Tucuman “the small drug trafficker is the guy who also works for the political leader of each 
neighbourhood”, and that these people “ask for favours…. when they are caught robbing, 
committing a crime… they personally call up legislators… or officials of the executive power, 
prosecutors, or members of the judiciary saying that this guy there works for us and is an 
important collaborator”,1007 and requests that “they set [him] free”.1008 Where a judge does not 
comply, this may motivate politicians to place pressure on the judge.   
 
TL3 summarised this by explaining that the relevant political interests here are those of the 
realpolitik.1009 TJ2 agreed, explaining that the issue is: “partisan or of power, because, 
unfortunately, in our country…. the strictly partisan or ideological issue, it’s like it has been left 
to one side, behind games of interests, circumstantial alliances”.1010 In line with this, TJ2 
explained that “politicians come and go from one group to another in accordance with their 
necessities of subsistence or of continuity in power, or to gain power”.1011 
                                                 
1001 Interview TJ2, lines 143-145. 
1002 Interview TL4, line 102. 
1003 Interview TJ1, lines 401-414. 
1004 Interview TJ1, lines 408-410. 
1005 Interview TL1, line 650. 
1006 Interview TL1, lines 650-652. 
1007 Interview TL1, lines 657-661. 
1008 Interview TL1, line 658. 
1009 Interview TL3, lines 301-304: “there is not a professional and technical juridical analysis, but rather a political 
analysis, of the realpolitik, pure and simple”. 
1010 Interview TJ2, lines 130-132. 
1011 Interview TJ2, lines 132-134. 
Page 210 of 366 
 
TL1 expanded on this to explain that political interests in this context meant the interests of the 
Governor: “[in] the current legislative power in Tucuman… a phenomenon occurs that…. as far 
as I know, did not exist before”,1012 which is that “the governor decided… to support, politically 
and economically…. transforming people who do not have popular legitimation, nor really any 
leadership, into legislators”.1013 These people “earn a lot of money” as legislators,1014 and “none 
of them will take a decision in contrary to the will of the governor himself”.1015 In this way, 
“independence does not exist” among legislators.1016 TJ3+4 agreed, explaining that in the 
acceptance of complaints this means that “the order, or the directive, comes from the central 
power, and obviously there is compliance and… they process [the complaint]”.1017 When asked 
whether the advisors of the various legislators that make up the Commission have any power 
over the process, TJ3+4 immediately replied “none… because… the order comes… they have to 
opine as they were told from above”.1018 
 
TO1 also noted that the Commission does not always necessarily intend to pursue the complaints 
it admits. It may sometimes be a political strategy to gain popularity by seemingly pursuing 
investigations against unpopular judges: 
 
what I understand is that the level of exposition that a complaint has plays a very 
important role [in whether it is accepted]. There is a great possibility that if the topic is on 
the front cover of the media or if there is some pressure from the federal level, whether it 
is through media or political pressure… this will be … a driving force for the admissibility 
or not. Because the commission knows that by accepting [the complaint], it has a positive 
media exposure. Because it does not mean to judge the case, it is only saying we accept 
it, and afterwards it can be shelved, left to sleep, the judge can be declared innocent 
etcetera,... therefore it gives the commission a margin of play in terms of its own 
legitimacy.1019 
                                                 
1012 Interview TL1, lines 690-691. 
1013 Interview TL1, lines 693-695. 
1014 Interview TL1, line 698. 
1015 Interview TL1, line 699. 
1016 Interview TL1, line 700. 
1017 Interview TJ3+4, lines 69-71. 
1018 Interview TJ3+4, lines 497-499. 
1019 Interview TO1, lines 116-125. 
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It is likely that TO1 was at least in part referring here to the Commission’s acceptance of the 
complaint against the judges of the Marita Verón case, where the unpopular ruling had been 
publicly condemned by President Fernandez, and the complaint had been made by Marita’s 
mother, who had wide-ranging public and political support. The other emblematic case where 
public pressure translated into the removal of a judge was removal of judge Freidenberg by the 
legislature in 2006 (before the jury had been introduced by the new constitution). In the context 
of high levels of violent crime, political rhetoric on being tough on crime was popular,1020 and 
therefore there was political pressure to condemn this judge for letting a criminal escape. TL1 
explained that this translated into a political interest in the case whereby “the commission acted 
politically, because the Governor wanted, and had said it, had expressed it, for her not to be a 
judge anymore”.1021 TO1 explained “the government said, mm, win win, I get rid of a judge who 
is difficult to control, for a reason that society will applaud me for”.1022  
 
In such cases, it appeared that the Commission’s usual rule of rejecting complaints based on the 
content of a judicial ruling is set aside. This happened in the case of Judge Freidenberg, who was 
ultimately reinstated by the supreme court for precisely that reason: 1023 she was removed on 
the basis that “the authorization [for the prisoner to visit his home] had been wrongly given”,1024 
which is a judicial ruling. TJ5 explained that it was for this reasons that the Freidenberg case had 
“very important institutional value”1025 as it “represents a restraint”1026 on the political branch, 
so that it cannot take over the role of judging that is strictly for the judiciary.1027 
Nevertheless, TJ1 was of the opinion that the Commission had done the same thing again in the 
case of the complaints against the judges of the Verón case.1028 TJ1 explained that the legal 
community thought “how come they are opening impeachment proceedings based on the 
content of the ruling, when they have been conducting themselves in the way that, for the 
                                                 
1020 Interview TO1, lines 51-52: “society had, still has, this idea of being tough with criminals: that they rot in jail 
and all of that discourse”. 
1021 Interview TL1, lines 646-648. 
1022 Interview TO1, lines 53-54. See also lines 50-51: “this judge was not necessarily very independent, but she was 
not a judge that was easy for the political power to control”. 
1023 Interview TJ5, lines 99-101. 
1024 Interview TJ5, line 60. 
1025 Interview TJ5, line 123. 
1026 Interview TJ5, line 127. 
1027 Interview TJ5, lines 127-129. 
1028 Interview TJ1, lines 30-34. 
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content of a ruling, proceedings were not opened”.1029 TL3 agreed that “they opened 
impeachment proceedings against the [Verón] judges for the content of their judgement”.1030 
TJ5 also observed more generally that “it has gone as far as making complaints against judges, 
observing the result of the judgement, with which it infringes upon judicial independence”.1031 
 
TL2 however pointed out that when judges claim that they cannot be judged for the content of 
their sentences, “it is a sophism because the constitution says that the judges should be 
controlled for malperformance in the exercise of his function”.1032 TL2 explained that therefore 
judges can argue that they cannot be removed for any actions carried out in their private life, as 
it is not “in the exercise of their function”, and cannot be questioned for their rulings due to 
judicial independence, “with which…. they have the same stability as a monarchy”.1033 TL2 
explained that what is being examined during a removals procedure is rather “the conduct within 
his function” in order to determine whether a judge has, for example, made “contradictory 
rulings, inspired in reasons other than the administration of justice”.1034 “The juridical content of 
the ruling” is not what is being evaluated in removal proceedings, concluded TL2,1035 pointing out 
that ruling will not be modified as a result.1036 
  
TJ2 did recognise that where the reasoning of a judicial decision “reveals the commission of a 
crime of prevarication, of openly ignoring evidence, of gross ignorance of the law, of a 
discriminatory, racist attitude” then it can be used in the case of a removal of a judge.1037 TJ3+4 
were also of the opinion that where there is “ignorance of the law”1038 or “there were some 
strange things involved”1039 then this can be a reason for the removal of a judge. TJ3+4 however 
argued that “this would be at the end: you have to wait until the provincial Supreme Court rules, 
that the Supreme Court of the nation rules”.1040 Their logic was that in order to know whether 
                                                 
1029 Interview TJ1, lines 432-435. 
1030 Interview TL3, lines 119-120. 
1031 Interview TJ5, lines 39-41. 
1032 Interview TL1, lines 209-211. 
1033 Interview TL2, lines 212-219. 
1034 Interview TL2, lines 222-224. 
1035 Interview TL2, lines 186-187. 
1036 Interview TL2, lines 219-221. 
1037 Interview TJ2, lines 354-356 
1038 Interview TJ3+4, line 215. 
1039 Interview TJ3+4, line 223. 
1040 Interview TJ3+4, lines 215-216. 
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the judge applied the law correctly, you need to wait for higher courts to decide this: “because 
otherwise the balance… is lost”1041 in the division of power, and it is important that “each power 
has its independence”.1042  
 
TL2 explained that the main problem was the lack of clarity about this point means that 
“everyone uses it as they like”. “When the national or provincial controlling bodies want to favour 
a particular judge, when he is reported… they say we cannot control what judges do in their 
rulings, and when acting to the contrary they say the [federal] congress said that yes we can 
where there are circumstances that these rulings show a functional malperformance”.1043 
 
6.2.3 Investigations by the PIC 
TO1 explained that during the investigations by the Commission in the case of suspected judicial 
corruption, “one of the big problems is obtaining information”,1044 “other than off the record, 
other than rumours: to see the paper is very difficult”.1045 This applies both for the person 
considering making a complaint, and for the commission whilst investigating a complaint. The 
reason why people are reluctant to seek or provide information in corruption cases, according to 
TO1, is that they fear retaliation in the future: “If I am in opposition to you, you are the current 
government, and I provide information in a corruption case, when I am in the government, you 
will provide information against me”.1046  
 
“Therefore”, explained TO1, “there is an implicit pact that information about corruption serves 
for denunciations in the media, for blaming, but never for a legal case”.1047 “Nobody wants to 
break this pact”, TO1 explained, and if someone does, “there would be a lot of complaints filed 
before the Commission”.1048 In addition to this “political pact”, explained TO1, “it is also a social 
pact”: “because corruption is something that benefits the majority of Argentineans in the short 
                                                 
1041 Interview TJ3+4, lines 220-221. 
1042 Interview TJ3+4, line 222. 
1043 Interview TL2, lines 228-234. 
1044 Interview TO1, line 184. 
1045 Interview TO1, lines 214-215. 
1046 Interview TO1, lines 184-186. 
1047 Interview TO1, lines 186-188. 
1048 Interview TO1, lines 191-193. 
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term. In the long term, no, but in the short term, there is a vision of corruption”.1049 “There are 
very few cases” concluded TO1, “where deep investigations are really carried out” by the 
commission:1050 “The commission will never want to seek a lot of information”.1051 
 
In addition, employees of the judiciary who may have information about corruption may be afraid 
of providing information about a judge as if the judge is not removed in the end “he will stay [in 
his post as a judge] his whole life”.1052 The Commission is also not able to provide credible offers 
of protection to anyone who comes forward with information as these people “will be in a 
situation of defencelessness, because when the government changes, they will say, oh, these are 
the judges who open their mouths, or these are the employees of the judiciary that open their 
mouths, these are the ones we have to sanction”.1053 This is relevant because, as TO1 pointed 
out “if I make a complaint against a judge, it is most possible that I need information that comes 
from the judiciary itself, because that is where the evidence is”.1054 
 
TO1 however pointed out that ultimately the result of an investigation will depend on “the 
character [and] level of interest that the government has in the case”.1055 In corruption cases, 
explained TO1, the government will clearly have an interest in the corruption coming to light or 
not, and a case will be investigated or not investigated correspondingly.1056 Indeed TL1 explained 
that “due to not having an equilibrium of opinions, or ideas, [the process] simply transforms itself 
into a tool of legitimisation of irregular acts”.1057 Indeed, TL1 explained that “there have been 
complaints by individuals, in well-known cases, which went before the Law Society’s 
[Impeachment Committee] with the result of a recommendation of impeachment which did not 
have the same result in the legislature”.1058 TL1 explained that “there are the tools to know what 
                                                 
1049 Interview TO1, lines 201-203. 
1050 Interview TO1, lines 194-195. 
1051 Interview TO1, lines 188-189. 
1052 Interview TO1, lines 207-209. 
1053 Interview TO1, lines 209-213. 
1054 Interview TO1, lines 205-207. 
1055 Interview TO1, lines 320-321. 
1056 Interview TO1, lines 321-328. 
1057 Interview TL1, lines 607-613. 
1058 Interview TL1, lines 142-145. 
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happened” available to the Commission during the “part of the investigation”,1059 but “the 
system…. does not guarantee the correct debate nor the correct making of decision”.1060 
 
“The interest of the government [in a case] is constituted by various factors” explained TO1. 
There are “boomerang factors”, such as “the level of exposition, or mediatization of a case”, as 
well as the level of interest the national government or the opposition party has in a case, which 
will also affect the level of interest the provincial governing party has in a case.1061 TJ5 agreed 
that the Committee will only pursue investigations where it is politically profitable to do so: “it 
all depends on the angle given to [the case] by the press”.1062 TL3 explained that a clear example 
of this was the process pursued against the judges in the Verón case: “you have a clear 
comportment of the PIC, completely influenced by the political power and by politics, and the 
general public opinion and the media, which do not act juridically”.1063 “There was no merit for 
impeachment proceedings, and the political power got on this because it was profitable, socially 
profitable” TL3 agreed.1064 TO1 was also of the opinion that “there was a situation where the 
Commission had already pre-judged these judges, we all knew that they would condemn 
them”.1065  
 
Explaining the interest of the government in that case, TJ1 said that “the investigation [into the 
disappearance of Verón] was conducted by the police of this government, therefore, in light of 
the great international impact of the case, [the local government] was interested in having a 
conviction” in the criminal trial against those accused of kidnapping Marita and forcing her into 
prostitution.1066 When the judges did not deliver, they became scapegoats. TO1 agreed that: 
 
the provincial government, who had not done anything in favour of protecting [people 
from] this scourge that is human trafficking, saw the opportunity to say, well, this is my 
contribution: I will remove the judges who issued the sentence declaring those accused of 
                                                 
1059 Interview TL1, lines 724-725. 
1060 Interview TL1, lines 723-724. 
1061 Interview TO1, lines 328-334. 
1062 Interview TJ5, line 167. 
1063 Interview TL3, lines 122-124. 
1064 Interview TL3, lines 343-344. 
1065 Interview TO1, lines 302-303. 
1066 Interview TJ1, lines 239-240. 
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human trafficking innocent. Therefore the government was cunning. It said… I will please 
the national government… [which] has a strong policy in favour of the fight against human 
trafficking, and the provincial government was in debt because they were not doing 
anything.1067 
 
TJ2 agreed that “the local government looked bad in front of the national government which was 
very interested in seeing a conviction in this trial…. whether or not there was evidence, there had 
to be a conviction”.1068 TJ3+4 agreed that the Verón verdict was “unpopular… the people 
expected a conviction, so well, the political response could not have been different”.1069 “The 
governor had an interest in looking good in front of the President”;1070 “it’s a strange federal ism” 
in Argentina, they added.1071  
 
President Fernández in turn had an interest in the case as she “had made friends with Susana 
Trimarco”,1072 the mother of Marita Verón, and the person who had filed the complaint against 
the judges. Susana Trimarco runs a foundation that helps victims of human trafficking and has 
gained international recognition for her work.1073 However, TJ3+4 argued that President 
Fernández also had a further political interest in condemning the judges of the Verón case:  
 
                                                 
1067 Interview TO1, lines 41-47. 
1068 Interview TJ2, lines 168-171. 
1069 Interview TJ3+4, lines 201-203. 
1070 Interview TJ3+4, lines 405-406. 
1071 Interview TJ3+4, line 407. 
1072 Interview TJ3+4, line 442. 
1073 The foundation is named after Trimarco’s missing daughter. The foundation’s website provides a list of the 
many provincial, national, and international awards that Trimarco has received: Fundación María de los 
Ángeles, ‘Susana Trimarco’ (FundacionMariadelosAngeles.org) <www.fundacionmariadelosangeles.org//susana-
trimarco.htm> accessed 15 December 2018. Amongst other awards, in 2007, the US Department of State 
awarded Trimarco an International Women of Courage Award: see Office of the Senior Coordinator for 
International Women’s Issues, ‘Fact Sheet: Secretary of State Confers the First International Women of Courage 
Awards’ (US Department of State Archive, 7 March 2007) <https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/wi/rls/81473.htm> 
accessed 15 December 2018. Trimarco was also the recipient of the Canadian John Diefenbaker Defender of 
Human Rights and Freedom Award: see Minister Baird, ‘Address at the Second Annual John Diefenbaker 
Defender of Human Rights and Freedom Award Ceremony’ (Government of Canada News Archives, 14 March 
2012) <www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2012/03/address-minister-baird-second-annual-john-diefenbaker-
defender-human-rights-freedom-award-ceremony.html> accessed 15 December 2018. In April of 2012, local 
media reported that the Argentine Federation of Lawyers’ Associations nominated Trimarco for a Nobel Peace 
Prize: Infobae, ‘Oficializan la Candidature de Susana Trimarco al Nobel de la Paz’ Infobae (16 April 2012) 
<www.infobae.com/2012/04/17/642643-oficializan-la-candidatura-susana-trimarco-al-nobel-la-paz/> accessed 
15 December 2018.  
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One of the propositions of the national government was the topic which is now known as 
“democratic justice”… the ideological component… to make judgements more… 
favourable to the community. Well, in that precise moment there was this case, with this 
topic which was of great interest to the community. Therefore, the result was that this 
[case] was used as an example of the justice that should not be, in other words, that it was 
not a democratised justice, but rather a justice removed from the interests of the people, 
of the citizens.1074 
 
This strategic partisan decision-making shares similarities with problems at the federal level. 
However, due to the differences between the PIC and the FJC in terms of composition, these 
influences play out in different ways. In Tucuman, participants explained that the Commission 
generally acts quickly in the investigation of complaints and does not shelve them or extend 
deadlines.1075 TL3 explained that “the commission has a timeframe and it abides by it, generally 
it abides by it… it is very rigorous in that way”.1076 Although (s)he did point out that in some cases 
the commission purposely allows the deadline for investigation pass in order not to investigate a 
case. TL3 however admitted that (s)he was not sure in how many cases this had occurred.1077  
 
TLC1 rebuffed this, clearly stated that this had “never” happened since (s)he worked in the 
legislature.1078 In terms of how long investigations take, TLC1 specified “in general the whole time 
period is used to make an accusation… because the accusation needs to be technically solid, it 
needs to have factual grounds”.1079 TLC1 of course clarified however that this does “depend on 
the case and the elemental necessities: if it is clear, it is more agile”.1080 What is taken into 
consideration when deciding whether or not to accuse a judge before an IJ, explained TLC1, is 
“that a cause exists, and that the cause is sustained by the complaint”.1081 
 
                                                 
1074 Interview TJ3+4, lines 446-455. 
1075 Interview TJ1, lines 426-428; Interview TL4, lines 172-174; Interview TJ2, line 238-253. 
1076 Interview TL3, lines 199-204. 
1077 Interview TL3, lines 207-212. 
1078 Interview TLC1, line 204. 
1079 Interview TLC1, lines 198-200. 
1080 Interview TLC1, lines 194-195. 
1081 Interview TLC1, lines 244-245. 
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TL3 explained that the problem is rather that complaints are dealt with too quickly, for reasons 
of political convenience.1082 Indeed, TL3 explained that this is exactly what happened in the case 
of the judges of the Verón case: “the Commission, through a public expression of the Governor, 
head of the governing party, accepted the complaint, immediately”.1083 TL4 agreed that in that 
case, “it was an express process… a super quick thing”.1084 TL4 also pointed out that this was 
particularly unusual given that it happened in January when the courts, schools, and other 
institutions are on summer break.1085 TO1 explained that both in the cases of the Verón judges 
and the case against Judge Freidenberg the processes “were very quick, quicker than what one 
would expect, and indeed it seems to me that they were too quick”.1086 TO1 added that “it was 
a shame as I believe that there were grounds to remove the [Verón] judges, I think the sentence 
[of those judges] was badly done, but [the removals process] was very quick, and very rash, and 
it left the sensation, the strong sensation that these judges paid the price for being against Susana 
Trimarco”.1087 
 
6.2.4 Due Process Guarantees  
“The system” explained TL1, “due to depending so much on the political blueprint, is also subject 
to the avatars of political decisions and not of technical decisions”.1088 In this way, “there are no 
guarantees of the system itself for the result to be impartial or to be just and objective”.1089 TL1 
added that “there are no guarantees for anyone”: neither for the complainant not the judge 
subject to these proceedings.1090 TJ3+4 described the judicial removals procedure in Tucuman as 
“anomalous”,1091 explaining that “the impeachment system, unfortunately, has been 
                                                 
1082 Interview TL3, lines 202-203. 
1083 Interview TL3, lines 120-121. 
1084 Interview TL4, lines 89-90. TJ3+4 also characterised the acceptance of this complaint as an “express process”: 
line 80. 
1085 Interview TL4, lines 92-94. 
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they were, as (s)he does not know enough about them or have any point of comparison: see lines 287-293. 
1087 Interview TO1, lines 305-310. 
1088 Interview TL1, lines 714-716. 
1089 Interview TL1, lines 713-714. 
1090 Interview TL1, lines 718-720. 
1091 Interview TJ3+4, lines 59, 65, 90, 156, 191, 262, and 429. 
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distorted1092”1093 and that there is an “imbalance [of power] where all guarantees that the system 
has are lost”.1094  
 
TJ5 explained that the problem is that PIC believes that because a juicio politico (‘political trial’, 
as impeachment proceedings are called in Spanish) is political, “it does not need to be 
juridical”.1095 However, as TJ5 explained, “this is not the case: no matter how political it is, the 
norms of due process must be adhered to, even in a juicio politico”.1096 TJ5 however said that this 
is not currently the case: “here, the trial is political, it is not a juridical trial in which the steps of 
the process are adhered to, and therefore the norms of due process are being violated”.1097 TL3 
agreed “that is how [the commission] works: …absolutely guided by political decisions, not with 
juridical criteria nor with objective judgement”.1098  
 
In response to such criticism, TLC1 (from the PIC) explained that the process is indeed political, 
but that “it is not bad that it is political”, clarifying that “by political I am referring to politics, not 
to party politics”.1099 TLC1 went on to explain that “I do not agree with the questioning that 
occurred, that… as the majority of legislators are not lawyers… how could they judge a judge if 
they are not trained”.1100 TLC1 explained that the legislator’s qualification to judge arises from a 
different source, as “whilst there is a process to follow, it is not something strictly juridical…. Here 
what is looked at, in impeachment processes, is if there is cause which make it advisable that this 
civil servant stops being a civil servant, so there is a political component”.1101  
 
Whilst as described in Chapter 3, the decision itself to remove a judge is indeed political, it also 
needs to ensure due process.1102 However, TLC1 argued that the process “is not something 
                                                 
1092 The word used here in Spanish was desnaturalizado, which means denatured, perverted, distorted, or altered.  
1093 Interview TJ3+4, line 60. 
1094 Interview TJ3+4, lines 63-64. 
1095 Interview TJ5, lines 338-339. 
1096 Interview TJ5, lines 340-341. 
1097 Interview TJ5, lines 346-348. 
1098 Interview TL3, lines 139-141. See also Interview TL3, lines 314-317: “It seems to me that the key… to the system 
is the independence of the body, that this body really is an independent body and judges in accordance to the 
law. That does not happen. It is very permeated by politics, very influenced by politics”. 
1099 Interview TLC1, lines 307-308. 
1100 Interview TLC1, lines 265-267. 
1101 Interview TLC1, lines 267-271. 
1102 See Section 3.3. 
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strictly juridical”,1103 explaining that the “function of the commission is to accuse”. TLC1 
explained that as it is a “prosecuting commission”, it is not their role to ensure a fair trial for the 
judge. “The margin of defence is limited” at that stage of the process,1104 (s)he explained. A 
judge’s defence “can be heard [in order] to have the other side [of the argument], but no, no, 
the right of defence acquires its fullness within the framework of the impeachment” TLC1 
clarified, referring to a possible trial before an IJ.1105 However, as explained by TL1, whilst “the 
system functions in ultima ratio, because there is the instance of going to the Supreme Court and 
of revoking the decision by the political power”, this takes a lot of time and there are many 
consequences for the life of a judge in the meantime. 1106  
 
The process against the Verón judges was used as an example of the lack of due process at the 
initial stage of the process: TJ2 explained that “there were no guarantees at all” in that 
process.1107 As at federal and ACBA levels however, it is worth noting however that many of the 
formalities prescribed by the law appear to have been adhered to: The Verón judges were 
notified of the complaint against them in a timely manner, and they were given the ten days 
prescribed by law to submit a defence.1108 TJ3+4 did argue that ten days is not a lot of time to 
provide a well written defence in big and complex cases,1109 however TLC1 defended the 
regulation, saying that “the timeframes are short… because it is believed that one cannot submit 
a person to a long process of this kind…. Because it is an ailment for a person who is exercising 
the [judicial] function and additionally have a complaint. It makes [them] exercise [the judicial 
function] in a different manner”.1110  
 
TJ3+4 however explained that the evidence which the Verón judges presented in their defence 
was not considered during initial hearing of the Commission,1111 and that the Commission made 
                                                 
1103 Interview TLC1, lines 268-269. 
1104 Interview TLC1, lines 178-179. 
1105 Interview TLC1, lines 180-181. 
1106 Interview TL1, lines 720-722. 
1107 Interview TJ2, lines 176-178. 
1108 Interview TJ3+4, lines 134-143. 
1109 Interview TJ3+4, lines 140-141. 
1110 Interview TLC1, lines 138-143. 
1111 Interview TJ3+4, lines 87-89. 
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the decision to accuse the judges before a jury “without having minimally, or in the amount of 
detail the seriousness of the situation called for, having analysed the defence [of the judges]”.1112  
Indeed, the mere speed with which the Commission reached the decision to accuse the judges 
demonstrated that the evidence had not been considered:1113 TJ3+4 explained that the Verón 
trial had developed over nine months, and was made up of over forty files of two hundred pages 
each in addition to the daily memorandums which explained how the trial developed, which was 
“very dense and voluminous”.1114 TJ3+4 explained that it would have been “impossible” for all of 
the member of the Commission to all familiarise themselves with these materials in the little time 
it took to move forward with the complaint.1115  
 
The speed with which the Commission dealt with the Verón case, its lack of detailed 
consideration of the judges’ defence, and the lack of an impartial decision can be partially 
explained by the understanding that the PIC has of its function, as described by TLC1: that it is 
not its role to impartially assess the evidence, nor to review judicial material, rather simply to see 
whether the allegations match with one of the reasons for removal of a judge listed in the law. 
Its view of itself as a political prosecutor, representing the interests of the people, may also 
partially explain why it reacts to public and media demands for a trial. This view is problematic 
however, because as TLC1 pointed out, “the accusation needs to be technically solid, it needs to 
have factual grounds”,1116 and therefore there has to be a careful assessment of the facts, 
including those presented by the defence. That PIC decisions can be affected by partisan politics 
is also problematic where cases do not go to a jury, which as TLC1 confirmed, as are the 
majority.1117  
 
6.2.5 Transparency of Proceedings 
Beyond examples such as the case of Judge Freidenberg or the Verón judges, the fact that the 
Commission gives participants the feeling of being partial, may be intensified or justified by the 
lack of transparency with which the Commission work. Whilst TJ2 pointed out that it is difficult 
                                                 
1112 Interview TJ3+4, lines 81-82. 
1113 Interview TO1, lines 289-310; Interview TL4, lines 89-94; Interview TL3, lines 202-203. 
1114 Interview TJ3+4, lines 177-188. 
1115 Interview TJ3+4, lines 177-188. 
1116 Interview TLC1, lines 198-200. 
1117 Interview TLC1, lines 11-12. 
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to make generalisations given that most cases are rejected and only a few have advanced to the 
stage of investigation,1118 (s)he explained that: 
 
My feeling is that in general, unfortunately… politicians act in accordance with interests, 
if they do not want something to be known… if they want to stop a judge because he is 
not functional to them, they will not allow the press to enter, the public to enter, they will 
manage it under lock and key; that is the truth.1119  
 
TJ2 explained that even in the Verón case, “there was no transparency. On the contrary, the 
Commission… decided that the meetings of the commission would be private”, and that no press 
was allowed.1120 
 
 Indeed, TLC1 confirmed that that the investigations and commission meeting are “generally very 
reserved”, 1121 except where oral evidence is taken, which is done publicly.1122 “This is not to 
conceal anything” TLC1 explained, “but rather so that it stays within the commission”.1123 Whilst 
this could be argued to partially shield the process from public pressure, the process is still being 
carried out by legislators who are not shielded from political, and therefore also public pressure. 
It is more likely that this secretiveness is used as a shield, not for the judges, but rather for the 
politicians. Indeed, TL2 pointed to the fact that historically the meetings of the Impeachment 
Commission of the National Congress (which still has the power to impeach national Supreme 
Court justices) were conducted in private but that this rule had been rightly abandoned at the 
turn of the century.1124 
 
6.3 Judicial Removal Proceedings before the Impeachment Jury of Tucuman 
At the time of conducting the interviews in Tucuman in October 2014, there had never been a 
hearing before the provincial IJ. Participants were therefore clearly not able to comment on the 
                                                 
1118 Interview TJ2, lines 237-238. 
1119 Interview TJ2, lines 274-278. 
1120 Interview TJ2, lines 264-267. 
1121 Interview TLC1, line 161. 
1122 Interview TLC1, lines 286-287. 
1123 Interview TLC1, line 163. 
1124 Interview TL2, lines 387-402. 
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way that this jury works in practice,1125 however some did give their opinion on its composition 
and on the fears that they have about what may happen in practice as a result. As TL3 explained: 
“the way it is composed… makes me doubt what its performance will be”.1126 TJ1 explained that 
the Association of Lawyers of Tucuman argued that the District Attorney, who is the legal 
representative of the province of Tucuman, should not sit on the Jury given that he “is the 
defendant in a great deal of the cases” before the Administrative Court.1127 It is argued that in 
the case of an impeachment hearing of one of the judges of this court, this would represent a 
conflict of interests for the District Attorney.  
 
TJ5 further specified that “the composition [of the jury] is uneven”1128 as “the legislative power 
and the executive power are in the majority”.1129 TJ5 was therefore of the view that more lawyers 
and judges should be represented on the jury in order to avoid politically motivated [partisan] 
removals.1130 As is the case on the FJC however, whether or not members respond to partisan 
interests does not solely depend on what sector they represent. As TO1 explained, “the 
composition can change in terms of [what] sectors [are represented and in what proportions], 
but the formal and informal institutional guiding principles that guide decisions will always be 
the same”.1131 In this sense, TJ1 explained that the jury at the time had “a composition that is 
almost wholly oficialista”,1132 although (s)he admitted that (s)he cannot recall the precise ratio 
of governing party to opposition members as “the truth is that we are in quite a bit of denial 
about this institution”.1133  
 
TJ3+4 gave the example of the jury in the Verón case as being “integrated by a majority of the 
government of the day”.1134 Of the six juror only two did not respond to the government’s 
interests according to TJ3+4: “an opposition legislator, and a member of the association of 
lawyers”.1135 “But the other four: there were three legislators from the governing party, and the 
                                                 
1125 Interview TJ5, lines 140-141; Interview TL3, lines 309-310. 
1126 Interview TL3, lines 310-311. 
1127 Interview TJ1, lines 24-30. 
1128 Interview TJ5, line 258. 
1129 Interview TJ5, lines 260-261. 
1130 Interview TJ5, lines 263-265. 
1131 Interview TO1, lines 340-342. 
1132 Interview TJ1, lines 113-115. 
1133 Interview TJ1, lines 117-118. 
1134 Interview TJ3+4, line 73. 
1135 Interview TJ3+4, line 75. 
Page 224 of 366 
 
president [of the Jury] who is also a member of the Supreme Court, but who had been an official 
of the executive power”.1136 TJ5 also was of the opinion that the jury was not impartial, “because 
if it were, the complaint [against the Verón judges] would have been rejected at the start, and 
the two judges would not have had to resign”.1137 
 
In summary, in contrast to the FJC and the ACBA, the IJ in Tucuman is perceived to respond to 
the interests of the government of the day. As TO1 put it, “there are no surprise decisions or 
outcomes: everything is known beforehand, everything is discussed”.1138 “There is a greater level 
of sophistication in the political negotiations” at the level of the jury, TO1 explained,1139 and “a 
direct dialogue with the government, with stakeholders”.1140 As TL3 agreed, “if I let myself be 
guided by the way in which the legislature works, I would say that the jury, it is very likely that it 
has the same behaviour, maybe a little less due to how it is composed, but I do not have much 
hope that it will function objectively”.1141   
 
TL2 however argued that the impartiality of the provincial IJ is largely irrelevant, as at the federal 
level: “in the light of the independence of judges, the impeachment tribunals [both federal and 
provincial], have demonstrated not to have any efficiency over the system”.1142 TL2 explained 
that the cases that reach the impeachment tribunal are “marginal residuals”, and that the large 
majority of control [over the judiciary] dies in the political dispute, finishes there”. TL2 explained 
that whatever justice could potentially be restored by an IJ is unhelpful as “it is like a health 
system where everyone dies, and they say, but there is a good doctor at the end of the corridor, 
which maybe one patient reaches and is cured, but statistically” it is irrelevant.1143   
 
Expanding on this further, TO1 explained that there may be reasons for few cases reaching the 
IJL: “the IJ also exercises pressure on the legislative commission”1144 to avoid being the ones who 
                                                 
1136 Interview TJ3+4, lines 76-78. 
1137 Interview TJ5, lines 148-150. 
1138 Interview TO1, lines 359-360. 
1139 Interview TO1, line 358. 
1140 Interview TO1, lines 355-356. 
1141 Interview TL3 lines 317-319. 
1142 Interview TL2, lines 337-378. 
1143 Interview TL2, lines 371-373. 
1144 Interview TO1, lines 343-344. 
Page 225 of 366 
 
have to “decide hot potatoes”;1145 “Unless they can be converted into the heroes” in a case where 
“the society wants heavy-handedness”, 1146 and they can say “we will get rid of these garantista 
judges”.1147 TO1 also explained that the jury may try to time their decisions in accordance with 
other events such as elections or football tournaments which may partially determine how much 
media coverage a decision gets, and therefore the political impact of a decision.1148  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
Many of the problems that exist in the JC at the Federal and ACBA levels are inexistent in the 
Tucuman PIC.  The PIC appears to work quickly, both in deciding on the admissibility of complaints 
and in investigating cases and deciding on whether to proceed before a jury. It also appears to 
comply with all of the procedural steps set out in the law, such as the timely notification of the 
judge, requesting a defence, and respecting time-limits. There do not appear to be any cases of 
‘shelving’ complaints against judges in order place pressure on them, and the decisions in the PIC 
are not subject to the same political and corporatist infighting that can be seen at the Federal 
and ACBA levels.  
 
It is however critical to note that the efficient functioning of the process in the PIC does not mean 
that it protects judicial independence better than the JC model at the Federal and ACBA levels. 
The reason why the PIC is not subject to the political ‘game of numbers’ witnessed in JCs is 
because the PIC is made up almost exclusively of legislators from the governing party, which 
means that there are no competing interests complicating the decision-making process. This has 
the potential to negatively affect judicial independence in several ways. It means that the 
governing party can make all decisions based on the interests of the government, without them 
being questioned by people with different views as part of the process. This is particularly 
problematic given a context of strict party control by the Governor: the legislators on the PIC 
were perceived to merely rubber-stamp the directives coming from above. Additionally, the lack 
                                                 
1145 Interview TO1, lines 344-346. 
1146 Interview TO1, lines 346-347. 
1147 Interview TO1, lines 347-348. Garantista is a popular term used, in essence, to describe judges (particularly 
criminal court judges) who protect or ‘guarantee’ the rights of the accused. The term is therefore used 
derogatively to indicate that judges are not tough enough on crime.  
1148 Interview TO1, lines 363-377. 
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of representation of a variety of interest groups may be detrimental to both the transparency 
and credibility of the process.  
 
These issues will surface mainly in cases that are of political interest. This appears to happen 
where there is popular demand to remove a judge, such as the emblematic cases of Judge 
Freidenberg and the judges of the Marita Verón case, all criminal court judges who had produced 
rulings that were seen as not being tough enough on crime, in a context of a society with high 
levels of violent crime. By removing these judges, the government can deflect criticism about 
crime away from the government, all whilst bringing the judiciary further under their control by 
creating fear amongst other judges that they too may face removal where they do not rule in 
accordance with the interests of the government.   
 
In cases such as these where the government pushes for the removal of a judge, the findings of 
this chapter suggest that there are serious violations of due process guarantees in the process 
before the PIC. It appears that where the government make a political decision that they want a 
judge to be removed, no one in the PIC pushes back against it, and the process is rushed through 
the bare minimum formalities in a way that does not allow time for due consideration of a judge’s 
defence, signalling a clear lack of impartiality in the decision-making of the PIC.  
 
This may partially be explained by a misconception of the role of the PIC as a “prosecuting 
commission” that does not need to afford the judge all of the rights of a legal proceeding; that 
where society is demanding answers, it is the PIC’s role to put the judge in question to trial. The 
participant from the PIC argued that the judge will get the chance to defend him/herself before 
the IJ. This echoes the arguments made by some participants at the Federal level, who viewed 
the JC’s role in a similar manner. The fact that the views of a variety of sectors and political parties 
are represented in the FJC however prevents judges having to face a jury trial where the 
government has a political interest in removing them. In Tucuman, the situation is such that 
judges can be put before a jury wherever the government wishes to do so. This is more troubling 
given the lack of credibility among legal professionals about the impartiality of the IJ in Tucuman. 
There is therefore a real fear amongst judges that the jury may remove judges based on partisan 
reasons.   
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Within this context, what is perhaps the most notable of all is the fact that very few judges are 
investigated by the PIC, and no judges were removed by the IJ since its creation in 2006. The 
explanation for this is critical to understanding the way in which the removals system impacts 
judicial independence: the government in Tucuman does not need to use investigations in the 
PIC as a way of placing pressure on judges. The fact that they have such great control over the 
process is already a constant threat that allows the government to place pressure on judges 
behind closed doors. Judges are generally only investigated where there is a real political interest 
in pushing all the way through to an actual removal. Within this context, it also makes sense that 
the PIC is good at protecting the judiciary in cases that are not of any political interests. The 
findings of this chapter suggest that in such routine cases, the PIC does not accept complaints 
against judges that are based merely on a disagreement with a judge’s ruling, or that are entirely 
unfounded. This finding fits in with the informal control the government has over the judiciary: 
they protect the judiciary as long as it plays by their rules.  
 
These findings confirm Hammergren’s observation that with the creation of JC’s in Latin America, 
the ‘old interests’ that had control of their judges would seek ways to exert their influence in the 
JC in order to keep their control over judges. However, the advantages of moving the control of 
these processes to a JC, can be clearly seen by comparing the experiences in Tucuman with the 
Federal level. First of all, it brings attempts to control the judiciary into a forum where there is 
greater transparency about what is happening, and second the multi-sectorial nature of the JC 
lessens the control of any one interest group over the process, giving judges a greater degree of 
security. In Tucuman, the influence that is placed over the judiciary takes place not in the PIC, 
but behind closed doors, which makes the problem a lot harder to address. Additionally, the 
threat of facing a trial before the IJ where a judge displeases the government is real, making that 
informal pressure all the more effective in this particular context.  
 
As was the case for the FJC, the PIC is also deemed to reject complaints against judges that it 
wishes to protect outright, which may further encourage judges in Tucuman to place themselves 
under the protective umbrella of the government.  It may also make some judges feel that they 
can accept under-the-table bribes and orders from officials knowing that they will never be 
investigated. The PIC was accused of using an apparent confusion over whether or not a judge’s 
ruling can be used in judicial removals processes in order to use the rule in whatever way suits 
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them best in the context: using it as an excuse for not accepting complaints against judges they 
wish to protect, and claiming that the ruling demonstrates malperformance where they wish to 
investigate a judge. 
 
This context of under the table political pressure on the judiciary also has knock-on effects that 
deepens the problem: It is extremely difficult to obtain evidence of such pressure being placed 
on judges and witnesses are reluctant to come forward either due to justified fear of retaliation, 
knowing that the judge will never be removed for ruling in line with government interests, or due 
to a belief that lawyers cannot complain about behaviour that they have tacitly accepted or 
openly endorsed. As at the federal level, it is also seen as pointless, and potentially even harmful 
to oneself, to file a complaint against a judge that is protected by the government. The only 
reason for doing so would be to file a complaint for the media impact that news of a complaint 
would have. The press in Tucuman is widely considered independent and critical of the 
government, so that news of complaints made would get good coverage which may be beneficial 
for NGOs seeking to do “blaming and shaming”, or opposition politicians looking to delegitimise 
the image of the governing party.  
  
In conclusion, whilst the process before a PIC follows a procedure that complies with many due 
process requirements, such as notifying a judge of a complaint and requesting his defence, and 
going through this process quickly in order to avoid adverse consequences on the judge’s career, 
the findings of this research suggest that the PIC is widely viewed as lacking impartiality and that 
it fails to undertake a thorough and fair evaluation of a judge’s conduct in cases before it. Judges 
believe that the PIC is simply a vehicle that the Governor can use at his discretion to put judges 
before a Jury where he wishes to do so, and protect judges who do not cause him any problems. 
This creates fear among judges that can be used as a way to place pressure on them informally 
thus negatively impacting judicial independence. It is also not sufficient to argue that a judge has 
the chance to defend himself before a jury, both because a jury trial is a highly public and 
disruptive process that judges would wish to avoid, and because of the lack of trust in the 
impartiality of the TIJ. These findings therefore further support the view that it is important for 
due process to be guaranteed at all stages of the removals process, not only during the trial 
before a jury. 
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It is important to note that the lack of due process in the early stages of the removals process is 
as damaging to judicial accountability as it is to judicial independence. Therefore the argument 
that the PIC is simply representing the cries in society for more judicial accountability does not 
justify the means: where there are real grounds to remove a judge, accountability would only be 
served by a proper and transparent investigation into those grounds, and is necessary if the judge 
is to be removed in a credible manner that would be upheld on appeal. Indeed, better 
accountability would appear to be a crucial factor in promoting the fair and impartial provision 
of judicial services in the province.  
 
The findings of these last two chapters demonstrate that there are several contextual factors 
including a desire by governments to control the judiciary, a distrust of accountability processes 
within the judiciary, and a lack of credibility of both these processes and judiciaries that are 
affecting the ability of removals processes to protect judicial independence and accountability. 
In order to better understand these contextual challenges and their effect on removals 
processes, Chapter 7 shall further examine the topics that emerged during discussions with 
participants to look more closely at the context of the removals processes in Tucuman, the ACBA, 
and at the Federal level, including the role the media plays in removal proceedings,  the nature 
of the political interest in the removals proceeding, other ways in which politicians attempt to 
place pressure on or ‘discipline’ judges, and the levels of judicial independence in each 
jurisdiction. Chapter 8 will then draw these observations together to assess the advantages of 
the JC model of removals at the Federal and ACBA levels in protecting judicial independence from 
external interests, and make recommendations as to ways in which the process could be 
strengthened. .  
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Chapter 7: Research Findings and Discussion (Part 3): The Context of 
Judicial Removals Processes 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 analysed the interview data on what happens at each stage of the judicial 
removals process, as conducted by JCs and a legislative committee respectively. Those chapters 
concluded that interests other than the protection of judicial independence and accountability, 
in particular partisan politics, and to some extent judicial corporatism, have an influence over the 
processes to a greater or lesser extent in all three jurisdictions. Using interview data, this chapter 
therefore considers these contextual factors in more depth, to gain a better understanding of 
their nature.  
 
The chapter explores the interview material about the wider context that arose in part as 
participants responded to specific questions that the researcher posed about the wider context, 
but that also arose in large part as participants responded to questions about the removals 
process itself. These issues included the ways in which judicial independence and accountability 
are viewed by politicians, judges, and civil society, and how this translates into contextual 
challenges such as the government’s attitude towards the judiciary, judges’ attitudes toward 
accountability, and whether civil society and the media can counter-balance the politicization of 
the process. Differences in the context at the Federal, ACBA, and Tucuman levels are also 
identified to further explain differences in the findings in each jurisdiction. 
 
In terms of specific questions, the researcher asked participants in all three jurisdictions whether 
there were any ways apart from the formal removals process which were used in practice to 
“discipline” judges. As a way of opening a conversation about the wider context, the researcher 
also asked participants about the 2013 judicial reforms and what they understood by the term 
“democratization of the judiciary”. As a way of further exploring a “democratization” of the 
judiciary, the researcher also asked participants for their views on the role of civil society in 
monitoring judges, and whether an institutionalised role for civil society in removals processes 
may help to counter-act the politicization of the process.1149  
  
                                                 
1149 See Section 4.4 for a discussion of the content of the interviews.  
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The political context – threats to judicial independence coming from the government – in each 
jurisdiction is considered separately at the start of the chapter (Section 7.2 at the Federal level, 
Section 7.3 at the ACBA level and Section 7.4 for Tucuman). Sections 7.5 then looks at the other 
side of the coin: the judiciary’s attitude towards accountability, considering any differences 
between jurisdictions. Further contextual factors such as a lack of institutionalisation (Section 
7.6), the effect of the media on judicial independence and accountability (Section 7.7), and media 
and societal overview of judicial removals processes (Section 7.8), are also considered jointly, 
with any differences in jurisdictions being pointed out.  
 
7.2 Wider Trend of Attempts to “Discipline” Judges at the Federal Level  
All federal judges and lawyers interviewed were asked whether there were ways that judges are 
“disciplined” in practice, other than filing complaints before the FJC. FJ3 and FJ4 answered clearly 
that yes, there are other attempts to “discipline” judges.1150 When asked what form such 
discipline could take, FJ3 answered: “the question how judges can be disciplined outside of the 
institutions – there we are already beyond the law. We are completely beyond the law. Well, in 
actions beyond the law – it depends on creativity! …And there is a lot of creativity! A lot!”1151 This 
section sets out such attempts, including telling judges what to decide in cases before them, 
publicly discrediting and intimidating judges, attempts to appoint “friend” judges, and legal 
reforms aimed to make it easier for the government to control judges. The 2013 judicial reforms 
and the attempted “democratization” of the judiciary are also explored.  
 
7.2.1 Attempts to Undermine Impartiality 
FJ5 explained that “the thing is that there is a whole culture in Argentina, [that every political 
power] that comes, tries to have its friend judges”.1152 Four judges raised the issue of members 
of the government telephoning judges who are deciding cases that interest them to let the judge 
know what they would like the outcome of the case to be. As FJ3 explained, they will “call [the 
judge] or perhaps offer him a position, or maybe a bit higher up or in another location”.1153 FJ1 
                                                 
1150 Interview FJ3, line 154; Interview FJ4, line 109. 
1151 Interview FJ3, lines 163-166. 
1152 Interview FJ5, lines 521-522. 
1153 Interview FJ3, lines 214-215. 
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explained that such attempts are kept hidden as in Argentina “there is a tradition whereby judges 
should be very independent”, and that therefore any influence that is placed on a judge is always 
“under the table, never on the table”.1154 FJ5 said that (s)he had personally experienced this,1155 
and when (s)he made it clear that (s)he would not be influenced in this way, “they never called 
again”, because they (the government) know whom they can influence and whom they 
cannot.1156 FJ5 however explained that “many [judges] cede to a telephone call because they are 
afraid, or for convenience”.1157   
 
For those that do not bend to the will of the government, who do not cooperate, the government 
turns to other, more public, methods of attempting to influence the judges. The “system” then, 
explained FJ5, is one of systematic complaints to the JC.1158 Public manifestations aimed at 
placing pressure on judges are also sometimes organised: “there were even attempts to put 
pressure on the Supreme Court by way of manifestations and insults in front of the Supreme 
Court building” explained FJ1.1159 
 
7.2.2 Monitoring Judges 
The monitoring of judges by the government was mentioned in two ways. The first was by way 
of a formal procedure that supposedly monitors the productivity of courts, but that is used as a 
way of placing pressure on judges: “At the moment, what is called Management Control is used 
a lot” explained FJ3, “but ultimately, instead of being Management Control, it is a type of 
investigation that tends to put pressure on the judge and conditions him/her.”1160 The other type 
of monitoring which judges claimed takes place is one which is conducted without the judge’s 
knowledge, in order to gather information on the judge that may be used against him/her or to 
intimidate him/her if and when the government wishes to do so. FJ2 claimed for example that 
his/her telephone is tapped, which is “a constant threat”.1161 FJ2 explained that there is nothing 
                                                 
1154 Interview FJ1, lines 25-29. 
1155 I did not ask the judges who did not volunteer this information whether or not they had experienced this, so it 
is possible that some of the other judges interviewed may also have experienced this. 
1156 Interview FJ5, lines 299-301. 
1157 Interview FJ5, lines 296-299. 
1158 Interview FJ5, lines 301-302. 
1159 Interview FJ1, lines 342-343. 
1160 Interview FJ3, lines 183-185. 
1161 Interview FJ2, lines 300-301. 
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that (s)he can do about it as “it is impossible to prove”.1162FJ3 also explained that in order to 
informally “discipline” judges, the government “uses information that is obtained perhaps from 
the Intelligence Services”.1163 
 
7.2.3 Discrediting and Intimidating Judges 
FJ3 explained that there are many ways in which attempts are made to publicly discredit judges 
who do not bend to the will of the government. These included the use of “false recordings, 
altered… recordings of telephone [conversations]… or some conversation”,1164 and 
“photographs”.1165 In addition to publicly attacking the persona of the judge, judges may also be 
intimidated in person. FJ3 explained that the government may threaten: “we will send the 
AFIP1166 to you… or we will send them to your sons/daughters”.1167 An emblematic cases of a 
judge being threatened is that of Judge Maria José Sarmiento, who emitted an injunction 
preventing the government from accessing reserve funds of the Central Bank without the prior 
approval that was required by law from the legislature.1168 As a judge ruling on important issue 
for the government, Judge Sarmiento has explained that she is frequently the target for 
pressure.1169 In this case, the government tried to deliver documents to her private home on the 
weekend and kept a police car parked outside of her home. Judge Sarmiento felt afraid and 
therefore called the media as a way of protecting herself.1170  
 
                                                 
1162 Interview FJ2, lines 303-305. 
1163 Interview FJ3, lines 170-171. 
1164 Interview FJ3, lines 173-177. 
1165 Interview FJ3, line 173. 
1166 The AFIP (Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos) is the revenue service in Argentina. 
1167 Interview FJ3, lines 185-187. 
1168 La Nación, ‘María José Sarmiento, la Jueza Que le Puso un Freno al Poder K’ La Nación (17 January 2010) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/maria-jose-sarmiento-la-jueza-que-le-puso-un-freno-al-poder-k-nid1222532> 
accessed 20 June 2019. 
1169 See for example La Nación, ‘”La Gente me Felicita Por la Calle”, Dijo la Jueza Sarmiento’ La Nación (15 January 
2010) <www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/la-gente-me-felicita-por-la-calle-dijo-la-jueza-sarmiento-nid1222480> 
accessed 20 June 2019, which quotes Judges Sarmiento saying “I have had several requests for my removal, but 
none of them prospered”. She was also quoted as explaining that in the Federal Contentious Administrative 
Court, they are “used to that” because they deal with “cases of certain reverberations”.  
1170 La Nación, ‘María José Sarmiento, la Jueza Que le Puso un Freno al poder K’ La Nación (17 January 2010) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/maria-jose-sarmiento-la-jueza-que-le-puso-un-freno-al-poder-k-nid1222532> 
accessed 20 June 2019. This article quotes Judge Sarmiento saying “I felt afraid for my family”. See also La 
Nación, ‘La Jueza Sarmiento No Se Volcará a la Política’ La Nación (16 January 2010) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/la-jueza-sarmiento-no-se-volcara-a-la-politica-nid1222679> accessed 20 June 
2019.  
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Judge Sarmiento was lauded for being very brave for standing up to the government.1171 In 
response, the government attempted to discredit her, looking into her father who was part of 
the military during the military dictatorship.1172 Later on, Judge Sarmiento ran as a substitute for 
a representative in the JC – a low-level position – and her list won. Shortly thereafter, her 
husband, who also works for the State, lost his job, without any warning or explanation.1173 He 
brought a case for wrongful dismissal, which he won, but the court case took several months.1174 
FJ4 explained that “they [the government] do things without grounds, without anything. They 
know they will lose afterwards, but they accomplished their goal, to disrupt, to frighten”,1175 and 
moreover, seeing what happened to Judge Sarmiento, explained FJ4, “everyone started to be 
more afraid, which was the idea”.1176  
 
FJ2 agreed: “here, often when they hit a judge, it is not only to hit that judge, but also as an 
example for us – ‘careful, because the same will happen to you’ – and that is also a form of 
discipline”.1177 FJ2 explained that many judges will families will think “I cannot expose myself to 
being kicked out, because I will be left without work”.1178 FJ2 therefore spoke of the “courage”1179 
and “moral strength”1180 that is necessary for a judge to resist such pressure and intimidation, 
and that “some of us have it… and others, no. That’s the problem. Therefore, there are many that 
are susceptible to pressure.1181 Or they are scared!”1182 
                                                 
1171 La Nación, ‘”La Gente Me Felicita Por la Calle”, Dijo la Jueza Sarmiento’ La Nación (15 January 2010) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/la-gente-me-felicita-por-la-calle-dijo-la-jueza-sarmiento-nid1222480> accessed 
20 June 2019.  
1172 Clarín, ‘La Justicia de Misiones Ordenó a Detención del Padre de la Jueza Sarmiento’ Clarín (19 March 2010) 
<www.clarin.com/economia/Justicia-Misiones-ordeno-detencion-Sarmiento_0_Sk4VjdzCw7e.html> accessed 
22 September 2019. 
1173 La Nación, ‘Desplazan al Marido de la Jueza Sarmiento’ La Nación (1 October 2010) 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/desplazan-al-marido-de-la-jueza-sarmiento-nid1310052> accessed 21 June 
2019.  
1174 See Disposición 49/2011, Administración Federal de Ingresos Publicos: Subizar Isidoro y Otro (BO del 
04/03/2011), 50, ordering the reinstatement of Judge Sarmiento’s husband, Isidoro Subizar, following 
judgements of the employment courts of first instance and of appeal.  
1175 Interview FJ4, lines 143-144. 
1176 Interview FJ4, lines 144-145. 
1177 Interview FJ2, lines 355-357. 
1178 Interview FJ2, lines 362-363. 
1179 Interview FJ2, line 365. 
1180 Interview FJ2, line 359. 
1181 The Spanish term that has been translated here as ‘susceptible to pressure’ is presionable. ‘Impressionable’ 
may be another way to translate this.  
1182 Interview FJ2, lines 365-367. 
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7.2.4 Appointing Acting Judges 
Perhaps due to the inability to influence the appointment procedures (also handled by the FJC) 
as much as they would wish,1183 another way in which the government exerts its influence is by 
blocking nominations for new judges when vacancies arise. In order to deal with the extra 
workload that is left on the remaining judges due to the vacancies that are not filled, the courts 
appoint temporary acting judges. These acting judges are often court secretaries who have not 
yet completed the selection process to become judges. Acting judges do not have the same 
guarantees as regular judges and therefore can be removed at a moment’s notice.1184 Therefore, 
as FJ4 explained, “they can’t decide anything [they want], because afterwards they may fail the 
competition [to become a judge] and it’s over. That is to say, there is zero independence”.1185 
FJC3 mentioned the same problem, saying that to fill a judicial vacancy “takes on average a 
minimum of 4 years”.1186 In November of 2015, this problem had become so pronounced that 
approximately a quarter of all federal judicial posts were vacant.1187 Usually acting judges were 
appointed to cover these roles, with permanent appointments being the exception.1188 
 
7.2.5 Modifications of the Law 
FJ3 mentioned threats by the government to implement tighter “controls” over the judiciary: 
another method “which has started to be used, is the modification of the constitution, or of the 
laws on procedure. So, they tell judges “every three years, we will examine you”. You will have 
to take exams. Well, that is a form of conditioning, to have them conditioned.”1189 FJ5 explained 
that other laws were aimed at reducing the amount of power that judges held: (s)he explained 
changes in the legal system that were taking place, which follow an Anglo-Saxon model by taking 
investigative power away from judges and giving it to prosecutors. The judge explained that in 
theory (s)he agrees with this reform, but (s)he believes that in the current political context, “it is 
                                                 
1183 See Section 7.2.6 for an example of this.  
1184 The law regulating the appointment of these judges was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court a year 
after the interviews for this thesis were conducted. Uriarte, Rodolfo Marcelo y otro c/ Consejo de la 
Magistratura de la Nación s/ Acción Mere Declarativa de Inconstitucionalidad, Fallos 338:1216.  
1185 Interview FJ4, lines 234-243. 
1186 Interview FJC3, lines 230-231. 
1187Centro de Información Judicial, ‘La Corte Suprema Declaró por Unanimidad la Inconstitucionalidad de la Ley de 
Jueces Subrogantes’ CIJ (4 November 2015) <www.cij.gov.ar/nota-18819-La-Corte-Suprema-declar--por-
unanimidad-la-inconstitucionalidad-de-la-ley-de-jueces-subrogantes.html> accessed 22 September 2019. 
1188 ibid. 
1189 Interview FJ3, lines 191-194. 
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done in reality to take power away from judges, over whom they do not have control, and give it 
to prosecutors over who they do have control”.1190 
 
7.2.6 Intimidation of JC Councillors  
Members of the JC explained that political pressure was placed not only on judges but on 
councillors as well. One emblematic incidence of this was in 2012-2013, at the time of the court 
case between the government and media-conglomerate Clarín.1191 There were several vacancies 
in the court that was to hear the Clarín case, and the government tried to push through new 
judicial nominations, including, “I will say it in a soft way, people which inspired confidence in 
them” explained FJC3.1192 However, the government did not have the necessary majority in the 
JC to approve these nominations, and the lack of agreement between councillors on this issue 
caused a grid-lock in all decision-making in the JC for one and a half years.1193 At the time the 
plenary of the JC was meant to decide on these judicial appointments, the Minister of Justice of 
the Nation gave a press conference in front of the JC, threatening the councillors who were seen 
to be blocking the appointment of these judges.1194 In late 2012, five councillors of the JC were 
accused of abuse of power in carrying out a public function, supposedly by blocking the decision-
making process in the JC.1195 The councillors ultimately won their case, after a year in the criminal 
courts. 1196 
 
Following these events, President Fernandez publicly stated that what had happened in the JC 
was shameful, that lawyers have “little crowns” (some of the councillors accused were lawyers) 
for thinking that they could block the will of the rest of the councillors.1197 On the basis of 
discrediting the behaviour of the councillors who would not support the judicial nominations 
pushed by the government, the President also took the opportunity to argue that the lawyers in 
the JC should not be elected by other lawyers, but rather by the public in general, which was one 
                                                 
1190 Interview FJ5, lines 393-396. 
1191 See Section 2.2.3. 
1192 Interview FJC3, lines 373-378. 
1193 Interview FJC3, lines 235-245. 
1194 Interview FJC3, lines 378-393. 
1195 Interview FJC3, lines 393-395. 
1196 Interview FJC3, lines 400-401. 
1197 Interview FJC3, lines 405-413. 
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of the changes brought in (and declared unconstitutional) by the 2013 judicial reforms.1198 “This 
was the origin… of the [judicial] reform”, of 2013, explained FJC3.1199  
 
7.2.7 “Democratization” of the Judiciary 
When asked the term “democratization” of the judiciary as used by the President and the 
governing party means, FO3 summarised the reaction of most participants, saying “the short 
answer is: I don’t know what they are talking about!”1200 FJ2 was not as subtle: “this about the 
democratization of the judiciary… is for the gullible masses, it’s playing to the gallery”.1201 The 
term “democratization” has a positive connotation, “like a bath of holiness” explained FJ2, and 
couched in these terms, it was easier for the reform to secure popular support. 1202 In addition, 
the low approval ratings and problems pervading the judiciary1203 lent an unfortunate credibility 
to the proposed reforms. As FO1 put it: “On the basis of certain correct diagnostic, a proposal 
was constructed that deepened the problems of the diagnosis instead of resolving them.”1204 FJ4 
agreed that the 2013 reforms did not achieve these goals, that “the democratization of the 
judiciary: we still have not seen it”.1205 “I do not see in practice that these debates… aim to 
concretely improve the system” BAJ5 explained, “which does not mean that the debate in itself 
isn’t well suggested”.1206 
                                                 
1198 La Nación, ‘Cristina: “Ni Los Jueces Ni Abogados Tienen Coronita Para Ser Elegidos Entre Ellos” La Nación (4 
March 2013) <www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/cristina-ni-los-jueces-ni-abogados-tienen-coronita-para-ser-
elegidos-entre-ellos-nid1559960> accessed 22 September 2019. 
1199 Interview FJC3, lines 242-243. 
1200 Interview FO3, line 351. 
1201 Interview FJ2, lines 574-575. Other participants said: it is “a pompous name that is attractive for the media” 
(Interview FJ3, line 233-234); “this whole process seems to me to be more political, more about exhibition than 
anything else” (Interview BAL1, line 214); “the so-called democratization of the judiciary… only has a political 
aim. There is no such democratization of the judiciary” (Interview BAL1, lines 227-228); “It was publicised as if it 
was democratising, but in reality it did not democratise, rather completely the opposite” (Interview FJC4, lines 
266-267); “the projects and laws that were presented and were approved under the idea of democratization of 
the judiciary… I did not find in them any significant relevance in terms of democracy” (Interview FO3, lines 352-
354). 
1202 Interview FJ2, line 502. The judge also gave other examples of the current governing party using such slogans, 
such as “patria o buitres” (motherland or vultures) in reference to Argentina’s 2014 dispute over its sovereign 
debt with vulture funds, and which turns the debate and loyalties into a mutually exclusive binary. 
1203 See Section 2.2.3. 
1204 Interview FO1, lines 371-373. See also Interview FO3, lines 365-371: “A series of possibilities of participation, 
accountability, transparency, access to information, [all of which] I do understand as being associated with the 
idea of democratising the institutional system, where not there, where not the object of any proposal nor 
reform nor anything of the style…. This is not to say that the diagnosis that the Argentine judicial system 
functions in a very opaque manner is incorrect”. 
1205 Interview FJ4, line 264. 
1206 Interview BAJ5, lines 465-467. 
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The real reason for the reforms, participants claimed, was that “the Kirchnerism1207 wants to put 
its judges in place”:1208 “to try to incorporate into the judiciary… the greatest quantity of judges 
who agree with or share the ideology of the governing political party”,1209 “so that when the 
current political power is no longer in place, it doesn’t find too many cases against it”.1210 FJ5, 
however, pointed out that there is a “terribly substantial” error in trying to have “friend judges”, 
as “when a judge sells himself, in quotation marks, to the power… he sold himself to power, not 
to this power”.1211 The point being made, was that when the governing party changes, the 
“friend” judge will become loyal to the new governing party, and no longer protect the interests 
of the party that appointed them but that is no longer in power.  
 
As part of this effort, the government wanted political control over the JC: “to elect [councillors 
of the JC] by way of direct vote of the population in general, which would mean to increase even 
with the best intentions the political influence”1212 in the JC. Under the new reforms, councillors 
would be elected “not only in the same electoral year as the election of the President of the 
Nation, but also [councillors would be] presented by a political party, and included on the ballot 
of the political party.”1213 “We would have all been politicians” FJ2 exclaimed.1214  
 
“The word democratization is a particular political interpretation of a group who, what they 
wanted, was to make its electoral presence prevail” concluded FJ1.1215 In an election such as the 
2011 election where the governing party won 54% of the votes, “this would have meant that they 
could have had an absolute majority in the JC” explained FO2.1216 The problem with this, FO1 
                                                 
1207 El Kirchnerismo is a term used in Argentina to describe the political movement started by Nestor and Cristina 
Kirchner.  
1208 Interview FJ2, line 576. See also Interview FO4, lines 260-262: “basically the government what it wanted was to 
limit the federal judges, especially the federal judges which are not aligned with the government, which…are in 
the more conservative association of judges”. 
1209 Interview FL3, lines 278-280. See also Interview FJ4, lines 231-234. 
1210 Interview FL3, lines 286-287. 
1211 Interview FJ5, lines 524-525. 
1212 Interview FJ1, lines 51-52. See also Interview FJ2, lines 81-83: “the last reform… aimed at politicising to an 
incredible extreme the conformation of the Council”. 
1213 Interview FCJ3, lines 157-159. 
1214 Interview FJ2, lines 553-554. 
1215 Interview FJ1, lines 47-48. See also Interview FO2, lines 337-338: “they created between politics and judges a 
kind of communion that is completely undesirable”. 
1216 Interview FO2, lines 343-346. 
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explained was that “the judiciary should not be at the service of a circumstantial majority, rather 
in general to the contrary”.1217 “Sometimes”, FO1 added, “the service of democracy is confused 
with the service of the majority”.1218  
 
This goes against the original aim of the JC, argued FJC3, which was “to limit the possibility that 
the executive appoints people who are close to its own political or personal affinity, in order to 
give a more technical profile to the designation of judges”.1219 FJC3 argued that it doesn’t make 
sense for the legal or judicial representatives in the JC to be elected by a popular vote, as “for 
this there are the representatives of the people in the form of the political representation”.1220 
FO1 was less stringent about this, explaining that “I wouldn’t even… take a radical position with 
respect to whether or not [councillors] can be directly elected”.1221 The problem with the reform, 
FO1 explained, was that “the way in which it was to be implemented, guaranteed [the governing 
party] the majority [and to] control to its whims the Council in both the process for the selection 
of judges, and in the disciplinary processes”.1222 FJ2 further explained that even if they knew that 
the law would not ultimately succeed, even simply proposing these reforms may be threatening 
enough to have a disciplinary effect on judges. FJ2 explained that judges might think “[what] if 
the new Council comes… perhaps I’ll put myself under the protective umbrella [of the 
government] just in case”.1223 
 
Furthermore, as BAJ5 explained, a lot of harm can be done in the name of “democratization”.1224 
Behind the term “democratization” stands the assumption that judges are not accountable, but 
as FJ2 explained “a judge has to have immunity, not impunity”.1225 It was however easy for the 
government to make claims that judges have impunity, as “people look at the judiciary as an elite 
                                                 
1217 Interview FO1, lines 390+391. 
1218 Interview FO1, lines 379-380. 
1219 Interview FJC3, lines 150-152. 
1220 Interview FJC3, lines 173-175. See Interview FJC4, lines 267-271, for a similar opinion.  
1221 Interview FO1, lines 385-387. 
1222 Interview FO1, lines 387-389. See also Interview FO3, lines 357-358: “I saw grave risks for certain conditions of 
impartiality, and independence of the Argentine judicial system in some of the laws that were approved”, and 
lines 361-363: “the design of this project, was, unequivocally in my point of view, a design to subject the 
designation, removal, and control of judges to the mandate of the dominant political parties”. 
1223 Interview FJ2, lines 580-582. 
1224 Interview BAJ5, lines 467-469. 
1225 Interview FJ2, lines 586-587. 
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power, as a privileged class who are removed from what citizens suffer every day”.1226 By 
aggravating this, “what is generated is a level of criticism that is so unfounded, that what it 
provokes is anger and resistance in citizens”.1227 FJ2 explained that people may not understand 
why judges need to have permanent appointments, and many will think “how come I don’t have 
a job, and a judge, they give him one for life?”1228 FJ2 explained that this government slogan, that 
the judiciary is not “democratic” “is difficult to contradict”,1229 as the explanations “are very 
long”.1230 
 
7.3 Context at the ACBA Level  
In contrast, BAJ2 and BAJ5 claimed that they had never been approached by government to tell 
them how to rule.1231 BAJ2 also explained that:  
 
I know this from the majority of colleagues with whom I chat, the political power never 
came to say or demand…whether by way of corruption… by way of threats, of coercion, in 
none of these hypothesis the political power came to say that they want the decision to 
be rendered in this and that way.1232  
 
BAJ1 agreed that “the telephone rings many times much less than I had expected, and for 
reasonably justifiable reasons the times it has rung”.1233 In explaining the latter, BAJ1 said “there 
are calls that one answers, listens, and afterwards ones independence is not altered. There are 
other calls which are sometimes answered and they obfuscate you… you answer and they make 
you change opinion. Of this second list, I have not had any experience in this sense”.1234  
 
BAJ2 explained that the reason for the ACBA judiciary coming under less pressure from the 
government than the federal judiciary is 
                                                 
1226 Interview FJ3, lines 234-235. 
1227 Interview BAJ5, lines 486-487. 
1228 Interview FJ2, lines 518-526. 
1229 Interview FJ2, line 527. 
1230 Interview FJ2, line 519. 
1231 Interview BAJ2, lines 343-347; Interview BAJ5, lines 264-267. 
1232 Interview BAJ2, lines 343-347. 
1233 Interview BAJ1, lines 258-259. 
1234 Interview BAJ1, lines 263-266. 
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for a very simple reason… because of the structural differences between the national 
government and the government of the city…. The current President, is very interested… 
in controlling everything. The current chief of the government, is not interested in that. If 
they [the judiciary] decide against him, that they decide against him. It is a political 
question.1235  
 
FL1 agreed that “the spirit which the politicians of the city” had was to “accompany the new 
process”.1236 “That is why I think there was less politicization in the institutions” FL1 explained.1237 
However, criticism was not altogether absent. “It would be ideal if politics sought the best, not 
what benefits that political party” explained BAJ3, “but well, in reality, this does not happen, 
because they look for a judge not so much who will stand out in terms of aptitude, and who will 
be so ideal that he will be able if that party contravenes the law, resolve with the whole strength 
of the law, but they are not expecting that. They are expecting someone who is functional. It’s 
unfortunate.”1238  
 
7.4 Context of “Discipline” of Judges in the Province of Tucuman  
 
As explained by TL3, “we have a very strong tendency of the powers, of the executive power to 
get involved, influence on the judiciary”.1239 Speaking from experience, TJ1 agree that “we are, 
the court where I am, eh, very monitored by the political power”.1240 TJ1 explained that there are 
clear attempts by both the government and private companies1241 to buy favours with the judge 
in order to obtain favourable rulings.1242 TJ1 explained that “they try to entangle you, so that you 
are in a tangle from which you cannot escape anymore, of the commitments to issue rulings”.1243 
TJ1 therefore explained that the way a judge must respond “is a question of black and white; 
there are no greys here. You receive a credit offer from a bank [that is] very advantageous, you 
                                                 
1235 Interview BAJ2, lines 157-161. 
1236 Interview FL1, lines 317-318. 
1237 Interview FL1, lines 318-319. 
1238 Interview BAJ3, lines 140-144. 
1239 Interview TL3, lines 63-64. 
1240 Interview TJ1, lines 279-280. 
1241 Interview TJ1, lines 315-321. 
1242 Interview TJ1, lines 295-299. 
1243 Interview TJ1, lines 297-299. 
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cannot accept it. You have to go down the difficult path of not being able to accept it”,1244 
“because these are receipts that have to be paid afterwards”.1245 “You need to have your hands 
free so that no one collects on receipts” explained TJ1, “and you have to see under the water, 
because sometimes it is difficult to find the connection that can exist, or for the future, or 
whatever”.1246 “There must be a conviction, on the part off the judge, like, it’s hard, it’s a narrow 
path, for the judge and his family, no? Where you cannot be connected to lots of people” 
concluded TJ1.1247 
 
TJ5 agreed that “the judge should be independent, the judge should be trained to be 
independent… but in this moment, with so many pressures, with so many threats of removal 
etcetera, it is quite difficult”.1248 TJ5 further explained that usually, the pressure is placed on a 
judge by way of “a phone call” or “favours in return for some other guarantee”, but that “there 
are different ways to influence a person”.1249 TJ5 explained that the government places pressure 
selectively on those judges that are of interest to them, particularly “the criminal court, because 
at the moment, the truth is that there is so much state corruption, that each government has to 
ensure themselves that in the future the criminal judges that remain will not imprison those 
which have left [the government]”.1250 
 
TJ1 gave an example of “a case of a prosecutor whose daughter was driving without a license. 
She crashed - she didn’t hurt anyone, but she crashed - so they covered it in the newspapers… it 
is a way of making [the prosecutor] vulnerable”.1251 This prosecutor, specified TJ1, was 
investigating criminal charges against government officials – “there are many government 
officials with criminal investigations”1252 added TJ1 – and within this context, the fact that the 
police was investigating her daughter “is a way to pressure” the prosecutor.1253 TJ5 nonetheless 
                                                 
1244 Interview TJ1, lines 295-297. TJ1 gave several more examples of such offers: see lines 303-325. 
1245 Interview TJ1, lines 304-305. 
1246 Interview TJ1, lines 306-308. 
1247 Interview TJ1, lines 276-278. 
1248 Interview TJ5, lines 276-280. 
1249 Interview TJ5, lines 285-289. 
1250 Interview TJ5, lines 358-361. 
1251 Interview TJ1, lines 283-286. 
1252 Interview TJ1, lines 288-289. 
1253 Interview TJ1, lines 288-292. 
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specified that “there are many independent judges”, but that there are also “others which are 
not [independent]”.1254 
 
TJ1 also spoke of the burden place on judges to produce a huge amount of reports for the 
purposes of auditing the work of the courts.1255 TJ1 explained that that burden falls on the judges 
themselves, instead of on their administrators or external auditors.1256 This is a huge burden on 
a judge who has plenty of other work to do.1257 Whilst everyone is meant to comply with such 
audits, the government will allow some people to escape auditing, explained TJ1, giving the 
example of “the prosecutor that was on the Lebbos case for seven years, [who] never had an 
audit”.1258 In that case, Paulina Lebbos, a 23 year old student, had been murdered in early 2006. 
Whilst the crime remains unsolved, former members of the Alperovich government were 
condemned – thirteen years later - of concealing evidence of her murder. 1259 “Poor Lebbos who” 
explained TJ1, “[who] has been crying for his daughter for seven years,” has not been able to 
elucidate the crime as he “does not have the umbrella of governing-party protection”.1260 
 
7.5 Judicial Attitudes to Accountability  
There was a view among NGOs that the Argentine judiciary resists transparency and 
accountability. FO3 explained that “the Argentine judicial system functions with a lot of opacity, 
with a lot of margin for arbitrariness, with a lot of margin for corruption and for privilege, like all 
Argentine institutional systems.”1261 FO1 agreed, that the judiciary “should be de-corporatised, 
get closer to the people, be less bureaucratic, citizens should appropriate the judiciary as another 
power of the state, and not as a distant power that can only be accessed by some.”1262 
                                                 
1254 Interview TJ5, lines 291-292. 
1255 Interview TJ1, lines 329-340. 
1256 ibid. 
1257 ibid. 
1258 Interview TJ1, lines 345-346. 
1259 Natalia Iocco, ‘Trece Años Después, Condenan a 5 Ex Funcionarios de Alperovich Pero el Crimen de Paulina 
Lebbos Sigue Impune’ Clarín (25 February 2019) <www.clarin.com/policiales/trece-anos-despues-condenan-ex-
funcinarios-alperovich-crimen-paulina-lebbos-sigue-impune_0_0t2f_LlrG.html> accessed 22 September 2019; 
Natalia Iocco, ‘El Juicio Donde Todos Mienten: Ya Metieron Presos a 8 Testigos del Crimen de Paulina Lebbos’ 
Clarín (19 June 2018) <www.clarin.com/policiales/juicio-mienten-metieron-presos-testigos-crimen-paulina-
lebbos_0_S1vTVfwW7.html> accessed 16 December 2018.  
1260 Interview TJ1, lines 224-226. 
1261 Interview FO3, lines 380-382. 
1262 Interview FO1, lines 374-376. 
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The judges interviewed however agreed that it was important that citizens had the right to 
denounce a judge, and that a judges conduct could be investigated. Judges also explained that 
they would be in favour of several reforms aimed at improving the accessibility, openness and 
transparency of the judiciary: “The democratization of the judiciary? Of course I am in favour of 
it”1263 explained BAJ4. We just need to see “how this democratization will be done”.1264 BAJ4 also 
spoke of “the actuation of the judiciary, which still handle themselves in a way which is… I don’t 
know if the word is transparent, but little known by society”.1265 “If by democratization what is 
meant is a transparency in the daily control of the job, it is welcomed” agreed BAJ5.1266 BAJ3 
spoke of the need to make judicial language more accessible to court users,1267 and that “it would 
be good if judges got out more and make contact with the people, what I call ‘treading the 
soil’”.1268 BAJ4 mentioned that access to the judicial profession needs to be more open to people 
of different backgrounds and without contacts.1269 BAJ5 mentioned that a debate about how 
court employees are selected would be “very welcome”.1270 
BAJ2 however noted that it is important that accountability does not interfere with 
independence as  
independence will be given not depending on who complaints against you, which is one 
aspect, but rather depending on who judges you. Because if the person who judges you 
will judge conditioned by political, economic, or civil power, there will immediately be no 
independence. Because the complaint is a mere instrument serving power.1271  
 
BAJ4 however suggested that the fact that “the political power seeks to condition the activity of 
judges… is only part of the problem”.1272 “Us judges” BAJ4 said “need to take responsibility for 
                                                 
1263 Interview BAJ4, line 438. 
1264 Interview BAJ4, lines 438-439. 
1265 Interview BAJ4, lines 419-420. 
1266 Interview BAJ5, lines 445-446. See also Interview FO1, line 377. 
1267 Interview BAJ3, lines 267-279. 
1268 Interview BAJ3, lines 283-284. The phrase used in Spanish was pisar el barro, and in a sense implies having your 
feet on the ground, being down-to-earth, and getting your hands dirty by exploring the reality around you.  
1269 Interview BAJ4, lines 411-413. 
1270 Interview BAJ5, line 434. 
1271 Interview BAJ2, lines 65-69. 
1272 Interview BAJ4, lines 396-398. 
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the part which concerns us, of why, or to what point us judges have transformed into partisan 
political actors.”1273 BAJ4 explained that where a judge uses the judgeship to carry out a partisan 
agenda – as happens frequently according to BAJ4 - “we have a problem”.1274 BAJ4 explained that 
judges  
 
enter the territory of politics, make decisions with a content that is clearly political and 
partisan, and then afterwards, when the reprisal from politics comes, they try to shield 
themselves as judges, [saying] that their impartiality should not be affected, they should 
not be conditioned.1275  
 
The rules of politics are different to the rules of exercising the judicial function, BAJ4 explained, 
and if judges “enter this territory, they should know the response will be one of a political 
nature”.1276  
 
BAL1 alluded to a similar problem by discussing the frequent use of injunctions by judges to block 
government decisions, which angers the government, and which the government tried to address 
by making it harder for judges to use injunctions as part of the judicial reform package of 2013. 
This political desire to stop injunctions from interrupting political decisions is “reasonable”, 
“when the injunction is arbitrary”, explained BAL1.1277 However, “if the injunction has grounds, 
it is not reasonable”.1278 The problem, concluded BAL1, “are the people who execute them 
[injunctions]”,1279 alluding perhaps to the politicisation of some judges in their decisions.  
 
BAJ3 however argued that it is within the nature of judicial decisions to have a political content: 
“it is a lie that the judge is in an aseptic crystal laboratory and does not see anything with the 
famous blindfold over his eyes”,1280 “his sentences which affect the polis are political 
components”.1281 BAJ3 however argued that many judges seem blind to the political 
                                                 
1273 Interview BAJ4, lines 399-401. 
1274 Interview BAJ4, line 407. 
1275 Interview BAJ4, lines 429-432. 
1276 Interview BAJ4, lines 432-435. 
1277 Interview BAL1, lines 221-222. 
1278 Interview BAL1, line 222. 
1279 Interview BAL1, lines 223-224. 
1280 Interview BAJ3, lines 94-95. 
1281 Interview BAJ3, lines 93-94. 
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consequences of their decisions: “It often seems like they [judges] wear the blindfold in order 
not to see reality, not in order to be impartial”.1282  
 
BAJ3 also spoke of the effect of judicial corporatism on accountability: “What should happen is… 
the court of appeals itself, when they revoke a sentence, to avert that this judge failed to really 
honour his role as a judge” suggested BAJ3.1283 However, “due to being colleagues, they do not 
like” doing this, BAJ3 explained.1284 As BAJ3 argued, this is not effective, as “the interests of the 
judiciary can enter into conflict with those of the individual judge”.1285 “If that judge behaved in 
a way that… goes against what I consider ethical, legal… I will not support him or her, as I am not 
here to support an individual judge and to do corporatism, rather this prejudices the judiciary in 
its entirety”.1286  
 
BAJ3 also explained that this judicial corporatism can be used to place pressure on judges who 
may not agree with the majority of judges or those judges in positions of power within the 
judiciary. In this sense, BAJ3 spoke of “internal pressure from the judiciary itself”,1287 lamented 
judges from appellate courts who “use it [their positions] for their personal grudges, their 
personal rancour”.1288 BAJ3 explained that many judges, “the day they become a judge they are 
already thinking about how to rise up to the appeal court, therefore, for many, this can be” a way 
to “discipline”1289 them internally:1290 “to many they say, well, we could put your ascent in 
danger”.1291  
 
BAJ2 however defended judicial corporatism and the rejection of external accountability (to the 
JC) arguing that faced with an executive that does not limit itself in respecting the ideal balance 
of powers, the judiciary has to push back. BAJ2 compared this to the need to compensate for 
                                                 
1282 Interview BAJ3, lines 97-98. 
1283 Interview BAJ3, lines 26-29. 
1284 Interview BAJ3, line 27. 
1285 Interview BAJ3, lines 86-87. 
1286 Interview BAJ3, lines 87-91. 
1287 Interview BAJ3, line 39. 
1288 Interview BAJ3, lines 46-47. 
1289 As BAJ3 explained: for “putting pressure we say they try to ‘discipline’”: Line 230. 
1290 Interview BAJ3, lines 223-224. 
1291 Interview BAJ3, lines 224-225. 
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inequality with legal mechanisms such as positive discrimination in other areas of law.1292 
Similarly, BAJ2 explained that  
 
as in the JC, no minimum standards are satisfied in terms of subjugation to the political 
power, the judiciary has to generate asystematic responses. Therefore, as a corporation, 
it has to say ‘I do not accept any complaint, I do not accept any’, and you can say, wait, 
that is bad. Yes, but I have to do it. Because if I do not do it, what happens? It [the political 
power] achieves complete imbalance.1293  
 
If the judiciary did not push back against politics, argues BAJ2, if they were to act in a neutral 
manner, their interests would be bulldozed by political interests. BAJ5 however took a slightly 
more balanced view on accountability: “the same as any other sector, we [the judiciary] are quite 
corporatised, and any type of modification or attempt to add another type of obligation with 
respect to our function, at first it’s like a tortoise, and we go inside our shell and react badly.”1294  
 
The power of the judicial corporation was not raised to the same extent in interviews at the 
federal level, perhaps due to having a lower percentage of the votes on the JC, and perhaps due 
to such arguments having less credibility at the federal level. FJ1, for example, advocated a more 
restrained approach to being investigated by the JC: “We have a Martin Fierro who says ‘make 
friends with the judge’.”1295 Martin Fierro is a gaucho1296 who is the subject of an epic poem by 
Argentinean writer José Hernández. The poem, written in the 1870s in the style of gaucho 
ballads, describes rural life in Argentina and is a cornerstone of national identity. FJ1 used this 
quote to explain that “it is not advisable” to “rush the person who has to judge you”.1297 Judge’s 
ability to push back against the FJC was however discussed in light of the role of Federal 
Associations of Judges.  
 
                                                 
1292 Interview BAJ2, lines 406-427. 
1293 Interview BAJ2, lines 428-433. 
1294 Interview BAJ5, lines 525-529. 
1295 Interview FJ1, lines 185-186. 
1296 Whilst gaucho would have to be translated as ‘cowboy’, I prefer to use the Spanish word as it denotes a very 
specific culture that developed among cattle herders in rural Argentina.  
1297 Interview FJ1, lines 184-185. 
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7.5.1 The Role of Associations of Judges 
FJ3 spoke of the role that judges’ associations can play in monitoring the removals process. FJ3 
explained that judges’ associations usually “do not interfere” when a judge is denounced,1298 
supposedly because they do not wish to interfere with accountability. However, FJ3 explained 
that “when the complaint is used to pressure or for vengeance, well, then yes”.1299 “In reality, 
[associations] are looking out for the right that people have for their conflicts to be resolved by 
impartial judges” explained FJ3,1300 suggesting that judicial independence may be affected where 
removals processes succumb to external interests. FJ3 explained that in such cases, associations 
may get involved by “making some declaration, sending observers to the process”.1301 FJ3 
recognised that “it’s complicated, it’s complex, it is not easy” as the association has to “seek the 
point of equilibrium” between defending judicial independence,1302 and not engaging in any 
action “that implies the actuation of a corporation aiming to achieve privilege, because that is a 
terrible institutional example” to set.1303 However, “keeping quiet when [judicial independence 
is under threat], no”, explained FJ3.1304 
 
7.6 Lack of Institutionalisation   
Participants were not asked about socio-economic factors that may affect disciplinary 
proceedings, however such factors were raised by participants of their own accord. BAL1 
explained that “it is crucial to understand [Argentina] as an underdeveloped country”.1305 BAL1 
pointed to the history of democracy in Argentina that has had many interruptions, observing that 
“we cannot seriously, although it hurts us, say that Argentina is a country that is institutionally 
developed”.1306 FL1 explained that this resulted in a lack of understanding among Argentineans 
about how the system of democracy and separation of powers works: “Here in Argentina…. the 
                                                 
1298 Interview FJ3, line 42. 
1299 Interview FJ3, lines 42-43. 
1300 Interview FJ3, lines 43-45. 
1301 Interview FJ3, line 47. 
1302 Interview FJ3, lines 55-56. 
1303 Interview FJ3, lines 50-52. 
1304 Interview FJ3, line 52. 
1305 Interview BAL1, line 188. 
1306 Interview BAL1, lines 193-194. 
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grave problem is the lack of understanding of the division of powers. It is a serious problem that 
distorts everything.”1307  
 
BAL1 added that “it is not a society that has institutional stability among its priorities. Nor respect 
for institutions.”1308 By way of example of this culture, FL1 explained that lawyers do not usually 
stand up when a judge enters the court room.1309 “The Argentinean is quite authoritarian, 
unfortunately”1310 but is also “anti-system”,1311 “defiant of the system”1312, engaging in “rebellion 
for rebellion’s sake”, explained FJ2.1313 In line with this defiance, FJC2 explained that “Argentina 
has a culture of denouncing”, which may go some way towards explaining the number of 
complaints the FJC receives.1314  
 
FL1 and FL2 also spoke of the effect of political polarisation on institutions. FL2 spoke of “the 
game of how we Argentineans have become divided”,1315 and the repercussions this has on the 
JC, how difficult it is to design the Council in a way so that they are not affected by this.1316 FL1 
explained that this division is a threat to the healthy institutional life of the country:  
 
Argentina has many problems, many, many. What has happened now is that [we currently 
have] a very authoritative government, with a lot… of confrontation between people. It 
has awakened a conflictive cohabitation: If they are vultures, if they are patriots or are 
not patriots,1317 and all of these things, which complicate daily life, no? But well, let’s hope 
it changes track at some point, because societies with conflicts always have to take a 
determination at the end to end the conflict, no? Otherwise we will reach anomie, no? We 
will reach anarchy.1318 
                                                 
1307 Interview FL1, lines 411-413. 
1308 Interview BAL1, lines 247-248. 
1309 Interview FL1, lines 387-415. 
1310 Interview FJ2, lines 214-215. 
1311 Interview FJ2, line 215. 
1312 Interview FJ2, lines 216-217. 
1313 Interview FJ2, lines 279. 
1314 Interview FJC2, line 37. 
1315 Interview FL2, lines 171-172. 
1316 Interview FL2, lines 174-175. 
1317 This is a reference to Argentina’s default on its sovereign debt, and the vulture funds who were holding out for 
payment.  
1318 Interview FL1, lines 330-337. 
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Indeed, FJ2, FL1, and BAJ5 also alluded to the “anomie” of Argentine society,1319 referring either 
explicitly or implicitly to the writings of Carlos Nino1320 that describe an anomia boba (foolish 
anomie) in Argentine society:1321 “an inobservance of the law that does not favour anyone and 
generates high levels of inefficiency”.1322 FJ2 explained: “I know that the possibility of the law not 
being abided by does not occur to an English mind; well in Argentina it is very common that the 
law is not abided by.”1323 The participants however did not explain how this affected the removals 
process in practice, and the interview data as a whole suggests that processes comply with all of 
the regulation with regard to the procedural formalities. The problem with the removals 
processes is the decision-making itself. Whether such issues constitute anomie therefore 
constitutes an interesting question that arose from the data collected, that would require further 
in-depth research to answer.  
 
7.7 The Role of the Media 
7.7.1 Media pressure on judges  
When asked about ways in which judges are “disciplined” in practice, FJ3 answered the “use of 
the media”,1324 and “media pressure”.1325 “When [the government] don’t have grounds for 
removal, the attack is on the independence of judges… via the media”1326 clarified FJ1. In this 
context, FJ2 agreed that “unfortunately, the media has tremendous power”.1327 “It happens fairly 
regularly… that when a decision that is uncomfortable for the executive comes out, a media 
campaign against that judge promptly appears”, confirmed BAJ4.1328 BAJ4 explained that these 
kind of campaigns are “preventative”,1329 aimed at “generating a kind of social disvalue of [the 
                                                 
1319 Interview FJ2, lines 212-213; Interview BAJ5, lines 488-489; Interview FL1, line 336. 
1320 Carlos Nino was also an advisor to President Alfonsín, whose government oversaw the introduction of the FJC 
in Argentina as described in Section 1.2.  
1321 Carlos Nino, Un País al Margen de la Ley (Ariel 2011). 
1322 Eduardo Fidanza, ‘Decálogo de la Anomia Argentina’, La Nación (19 November 2009), 
<www.lanacion.com.ar/1201363-decalogo-de-la-anomia-argentina> accessed 21 August 2018.  
1323 Interview FJ2, lines 210-212. 
1324 Interview FJ3, line 170. 
1325 Interview FJ3, line 156. 
1326 Interview FJ1, lines 399-341. 
1327 Interview FJ2, lines 323-324. 
1328 Interview BAJ4, lines 301-303. 
1329 Interview BAJ4, line 306. 
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judge’s] actions, and so that it doesn’t occur again in the future”.1330 “Even political actors 
themselves are the ones to make declarations against judges, by name”,1331 BAJ4 explained. 
  
FJ2 explained that if a judge rules against the interests of the government, it may also attempt to 
“besmirch the decision, saying ‘it looks like [the judge] was bribed’… therefore conditioning the 
legitimacy of the decision”.1332 FJ2 spoke of the escrache público which is a “very Argentinean” 
term which means to publicly put someone in evidence.1333 FJ2 said that nowadays it is used 
wrongly against judges. FJ2 gave an example of a judge deciding a case that the government has 
an interest in: A pro-governing party journalist may cast a doubt over the judge by saying that 
“there are people who say that Judge X who is deciding Y case, is in connection with Z”.1334 Even 
if it is absolutely false, and there are no grounds for such suspicions, it is enough to raise doubt 
about the judge, and this quickly takes on a life of its own, turning from a potential, into an 
appearance, into a certainty.1335 “The issue of media lynching is very tough”, FJ2 concluded.1336 
FJ2 further explained that it is very difficult to get rid of a negative portrayal in the media; people 
remember it, and “how do I prove I am not corrupt?”1337 Although a judge can open up all of 
his/her finances, properties, and sworn declaration of assets, explained FJ2, “[people] 
nevertheless say ‘no, because the mother, aunt, grandmother, neighbour…’”1338 
 
The media can however work in both ways. FJ4 explained that speaking to the media can be a 
way for a judge to defend him or herself in the face of persecution by the government, by 
exposing their actions, as for example Judge Sarmiento did in the example discussed in Section 
6.2.3 above.1339 
 
                                                 
1330 Interview BAJ4, lines 306-307. 
1331 Interview BAJ4, lines 303-305. See also Interview FJ1, lines 335-336. 
1332 Interview FJ2, lines 322-323. 
1333 Interview FJ2, lines 307-308. 
1334 Interview FJ2, lines 314-315. 
1335 Interview FJ2, lines 315-318. 
1336 Interview FJ2, lines 312-318. 
1337 Interview FJ2, lines 326-327. 
1338 Interview FJ2, lines 327-329.  
1339 Interview FJ4, lines 322-324. 
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7.7.2 Media pressure on judicial councils, disciplinary committees and juries  
It is worth considering the way in which this media power affects councillors, jurors, and decisions 
throughout the removals process. FO3 explained that “in some cases, the pressure from the 
media on how the case should be resolved, exercised a pressure which in my opinion is negative 
in consideration of the impartiality on the part of the Council”.1340 FJC1 agreed that there is 
“external pressure through the media, and mobilisations, and which in turn act as a pressure for 
the councillors which want to act independently... many times even the councillors themselves 
have received affronts and pressures at their homes”.1341 FJ5 also agreed that “I think that the 
press in many cases played the role that sometimes institutions such as the JC should have 
played”.1342  
 
FO1 explained that in the context of a society that is demanding judges to be tough on crime, this 
is particularly the case as: “this has to do with the popular demand for an increase in 
punishments” explained FO1, and although some terrible things happen, “the truth is that the 
responsibility [for this] does not fall on the judge”.1343 FO3 explained that “in these cases, it was 
very difficult for the JC to analyse… the case, given that popular indignation, amplified in the 
press, really played a very significant role.”1344 FO3 concluded that “I think that this type of 
coverage, not referring to the process and the transparency of the process but rather how the 
concrete case should be resolves… I think it is a negative participation on the part of the 
media”.1345  
 
BAJC1 explained that this pressure continues in the jury: “the role of the media is extremely 
strong because the media depose a judge before the jury”.1346 (S)he pointed to the example of 
Judge Parrilli, where “the media had already condemned her, and I think this put a great deal of 
pressure on the members of the jury”.1347 BAJC1 concluded: “I think that both the media as well 
                                                 
1340 Interview FO3, lines 199-201. 
1341 Interview FJ1, lines 345-348. 
1342 Interview FJ5, lines 430-431. 
1343 Interview FO1, lines 478-480. 
1344 Interview FO3, lines 210-212. 
1345 Interview FO3, lines 212-215. 
1346 Interview BAJC1, lines 175-176. 
1347 Interview BAJC1, lines 185-186. 
Page 253 of 366 
 
as the public opinion reflected in the media is a very strong influence in processes… of the 
removal of judges.”1348 
 
FJ4 however pointed out that “the press can play in favour and against” the fairness of the 
process.1349 BAJC1 was also cautious to note that whilst the media can impact removals 
processes, it is “part of the rules of the game”,1350 and wanted to emphasize that “I don’t oppose 
anything that means transparency – to the contrary!”1351 Indeed, in some cases the media has 
served to shine a light on questionable actions by the JC, such as the case of Judge Oyarbide, who 
had several complaints against him rejected in limine, “and if the press had not said or started to 
insist about the case of Oyarbide, about some things that Oyarbide did, it is possible that the 
other [complaints against him] would have been dead” as well, explained FJ5.1352 FO3 agreed 
that NGOs can use the media to have “a public discussion, scandalising the discretion of the JC in 
public opinion” where complaints are rejected in limine.1353 “The media are… a good way to 
propel, to get the mechanisms of the judiciary to work” agreed FO4.1354 
 
FL3 gave another example of a complaint that (s)he had filed against a judge, and explained that 
“the news media… gave [the case] a strong and large diffusion, which meant that the veils were 
lifted which had impeded society to know what is happening inside of the [courthouse]”.1355 FL3 
continued 
 
If the intervention of the media had not taken place in [this way], the trial [of the judge] 
probably would not have reached the destination it did. It would have perhaps been 
wrapped in a series of delaying issues, and… the case would have maybe finished due to 
prescription.1356  
 
                                                 
1348 Interview BAJC1, lines 190-192. 
1349 Interview FJ4, line 324. See also Interview FJ5, line 407. 
1350 Interview BAJC1, line 217. 
1351 Interview BAJC1, lines 217-218; Interview TJ3, line 288; Interview TL3, lines 354-357. 
1352 Interview FJ5, lines 433-435. 
1353 Interview FO3, lines 96-97. 
1354 Interview FO4, lines 48-50. 
1355 Interview FL3, lines 217-219. 
1356 Interview FL3, lines 224-227. 
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FO3 agreed that “the margin for negotiation of vetoes and capricious decisions is a lot more 
limited when there is an active discussion in the public opinion about these decisions”:1357 “It 
obliges the Council [to take]… care and [have] auto-restrictions in what they do which seem 
healthy to me.”1358 FO2 explained that those media outlets that are critical of the government 
have provided very valuable coverage: “the few time that they have been able to discover topics 
of really bad functioning of the JC have been thanks to denouncements in the media, in these 
newspapers [La Nación and Clarín]”.1359 “Especially La Nación, because it has… people who are 
better trained to analyse these things”.1360 “Clarín, due to having been strongly attacked by the 
government, with the law on the media and all that, has a very critical stance on the government, 
always”, (s)he specified.1361  
 
Media pressure however is not always a factor. There are cases that go unnoticed by the media: 
“as [the judges] are not very known, the press does not detect them” explained FJ5.1362 “The 
media intervenes when the case is… interesting from a political point of view… the media wants 
to sell” agreed FJ4.1363 As FJC1 confirmed, media presence “is normal when there are meetings 
with a judge that is known to the media”.1364  
 
FJ2 also explained that councillors themselves attempt to use the power of the media to affect 
decision-making within the council: when a councillor “sees that [he] can’t advance within the 
Council, yes? He goes to the media to denounce this”.1365 “This standstill that there is in the 
Council… they try to overcome it in this way, mutually placing media pressure”1366 on each other, 
FJ2 explained. FJC1 also noted that “due to the conformation of the Council; that all of them 
come for a question either of party politics, or judicial politics, or lawyer politics, all of them have 
a relationship with the press”.1367 This however may lead to a lack of objectivity in the media 
coverage of events. As FO1 noted, media coverage  
                                                 
1357 Interview FO3, lines 179-181. 
1358 Interview FO3, lines 197-198. 
1359 Interview FO2, lines 312-314. 
1360 Interview FO2, lines 311-312. 
1361 Interview FO2, lines 315-316. 
1362 Interview FJ5, lines 483-493. 
1363 Interview FJ4, lines 313-314. 
1364 Interview FJC1, lines 639-642. 
1365 Interview FJ2, lines 375-376. 
1366 Interview FJ2, line 377-379. 
1367 Interview FJC1, lines 655-657. 
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tends to be functional… to the context of polarization that exists in Argentina in public 
opinion, and therefore, the truth is that they contribute to this polarization. Therefore… 
media which are pro-governing party, they protect the judges that the governing-party 
protects, or they vindicate the decisions of the governing-party in the Council which 
protects the judges, and vice versa, the more opposition-leaning media do this with 
respect to the actors in the Council that are more aligned with the opposition sectors. 
Therefore, the truth is that the information that reaches citizens… has an extremely high 
level of subjectivity: more than is recommendable.1368 
 
In Tucuman, due to the lack of heterogeneity in the legislative commission, and the de facto 
control that the governing party has over decisions, the media was not seen to have the same 
type of power. TJ3+4 therefore disagreed that the media can act as a counterweight against 
politics: “I have my doubts”, (s)he explained. “I think that [to the extent that] the political power 
[is] restrained, [it is restrained] by the law and by the constitution”.1369 Indeed, the legislative 
commission has little reason to draw attention to its process and decisions. “In general”, 
confirmed TLC1, “the presence of the media is given by the complainant…. It is not something 
pursued by the Commission”1370 specifying that “it is the solution that is made known”.1371  
 
In some cases of great popular interests, however, the media was deemed to have an influence. 
Citing the Verón case, TJ3+4 explained: “it was an unpopular verdict…. People expected a prison 
sentence. And well, the political response couldn’t be any different to [what it was]”,1372 which 
was to condemn the judges. The media had in this case “generated social prejudgements, and 
verdicts of the media and public opinion before the verdict of the tribunal” agreed TL3.1373 TO1 
explained that the role the media plays in such cases   
 
                                                 
1368 Interview FO1, lines 494-501. 
1369 Interview TJ3+4, lines 388-389. Note that only one of the two judges interviewed here expressed this opinion. 
1370 Interview TLC1, lines 279-282. 
1371 Interview TLC1, line 284. 
1372 Interview TJ3+4, lines 201-202. 
1373 Interview TL3, lines 352-353. 
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is not like causal, rather inter-causal. Because the level of exposition, the level of media 
attention of a case, will determine the level of interest of the government. Therefore here 
another factor enters and afterwards there is the factor that we call a boomerang factor… 
The level of interest of the government depends on many factors, and this is what will 
determine, in my opinion, the outcome of the case.1374  
 
TO1 further explained that this influence may be strongest in terms of affecting whether or not 
a case is accepted:  
 
There is a large possibility that if a topic is really in the front cover news… this will be a 
driving force for the admission, the admissibility or [rejection]… afterwards it can shelve it 
and let it sleep, it can declare him/her innocent… so it gives a margin to the Commission 
to play in terms of its own legitimacy.1375 
 
TL2 therefore was of the opinion that “the media has served to shine a light on facts that should 
have it” agreed TL2.1376 TJ2 agreed that “the media has played a certain balancing role… the press 
showed [itself to]… divert arbitrariness…. I think in this aspect, in many questions in the removals 
process in itself, [the press] placed a certain quota of equilibrium, of counterweight”.1377 In this 
regard, TL2 spoke positively about the local media coverage of judicial removals: 
 
they cover in an appropriate way, in a reasonable way…. There are no grave distortions. I 
think that given the decadent political system of our democracy, this is an aspect that is 
reasonably well developed: information by the media.1378  
 
TJ2 however was of the opinion that media coverage was poor, with little and even in some cases 
wrong information: “sometimes they are influenced by trends, and sometimes they are simply 
not objective… and sometimes they are even imprudent”.1379   
                                                 
1374 Interview TO1, lines 330-334. 
1375 Interview TO1, lines 117-125. 
1376 Interview TL2, line 351. 
1377 Interview TJ2, 292-296; see also TJ3+4, lines 385-387. 
1378 Interview TL2, lines 405-411. 
1379 Interview TJ2, lines 289-290. 
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7.8 The Role of Civil Society  
As FJC2 pointed out, civil society is “very well represented [in the JC] by the legislators… which 
represent the people”.1380 BAJ2 also pointed out that civil society in the form of lawyers and 
academics were also represented on the Council. Given the system of representative democracy 
in force in Argentina, BAJ2 explained that the inclusion of these councillors was “a phenomenon… 
that did not have a precedent in the history of Argentine law”.1381 This means that “public non-
governmental organizations, can make decisions in the construction of the public power”, BAJ2 
explained.1382  
 
BAJC1 however questioned the extent to which civil society’s interests are truly represented by 
these sectors, lamenting that whilst “society criticises the judiciary” (indicating that this is 
justifiably the case),1383 when it is time to “form the bodies which are those that choose or 
remove judges, [society] becomes disinterested”.1384 “Nobody, nobody checks who are their 
representatives in the JC” insisted BAJC1,1385 “civil society stays with criticism, but does not 
participate”.1386 The consequence of this, explained BAJC1, is that people who go to the JC are 
“not the most representative people, but rather those people who are motivated by political 
interests, which are not always of the good politics, rather which sometimes simply are partisan 
politics, or personal benefits, or of groups or sectors, and that is not a reflection of society”.1387 
BAJ5 agreed that “there are not average citizens who show interest in supervising how their 
representatives manage the public thing. What there are, on the contrary, are interest groups 
who fill this space.”1388  
 
                                                 
1380 Interview FJC2, lines 127-128. 
1381 Interview BAJ2, lines 231-236. See also Interview FJC3, lines 199-204: “it is the first time that in a constitutional 
body… the lawyers, who are representatives of civil society, sit at the same table as the representatives of the 
three powers [of state] to talk as equals about a topic as sensitive as the topics of justice, the sanctioning of 
judges, the selection of judges, and the administration of justice.” 
1382 Interview BAJ2, lines 233-234. 
1383 Interview BAJC1, lines 280-281. 
1384 Interview BAJC1, lines 282-283. 
1385 Interview BAJC1, lines 283-284. 
1386 Interview BAJC1, lines 286-287. 
1387 Interview BAJC1, lines 287-290. 
1388 Interview BAJ5, lines 539-541. See also Interview FL1, lines 347-348: “our civil society is very much a denier of 
this, of control, of being interested in the control of the judges”. 
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FL3 explained this saying “society is a diffuse concept here. There is not really a concept of 
organised society in its quality as part of a community and a democratic process, which 
understands that it has the right to request information”.1389 BAL1 agreed that “the Argentinean, 
in general, is not a person, due to the level of cultural development that we have, which is familiar 
with institutional stability”.1390 Therefore, BAL1 explained, “there is not a perception deeply 
embedded in society, that the institutional improves their quality of life.”1391 “The passivity of 
civil society is noticeable” 1392 agreed FL2. “Even in a thriving city such as the City of Buenos Aires” 
explained BAJ5, “in general terms, the average porteño1393 it not interested in what any of the 
government bodies produce, not just the judiciary”.1394 “It is not a society” explained BAL1 “that 
has institutional stability within its priorities. Nor respect for institutions.”1395  
 
FL2, however, offered a different explanation for the lack of participation. “You are asking me an 
exquisite question: Why doesn’t civil society implicate itself more in the JC?”1396 The answer, FL2 
explained, is that “civil society is dramatically looking at its own navel, to see how to subsist in 
this sort of economic and social catacomb that we are living. I cannot demand of it, I would like 
to demand a greater understanding1397 of the JC, but when parents cannot cover the basics for 
the young and old…” it is too much to ask.1398 Referencing the default (of 2014), inflation, the 
dollar, the cepo cambiario,1399 the laws reducing the free movement of goods, the blocking of 
imports, and the vetoes on exportations, FL2 explained that civil society’s willingness to 
participate was in decline and was noticeably worse in 2014 than in previous years.1400 
 
                                                 
1389 Interview FL3, lines 262-265. 
1390 Interview BAL1, line 244-245. 
1391 Interview BAL1, lines 251-252. See also Interview FO3, line 236, which points out that Argentina does not have 
a democratic history.   
1392 Interview FL2, line 203. See also Interview FO1, lines 432-434, where FO1 explains that civil society shows no 
interest in the majority of the decisions emanating from the JC or the judiciary (except those related to certain 
crimes of interest to society). 
1393 The word porteño literally translates as ‘a person of the port’, and refers to people from Buenos Aires.  
1394 Interview BAJ5, lines 533-536. 
1395 Interview BAL1, line 247. See also FL3, lines 303-306: “the majority of society in this country does not have any 
commitment with the institutions, although that sounds tough, but the intellectual level of an important 
portion of society means that they do not care much what the judiciary is that will resolve its conflicts”. 
1396 Interview FL2, lines 203-205. 
1397 The word used in Spanish here was compenetración.  
1398 Interview FL2, lines 215-218. 
1399 This literally translates as ‘exchange clamp’ and refers to the currency controls that were in place between 2011 
and 2015 in Argentina, which limited the amount of foreign currency Argentineans could buy and sell.  
1400 Interview FL2, lines 206-214. 
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FO2 however suggested that NGOs could do more as external monitors of the judicial removal 
processes, which could “expose a bit better what the irregularities” are. “One could have a 
permanent monitor of… how many times the JC met, or when disciplinary files enter, and all of 
the steps which have been taken on this file”, suggested FO2,1401 clarifying that “I do not 
[currently] have a control, I as a citizen, us as an NGO, over how many complaints are filed, 
unfortunately I don’t know it”.1402 Several difficulties with this were however noted. FO1 
explained that they did not follow removals processes as thoroughly as they follow the processes 
for the appointment of judges, “only because the characteristics of the process mean that it is 
much more difficult to follow them”.1403 “It is not that is [the removals process] has a start and a 
finish with limited times and steps which are always the same”, FO1 explained.1404  
 
FO2 also noted that the way that the JC works makes it difficult to monitor removals processes, 
“because… if they want to protect Judge Perez,1405 they agree not to meet, therefore there are 
not many tools there to prevent that, or to verify that a norm is not being fulfilled”.1406 There are 
some issues that it is inherently difficult for civil society to have information on, explained FJ4: 
these issues “…they do not look at in depth. Concretely I am referring to the topic of corruption….. 
it is very difficult because it occurs in darkness”.1407 To further complicate matter, explained FO2, 
the costs are prohibitive: “you need a lot a lot of economic means to… send an observer that 
goes to all of the meetings of the JC, it requires an inversion”.1408 FO2 explained that “it is not 
easy to obtain financing for that”.1409  
 
Additionally, as BAJ3 pointed out, “NGOS are not aseptic and free from the political power”.1410 
FJ2 explained that “NGOs – not all of them, because it is not like that – but there are many that 
function as a satellite of some political party or of some political personage”.1411 Citing the 
personalised nature of politics in Argentina, FJ2 explained that “each politician when he begins, 
                                                 
1401 Interview FO2, lines 278-281. 
1402 Interview FO2, lines 282-284. 
1403 Interview FO1, lines 406-409. 
1404 Interview FO1, lines 409-410. 
1405 Perez is used here to designate a hypothetical person. 
1406 Interview FO2, lines 291-293. 
1407 Interview FJ4, lines 350-352. 
1408 Interview FO2, lines 250-252. 
1409 Interview FO2, lines 252-253. See also lines 288-289. 
1410 Interview BAJ3, line 259. 
1411 Interview FJ2, lines 632-634. 
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also creates a foundation…. Under the legal umbrella of the foundation, in reality it is something 
like organising not to pay taxes”.1412 Linked to this, FJ2 said that “there is a lot of unbelief in 
Argentina”,1413 which makes it hard for NGOs or civil society to monitor the JC. “They always 
bump into… political problems”,1414 and it is difficult for them to be taken seriously.  
 
FO4 concluded that “it is impossible that civil society controls absolutely all of the processes that 
have to do with the JC or the removal of judges”.1415 Instead, FO4 argued that civil society’s role 
is that of a “watchdog”, particularly in “paradigmatic cases”, and as “creators, generators of ideas 
to improve and reform the functioning of the justice system”.1416 Importantly, explained FO4, 
“civil society does not really have factual power to realise change”.1417 Civil society can only play 
“an important role, to the extent that there are other actors that want to listen to civil 
society”.1418 
 
When asked about an institutionalised role for civil society on the JC, by including a councillor 
representing their interests, FO1 explained that this solution is not without its problems: “there 
is a risk that the existence of a councillor legitimises the same practices” explained FO1.1419 
“There is a guy there who they keep more or less comfortable, and that is not civil society” said 
FO1.1420 The other problem is how such a representative would be elected, and “who would be 
empowered with the moniker of being the representative of civil society in the Council”.1421 FO4 
however pointed to other JCs in other provinces where there are individuals directly elected by 
the people, and argued that “civil society has in these topics shown itself to have a lot of 
coherence and seriousness in its work”.1422 FO4 did however add that this in itself “would not be 
                                                 
1412 Interview FJ2, lines 629-630. 
1413 Interview FJ2, line 609. 
1414 Interview FJ2, lines 606-607. 
1415 Interview FO4, lines 270-272. 
1416 Interview FO4, lines 272-276. 
1417 Interview FO4, line 284. 
1418 Interview FO4, lines 287-288. 
1419 Interview FO1, line 449. See also lines 460-463: “there is a risk….that if the participation of civil society is 
bureaucratised in the process, it may divert in that it ends up being just another actor for the construction of 
these agreements, and in reality that it is a legitimator of decisions more than someone who guarantees this 
openness.”  
1420 Interview FO1, line 450. 
1421 Interview FO1, lines 440-441. 
1422 Interview FO4, lines 295-300. 
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a motor for change”.1423 On a more practical level, FJC2 did not hesitate to underline the need to 
draw the line somewhere: “if, in addition to congressmen [that represent the people], you will 
also put individuals, this [the JC] will become immense! It seems to me that no, that it does not 
correspond. That’s it.” 1424 FO4 suggested that alternatively “a mechanism where civil society has 
an advisory role could be envisaged”.1425 
 
There was however also some concern about civil society playing a greater role in removals 
processes. TJ2 explained that “sometimes civil society is with the political power”,1426 which 
makes it an ineffective counter-balance to the politicisation of the process. In the same vein, FJ5 
explained that “it was always said that the judiciary is a counter-power”,1427 therefore to be 
subject to the whims of the majority is incongruent with its role of guaranteeing the rights of 
everyone, including the minority.1428 Which is why “it is important that the bodies that intervene 
in the removal are really independent…. That they do not have a predominantly political weight”, 
concluded TJ2.1429 
 
In this sense, there is the fear that, as FO1 put it “the citizens accompany the climate of the 
context, generated by the media”.1430 Particular concern was voiced over the “punitive 
demagogy in relation to the issue of security”:1431 In light of the high levels of violent crime in the 
country, “when a [criminal] judge releases a prisoner… then there is all of society demanding 
how” it is possible that no one is being held responsible for crimes committed.1432 TJ2 gave the 
example of Judge Freidenberg: “there was nothing that could be done because all of the press, 
all of the public opinion, and all of the political power was decided to remove her!”1433 As 
happened in that case, BAJ5 explained that when the public does show interest in the judiciary, 
                                                 
1423 Interview FO4, line 301. 
1424 Interview FJC2, lines 128-130. 
1425 Interview FO4, lines 293-294. 
1426 Interview TJ2, line 301. TJ3 noted that sometimes, but not always, civil society and the political powers are 
aligned for good reason: lines 301-302.  
1427 Interview FJ5, lines 516-517. 
1428 TLC1 agreed: “It seems dangerous to allow oneself to be guided by the majority, the public opinion, to make a 
decision, because the opinion is not always correct and one may end up condemning a person that does not 
merit it”, lines 325-327. 
1429 Interview TJ2, lines 321-323. 
1430 Interview FO1, lines 470-471. 
1431 Interview FO1, lines 428-429. 
1432 Interview FO1, lines 429-430. 
1433 Interview TJ2, lines 303-305. 
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it is “often… for the decisions that we make”.1434 “There is no analysis from the point of view of 
my function, and how the performance of my function is, rather it goes directly to… the content 
of the decision”1435 explained BAJ5. BAJ3 also spoke of society placing what (s)he perceived as 
excessive judgement on the private lives of judges, “I recognise that the judge has an obligation… 
[but] neither should the judge have to convert himself into a Discalced Carmelite who cannot 
drink wine if he is eating”.1436  
 
For these reasons, BAJC1 explained: “I don’t know if as things stand today civil society is prepared 
for that…. It seems to me that not yet, that we have yet to walk a bit further”1437 “Argentine 
society, in my opinion, is not ready… to have in its hands the responsibility to, in an indirect 
manner, administer justice” agreed BAL1.1438 TL3 agreed, explaining that the people entrusted 
with the decision to remove a judge “need to have an important degree of specialisation and 
professionalization, because it is a matter of judging, it is a trial”.1439 Referencing discrimination 
present in society, BAJ3 explained that “I don’t know to what point that ends up being more just. 
I tell you that I have my doubts, I don’t know, it seems so complex to me that I’m not one of those 
that says “yes, the people came, oh, it’s the entelechy, the people””.1440 FO3 agreed: “I do not 
value citizenship participation in terms of favouring that institutional decisions are taken by 
citizens in all possible institutional aspects. That is to say, I do not value for it to be citizens who 
decide if a judge should continue being a judge or not, I do not value that in itself”.1441 The 
priorities of civil society are economic, “of personal satisfaction, but not the institutional… 
because it is not socially and politically mature” explained BA1.1442 “There is a vision that is often 
idealised of civil society, so it would seem sometimes that the civil society is the civil society of 
Stockholm. It is not Stockholm. We are not Stockholm. We are not Stockholm” BAJ1 
concluded.1443 
 
                                                 
1434 Interview BAJ5, lines 547-548. 
1435 Interview BAJ5, lines 550-552. 
1436 Interview BAJ3, lines 58-360. 
1437 Interview BAJC1, lines 312 and 320. 
1438 Interview BAL1, lines 239-240. 
1439 Interview TL3, lines 189-191. 
1440 Interview BAJ3, lines 293-300. 
1441 See Interview FO3, lines 236-241. 
1442 Interview BAL1, lines 250-251, and 258-259. 
1443 Interview BAJ1, lines 379-382. 
Page 263 of 366 
 
In spite of these perceived challenges, however, many participants were clearly and strongly in 
favour of an increased presence and role of civil society.1444 As BAJ5 explained, “in terms of a 
conservative judiciary, citizens, in general, do not have access to control, [which is] something 
that seems negative to me”.1445 FO3 agreed that institutions in Argentina tend to “function closed 
to civil society and with their backs to civil society”, and that therefore “I tend to see all instances 
of institutional openness and citizen participation in institutions from a good perspective… I value 
this participation because it permits a greater accountability on the part of the institutions, 
because it allows a better circulation of information, and a more intense democratic life”.1446 TL3 
agreed that “here we have a strong tendency… of the executive power to… influence over the 
judiciary… [and] I say that citizen control equilibrates… it prevents arbitrariness.”1447 BAJ1 
summarised the solution to this simply: “In what way can the problems of democracy be 
resolved? With more democracy. In what way can the problems of participation be resolved? 
With more participation.”1448  
 
Ultimately, explained FO1, there are many ways in which civil society could potentially participate 
more in the JC, but what is more important “is that society has to be there”, no matter in what 
capacity.1449 For that truly to happen, explained FO1, there needs to be “a political decision to 
open the Council to citizen participation”.1450 As FO2 confirmed, currently “it is not as if they are 
inviting you in the JC to participate”.1451 “Never ever does the JC invite NGOs to analyse a topic, 
or for their advice”, FO2 explained.1452 FO1 however noted that in order for this to happen, it 
would be necessary to “raise awareness in civil society of the relevance of the judiciary”.1453 
There was also some limited optimism, however: “Argentina is in some way progressing”1454 said 
                                                 
1444 Interview BAL1, line 237; Interview FL3, lines 303-304; Interview FO1, lines 443-448; Interview FO2, line 275; 
Interview TL3, lines 178-188. 
1445 Interview BAJ5, lines 81-82. 
1446 Interview FO3, lines 228-235. See also lines 241-243: “I do value that the decision process be sufficiently open 
and participative in order to ensure that the institutional system includes and processes the points of views of 
citizens and is accountable to citizens”.  
1447 Interview TL3, lines 63-66. 
1448 Interview BAJ1, lines 386-388. 
1449 Interview FO1, lines 443-444. 
1450 Interview FO1, lines 453-454. 
1451 Interview FO2, lines 262-263. 
1452 Interview FO2, lines 265-267. 
1453 Interview FO1, lines 426-427. FO1 also indicated that it would be necessary to consider how to reinforce 
demand and citizen participation: lines 434-435. 
1454 Interview BAL1, line 347. 
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BAL1. “In spite of everything, we are progressing”.1455 BAL1 pointed to the fact that topics such 
as judicial accountability and the needs for judicial reform were previously only spoken about by 
a very select group of specialists and politicians, but that nowadays it is widely debated, and all 
over the media.1456  
 
7.8.1 The Role of Bar Associations  
In addition to NGOs that carry out work relating to the promotion of judicial independence, there 
are bar associations across the country that also play an active role in monitoring both judicial 
conduct and the removals processes in each jurisdiction. On the Federal level, the Federación 
Argentina de Colegios de Abogados (Argentine Federation of Bar Associations) has a commission 
that is dedicated to following the work of the FJC and the FIJ, and another commission dedicated 
to monitoring the administration of justice. 1457 At the ACBA level, the Colegio Público de 
Abogados de la Capital Federal (Public Bar Association of the Federal Capital) has a commission 
for ‘monitoring judicial activity’. The regulation of this commission describes its mission, amongst 
other things, as being to ‘verify and make known, and identify deficiencies and irregularities that 
it observes in the functioning of the administration of justice and cases of judicial malpractice’.1458  
 
Lawyers in Tucuman are particularly active in this regard, perhaps given that they have no 
institutionalised role within the judicial removals process. The Bar Association instead attempts 
to counteract the politicisation of the process from its position as an external force. It has an 
Impeachment Commission (TBAIC)1459 that works in the same way as and in parallel to the PIC, 
receiving complaints against judges and investigating them. Its work however concludes in an 
                                                 
1455 Interview BAL1, line 349. 
1456 Interview BAL1, lines 349-357. 
1457 Federación Argentina de Colegios de Abogados, ‘Listado de Comisiones de la FACA 2018’ (FACA) 
<www.faca.org.ar/comisiones.html> accessed 10 July 2019.  
1458 Colegio Público de Abogados de la Capital Federal, ‘Reglamento de la Comisión de Seguimiento de la Actividad 
Judicial’ (CPACF) <www.cpacf.org.ar/inst_com.php?sec=seguimiento_de_la_actividad_judicial_reg> accessed 10 
July 2019.  
1459 See Colegio de Abogados Tucumán, ‘Comisiones’ (Colegio de Abogados Tucumán) 
<www.colegioabogadostuc.org.ar/institucional/comisiones/> accessed 10 July 2019.  
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independent opinion as to whether the case merits a hearing before an IJ:1460 “a technical 
evaluation of the case, of feasibility”.1461 The TBAIC has no power to actually remove a judge.1462  
 
As TL1 explained,  
 
under the provincial constitution, the Bar Association, as an auxiliary to the judiciary, has 
the function and the faculty and in some cases the obligation to monitor judges and the 
justice system, it is part of the public function that it exercises. Part of the function is of 
the executive power, which it delegates to the Bar Association as an independent body in 
Tucuman, or autonomous, to monitor the judiciary.1463  
 
The TBAIC has “all of the possibilities to gather evidence, and to request reports, ex officio or 
personally, and the judge has the obligation to respond”.1464 The members of the TBAIC are 
elected by lawyers for a period of two years.1465 Anyone can put themselves forward as a 
candidate, either as an individual, or as a representative of a group.1466 The TBAIC then acts as 
an autonomous advisory commission to the Managing Council of the Bar Association,1467 who 
receives the recommendation of the TBAIC and takes a final decision on the case.1468  
 
TL1 noted that lawyers may feel “a little bit more protected” going to their own Bar Association, 
than to the legislature if they suspect judicial malperformance, and that they may trust them 
more, as they “understand in some way that it is our own area, they are technical colleagues”.1469 
Nevertheless, the number of lawyers who would chose to make a complaint were still in TL1’s 
                                                 
1460 Interview TL1, lines 92-93. 
1461 Interview TL1, line 78. 
1462 Article 21(7), Law 5233, Ejercicio de la Profesión de Abogado y de la Profesión de Procurador. Colegio de 
Abogados de Tucumán (BOT del 11/02/1981). 
1463 Interview TL1, lines 85-89. 
1464 Interview TL1, lines 207-209. 
1465 Interview TL1, lines 98-103, and lines 116-117. The TBAIC is made up of three elected members and three 
elected substitutes. Two members of the Bar Association’s Managing Council also participate. See lines 123-
124.  
1466 Interview TL1, lines 104-114. 
1467 Interview TL1, lines 95-98. 
1468 TL1 explained that logic behind this was that the councillors making the final decisions would be making them 
on the basis of a full report of the facts and law, and would not have been affected by the emotions and 
arguments of prior debates: Interview TL1, lines 263-276. 
1469 Interview TL1, lines 132-134, and 141-142. This fits in with the finding in Section 6.2.1 that it is mainly 
individuals, not lawyers, who file complaints before the PIC.  
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opinion “very few”,1470 due to the fear and apathy described above in Section 5.2.1, although TL1 
also noted that some lawyers do not know that they can file a complaint before the TBAIC.1471 
TL1 estimated that there was an average of two complaints a month made to the TBAIC, for 
approximately 5,000 practising lawyers in the province.1472 Individuals who are not lawyers are 
also entitled to file a complaint before the TBAIC.1473 The TBAIC have also found that complaints 
“do not always fit within a situation of a possible impeachment”,1474 so that the true number of 
complaints about things that warrant an investigation into whether a judge should be removed 
is even lower. Echoing the many judges interviewed that said that complaints are often made for 
the wrong reasons, TL1 explained that many lawyers “do not know how it [the process] 
works”,1475 lamenting that young lawyers often “make a big emotional vent about the anger they 
have towards a judge, and they are not technical, and they are not strict”.1476 In looking into these 
complaints, TL1 explained that the TBAIC often did find judicial malperformance, “much more 
grave than those that were denounced”,1477 but as the complainant was “very angry about 
certain questions, therefore they put the emphasis on their anger and not on the technical defect 
in the functioning of the judge”.1478 
 
TL1 also noted that an important role that the TBAIC can play is that of providing a second, 
technical and justified opinion.1479 TL1 explained that the TBAIC does not have “any type of 
connection, not formal, nor informal” with the PIC, and as such is able to provide a truly 
independent analysis of each case.1480 Whilst noting that the TBAIC does come under informal 
pressure in some cases not to investigate, or to decide in a certain way,1481 TL1 explained that 
there had been cases that had been investigated by both the TBAIC and the PIC, “with different 
results”,1482 including in cases of complaints made by individuals in “resonant cases” which were 
                                                 
1470 Interview TL1, line 17. 
1471 Interview TL1, lines 226-229. 
1472 Interview TL1, lines 19-20.  
1473 Interview TL1, line 75. 
1474 Interview TL1, lines 20-22. 
1475 Interview TL1, lines 228-229. 
1476 Interview TL1, lines 229-231. 
1477 Interview TL1, line 233. 
1478 Interview TL1, lines 233-235. 
1479 Interview TL1, lines 134-135. See also line 93, where it is stated that whatever the decision of the TBAIC, “it 
must be founded”. 
1480 Interview TL1, lines 139-140. 
1481 Interview TL1, lines 147-150, 160-166, and 185-194. 
1482 Interview TL1, lines 136-137. 
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concluded in the TBAIC making a “recommendation for impeachment, which did not have the 
same result in the legislature”.1483 TL1 explained that this can be “because the Commission 
investigated in one place, did not take into account or was not able to access evidence, or 
[employing] different criteria to those the other Commission worked” with.1484  
 
TL1 also explained that as the TBAIC has “an institutional policy to say to our colleagues, we will, 
in some way try to protect you, as long as you do not cross certain limits”, so that lawyers feel 
empowered to stand up to injustices they may come across in their careers.1485 By way of 
example, TL1 explained that they criteria for deciding what evidence is admissible in their 
investigations is very broad, citing a case where a lawyer had secretly recorded a judge in both 
public hearing and private discussions, and that these recordings had been permitted as evidence 
by the TBAIC.1486  
 
In such cases, explained TL1, “it was important for the community, for the citizens, that there be 
a technical opinion that says, here something happened that should not have happened”.1487 
Additionally, TL1 added, “we [lawyers] do not pass by a stunning and shameful silence before 
certain situations. Something has to be said. Someone has to say something.”1488 TL1 saw it as 
the responsibility of both individual lawyers and the Bar Association in its institutional role, to 
“put a break on certain decisions that are political, and that they be made more technical”.1489 
TL1 also spoke of this technical opinion being a counterpoint to the media that “do not have this 
technical rigour”.1490 
 
Voicing these opinions through the TBAIC and a well-documented and justified process,1491 not 
only lends their voice more credibility, but also has the benefit of “who speaks is the institution, 
not the person. Therefore it enables certain things to be said”, explained TL1.1492 Although 
                                                 
1483 Interview TL1, lines 142-145. 
1484 Interview TL1, lines 137-139. 
1485 Interview TL1, lines 345-347. 
1486 Interview TL1, lines 322-345. 
1487 Interview TL1, lines 166-168. 
1488 Interview TL1, lines 175-176. 
1489 Interview TL1, lines 168-172. 
1490 Interview TL1, lines 476-477. 
1491 TL1 also noted that the meetings of the TBAIC, as a rule, as public: Interview TL1, lines 278-280. 
1492 Interview TL1, lines 176-178. TL1 did however explain that the opinion emitted by the TBAIC can be unanimous 
or not, and each member can chose to provide a dissenting analysis, or different grounds for reaching the same 
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“judges get annoyed anyway, with the people” added TL1.1493 “The resonance of the request [for 
impeachment] of a group such as the Bar Association, has a social impact, and has an impact also 
on may legislators… who genuinely may think that… it was not possible to bring about an 
impeachment, and with a different analysis, adding new elements of criteria, of conviction and 
why it can, it also opens the path for other people to also have the courage to request it”.1494 
 
Despite the technicality of the process in the TBAIC and their dedication to providing full 
justifications for each opinion, TL1 did note that there were nevertheless marked differences in 
opinions between lawyers on what constitutes grounds for an impeachment trial. TL1 remarked 
that “what is happening a lot at the moment, is a generational debate, where the younger 
members… have an attitude of running with the times, revisionist, of denouncing, investigating, 
and the members of the other older generation are a bit more prudent and do not agree as much 
with requiring an impeachment trial, or making manifestations about the performance of a judge 
if it is not something really of a very important institutional gravity”.1495 TL1 noted that this may 
be partially because “young people have fewer interests because they have not walked as far in 
their professions”, but also because older people have developed “thicker skins to tolerate a lot 
of things”.1496 Nevertheless, TL1 noted that this creates a “richness” in the debate.1497 Indeed, 
the TBAIC may provide a useful forum to further the debate and understanding of these issues 
among lawyers.   
 
TL1 also noted that one of the downsides of the Bar Association’s system was that the TBAIC 
could only consider grounds for impeachment, and were entirely powerless faced with judicial 
behaviour that was not grave enough to warrant removal, however was still inappropriate. “The 
judge is untouchable” explained TL1, noting that this is important for the maintenance for judicial 
independence and impartiality, but that it also has its problems:1498 “we see every day that there 
are judges which make… small acts of hostility, and small abuses of the law, of his power, of his 
facilities, and there is no way to limit him, if that limit is not imposed by the Supreme Court or 
                                                 
conclusion: lines 487-499. 
1493 Interview TL1, line 178. 
1494 Interview TL1, lines 198-204. 
1495 Interview TL1, lines 525-530. 
1496 Interview TL1, lines 549-552. 
1497 Interview TL1, line 552. 
1498 Interview TL1, lines 562-573. 
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someone with the faculty” to do so.1499 The TBAIC did however, noted TL1, decide to make 
recommendations and observations, or request that observations be made, to the Supreme 
Court, to the Chief of Ministers, to the Superintendence, so that they are made aware of certain 
practices”.1500 
 
7.9 Conclusion 
An understanding of the contextual challenges facing removals processes is important in order 
to gain a full understanding of what is going wrong in practice. The interview data in this respect 
shows significant differences in the context at the federal, ACBA and Tucuman levels. At the 
federal level, participants described a government attempting to influence judicial decisions. 
Where judges resisted, however, participants described several different ways that the 
government attempted to place pressure on judges. This ranged from attempts to publicly taint 
the credibility both of individual judges and the judiciary as a whole, to attempts to simply avoid 
judges through reforms aimed to reduce the power held by the judiciary and appointing 
temporary judges to fill judicial vacancies, to the downright intimidation of judges and their 
families. Within this context, there is more reason to believe that partisan decisions about the 
acceptance of complaints against judges described in Chapter 5 are indeed motivated by a desire 
to place pressure on the judges involved, and that such decisions are part of a broader trend or 
strategy to control the judiciary. Indeed, councillors of the JC themselves also described pressure 
and intimidation being placed on them by the government where they voted against the 
government’s interests. The proposed judicial reform of 2013 can therefore also be understood 
as an attempt by the government to gain greater control over JC decision-making, and by 
extension the judiciary.  
 
The context described by participants in Tucuman was markedly different and supports the 
conclusions drawn in Chapter 6. The government in Tucuman also attempts to influence judicial 
decision-making, however participants described these attempts as being mainly under the table, 
in the form of trading favours. Judge explained that such attempts were not always clear at the 
time, but that the government attempts to put judges in a position where either the judge owes 
                                                 
1499 Interview TL1, lines 567-571. 
1500 Interview TL1, lines 556-562. 
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the government for some benefit they received in the past, or where the government is exerting 
some inconvenience on the judges (such as a police investigation or court auditing), that the 
government has the power to relieve the judges of in return for a favourable ruling. Given the 
context of a government with a great deal of de facto control over the province, and complete 
control of the PIC, this may mean the government does not need to resort to the other ways of 
placing pressure on judges described at the Federal level. As the government clearly has the 
power to make life uncomfortable for judges, there is no need to use pending complaints or to 
publicly discredit judges in order to place pressure on them, which may go some way towards 
explaining why complaints and investigations are not used in Tucuman as a method to place 
pressure on judges.  
 
An additional explanation for this difference may be both governments’ concerns for legitimacy. 
In Tucuman where control of the removals process is openly with the government, it would come 
under a great deal of criticism for opening investigations into judge where they rule against their 
interests, or for stalling investigations in order to place pressure onto a judge. The times when 
removals are pursued are in cases where there is public outrage against a judge which allows the 
government to simultaneously gain popularity by removing an unpopular judge, and claim to be 
representing society’s calls for accountability, whilst using the procedure as a warning to other 
judges. At the Federal level, the government can point a finger at the opposition or at lawyers or 
judges for stalling procedures in the FJC, and therefore can comfortably open investigations into 
judges in order to place pressure on judges rather than an intention to follow through with a 
removal. Additionally, publicly discrediting judges helps justify further attempts to bring the JC 
and the judiciary under government control.  
 
In contrast, participants at the ACBA level explained that the ACBA government did not show any 
desire to control the ACBA judiciary, which suggests that the lack of the use of the removals 
process in the ACBA JC to influence judges is not only due to the composition or the regulation 
of the procedure, but also due to a lack of any desire to do so. This does not necessarily mean 
that the government does not use the power it has within legal limits to attempt to craft a 
judiciary that is functional to its politics, or that it would not benefit from voting to pursue the 
removal of unpopular judges. Within that context, there is a tendency of the judiciary at the ACBA 
level to protect judges against the political nature of the removal process.  
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Participants agree that the media in all jurisdictions has a big impact on judicial removal 
processes, both in terms of providing a channel for the government to discredit judges, and by 
expressing a punitive demagogy that criticises judges for rulings that are perceived by society as 
not being tough enough on crime. This plays into the hands of governments who can then pursue 
the removal of the judge in question, which in itself can be further used as a means of placing 
some control over the judiciary as a whole, without being criticised. Once removals processes are 
underway, this pressure can additionally be placed on councillors and jurors where the media 
has already judged the situation and pushes for the removal of a judge.  
 
However participants also noted that this media power also sometimes has the contrary effect, 
of placing pressure on the JC to accept a complaint that may otherwise have been rejected in 
limine in an attempt to protect the judge in question, and as a way of securing some transparency 
about the procedure in the JC. Whilst this positive effect was noted in particular on the federal 
level, it is questionable whether the media has this power in Tucuman where participants agreed 
that the government has no incentive or need to respond to such demands. In a similar manner, 
participants in all jurisdictions noted that whilst civil society can play a role as a watchdog, it does 
not have any real power to counteract the politicization of processes, and that ultimately the 
success of these processes depended upon a political decision for JCs to function correctly.  
 
In this regard, the underlying factor behind the problems in all three jurisdictions, it was agreed, 
is a lack of understanding of the importance of judicial independence. This affected actors on all 
sides including politicians not respecting the need for impartial judicial decisions, with some 
judges bending to their will, those in charge of removals processes not making decisions 
impartially with sole regard to the protection of judicial impartiality, a lack of interest on the part 
of lawyers and judges as to who their representatives are on the JC, and criticism of judicial 
decisions by the media. This was even seen to be true at the ACBA level where decisions were 
not necessarily taken as a means of purposefully placing pressure on judges in order to affect 
their impartiality, but nevertheless strategic and politically tinged decisions were seen to prevent 
decisions from being taken purely based on the merits of a case.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction  
JCs are being introduced all over the world as a way of removing the political influence from 
processes for the appointment and removal of judges and protecting judicial independence.1501 
However, there is no real evidence of the link between the use of a JC model and increased 
protection of judicial independence, and very few studies on the effectiveness of JCs in 
context.1502 This thesis therefore used three case-studies to evaluate the effectiveness of the JC 
model in protecting judicial independence in processes for the removal of lower-court judges 
using three jurisdictions: the federal Argentine level, the ACBA and the province of Tucuman.  
 
In-depth individual interviews with 36 stakeholders across the three jurisdictions were used to 
gain an insight into the factors influencing removals at each stage of the process, thereby both 
identifying where problems arose, as well as gaining a detailed understanding of the nature of 
such problems. A comparison between the experiences at the federal and ACBA levels, that 
entrust the removals process to a JC, with the experience in the province of Tucuman, where the 
process is conducted by a legislative committee, allowed for an evaluation of the comparative 
strengths of the JC model. Additionally, differences in the experience with JCs at the federal and 
ACBA levels revealed the ways in which different contextual challenges can impact on their 
effectiveness.  It also allowed for an evaluation of the ways in which differences in the 
composition of the JC and the regulation of the removals process can impact on the ability of JCs 
to protect judicial independence.  
 
This chapter will start by drawing together the conclusions from previous chapters and providing 
further consideration of the experience with the removals process in the three jurisdictions and 
what this demonstrates in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of the JC model, and the way 
that contextual factors can affect the process and in turn judicial independence. To this end, 
Sections 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 review the experience in each jurisdiction individually, and Sections 8.5 
                                                 
1501 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Human Rights Council, 38th 
Session (Agenda Item 3) UN Doc A/HRC/38/38 (2018); Diego García-Sayán, ‘Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Speech at the 38th session of the Human Rights Council’ (UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 2018) 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23793&LangID=E> accessed 15 June 2019. 
1502 See Section 1.2. 
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draws conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the JC model. Section 8.6 then uses 
this analysis to lay out areas for improvement and some suggestions as to modifications in the 
regulation of JCs and the removals process that may better protect judicial independence and 
accountability in judicial removals processes. Lastly, Section 8.7 discusses questions that arise 
from this research that merit further investigation.  
 
8.2 The Experience at the Federal Level  
8.2.1 The Influence of Party Politics in the FJC 
 
The JC at the federal level was born into a context of a judiciary with low levels of popular 
approval, and strong disagreements between the two main political parties at the time, the 
Peronist Partido Justicialista, and the Unión Cívica Radical about the path the country should take 
upon the restoration of democracy. Those that pushed for the creation of the FJC and FIJ hoped 
that by creating an independent and multilateral body to manage the appointment and removals 
of judges, the processes would be shielded from executive interference. However, the interview 
data collected for this thesis in 2014 describes continued attempts by the executive to place 
pressure on the judiciary, including attempts to bring the JC and the investigation and removal 
of judges under its control. The fact that the FJC yields real power has meant that it is able to 
push back against executive interference, and has done so on a number of occasions. This, 
however, has intensified the government’s desire to infiltrate the institution.  
 
In 2012, the FJC was able to block attempts by the executive to appoint their chosen judges to 
the court that was to oversee the government’s high profile case against media-conglomerate 
Clarín Group. This showdown, however, was partly responsible for fuelling the judicial reforms 
announced by President Fernández shortly thereafter. Basing itself on low levels of public trust 
in the judiciary, with citizens viewing it as an elite power with impunity and out of touch with 
societal needs, the President called for a “democratisation” of the judiciary, including a change 
to the composition of the FJC and the way in which councillors were to be elected. The provisions 
calling for the universal direct election of some councillors was however declared 
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unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case of Rizzo,1503 as it would have given the 
governing political party undue influence over the FJC.  
 
Against this backdrop of attempts by the government to control the FJC, this research revealed 
that in practice, there were several councillors who openly aligned their votes with the interests 
of the government, and that they formed a large enough majority to be able in many cases to 
accept or reject complaints against judges for partisan reasons. Therefore, where for example a 
judge ruled against the interests of the governing party, someone connected to the party may 
file a complaint, and even if it is unfounded, it is accepted and investigations used as a way to 
discredit and place pressure on the judge in question. The president and a majority of councillors 
on the CDA also supported the governing party, and therefore had significant power over 
investigations, including when and how investigations are carried out, and what motions were 
proposed for the plenary to vote on.  
 
The governing party however did not have enough votes to gain the 2/3 majority required to 
move forward to a trial before a jury. Where the governing party attempted to push through such 
votes, the opposition would rally together to block the motion (and vice versa). Whilst this may 
protect judges from going to trial for partisan reasons, the interviews also revealed that the 
political parties have a tendency to strategically oppose motions because it is backed by the 
opposing party. This leads to a situation where no-one can pass a resolution to take a judge to 
trial, which may prevent judges who are genuinely suspected of malperformance from being 
tried by a jury. Additionally, where the governing party accept a complaint but know they cannot 
get it past a plenary vote, they may ‘sit on top of the file’ for years, waiting for a change in 
circumstantial alliances in the plenary, creating prolonged periods of anxiety and pressure on the 
judge in question. This type of strategic voting by both parties also provides them leverage to 
trade favours or reach agreements; for example, not to pursue investigations against one judge 
if the other party agrees to appoint another judge. In this sense, the functions carried out in the 
JC go far beyond the removal of judges, and negotiations about removals are part of a much 
larger game.  
 
                                                 
1503 Rizzo, Jorge Gabriel (apoderado Lista 3 Gente de Derecho) s/ acción de amparo c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 
Fallos: 336:760. 
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This situation is problematic not least because councillors are not voting on the basis of the merits 
of each case. As discussed in Chapter 3, judicial accountability in the form of judicial removals 
processes are not a threat to judicial independence where they target the same aim of ensuring 
effective and impartial judicial services. It is important, however, for decision-making throughout 
the whole process to be focused on this aim. Whilst the decision to proceed with the removal of 
a judge is a political one in the sense that the interests of different sectors of society are 
represented, the decision should be made with the interest that these sectors have in protecting 
quality and impartial judicial services in mind, and not based on interests other than protecting 
the integrity of the judiciary.  
 
The findings set out in Chapter 7 suggest that the motivation behind this political infiltration of 
the JC at the federal level is an interest in controlling the judiciary and having “friend” judges, 
and cannot be ascribed to differences in views on appropriate judicial behaviour. There however 
also appears to be a misconception, as shall be discussed further in Section 8.6 below, about the 
role of the JC and a failure to recognise the need for judicial independence to be protected even 
during the early stages of the process.  
 
The knock-on effect of these party politics is that even those councillors who are neutral, such as 
perhaps many of the judges and lawyers on the council, are put in a position where they feel that 
they need to act strategically to push back against partisan decisions, thus further compounding 
the problem. The damage that this has done to the reputation of the FJC has meant that many 
people who suspect malperformance cannot see the point in filing a complaint anymore, the 
suspicions are left unaddressed, and levels of trust in the judiciary fall lower.   
 
8.2.2 The Federal Impeachment Jury 
 
Only cases where neither one of the political parties, nor the judicial corporation has an interest 
in protecting the judge can gain enough votes in the plenary of the JC to move forward to a trial 
before the FIJ. Whilst that would usually be in cases where there is a lot of evidence of 
malperformance, it is possible that situations arise where a judge has engaged in behaviour that 
would not necessarily be deemed grounds for removal, yet public opinion is against him or her 
and no interest group wishes to pay the political price of protecting the judge. In such cases 
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however, it is arguably appropriate for the issue to be tried before an independent jury. As long 
as the jury trial fully protects the judge from undue removals, a trial in such circumstances may 
be beneficial in terms of maintaining the reputation of the judiciary and the JC, and providing a 
public forum for discussion.  
 
Most cases that go before the FIJ end in the removal or resignation of the judge in question. This 
is perhaps not altogether surprising given that for a case to have got so far, a great deal of 
evidence against the judge is usually necessary. However, as one participant also pointed out, 
the same sectors that are represented in the FJC are also represented in the FIJ, therefore if 
enough votes were secured in the FJC to accuse a judge, it can be assumed that those sectors are 
in favour of the removal of the judge, or do not wish to pay the political price of protecting him 
or her. Where this relates to media and societal pressure to remove a judge, this could be 
problematic where this pressure affects the FIJ’s decisions.  
 
Participants however spoke of the FIJ as appearing to be fair, transparent and impartial in its 
work, noting that new jurors are selected by way of raffle every six months. A participant from 
the FIJ explained that whilst jurors may initially have some preconceptions about the judge in 
question or the judicial function, these quickly fade in light of the oral testimony, the written 
evidence, and the pressure of being in the public eye and having to put a signatures on an official 
document that can be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Trials before the FIJ are also conducted 
in line with a tight time-frame, and in accordance with criminal procedural rules, and there was 
nothing arising from the data that suggested any issues with due process at this stage of the 
removals process. The FIJ therefore appears to play an important role in protecting judges against 
politically motivated removals. The number of cases that go before a jury is however very small, 
and it is the FJC, not the FIJ, that is the ultimate arbiter of the fate of many of the investigations 
into judicial malperformance.  
  
 
8.2.3 Other Problems  
In addition to the influence of partisan politics, a number of additional aggravating factors were 
identified. One of these difficulties was the stringent requirements that one has to fulfil when 
making a complaint. A complainant is required to specify, in legal terms, the transgression of the 
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judge. In addition, a complainant is required to provide or specify the precise location of evidence 
for the allegations being made. This creates a number of difficulties, not least that obtaining or 
even having knowledge of evidence of for example corruption, is extremely difficult. As 
participants confirmed, many legitimate suspicions about judicial behaviour therefore go 
unreported.  
 
Additionally, it would be very difficult for a non-lawyer citizen to pinpoint the legal transgressions 
of a judge without the help of a lawyer, which may go some way towards explaining why the 
majority of complaints made by citizens are rejected due to being complaints about the content 
of a judicial decision, and not malperformance. These complaints are often made in an emotional 
manner, and whilst the complainant may not be right in all of the allegations, he often misses the 
real transgressions which may be more serious in nature than the issues identified by the 
complainant. This coupled with the finding that many lawyers are reluctant to file complaints 
either because they have no faith in the JC and feel that it is pointless, or because they fear 
reprisal from judges, means that there may be many cases of malperformance that are never 
investigated.  
 
There are also a number of practical difficulties facing councillors, such as not having enough 
time to dedicate to their role in the FJC. In particular the councillors that are congressmen or 
women, or senators, spend little time at the FJC. Their advisors who support these politicians in 
their roles may further undermine the impartiality of councillors, providing views affected by the 
councillor’s broader work context. Given this situation, some participants suggested that at the 
very least, it would be helpful to have a team of advisors and administrators that are more 
specialised and better trained to support councillors of the JC.  
 
8.3 The Experience at the ACBA Level 
 
The ACBA JC and IJ were created shortly after the ACBA was granted autonomy and were 
instrumental in setting up a new ACBA judiciary. Having fought hard for this autonomy, there was 
a willingness across the political spectrum to use and empower these institutions. This set the 
tone for a political context where the government does not appear to try to interfere with the 
judiciary. Indeed, even beyond the JC, judges reported that they did not know of attempts by the 
government to pressure, bribe or intimidate judges in any way. This could be in part due to the 
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limited amount of power transferred from the federal level to the ACBA level, particularly in 
terms of the judiciary. There are fewer highly controversial topics being dealt with by the ACBA 
judiciary than the Federal judiciary, which may in part account for less desire on the part of the 
government to interfere. As the judiciary started with a clean sheet, it may also not face criticism 
and suspicion from society to the same level as the federal judiciary, which may also translate 
into less political desire to hold judges accountable as a strategy to increase the popularity of the 
government. The ACBA JC also has the advantage of being smaller than the FJC, and of overseeing 
a far smaller judiciary. The political representatives in the ACBA JC are not sitting politicians, 
meaning that they have more time and may be perceived to be more independent than the 
political councillors at the Federal level.  
 
In contrast to the experience at the Federal level, there was no mention of any politically 
motivated complaints being made to the ACBA JC by people connected to the government, or of 
the shelving of complaints with the conscious aim of “disciplining” judges. This may however also 
be due to stricter time limits for each stage of the process at the ACBA level that may prevent 
complaints from being shelved, and a more balanced composition with less representation from 
the political sectors which would make it would be harder for the governing party to gain control 
over which complaints are accepted or rejected. Judge councillors, who hold a third of the vote 
in the ACBA JC, also tend to group together to protect judges from what are perceived to be 
political investigations. It would therefore take essentially all of the remaining councillors to 
group together to form even a simple majority, which would most likely require an agreement 
between the two main political parties. In addition, unless all of the other councillors 
unanimously agree to proceed to a jury, the vote of at least one judge will be necessary to make 
that decision.  
 
The power held by judges in the ACBA JC could potentially support the successful protection of 
judicial interest in the face of attempts to investigate or remove judges based on partisan or 
other external interests, however it could also be used to resist any type of political accountability 
as a matter of principle. Such a stance could however be based on a lack of trust in actors from 
other sectors making decisions with the judiciary’s best interest at heart. Indeed, a lack of 
institutionalisation and understanding of the importance of judicial independence may make this 
distrust understandable.  
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Indeed, in the one case that a judge had been removed, the case of Judge Parilli, there was a 
great deal of media pressure which according to some participants resulted in pressure on the JC 
and the jury and an unfair removal. Other participants, including some judges, however deemed 
it to be a clear-cut case of inappropriate behaviour, and interpreted the media coverage of it not 
as pressure, but simply as an agreement on all sides that what Judge Parilli had done was wrong. 
It is therefore difficult to untangle whether the controversy about the case simply demonstrates 
differing opinions on the grounds for removal, reflecting the political nature of the process, and 
demonstrating that the various stakeholder in the process are being heard, or whether media 
pressure stifled a real debate or discouraged councillors and jurors from defending the judge.  
Some suggestions that councillors have a tendency to act strategically and not necessarily always 
purely on the merits of each case, the latter explanation is also a possibility.  
 
The biggest difference in the performance of the Federal and ACBA JCs is therefore contextual: 
the ACBA JC does not appear to have been infiltrated by political interest groups in the way the 
FJC has. This in addition to less political representation on the ACBA JC, and a tighter regulation 
of the removals process translates into a process that at the time the research for this thesis was 
conducted in 2014, was more conducive to protecting judicial independence and accountability 
at the initial stage of choosing whether to accept or reject a complaint, and during initial 
investigations.   
 
Nevertheless, an issue that arose at both the Federal and ACBA levels is a lack of consensus on 
the form judicial accountability should take, and the ability of the JC to protect judicial 
independence. This debate is divided into a belief that political accountability can serve to bring 
justice further in line with the needs of the society they serve on the one hand, to  resistance to 
any form of political accountability, including removals processes conducted by the JC, on the 
other. The work of the JC is affected by these different interpretations as to its role. Whilst the 
debate is conceptual, it is further fuelled by a mutual and unhelpful mistrust of motives on all 
sides. As shall be further explored in Section 8.6, it is suggested that the best way to approach 
this debate is by shifting the focus away from the ‘who’, and concentrating instead of the ‘how’: 
fomenting more debate and consensus on what constitutes grounds for removal, putting in place 
Page 280 of 366 
 
further due process guarantees, and most crucially, putting the provision of fair and impartial 
judicial services at the heart of the work of the JC. 
 
8.4 The Experience in the Province of Tucuman 
 
Following a controversial reform of the provincial constitution in 2006, the process for the 
removal of lower-court judges in Tucuman is a hybrid system with the investigation of complaints 
entrusted to a committee of the provincial legislature, who then act as prosecutors before an 
independent IJ in cases where they decide to pursue the removal. Whilst this reform appeared 
on the face of it to introduce greater impartiality by introducing an independent IJ, the IJ is 
composed of a majority of political representatives. Within a context of a governing party that 
controls eighty-five percent of the legislature, and strong party control by the Governor, it was 
therefore highly likely that a majority of the members of the Jury would still in practice respond 
to the interests of the government. The creation of the IJ, therefore, only served to create a veil 
of legitimacy over what continues to be a partisan system. Nevertheless, at the time the 
interviews were conducted, no case had proceeded as far as a hearing before the IJ, and there 
was therefore no proof of its levels of partiality or impartiality in practice. The mere perception 
of the partiality of the IJ amongst judges was however enough to create a fear of the process 
amongst judges.  
 
Within this context, it is perhaps not surprising that participants explained that many complaints 
against judges that are protected by the governing party get rejected outright, sometimes under 
the excuse of not wanting to review the content of a judicial ruling. In some cases, the PIC may 
play with its legitimacy by accepting a complaint but then rejecting the case. Many of the cases 
that the Tucuman Bar Association had concluded warranted a trial before an IJ were rejected by 
the PIC. There are also significantly fewer complaints filed against judges, which appears to be in 
large part because lawyers believe that it is pointless to file a complaint about a judge who is 
protected by the government. 
 
Given the control that the governing party has over the PIC, there is no benefit in opening 
investigations into judges as a way of placing pressure on them. The threat of potential 
investigations is already constant and clear. Given the open control the party exerts over the 
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process, they may also lose credibility if they were to use this control to frequently and publicly 
undermine judicial independence. They may therefore chose to resort to under the table means 
of placing pressure on judges, which several participants described as being common, and 
reserve pursuing removals for cases where there is a public demand for it and they can gain 
popularity by putting a judge before a jury.  
 
The fact that there are no competing interests in the PIC also allow it to work quickly and 
efficiently in pursuing its aims. Where there is a political interest in pursuing investigations 
against a judge,   investigations are pushed through the PIC and to a jury very quickly; the process 
was not being used as a tool to pressure the judge, rather it was being used with the full intention 
of actually removing the judge. The emblematic case is of the judges of the Marita Verón case, 
where the public was angry about impunity for the disappearance of Marita, and the judges were 
used as scapegoats by the government to deflect the blame for the high crime levels in the 
province away from their government. The case echoes what happened to judge Freidenberg 
who was removed by the legislature before the jury was introduced in 2006. Ironically, in addition 
to damaging judicial independence, the resulting removals and resignations did not serve any 
accountability purposes either, as the lack of due process and any impartial consideration of the 
facts robbed the processes of any credibility or proper investigation into the facts.  
 
8.5 The Strengths and Weaknesses of the JC Model 
 
The main advantage of the JC model at both the federal and ACBA level is that bringing a case 
before an IJ requires a large percentage of the votes of the plenary of the JC such that currently 
no interest group in either JC can make this decision on their own. This prevents a situation where 
judges can be put on trial for partisan reasons. This in itself is a major advantage when compared 
to the situation in Tucuman where it is within the government’s power to put judges on trial 
where they wish to do so.  
 
It is worth noting that in cases where there are no interests at play, the removals processes in all 
three jurisdictions studied here worked equally well, for example protecting judicial 
independence by rejecting complaints based on the content of judicial rulings. However, the 
strength of a model is best measured by its ability to withstand pressure, and therefore it is 
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important to assess whether the process protects judicial independence where other interests 
are at play. In this sense, the JC has ironically created some problems that are not present in 
Tucuman where the process is more obviously partisan. Whilst the multi-sectorial nature of the 
process ensures that no single sector can dictate decision-making, this has transformed the JC 
into a forum for a battle of interests, characterised by strategic voting to protect interests, block 
other interests, and gain the upper hand in negotiations and alliances. From a practical 
perspective, therefore, the hope that the FJC would be a relatively small, specialized body that 
would manage removals processes more quickly and efficiently than the legislature, has not 
yielded the desired results. The process is weighed down and at times entirely blocked due to 
the very political games that it was hoped it would side-line. 
 
Within the Federal context of a government that attempts to exert control over the judiciary, the 
governing party has succeeded in aligning a majority of councillors, from various sectors, with its 
interests, and therefore the decision to accept or reject complaints can be taken based on the 
partisan interests of the governing party which is problematic for judicial independence and 
accountability. This situation has arisen because councillors representing lawyers, judges, and 
academia have aligned themselves in practice with the partisan interests of political parties. This 
demonstrates that even where the influence of the political sector is limited by a composition 
that gives it a minority of votes in the JC, circumstantial alliances may nonetheless allow political 
parties to exert their influence over a JC.  
 
Whilst the combination of the multi-sectorial and multi-party composition of the FJC, and 
regulation requiring a 2/3 majority in order to accuse a judge before an IJ does protect judges 
from being subjected to a trial for partisan reasons, the experience at the federal level 
demonstrates that this is not enough to protect judicial independence. Judicial independence 
can also be negatively affected where complaints are rejected due to political parties protecting 
compliant judges, and conversely where complaints are made, accepted, and investigated with 
the purpose of placing pressure on independent judges, even where such investigations do not 
proceed to a jury.  
 
This experience demonstrates that the full protection of judicial independence in all JC decisions 
ultimately depends on individual councillors taking decisions in an impartial manner with sole 
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regard to the protection of judicial independence and accountability. Whilst at best a multi-
sectoral JC can incorporate the views and experiences of all stakeholders into the management 
and accountability of the judiciary, there is also the danger that councillors make decisions with 
regard to interests other than protecting judicial independence and accountability. The problems 
in this regard confirms the observation Linn Hammergren made from her experience of working 
with various judiciaries in Latin America, that the biggest challenge facing judicial councils in the 
region is a lack of institutionalisation.1504  
 
Within the context of councillors that respond to the interests of various sectors and political 
parties, JC decisions also become susceptible to pressure from the media and civil society. This 
can be in the form of anger over high crime levels or of societal anger over a judiciary perceived 
as being elite and ‘undemocratic’, resulting in demands for the removal of unpopular judges even 
where their actions do not necessarily warrant removal. The media can also play an instrumental 
role in allowing interests to justify their actions and discredit others, and of sustaining a polarized 
view of the judiciary that is functional to those wishing to exert pressure on it.  
 
Whilst civil society and the media can also play a positive role in monitoring removals processes 
and the functioning of the JC, and media coverage can help place pressure on the JC to take action 
where judges may otherwise have been protected, they cannot solve the central problem facing 
the JC. Whilst greater openness and transparency, such as initiatives to allow for NGOs to 
officially observe and monitor processes and even provide advisory opinions may certainly result 
in some improvement, it will not address the root of the problem. It should be noted that in 
practice a number of practical problems such as funding were also seen to make it difficult for 
civil society to fulfil the role of a watchdog, and such problems would need to be addressed. 
 
The independent IJ plays an important role with regards to guarding against politically motivated 
removals: the proceedings before the IJ appear to be transparent, fair and impartial. However, it 
is important to note that the jury has only ever heard cases that the plenary of the JC have voted 
should go to trial. This can only be the case where there is agreement between all sectors of the 
                                                 
1504 Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America (Rule of Law Series, 
Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Number 28, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2002). See also 
Chapter 2 for a discussion.  
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JC and there is no interest group protecting the judge. This means that the strength of jury to 
withstand pressure from political or partisan interests has not been tested. There are some 
compelling arguments that is may be able to stay impartial in the face of such pressures: jurors 
are selected at random, and jurors need to put their signature on an important decision that will 
face public and supreme court scrutiny. Nevertheless, the way in which the process currently 
works, letting few cases through, demonstrates the advantage of having a two-step system as a 
safe-guard against interests infiltrating the trial process.  
 
Ultimately, the JC model does protect judges from partisan removals, therefore successfully 
protecting judicial independence in a crucial aspect. Careful regulation of the removals process 
combined with institutional openness and transparency, can also limit arbitrariness. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a JC does not guarantee that those making up the council will 
prioritise the protection of judicial independence and accountability over sectorial and partisan 
interests in their decision-making. Given the political nature of the removals process that requires 
a degree of discretion in the decision to investigate and remove judge, there will always be the 
risk of ulterior interests affecting decisions.  
 
8.6 Suggestions for Improvement 
 
The analysis of the data shows clear trends emerging across all three jurisdictions as to the 
underlying issues that are negatively affecting removal processes and therefore also judicial 
independence, accountability, and the reputation of judicial councils. This section will summarise 
these broad issues and set out ideas for ways in which the problems can be addressed. It shall 
start with the underlying issues that are applicable to all three jurisdictions before moving onto 
more detailed suggestions as to ways that removals processes conducted by judicial councils can 
be strengthened.  
 
The biggest lesson arising out of this research is that judicial independence can be negatively 
affected by the actions of a judicial council or legislative impeachment committee even where a 
complaint never reaches an impeachment jury. It is therefore not enough to argue that a judge 
will have the opportunity to defend him or herself before a jury, it is crucial that due process 
guarantees are afforded to the judge at all levels of the process, from the moment a complaint 
is first made.  
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There is a view that was repeated across all three jurisdictions that it is the role of the council or 
committee to represent the people, to make accusations and express popular anger at perceived 
problems in the judiciary. Indeed, within a context of high levels of distrust of the judiciary and 
institutions in general, proper accountability is key to restoring trust and addressing problems in 
the judiciary. However, in order for accountability to be served, due process guarantees need to 
be protected by the council/committee in all of their actions. The judiciary will only be held 
accountable where the removals process does not allow for judges to be protected by political 
parties, and where investigations are carried out in a proper and efficient manner. Decisions 
supported by better investigations would also serve to improve the credibility of the system, 
without which the aim of accountability would not be served.  
 
In clarifying the role of judicial councils and legislative committees, it is necessary to address a 
broad misconception, witnessed across all sectors, of accountability and independence being at 
loggerheads. It would be helpful to recognise that both are tools that are intended to secure the 
same goal of maintaining fair and impartial justice systems for the benefit of its users. This 
recognition would also serve to improve decision-making in the councils and legislative 
committees: it is crucial for the best interests of the provision of impartial judicial services, the 
integrity of the judiciary, to be placed at the heart of all decision making in the council and 
legislative committee. Bona fide differences in perceptions arising out of different sectors can be 
seen as a source of rich information about the challenges facing the judiciary, and not necessarily 
a source of conflict.  
 
Closely tied to the need to improve decision-making in removals processes is a lack of broad 
consensus about what constitutes grounds to remove a judge, compounded by a resistance to 
any form of political accountability by some factions within the judiciary, and an unhelpful mutual 
distrust of motives between the political and legal sectors. In this regard, it is helpful to review 
the legal framework that prescribes both the political nature of the decision to remove a judge 
and the need for due process to be guaranteed to avoid any negative effects on judicial 
independence. The political nature of the decision necessarily incorporates an element of 
discretion that can be helpful in restoring faith in an institution that can improve its 
responsiveness to the needs of its users. Notwithstanding, the current lack of consensus creates 
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damaging legal uncertainty and is damaging to the reputation of councils and the willingness of 
all sectors to participate constructively. Some form of consensus-building within councils is 
therefore suggested, perhaps by way of creating non-prescriptive internal guidelines as to how 
to interpret grounds for removals.  
 
Without addressing the need for decision-making based on promoting the integrity of the 
judiciary and that is subject to rigorous due process guarantees, any other changes in the who or 
how of the system for the removal of judges is unlikely to have any profound effect on the 
credibility and effectiveness of the system. However, the research data suggests that there are a 
number of smaller issues that it may also be beneficial to address. One issue that again arose to 
a greater or lesser extent in all three jurisdictions was that complaints were accepted or rejected 
based on strategical or political interests. Confusion over whether a judge’s ruling can be 
reviewed as part of disciplinary investigations is purportedly used as a way of covering up ulterior 
motives for accepting or rejecting a complaint.  
 
There is therefore clearly a need for greater clarity as to when it is acceptable to reject a 
complaint in limine. The case law on this point is clear: a judge’s ruling can be used to illustrate 
how a judge’s conduct constitutes malperformance, but the judge’s reasoning cannot be 
reviewed as that is the sole jurisdiction of the courts. In other words, it is the judge’s conduct, 
not his ruling, that can be reviewed as part of disciplinary and removals processes. Consequently, 
any complaint about a judge’s ruling ought to be rejected, whereas any complaint about a judge’s 
conduct ought to be investigated, regardless of whether or not reference is made in the 
supporting evidence to a judge’s ruling. Given the problems this mechanism has created, a 
system by which the decision to reject or accept a complaint can be appealed by both a judge or 
a complainant may be beneficial, although such an appeal should be reviewed by councillors 
other than the ones making the initial decision, and should be decided in a very short time frame.  
 
Closely linked to the problems of accepting and rejecting complaints, the strict requirements that 
a complaint needs to comply with including framing a complaint in legal terms and providing 
supporting evidence means that potential complainants decide not to file a complaint, or where 
they fail to comply with these formalities, their complaint is rejected without further 
consideration. It is in the interest of the judiciary that complaints come to light and are addressed, 
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and it should therefore be made easier to file a complaint against a judge. If judges fear negative 
consequences arising out of investigations, the proper way to tackle those is addressing the 
failures of the process, and not by pushing back against any complaints. By way of example, a 
form could be envisaged that sets out the various grounds on which a complaint can be made, 
using the correct legal terminology along with an explanation for non-lawyers, so that a 
complainant can easily tick and fill in the relevant sections. Whilst a complainant should of course 
have room to explain the basis of his or her complaint, and to provide supporting evidence, the 
provision of evidence where not available to the complainant should not be necessary. 
 
The next important step, particularly relevant at the Federal level, would be to address the delays 
in investigations and decisions within the council that create uncertainty for the judge in 
question. Far shorter time limits should be placed on the initial investigations into a complaint, 
with the possibility for the plenary to vote on extending the time limit where the findings of an 
initial investigation suggest reason to continue investigating. In order to avoid ‘shelving’ of 
complaints, any councillor should also be able to propose to dismiss a complaint where no 
investigations have taken place for a fixed number of weeks. A system of explanatory 
accountability could also be envisaged by which a judge can ask for an explanation for decisions 
made in an investigation against him or her.  
 
Finally, it is worth reflecting for a moment on the unease that judges have about the judicial 
council and removals processes. A judicial council will never be able to protect the integrity of an 
institution that does not trust it. Whilst the context in Argentina of low levels of trust in the 
judiciary does point to the benefits of a strong system of accountability and a multi-sectorial JC, 
it may be worth considering small changes that can be made to bring the process further in line 
with international best practice that suggests that judges should form the majority of any 
disciplinary body. One way of achieving this without having to change the composition of the 
council yet again, would be to modify the composition of the internal CDA to be presided by and 
composed predominantly of judges.  
 
This would both make use of the expertise of judges who are well placed to conduct such 
investigations, whilst also restoring some trust in the system among judges thus better protecting 
judicial independence. The advantages of multi-sectorial scrutiny would still be present in the 
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plenary who would make the final decision, thus honouring the political nature of the decision. 
The tighter regulation of the investigations process and ability of the plenary to hear appeals of 
CDA decisions would also give the plenary the necessary oversight of the process to avoid any 
corporatist decisions by the CDA.  
 
The judiciary may be able to ward off improper forms of accountability to some degree by 
embracing proper accountability, and placing the needs of its users for fast, transparent and 
impartial judicial services at the heart of its work. In this regard, the ongoing initiatives promoting 
the transparency of the judiciary in Argentina are to be commended. A Code of Ethics in the form 
of guidelines for judges as to how to deal with various scenarios may help promote the 
institutionalisation and integrity of the judiciary. It is however important to note that such a Code 
of Ethics is merely a working document providing professional guidance for judges and a violation 
of the Code should not be grounds for a disciplinary or removals process in itself, although it may 
sometimes overlap with the need for such procedures. Any code of judicial conduct or code of 
ethics should be formulated by the judiciary itself.1505 
 
8.7 Directions for Further Research 
 
The findings of this thesis demonstrates the need for a more nuanced understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of JCs in protecting judicial independence in various contexts, and for 
more detailed guidance on due process guarantees in removals processes to better protect 
judicial independence and accountability.  With regard to the composition of JCs, which is often 
the main source of debate, the Argentine experiences confirms the dangers of vesting disciplinary 
control of the judiciary to a body that includes members of the legislative and executive 
branches.1506 However, the fact that circumstantial political alliances rather than sectorial 
identities dictate decision-making in the FJC demonstrates that the debate about the 
composition of the council is not a conversation about who the judiciary should be accountable 
                                                 
1505 See Point 16, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Commentary on the Bangalore Principle of Judicial 
Conduct’ (September 2007), 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/publications/Otherpublications/Commentry_on_the_Bangalore_
principles_of_Judicial_Conduct.pdf> accessed 10 May 2020. 
1506 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, paras 101 and 103.  
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to, but rather a mutual lack of trust in actors from all sectors to protect both judicial 
independence and accountability.  
 
The more fundamental but difficult problem behind this issue is how to create an institution that 
is made up of people who pursue not their own interests but the protection of judicial 
independence and accountability. This question warrants further exploration and could be 
considered from many perspectives, from preventative efforts to counter a lack of 
institutionalisation to a consideration of when the pursuit of alternative interests may constitute 
an abuse of office, and the challenges of bringing such actions in practice and indeed whether or 
not they could be a motor for change.  
 
Current international recommendations on composition of the disciplinary arm of JCs to include 
mainly judges assume that politicians will not have the interests of judicial independence at 
heart, and that lawyers, academics, and judges will. The experiences at the Federal, ACBA, and 
Tucuman levels however show that there is a wide range of judicial attitudes to independence 
and accountability, including ‘addicted’ judges that protect the interests of the government on 
one end of the spectrum to judges protecting colleagues on the other, with a range of opinions 
in between. It would be interesting to gain a better understanding of judicial attitudes to 
accountability, and the causes for resistance among some judges or judiciaries. In particular, it 
would be interesting to see how attitudes to accountability vary in accordance with levels of 
independence and corruption. It would also be interesting to see what types of accountability 
programs can improve popular perceptions of judiciaries, and to what extent they can be 
effective in improving the quality of judicial services including access to justice, transparency of 
judicial services, reduced judicial corruption, and a more representative judiciary.   
 
The findings of this thesis also call into question the ability of civil society to counterbalance 
partisan interests and judicial corporatism for a number of reasons, not least that a general lack 
of interest and understanding of the importance of the JC makes it easier for interest groups to 
fill the space and that civil society councillors may therefore align themselves in practice with 
partisan interests. On the flip side, on JCs where civil society is represented but do not have real 
power to change decisions, they may simply end up legitimising partisan or corporatist decisions. 
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In the context of societies with high crime levels and a lack of trust in judiciaries perceived as 
elitist and lacking in independence may also result in unfavourable pressure from civil society 
and the media being placed on removals processes. It would therefore be interesting to consider 
how JCs with various compositions around the world stand up to this pressure to elucidate best 
practice in this regard.  
 
Crucially, however, the findings of this thesis also suggest that focus of the debate on 
composition detracts from a consideration of some more practical steps which could be more 
easily taken to at the least improve removals processes. The suggestions made in Section 8.6 as 
to time-limits on investigations, appeals mechanisms, and increased clarity on grounds for 
complaints and removals, require further consideration as ways of better protecting due process 
and preventing arbitrariness. A comparative analysis of removals processes and guidelines 
conducted by other JCs around the world, for example, may help to reveal which procedures best 
protect judicial independence. 
 
Given that this study is based on interviews with a small number of stakeholders in order to gain 
an understanding of the nature of the factors at play, further research could be envisaged to 
explore concrete cases before the JCs in order to gain an understanding of the extent of the 
problem, as well as placing it within an examination of the other work undertaken by the JC to 
gain an understanding of how the JC works as a whole. The experience at the federal and ACBA 
levels could also be compared to other JCs around the world to gain a further understanding of 
the ways in which the context affects removals processes as conducted by JCs, with a particular 
focus on the challenges posed by public sector corruption for these processes. 
 
In more abstract terms, the lessons extracted from this thesis demonstrate the challenges that a 
context of political polarisation and a breakdown of trust can pose to democratic institutions, JCs 
in this case. Within a context of increasing levels of political polarisation throughout the world, 
this serves as an example that highlights the need to further understand the harmful effects of 
conflictive dialogue, and the importance of finding ways to protect constructive dialogue based 
on a general consent on the importance of the rule of law.   
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Appendix B: Participant Information Sheets 
 
For Federal and ACBA Judges (English Version): 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
FOR A 
Doctoral Research Project on  
the Judicial Council and Judicial Accountability in Practice 
 
  
Introduction 
 
You have been invited to take part in this research project being conducted by Miss Jessica 
Walsh, a PhD student at the University of Surrey’s School of Law.  
 
This Participant Information Sheet explains why this research is being done and what your 
participation will involve for you. Before you decide whether you wish to participate, please take 
the time to read the following information carefully. If there is anything that you do not understand 
or would like clarifying, please ask the researcher.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand how processes for judicial accountability work in 
practice, to identify factors that may be undermining these processes in practice and to 
understand how.  
 
The researcher does not wish to obtain details of any individual cases of judicial accountability, 
rather the aim of the study is to obtain abstract information about common practices and your 
personal views on the subject.    
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study because as a magistrate, you are subject to the 
accountability rules and procedures in place. Your insight and opinion on the ways in which these 
rules and procedures are implemented in practice are therefore highly relevant to this study. 
 
The researcher will also be seeking the views of other stakeholders and will therefore also be 
interviewing lawyers, NGO workers, and members of the Judicial Council.  
 
What will my participation in the study involve? 
 
Your participation will involve one interview with the researcher to be carried out face-to-face at a 
time convenient to you. The interview will last approximately 45 minutes and can be carried out 
either at your place of work or at a café or restaurant convenient to you, in accordance with your 
preference. Please discuss your preferences with the researcher who will endeavour to 
accommodate your wishes as far as possible. Where a face-to-face interview is not possible, the 
researcher may arrange for a Skype or telephone interview at a time convenient to you.  
 
With your consent, the interview will be recorded by the researcher using a voice recorder. The 
voice recording and transcript of the recording will be anonymised and will not be published or 
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released to any third party other than the researcher’s supervisors and potentially her PhD 
examiners. As described below, only the researcher’s summary and analysis of interviews shall 
be published. All data collected from the interviews shall be stored securely in accordance with 
data protection laws.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary, and there will be no consequences if you 
refuse to do so.  
 
If you chose to participate, you may withdraw at any time without explanation. If you withdraw 
from the research during or after your interview, any collected data from your interview will be 
deleted and will not be used. However, once the data has been analysed and published, 
withdrawal will only result in the deletion of the data collected from your interview.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
 
The risk of physical, emotional, or psychological harm arising from your participation in this 
research is minimal as the purpose of the interview is for the researcher to gain an understanding 
of how the system for judicial accountability works in practice, and to gain your views on these 
processes. The interview will therefore take the form of both a conceptual discussion of processes 
and systems, and a discussion of common practice in hypothetical situations that will be set out 
by the researcher. You will not be asked to provide examples of your own experience of the 
system or the experience of others. Where you wish to discuss problems with the system 
therefore, any potential risk of incriminating a colleague or yourself is minimal. You will also be 
asked by the researcher at the start of your interview to avoid disclosing any specific knowledge 
of criminal activity.   
 
Any publications arising from the research will engage in a discussion on a conceptual level and 
anonymise any examples used. The publication of the research will therefore not directly 
disadvantage anyone – participants or third parties. In addition, as explained below, your 
participation in the study shall be kept confidential. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All of the information you give will be anonymised so that those reading reports from the 
research will not know who has contributed to it. 
 
Data will be stored securely in England for 10 years in accordance with the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
However, should you disclose that you or someone else has engaged in criminal activity then the 
researcher may need to report this to an appropriate authority. You will be asked by the 
researcher at the start of your interview to avoid any such disclosure and all interview questions 
have been designed to avoid such an occurrence.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
It is unlikely that you will benefit directly but it is hoped that the interview will provide you with an 
opportunity to talk about processes for judicial accountability such as those overseen by the 
Judicial Council, and shed light on how these processes work in practice. In this way, you will 
help the researcher draw conclusions that will contribute to international academic research on 
judicial accountability both specifically in Argentina, and conceptually.  
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By publishing this research in English, in England and possibly other countries, the researcher 
hopes to raise awareness of the Argentine experience internationally.  
 
The researcher also hopes to publish this research locally in Argentina to contribute to the national 
academic debate on the subject.  
 
Presentation of results  
 
The findings of this research will be published in English and in England, in the researcher’s PhD 
thesis, and possibly in other publications in Argentina, the UK, or elsewhere. The findings will take 
the form of a summary and analysis of the data collected from all of the interviews to be conducted 
by the researcher in connection with this study. The analysis may be of data from individual 
interviews, or collectively from data of various interviews with a category of participants, or globally 
of the data collected from all of the interviews conducted.  
 
However, a full transcript of your interview will not be published. Anonymised quotes from your 
interview may be used in the researcher’s PhD thesis or other publications where you have 
consented to this on the Consent Form.   
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the course 
of the study will be addressed; please contact the researcher’s supervisor, Professor Indira Carr, 
on +44 1483683124 or i.carr@surrey.ac.uk. You may also contact the Head of School, Mr Robert 
Jago on +44 1483686207 or r.jago@surrey.ac.uk.  
  
Contact details of researcher  
 
Miss Jessica Walsh 
Room 38AP02, School of Law 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH 
England 
 
e-mail: j.a.walsh@surrey.ac.uk 
UK mobile number: +44 7952060172 
Argentinean mobile number: [to be inserted upon arrival in Argentina/purchase of a SIM card] 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This study has been organised by the researcher under the supervision of Professor Indira Carr 
and Mr Robert Jago of the University of Surrey. This research is funded by the University of Surrey 
by way of a PhD Studentship.  
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
 
The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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For Federal and ACBA Judges (Spanish Version): 
 
 
FOLLETO EXPLICATIVO PARA PARTICIPANTES 
EN LA 
Investigación Doctoral sobre 
el Consejo de la Magistratura y la Responsabilidad Judicial en la Practica 
 
  
Introducción 
 
Vuestra participación ha sido solicitada en una investigación que está siendo llevada a cabo por 
Jessica Walsh, doctorando en la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Surrey, Inglaterra.  
 
Este Folleto Explicativo para Participantes explica porque esta investigación está siendo llevada 
a cabo y que conllevara su participación. Antes de tomar la decisión de si quiere participar, por 
favor tome el tiempo leer la siguiente información concienzudamente. Si hay algo que no entiende 
o sobre lo cual desea aclaraciones, por favor pregunte a la investigadora.  
 
¿Cuál es el propósito de este estudio? 
 
El propósito de este estudio es el de entender como los procesos de responsabilidad judicial 
funcionan en la práctica, de identificar los factores que podrían estar afectando estos procesos 
en la práctica y de entender cómo.  
 
La investigadora no está interesada en obtener detalles sobre casos específicos de 
responsabilidad judicial, más bien el objetivo del estudio es obtener información abstracta sobre 
prácticas comunes y sus puntos de vistas personales sobre el tema.  
 
¿Porque he sido yo invitado participar en el estudio? 
 
Ha sido invitado participar en este estudio porque en su rol de magistrado, está sujeto a las reglas 
y procedimientos de la responsabilidad judicial. Su conocimiento y opinión sobre la manera en 
que estas reglas y procedimientos están implementados en la práctica son altamente relevantes 
para este estudio.  
 
La investigadora estará recolectando la opinión de otros incluyendo abogados, ONGs, y 
miembros del Consejo de la Magistratura.  
 
¿Qué conllevara mi participación en el estudio? 
 
Su participación conllevara una entrevista con la investigadora que se llevara a cabo en persona 
en una fecha y hora convenientes para usted. La entrevista durara aproximadamente 45 minutos 
y puede realizarse en su lugar de trabajo, en un café o restaurant dependiendo de su 
conveniencia. Se ruega comunicar las posibles fechas con la mayor anticipación para que de 
este modo la investigadora confirme la viabilidad de las mismas. Si no es posible hacer la 
entrevista en persona, la investigadora puede organizar la misma por Skype o vía telefónica en 
una fecha y hora de su conveniencia.  
 
Con su consentimiento, la investigadora grabara la entrevista con un grabador de voz. La 
grabación de audio y su transcripción serán anónimas y no estarán publicadas ni emitidas a 
ningún tercero aparte de los tutores de la investigadora y potencialmente sus examinadores. 
Como esta explicado a continuación, únicamente el resumen y análisis que la investigadora hará 
basado en las entrevistas estarán publicados. Todos los datos recogidos en las entrevistas serán 
guardados en conformidad con las leyes de protección de datos.  
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¿Es necesario que participe? 
 
Su participación en el estudio es enteramente voluntaria y no habrá ninguna consecuencia si 
declina.  
 
Si elige participar, puede retirarse en cualquier momento sin dar explicaciones. Si se retira del 
estudio durante o después de la entrevista, todos los datos recogidos de su entrevista serán 
eliminados y no serán utilizados. Sin embargo, una vez que los datos han sido analizados y 
publicados, retirarse solo puede resultar en la eliminación de los datos recogidos de su entrevista.  
 
¿Cuáles son las posibles desventajas y riesgos de participar?  
 
El riesgo de daño físico, emocional, o psicológico como resultado de su participación en este 
estudio es mínimo dado que el objetivo de la entrevista es que la investigadora logre un 
entendimiento de cómo funcionan los sistemas de responsabilidad jurídica en la práctica. La 
entrevista consistirá  una discusión conceptual de los procesos y sistemas de responsabilidad, y 
una discusión sobre cuáles serían las prácticas comunes en situaciones hipotéticas que 
planteara la investigadora. No le pedirá dar ejemplos sobre su experiencia o la experiencia de 
otros. Por lo tanto, si desea hablar de problemas con el sistema será en un nivel abstracto y 
cualquier riesgo de incriminar a otra persona o a sí mismo será mínimo. La investigadora 
solicitará al principio de su entrevista que se evite revelar cualquier conocimiento de actividad 
criminal.  
 
Toda publicación resultante de este estudio entablará una discusión a nivel conceptual y con 
ejemplos anónimos.  Por lo tanto, la publicación de los resultados de este estudio no supondrá 
inconveniente directo para cualquiera de los participantes o terceros. Su participación en este 
estudio se mantendrá confidencial.  
 
¿Mi participación en el estudio se mantendrá confidencial?  
 
Sí. Toda la información que proporciona será anónima para que cualquiera que lea los informes 
resultantes del estudio no sabrá quien ha contribuido al estudio.  
 
Los datos serán guardados en seguridad en Inglaterra conforme con el Data Protection Act 1998 
de Inglaterra.   
 
Sin embargo, si se revela que usted u otra persona están involucrado en actividades criminales, 
puede que la investigadora necesite denunciarlo ante las autoridades competentes. Sera avisado 
por la investigadora al principio de su entrevista para evitar tales relevaciones. Además, todas 
las preguntas han sido diseñadas para evitar una situación tal.  
 
¿Cuáles son los posibles beneficios de participar en el estudio?  
 
Es improbable el beneficio directo, pero se espera que la entrevista le proporcione la oportunidad 
de hablar sobre el sistema de responsabilidad judicial monitorizado por el Consejo de la 
Magistratura, y de aclarar cómo estos procesos funcionan en la práctica. De esta manera, estará 
ayudando a la investigadora a llegar a conclusiones que contribuirán a la investigación 
académica internacional sobre responsabilidad judicial tanto en la Argentina como en el mundo.  
 
Como este estudio estará publicado en Ingles, en Inglaterra, y posiblemente en otros países, la 
investigadora espera aumentar el nivel de conciencia del modelo Argentino a nivel internacional. 
 
La investigadora también espera publicar los resultados del estudio en castellano, en Argentina.  
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Presentación de los resultados  
 
Los resultados de este estudio serán publicados en Ingles, y en Inglaterra, en la tesis doctoral de 
la investigadora, y posiblemente en otras publicaciones en la Argentina, Inglaterra, u en otros 
países. Los resultados estarán publicados bajo la forma de un resumen analítico de los datos 
recogidos en las entrevistas. El análisis puede ser de datos de entrevistas individuales, o 
colectivamente de los datos de varias entrevistas de la misma categoría de participantes, o 
globalmente de los datos recogidos de todas las entrevistas.  
 
Sin embargo, ninguna transcripción complete de su entrevista será publicado. Citas anónimas 
de su entrevista pueden ser utilizadas en la tesis doctoral de la investigadora o en otras 
publicaciones siempre y cuando se cuente con su consentimiento (ver Formulario de 
Consentimiento).  
 
¿Y si hay un problema? 
 
Cualquier queja o preocupación sobre cualquier aspectos de la manera en la cual ha sido tratado 
durante el estudio será atendido; por favor póngase en contacto con los tutores de la 
investigadora, la catedrática Profesora Indira Carr (+44 1483683124 o i.carr@surrey.ac.uk). 
También puede contactar el Director de la Escuela de Derecho, Sr Robert Jago (+44 1483686207 
o r.jago@surrey.ac.uk).  
  
Datos Personales de la Investigadora 
 
Ms Jessica Walsh 
Room 38AP02, School of Law 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH 
England 
 
e-mail: j.a.walsh@surrey.ac.uk 
tel. Inglés: +44 7952060172 
tel. Argentino:  
 
¿Quién organiza y proporciona la financiación para este estudio? 
 
Este estudio ha sido organizado por la investigadora bajo la supervisión de Profesor Indira Carr 
y Sr Robert Jago de la Universidad de Surrey. El mismo es financiado por la Universidad de 
Surrey.  
 
¿Quién ha revisado este proyecto?  
 
Este estudio ha sido revisado y ha obtenido un Opinión Ética Favorable (Favourable Ethical 
Opinion: FEO) de la Comisión de Ética de la Universidad de Surrey (the University of Surrey 
Ethics Committee).  
 
Gracias por haber tomado el tiempo de leer este Folleto Explicativo.  
Page 299 of 366 
 
 
For Tucuman Judges (English Version): 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
FOR A 
Doctoral Research Project on  
Judicial Accountability in Practice 
 
Introduction 
 
You have been invited to take part in this research project being conducted by Miss Jessica 
Walsh, a PhD student at the University of Surrey’s School of Law.  
 
This Participant Information Sheet explains why this research is being done and what your 
participation will involve for you. Before you decide whether you wish to participate, please take 
the time to read the following information carefully. If there is anything that you do not understand 
or would like clarifying, please ask the researcher.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand how processes for judicial accountability work in 
practice, to identify factors that may be undermining these processes in practice and to 
understand how.  
 
The researcher does not wish to obtain details of any individual cases of judicial accountability, 
rather the aim of the study is to obtain abstract information about common practices and your 
personal views on the subject.    
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study because as a magistrate, you are subject to the 
accountability rules and procedures in place. Your insight and opinion on the ways in which these 
rules and procedures are implemented in practice are therefore highly relevant to this study. 
 
The researcher will also be seeking the views of other stakeholders and will therefore also be 
interviewing lawyers, NGO workers, and members of the Legislative Committee for Impeachment.  
 
What will my participation in the study involve? 
 
Your participation will involve one interview with the researcher to be carried out face-to-face at a 
time convenient to you. The interview will last approximately 45 minutes and can be carried out 
either at your place of work or at a café or restaurant convenient to you, in accordance with your 
preference. Please discuss your preferences with the researcher who will endeavour to 
accommodate your wishes as far as possible. Where a face-to-face interview is not possible, the 
researcher may arrange for a Skype or telephone interview at a time convenient to you.  
 
With your consent, the interview will be recorded by the researcher using a voice recorder. The 
voice recording and transcript of the recording will be anonymised and will not be published or 
released to any third party other than the researcher’s supervisors and potentially her PhD 
examiners. As described below, only the researcher’s summary and analysis of interviews shall 
be published. All data collected from the interviews shall be stored securely in accordance with 
data protection laws.  
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Do I have to take part? 
 
Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary, and there will be no consequences if you 
refuse to do so.  
 
If you chose to participate, you may withdraw at any time without explanation. If you withdraw 
from the research during or after your interview, any collected data from your interview will be 
deleted and will not be used. However, once the data has been analysed and published, 
withdrawal will only result in the deletion of the data collected from your interview.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
 
The risk of physical, emotional, or psychological harm arising from your participation in this 
research is minimal as the purpose of the interview is for the researcher to gain an understanding 
of how the system for judicial accountability works in practice, and to gain your views on these 
processes. The interview will therefore take the form of both a conceptual discussion of processes 
and systems, and a discussion of common practice in hypothetical situations that will be set out 
by the researcher. You will not be asked to provide examples of your own experience of the 
system or the experience of others. Where you wish to discuss problems with the system 
therefore, any potential risk of incriminating a colleague or yourself is minimal. You will also be 
asked by the researcher at the start of your interview to avoid disclosing any specific knowledge 
of criminal activity.   
 
Any publications arising from the research will engage in a discussion on a conceptual level and 
anonymise any examples used. The publication of the research will therefore not directly 
disadvantage anyone – participants or third parties. In addition, as explained below, your 
participation in the study shall be kept confidential. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All of the information you give will be anonymised so that those reading reports from the 
research will not know who has contributed to it. 
 
Data will be stored securely in England for 10 years in accordance with the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
However, should you disclose that you or someone else has engaged in criminal activity then the 
researcher may need to report this to an appropriate authority. You will be asked by the 
researcher at the start of your interview to avoid any such disclosure and all interview questions 
have been designed to avoid such an occurrence.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
It is unlikely that you will benefit directly but it is hoped that the interview will provide you with an 
opportunity to talk about processes for judicial accountability such as those overseen by the 
Legislative Committee for Impeachment, and shed light on how these processes work in practice. 
In this way, you will help the researcher draw conclusions that will contribute to international 
academic research on judicial accountability both specifically in Argentina, and conceptually.  
 
By publishing this research in English, in England and possibly other countries, the researcher 
hopes to raise awareness of the Argentine experience internationally.  
 
The researcher also hopes to publish this research locally in Argentina to contribute to the national 
academic debate on the subject.  
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Presentation of results  
 
The findings of this research will be published in English and in England, in the researcher’s PhD 
thesis, and possibly in other publications in Argentina, the UK, or elsewhere. The findings will take 
the form of a summary and analysis of the data collected from all of the interviews to be conducted 
by the researcher in connection with this study. The analysis may be of data from individual 
interviews, or collectively from data of various interviews with a category of participants, or globally 
of the data collected from all of the interviews conducted.  
 
However, a full transcript of your interview will not be published. Anonymised quotes from your 
interview may be used in the researcher’s PhD thesis or other publications where you have 
consented to this on the Consent Form).   
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the course 
of the study will be addressed; please contact the researcher’s supervisor, Professor Indira Carr, 
on +44 1483683124 or i.carr@surrey.ac.uk. You may also contact the Head of School, Mr Robert 
Jago on +44 1483686207 or r.jago@surrey.ac.uk.  
  
Contact details of researcher  
 
Miss Jessica Walsh 
Room 38AP02, School of Law 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH 
England 
 
e-mail: j.a.walsh@surrey.ac.uk 
UK mobile number: +44 7952060172 
Argentinean mobile number: [to be inserted upon arrival in Argentina/purchase of a SIM card] 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This study has been organised by the researcher under the supervision of Professor Indira Carr 
and Mr Robert Jago of the University of Surrey. This research is funded by the University of Surrey 
by way of a PhD Studentship.  
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
 
The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee. 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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For Tucuman Judges (Spanish Version): 
 
 
FOLLETO EXPLICATIVO PARA PARTICIPANTES 
EN LA 
Investigación Doctoral sobre 
la Responsabilidad Judicial en la Practica 
 
 Introducción 
 
Vuestra participación ha sido solicitada en una investigación que está siendo llevada a cabo por 
Jessica Walsh, doctorando en la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Surrey, Inglaterra.  
 
Este Folleto Explicativo para Participantes explica porque esta investigación está siendo llevada 
a cabo y que conllevara su participación. Antes de tomar la decisión de si quiere participar, por 
favor tome el tiempo leer la siguiente información concienzudamente. Si hay algo que no entiende 
o sobre lo cual desea aclaraciones, por favor pregunte a la investigadora.  
 
¿Cuál es el propósito de este estudio? 
 
El propósito de este estudio es el de entender como los procesos de responsabilidad judicial 
funcionan en la práctica, de identificar los factores que podrían estar afectando estos procesos 
en la práctica y de entender cómo.  
 
La investigadora no está interesada en obtener detalles sobre casos específicos de 
responsabilidad judicial, más bien el objetivo del estudio es obtener información abstracta sobre 
prácticas comunes y sus puntos de vistas personales sobre el tema.  
 
¿Porque he sido yo invitado participar en el estudio? 
 
Ha sido invitado participar en este estudio porque en su rol de magistrado, está sujeto a las reglas 
y procedimientos de la responsabilidad judicial. Su conocimiento y opinión sobre la manera en 
que estas reglas y procedimientos están implementados en la práctica son altamente relevantes 
para este estudio.  
 
La investigadora estará recolectando la opinión de otros incluyendo abogados, ONGs, y 
miembros de la Comisión de Enjuiciamiento.  
 
¿Qué conllevara mi participación en el estudio? 
 
Su participación conllevara una entrevista con la investigadora que se llevara a cabo en persona 
en una fecha y hora convenientes para usted. La entrevista durara aproximadamente 45 minutos 
y puede realizarse en su lugar de trabajo, en un café o restaurant dependiendo de su 
conveniencia. Se ruega comunicar las posibles fechas con la mayor anticipación para que de 
este modo la investigadora confirme la viabilidad de las mismas. Si no es posible hacer la 
entrevista en persona, la investigadora puede organizar la misma por Skype o vía telefónica en 
una fecha y hora de su conveniencia.  
 
Con su consentimiento, la investigadora grabara la entrevista con un grabador de voz. La 
grabación de audio y su transcripción serán anónimas y no estarán publicadas ni emitidas a 
ningún tercero aparte de los tutores de la investigadora y potencialmente sus examinadores. 
Como esta explicado a continuación, únicamente el resumen y análisis que la investigadora hará 
basado en las entrevistas estarán publicados. Todos los datos recogidos en las entrevistas serán 
guardados en conformidad con las leyes de protección de datos.  
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¿Es necesario que participe? 
 
Su participación en el estudio es enteramente voluntaria y no habrá ninguna consecuencia si 
declina.  
 
Si elige participar, puede retirarse en cualquier momento sin dar explicaciones. Si se retira del 
estudio durante o después de la entrevista, todos los datos recogidos de su entrevista serán 
eliminados y no serán utilizados. Sin embargo, una vez que los datos han sido analizados y 
publicados, retirarse solo puede resultar en la eliminación de los datos recogidos de su entrevista.  
 
¿Cuáles son las posibles desventajas y riesgos de participar?  
 
El riesgo de daño físico, emocional, o psicológico como resultado de su participación en este 
estudio es mínimo dado que el objetivo de la entrevista es que la investigadora logre un 
entendimiento de cómo funcionan los sistemas de responsabilidad jurídica en la práctica. La 
entrevista consistirá  una discusión conceptual de los procesos y sistemas de responsabilidad, y 
una discusión sobre cuáles serían las prácticas comunes en situaciones hipotéticas que 
planteara la investigadora. No le pedirá dar ejemplos sobre su experiencia o la experiencia de 
otros. Por lo tanto, si desea hablar de problemas con el sistema será en un nivel abstracto y 
cualquier riesgo de incriminar a otra persona o a sí mismo será mínimo. La investigadora 
solicitará al principio de su entrevista que se evite revelar cualquier conocimiento de actividad 
criminal.  
 
Toda publicación resultante de este estudio entablará una discusión a nivel conceptual y con 
ejemplos anónimos. Por lo tanto, la publicación de los resultados de este estudio no supondrá 
inconveniente directo para cualquiera de los participantes o terceros. Su participación en este 
estudio se mantendrá confidencial.  
 
¿Mi participación en el estudio se mantendrá confidencial?  
 
Sí. Toda la información que proporciona será anónima para que cualquiera que lea los informes 
resultantes del estudio no sabrá quien ha contribuido al estudio.  
 
Los datos serán guardados en seguridad en Inglaterra conforme con el Data Protection Act 1998 
de Inglaterra.   
 
Sin embargo, si se revela que usted u otra persona están involucrado en actividades criminales, 
puede que la investigadora necesite denunciarlo ante las autoridades competentes. Sera avisado 
por la investigadora al principio de su entrevista para evitar tales relevaciones. Además, todas 
las preguntas han sido diseñadas para evitar una situación tal.  
 
¿Cuáles son los posibles beneficios de participar en el estudio?  
 
Es improbable el beneficio directo, pero se espera que la entrevista le proporcione la oportunidad 
de hablar sobre el sistema de responsabilidad judicial monitorizado por la Comisión de 
Enjuiciamiento, y de aclarar cómo estos procesos funcionan en la práctica. De esta manera, 
estará ayudando a la investigadora a llegar a conclusiones que contribuirán a la investigación 
académica internacional sobre responsabilidad judicial tanto en la Argentina como en el mundo.  
 
Como este estudio estará publicado en Ingles, en Inglaterra, y posiblemente en otros países, la 
investigadora espera aumentar el nivel de conciencia del modelo Argentino a nivel internacional. 
 
La investigadora también espera publicar los resultados del estudio en castellano, en Argentina.  
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Presentación de los resultados  
 
Los resultados de este estudio serán publicados en Ingles, y en Inglaterra, en la tesis doctoral de 
la investigadora, y posiblemente en otras publicaciones en la Argentina, Inglaterra, u en otros 
países. Los resultados estarán publicados bajo la forma de un resumen analítico de los datos 
recogidos en las entrevistas. El análisis puede ser de datos de entrevistas individuales, o 
colectivamente de los datos de varias entrevistas de la misma categoría de participantes, o 
globalmente de los datos recogidos de todas las entrevistas.  
 
Sin embargo, ninguna transcripción complete de su entrevista será publicado. Citas anónimas 
de su entrevista pueden ser utilizadas en la tesis doctoral de la investigadora o en otras 
publicaciones siempre y cuando se cuente con su consentimiento (ver Formulario de 
Consentimiento).  
 
¿Y si hay un problema? 
 
Cualquier queja o preocupación sobre cualquier aspectos de la manera en la cual ha sido tratado 
durante el estudio será atendido; por favor póngase en contacto con los tutores de la 
investigadora, la catedrática Profesora Indira Carr (+44 1483683124 o i.carr@surrey.ac.uk). 
También puede contactar el Director de la Escuela de Derecho, Sr Robert Jago (+44 1483686207 
o r.jago@surrey.ac.uk).  
  
Datos Personales de la Investigadora 
 
Ms Jessica Walsh 
Room 38AP02, School of Law 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH 
England 
 
e-mail: j.a.walsh@surrey.ac.uk 
tel. Inglés: +44 7952060172 
tel. Argentino:  
 
¿Quién organiza y proporciona la financiación para este estudio? 
 
Este estudio ha sido organizado por la investigadora bajo la supervisión de Profesor Indira Carr 
y Sr Robert Jago de la Universidad de Surrey. El mismo es financiado por la Universidad de 
Surrey.  
 
¿Quién ha revisado este proyecto?  
 
Este estudio ha sido revisado y ha obtenido un Opinión Ética Favorable (Favourable Ethical 
Opinion: FEO) de la Comisión de Ética de la Universidad de Surrey (the University of Surrey 
Ethics Committee).  
 
Gracias por haber tomado el tiempo de leer este Folleto Explicativo. 
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For Federal and ACBA Lawyers (English Version): 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
FOR A 
Doctoral Research Project on  
the Judicial Council and Judicial Accountability in Practice 
 
Introduction 
 
You have been invited to take part in this research project being conducted by Miss Jessica 
Walsh, a PhD student at the University of Surrey’s School of Law.  
 
This Participant Information Sheet explains why this research is being done and what your 
participation will involve for you. Before you decide whether you wish to participate, please take 
the time to read the following information carefully. If there is anything that you do not understand 
or would like clarifying, please ask the researcher.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand how processes for judicial accountability work in 
practice, to identify factors that may be undermining these processes in practice and to 
understand how.  
 
The researcher does not wish to obtain details of any individual cases of judicial accountability, 
rather the aim of the study is to obtain abstract information about common practices and your 
personal views on the subject.    
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study because as a lawyer, you are in a position to 
invoke the accountability rules and procedures in place. Your insight and opinion on the ways in 
which these rules and procedures are implemented in practice are therefore highly relevant to 
this study.  
 
The researcher will also be seeking the views of other stakeholders and will therefore also be 
interviewing lawyers, NGO workers, and members of the Judicial Council.  
 
What will my participation in the study involve? 
 
Your participation will involve one interview with the researcher to be carried out face-to-face at a 
time convenient to you. The interview will last approximately 45 minutes and can be carried out 
either at your place of work or at a café or restaurant convenient to you, in accordance with your 
preference. Please discuss your preferences with the researcher who will endeavour to 
accommodate your wishes as far as possible. Where a face-to-face interview is not possible, the 
researcher may arrange for a Skype or telephone interview at a time convenient to you.  
 
With your consent, the interview will be recorded by the researcher using a voice recorder. The 
voice recording and transcript of the recording will be anonymised and will not be published or 
released to any third party other than the researcher’s supervisors and potentially her PhD 
examiners. As described below, only the researcher’s summary and analysis of interviews shall 
be published. All data collected from the interviews shall be stored securely in accordance with 
data protection laws.  
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Do I have to take part? 
 
Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary, and there will be no consequences if you 
refuse to do so.  
 
If you chose to participate, you may withdraw at any time without explanation. If you withdraw 
from the research during or after your interview, any collected data from your interview will be 
deleted and will not be used. However, once the data has been analysed and published, 
withdrawal will only result in the deletion of the data collected from your interview.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
 
The risk of physical, emotional, or psychological harm arising from your participation in this 
research is minimal as the purpose of the interview is for the researcher to gain an understanding 
of how the system for judicial accountability works in practice, and to gain your views on these 
processes. The interview will therefore take the form of both a conceptual discussion of processes 
and systems, and a discussion of common practice in hypothetical situations that will be set out 
by the researcher. You will not be asked to provide examples of your own experience of the 
system or the experience of others. Where you wish to discuss problems with the system 
therefore, any potential risk of incriminating a colleague or yourself is minimal. You will also be 
asked by the researcher at the start of your interview to avoid disclosing any specific knowledge 
of criminal activity.   
 
Any publications arising from the research will engage in a discussion on a conceptual level and 
anonymise any examples used. The publication of the research will therefore not directly 
disadvantage anyone – participants or third parties. In addition, as explained below, your 
participation in the study shall be kept confidential. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All of the information you give will be anonymised so that those reading reports from the 
research will not know who has contributed to it. 
 
Data will be stored securely in England for 10 years in accordance with the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
However, should you disclose that you or someone else has engaged in criminal activity then the 
researcher may need to report this to an appropriate authority. You will be asked by the 
researcher at the start of your interview to avoid any such disclosure and all interview questions 
have been designed to avoid such an occurrence.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
It is unlikely that you will benefit directly but it is hoped that the interview will provide you with an 
opportunity to talk about processes for judicial accountability such as those overseen by the 
Judicial Council, and shed light on how these processes work in practice. In this way, you will 
help the researcher draw conclusions that will contribute to international academic research on 
judicial accountability both specifically in Argentina, and conceptually.  
 
By publishing this research in English, in England and possibly other countries, the researcher 
hopes to raise awareness of the Argentine experience internationally.  
 
The researcher also hopes to publish this research locally in Argentina.  
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Presentation of results  
 
The findings of this research will be published in English and in England, in the researcher’s PhD 
thesis, and possibly in other publications in Argentina, the UK, or elsewhere. The findings will take 
the form of a summary and analysis of the data collected from all of the interviews to be conducted 
by the researcher in connection with this study. The analysis may be of data from individual 
interviews, or collectively from data of various interviews with a category of participants, or globally 
of the data collected from all of the interviews conducted.  
 
However, a full transcript of your interview will not be published. Anonymised quotes from your 
interview may be used in the researcher’s PhD thesis or other publications where you have 
consented to this on the Consent Form).   
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the course 
of the study will be addressed; please contact the researcher’s supervisor, Professor Indira Carr, 
on +44 1483683124 or i.carr@surrey.ac.uk. You may also contact the Head of School, Mr Robert 
Jago on +44 1483686207 or r.jago@surrey.ac.uk.  
  
Contact details of researcher  
 
Miss Jessica Walsh 
Room 38AP02, School of Law 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH 
England 
 
e-mail: j.a.walsh@surrey.ac.uk 
UK mobile number: +44 7952060172 
Argentinean mobile number: [to be inserted upon arrival in Argentina/purchase of a SIM card] 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This study has been organised by the researcher under the supervision of Professor Indira Carr 
and Mr Robert Jago of the University of Surrey. This research is funded by the University of 
Surrey.  
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
 
The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee. 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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For Federal and ACBA Lawyers (Spanish Version): 
 
 
FOLLETO EXPLICATIVO PARA PARTICIPANTES 
EN LA 
Investigación Doctoral sobre 
el Consejo de la Magistratura y la Responsabilidad Judicial en la Practica 
 
Introducción 
 
Vuestra participación ha sido solicitada en una investigación que está siendo llevada a cabo por 
Jessica Walsh, doctorando en la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Surrey, Inglaterra.  
 
Este Folleto Explicativo para Participantes explica porque esta investigación está siendo llevada 
a cabo y que conllevara su participación. Antes de tomar la decisión de si quiere participar, por 
favor tome el tiempo leer la siguiente información concienzudamente. Si hay algo que no entiende 
o sobre lo cual desea aclaraciones, por favor pregunte a la investigadora.  
 
¿Cuál es el propósito de este estudio? 
 
El propósito de este estudio es el de entender como los procesos de responsabilidad judicial 
funcionan en la práctica, de identificar los factores que podrían estar afectando estos procesos 
en la práctica y de entender cómo.  
 
La investigadora no está interesada en obtener detalles sobre casos específicos de 
responsabilidad judicial, más bien el objetivo del estudio es obtener información abstracta sobre 
prácticas comunes y sus puntos de vistas personales sobre el tema.  
 
¿Porque he sido yo invitado participar en el estudio? 
 
Ha sido invitado participar en este estudio porque en su rol de abogado, está en posición de 
invocar las reglas y procedimientos de la responsabilidad judicial. Su conocimiento y opinión 
sobre la manera en que estas reglas y procedimientos están implementados en la práctica son 
altamente relevantes para este estudio.  
 
La investigadora estará recolectando la opinión de otros incluyendo abogados, ONGs, y 
miembros del Consejo de la Magistratura.  
 
¿Qué conllevara mi participación en el estudio? 
 
Su participación conllevara una entrevista con la investigadora que se llevara a cabo en persona 
en una fecha y hora convenientes para usted. La entrevista durara aproximadamente 45 minutos 
y puede realizarse en su lugar de trabajo, en un café o restaurant dependiendo de su 
conveniencia. Se ruega comunicar las posibles fechas con la mayor anticipación para que de 
este modo la investigadora confirme la viabilidad de las mismas. Si no es posible hacer la 
entrevista en persona, la investigadora puede organizar la misma por Skype o vía telefónica en 
una fecha y hora de su conveniencia.  
 
Con su consentimiento, la investigadora grabara la entrevista con un grabador de voz. La 
grabación de audio y su transcripción serán anónimas y no estarán publicadas ni emitidas a 
ningún tercero aparte de los tutores de la investigadora y potencialmente sus examinadores. 
Como esta explicado a continuación, únicamente el resumen y análisis que la investigadora hará 
basado en las entrevistas estarán publicados. Todos los datos recogidos en las entrevistas serán 
guardados en conformidad con las leyes de protección de datos.  
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¿Es necesario que participe? 
 
Su participación en el estudio es enteramente voluntaria y no habrá ninguna consecuencia si 
declina.  
 
Si elige participar, puede retirarse en cualquier momento sin dar explicaciones. Si se retira del 
estudio durante o después de la entrevista, todos los datos recogidos de su entrevista serán 
eliminados y no serán utilizados. Sin embargo, una vez que los datos han sido analizados y 
publicados, retirarse solo puede resultar en la eliminación de los datos recogidos de su entrevista.  
 
¿Cuáles son las posibles desventajas y riesgos de participar?  
 
El riesgo de daño físico, emocional, o psicológico como resultado de su participación en este 
estudio es mínimo dado que el objetivo de la entrevista es que la investigadora logre un 
entendimiento de cómo funcionan los sistemas de responsabilidad jurídica en la práctica. La 
entrevista consistirá una discusión conceptual de los procesos y sistemas de responsabilidad, y 
una discusión sobre cuáles serían las prácticas comunes en situaciones hipotéticas que 
planteara la investigadora. No le pedirá dar ejemplos sobre su experiencia o la experiencia de 
otros. Por lo tanto, si desea hablar de problemas con el sistema será en un nivel abstracto y 
cualquier riesgo de incriminar a otra persona o a sí mismo será mínimo. La investigadora 
solicitará al principio de su entrevista que se evite revelar cualquier conocimiento de actividad 
criminal.  
 
Toda publicación resultante de este estudio entablará una discusión a nivel conceptual y con 
ejemplos anónimos. Por lo tanto, la publicación de los resultados de este estudio no supondrá 
inconveniente directo para cualquiera de los participantes o terceros. Su participación en este 
estudio se mantendrá confidencial.  
 
¿Mi participación en el estudio se mantendrá confidencial?  
 
Sí. Toda la información que proporciona será anónima para que cualquiera que lea los informes 
resultantes del estudio no sabrá quien ha contribuido al estudio.  
 
Los datos serán guardados en seguridad en Inglaterra conforme con el Data Protection Act 1998 
de Inglaterra.   
 
Sin embargo, si se revela que usted u otra persona están involucrado en actividades criminales, 
puede que la investigadora necesite denunciarlo ante las autoridades competentes. Sera avisado 
por la investigadora al principio de su entrevista para evitar tales relevaciones. Además, todas 
las preguntas han sido diseñadas para evitar una situación tal.  
 
¿Cuáles son los posibles beneficios de participar en el estudio?  
 
Es improbable el beneficio directo, pero se espera que la entrevista le proporcione la oportunidad 
de hablar sobre el sistema de responsabilidad judicial monitorizado por el Consejo de la 
Magistratura, y de aclarar cómo estos procesos funcionan en la práctica. De esta manera, estará 
ayudando a la investigadora a llegar a conclusiones que contribuirán a la investigación 
académica internacional sobre responsabilidad judicial tanto en la Argentina como en el mundo.  
 
Como este estudio estará publicado en Ingles, en Inglaterra, y posiblemente en otros países, la 
investigadora espera aumentar el nivel de conciencia del modelo Argentino a nivel internacional. 
 
La investigadora también espera publicar los resultados del estudio en castellano, en Argentina.  
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Presentación de los resultados  
 
Los resultados de este estudio serán publicados en Ingles, y en Inglaterra, en la tesis doctoral de 
la investigadora, y posiblemente en otras publicaciones en la Argentina, Inglaterra, u en otros 
países. Los resultados estarán publicados bajo la forma de un resumen analítico de los datos 
recogidos en las entrevistas. El análisis puede ser de datos de entrevistas individuales, o 
colectivamente de los datos de varias entrevistas de la misma categoría de participantes, o 
globalmente de los datos recogidos de todas las entrevistas.  
 
Sin embargo, ninguna transcripción complete de su entrevista será publicado. Citas anónimas 
de su entrevista pueden ser utilizadas en la tesis doctoral de la investigadora o en otras 
publicaciones siempre y cuando se cuente con su consentimiento (ver Formulario de 
Consentimiento).  
 
¿Y si hay un problema? 
 
Cualquier queja o preocupación sobre cualquier aspectos de la manera en la cual ha sido tratado 
durante el estudio será atendido; por favor póngase en contacto con los tutores de la 
investigadora, la catedrática Profesora Indira Carr (+44 1483683124 o i.carr@surrey.ac.uk). 
También puede contactar el Director de la Escuela de Derecho, Sr Robert Jago (+44 1483686207 
o r.jago@surrey.ac.uk).  
  
Datos Personales de la Investigadora 
 
Ms Jessica Walsh 
Room 38AP02, School of Law 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH 
England 
 
e-mail: j.a.walsh@surrey.ac.uk 
tel. Inglés: +44 7952060172 
tel. Argentino:  
 
¿Quién organiza y proporciona la financiación para este estudio? 
 
Este estudio ha sido organizado por la investigadora bajo la supervisión de Profesor Indira Carr 
y Sr Robert Jago de la Universidad de Surrey. El mismo es financiado por la Universidad de 
Surrey.  
 
¿Quién ha revisado este proyecto?  
 
Este estudio ha sido revisado y ha obtenido un Opinión Ética Favorable (Favourable Ethical 
Opinion: FEO) de la Comisión de Ética de la Universidad de Surrey (the University of Surrey 
Ethics Committee).  
 
 
Gracias por haber tomado el tiempo de leer este Folleto Explicativo.  
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For people working in NGOs, Judicial Councils, Impeachment Commissions, and Impeachment 
Juries (English Version): 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
FOR A 
Doctoral Research Project on  
the Judicial Council and Judicial Accountability in Practice 
 
Introduction 
 
You have been invited to take part in this research project being conducted by Miss Jessica 
Walsh, a PhD student at the University of Surrey’s School of Law.  
 
This Participant Information Sheet explains why this research is being done and what your 
participation will involve for you. Before you decide whether you wish to participate, please take 
the time to read the following information carefully. If there is anything that you do not understand 
or would like clarifying, please ask the researcher.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand how processes for judicial accountability work in 
practice, to identify factors that may be undermining these processes in practice and to 
understand how.  
 
The researcher does not wish to obtain details of any individual cases of judicial accountability, 
rather the aim of the study is to obtain abstract information about common practices and your 
personal views on the subject.    
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study as due to your work on the judiciary, you are in 
a position to monitor and invoke the accountability rules and procedures in place. Your insight 
and opinion on the ways in which these rules and procedures are implemented in practice are 
therefore highly relevant to this study.  
 
The researcher will also be seeking the views of other stakeholders and will therefore also be 
interviewing lawyers, NGO workers, and members of the Judicial Council.  
 
What will my participation in the study involve? 
 
Your participation will involve one interview with the researcher to be carried out face-to-face at a 
time convenient to you. The interview will last approximately 45 minutes and can be carried out 
either at your place of work or at a café or restaurant convenient to you, in accordance with your 
preference. Please discuss your preferences with the researcher who will endeavour to 
accommodate your wishes as far as possible. Where a face-to-face interview is not possible, the 
researcher may arrange for a Skype or telephone interview at a time convenient to you.  
 
With your consent, the interview will be recorded by the researcher using a voice recorder. The 
voice recording and transcript of the recording will be anonymised and will not be published or 
released to any third party other than the researcher’s supervisors and potentially her PhD 
examiners. As described below, only the researcher’s summary and analysis of interviews shall 
be published. All data collected from the interviews shall be stored securely in accordance with 
data protection laws.  
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Do I have to take part? 
 
Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary, and there will be no consequences if you 
refuse to do so.  
 
If you chose to participate, you may withdraw at any time without explanation. If you withdraw 
from the research during or after your interview, any collected data from your interview will be 
deleted and will not be used. However, once the data has been analysed and published, 
withdrawal will only result in the deletion of the data collected from your interview.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
 
The risk of physical, emotional, or psychological harm arising from your participation in this 
research is minimal as the purpose of the interview is for the researcher to gain an understanding 
of how the system for judicial accountability works in practice, and to gain your views on these 
processes. The interview will therefore take the form of both a conceptual discussion of processes 
and systems, and a discussion of common practice in hypothetical situations that will be set out 
by the researcher. You will not be asked to provide examples of your own experience of the 
system or the experience of others. Where you wish to discuss problems with the system 
therefore, any potential risk of incriminating a colleague or yourself is minimal. You will also be 
asked by the researcher at the start of your interview to avoid disclosing any specific knowledge 
of criminal activity.   
 
Any publications arising from the research will engage in a discussion on a conceptual level and 
anonymise any examples used. The publication of the research will therefore not directly 
disadvantage anyone – participants or third parties. In addition, as explained below, your 
participation in the study shall be kept confidential. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All of the information you give will be anonymised so that those reading reports from the 
research will not know who has contributed to it. 
 
Data will be stored securely in England for 10 years in accordance with the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
However, should you disclose that you or someone else has engaged in criminal activity then the 
researcher may need to report this to an appropriate authority. You will be asked by the 
researcher at the start of your interview to avoid any such disclosure and all interview questions 
have been designed to avoid such an occurrence.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
It is unlikely that you will benefit directly but it is hoped that the interview will provide you with an 
opportunity to talk about processes for judicial accountability such as those overseen by the 
Judicial Council, and shed light on how these processes work in practice. In this way, you will 
help the researcher draw conclusions that will contribute to international academic research on 
judicial accountability both specifically in Argentina, and conceptually.  
 
By publishing this research in English, in England and possibly other countries, the researcher 
hopes to raise awareness of the Argentine experience internationally.The researcher also hopes 
to publish this research locally in Argentina to contribute to the national academic debate on the 
subject.  
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Presentation of results  
 
The findings of this research will be published in English and in England, in the researcher’s PhD 
thesis, and possibly in other publications in Argentina, the UK, or elsewhere. The findings will take 
the form of a summary and analysis of the data collected from all of the interviews to be conducted 
by the researcher in connection with this study. The analysis may be of data from individual 
interviews, or collectively from data of various interviews with a category of participants, or globally 
of the data collected from all of the interviews conducted.  
 
However, a full transcript of your interview will not be published. Anonymised quotes from your 
interview may be used in the researcher’s PhD thesis or other publications where you have 
consented to this on the Consent Form).   
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the course 
of the study will be addressed; please contact the researcher’s supervisor, Professor Indira Carr, 
on +44 1483683124 or i.carr@surrey.ac.uk. You may also contact the Head of School, Mr Robert 
Jago on +44 1483686207 or r.jago@surrey.ac.uk.  
  
Contact details of researcher  
 
Miss Jessica Walsh 
Room 38AP02, School of Law 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH 
England 
 
e-mail: j.a.walsh@surrey.ac.uk 
UK mobile number: +44 7952060172 
Argentinean mobile number: [to be inserted upon arrival in Argentina/purchase of a SIM card] 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This study has been organised by the researcher under the supervision of Professor Indira Carr 
and Mr Robert Jago of the University of Surrey. This research is funded by the University of Surrey 
by way of a PhD Studentship.  
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
 
The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee. 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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For people working in NGOs, Judicial Councils,  
Impeachment Commissions, and Impeachment Juries (Spanish Version): 
 
FOLLETO EXPLICATIVO PARA PARTICIPANTES 
EN LA 
Investigación Doctoral sobre 
el Consejo de la Magistratura y la Responsabilidad Judicial en la Practica 
 
  
Introducción 
 
Vuestra participación ha sido solicitada en una investigación que está siendo llevada a cabo por 
Jessica Walsh, doctorando en la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Surrey, Inglaterra.  
 
Este Folleto Explicativo para Participantes explica porque esta investigación está siendo llevada 
a cabo y que conllevara su participación. Antes de tomar la decisión de si quiere participar, por 
favor tome el tiempo leer la siguiente información concienzudamente. Si hay algo que no entiende 
o sobre lo cual desea aclaraciones, por favor pregunte a la investigadora.  
 
¿Cuál es el propósito de este estudio? 
 
El propósito de este estudio es el de entender cómo los procesos de responsabilidad judicial 
funcionan en la práctica, de identificar los factores que podrían estar afectando estos procesos 
en la práctica y de entender cómo.  
 
La investigadora no está interesada en obtener detalles sobre casos específicos de 
responsabilidad judicial, más bien el objetivo del estudio es obtener información abstracta sobre 
prácticas comunes y sus puntos de vistas personales sobre el tema.  
 
¿Porque he sido yo invitado participar en el estudio? 
 
Ha sido invitado participar en este estudio porque a raíz de su trabajo acerca de la justicia, está 
en posición de monitorear e invocar las reglas y procedimientos de la responsabilidad judicial. 
Su conocimiento y opinión sobre la manera en que estas reglas y procedimientos están 
implementados en la práctica son altamente relevantes para este estudio.  
 
La investigadora estará recolectando la opinión de otros incluyendo abogados, ONGs, y 
miembros del Consejo de la Magistratura.  
 
¿Qué conllevara mi participación en el estudio? 
 
Su participación conllevara una entrevista con la investigadora que se llevara a cabo en persona 
en una fecha y hora convenientes para usted. La entrevista durara aproximadamente 45 minutos 
y puede realizarse en su lugar de trabajo, en un café o restaurant dependiendo de su 
conveniencia. Se ruega comunicar las posibles fechas con la mayor anticipación para que de 
este modo la investigadora confirme la viabilidad de las mismas. Si no es posible hacer la 
entrevista en persona, la investigadora puede organizar la misma por Skype o vía telefónica en 
una fecha y hora de su conveniencia.  
 
Con su consentimiento, la investigadora grabara la entrevista con un grabador de voz. La 
grabación de audio y su transcripción serán anónimas y no estarán publicadas ni emitidas a 
ningún tercero aparte de los tutores de la investigadora y potencialmente sus examinadores. 
Como esta explicado a continuación, únicamente el resumen y análisis que la investigadora hará 
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basado en las entrevistas estarán publicados. Todos los datos recogidos en las entrevistas serán 
guardados en conformidad con las leyes de protección de datos.  
 
¿Es necesario que participe? 
 
Su participación en el estudio es enteramente voluntaria y no habrá ninguna consecuencia si 
declina.  
 
Si elige participar, puede retirarse en cualquier momento sin dar explicaciones. Si se retira del 
estudio durante o después de la entrevista, todos los datos recogidos de su entrevista serán 
eliminados y no serán utilizados. Sin embargo, una vez que los datos han sido analizados y 
publicados, retirarse solo puede resultar en la eliminación de los datos recogidos de su entrevista.  
 
¿Cuáles son las posibles desventajas y riesgos de participar?  
 
El riesgo de daño físico, emocional, o psicológico como resultado de su participación en este 
estudio es mínimo dado que el objetivo de la entrevista es que la investigadora logre un 
entendimiento de cómo funcionan los sistemas de responsabilidad jurídica en la práctica. La 
entrevista consistirá una discusión conceptual de los procesos y sistemas de responsabilidad, y 
una discusión sobre cuáles serían las prácticas comunes en situaciones hipotéticas que 
planteara la investigadora. No le pedirá dar ejemplos sobre su experiencia o la experiencia de 
otros. Por lo tanto, si desea hablar de problemas con el sistema será en un nivel abstracto y 
cualquier riesgo de incriminar a otra persona o a sí mismo será mínimo. La investigadora 
solicitará al principio de su entrevista que se evite revelar cualquier conocimiento de actividad 
criminal.  
 
Toda publicación resultante de este estudio entablará una discusión a nivel conceptual y con 
ejemplos anónimos. Por lo tanto, la publicación de los resultados de este estudio no supondrá 
inconveniente directo para cualquiera de los participantes o terceros. Su participación en este 
estudio se mantendrá confidencial.  
 
¿Mi participación en el estudio se mantendrá confidencial?  
 
Sí. Toda la información que proporciona será anónima para que cualquiera que lea los informes 
resultantes del estudio no sabrá quien ha contribuido al estudio.  
 
Los datos serán guardados en seguridad en Inglaterra conforme con el Data Protection Act 1998 
de Inglaterra.   
 
Sin embargo, si se revela que usted u otra persona están involucrado en actividades criminales, 
puede que la investigadora necesite denunciarlo ante las autoridades competentes. Sera avisado 
por la investigadora al principio de su entrevista para evitar tales relevaciones. Además, todas 
las preguntas han sido diseñadas para evitar una situación tal.  
 
¿Cuáles son los posibles beneficios de participar en el estudio?  
 
Es improbable el beneficio directo, pero se espera que la entrevista le proporcione la oportunidad 
de hablar sobre el sistema de responsabilidad judicial monitorizado por el Consejo de la 
Magistratura, y de aclarar cómo estos procesos funcionan en la práctica. De esta manera, estará 
ayudando a la investigadora a llegar a conclusiones que contribuirán a la investigación 
académica internacional sobre responsabilidad judicial tanto en la Argentina como en el mundo.  
 
Como este estudio estará publicado en Ingles, en Inglaterra, y posiblemente en otros países, la 
investigadora espera aumentar el nivel de conciencia del modelo Argentino a nivel internacional. 
La investigadora también espera publicar los resultados del estudio en castellano, en Argentina.  
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Presentación de los resultados  
 
Los resultados de este estudio serán publicados en Ingles, y en Inglaterra, en la tesis doctoral de 
la investigadora, y posiblemente en otras publicaciones en la Argentina, Inglaterra, u en otros 
países. Los resultados estarán publicados bajo la forma de un resumen analítico de los datos 
recogidos en las entrevistas. El análisis puede ser de datos de entrevistas individuales, o 
colectivamente de los datos de varias entrevistas de la misma categoría de participantes, o 
globalmente de los datos recogidos de todas las entrevistas.  
 
Sin embargo, ninguna transcripción complete de su entrevista será publicado. Citas anónimas 
de su entrevista pueden ser utilizadas en la tesis doctoral de la investigadora o en otras 
publicaciones siempre y cuando se cuente con su consentimiento (ver Formulario de 
Consentimiento).  
 
¿Y si hay un problema? 
 
Cualquier queja o preocupación sobre cualquier aspectos de la manera en la cual ha sido tratado 
durante el estudio será atendido; por favor póngase en contacto con los tutores de la 
investigadora, la catedrática Profesora Indira Carr (+44 1483683124 o i.carr@surrey.ac.uk). 
También puede contactar el Director de la Escuela de Derecho, Sr Robert Jago (+44 1483686207 
o r.jago@surrey.ac.uk).  
  
Datos Personales de la Investigadora 
 
Ms Jessica Walsh 
Room 38AP02, School of Law 
University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH, England 
 
e-mail: j.a.walsh@surrey.ac.uk 
tel. Inglés: +44 7952060172 
tel. Argentino:  
 
¿Quién organiza y proporciona la financiación para este estudio? 
 
Este estudio ha sido organizado por la investigadora bajo la supervisión de Profesor Indira Carr 
y Sr Robert Jago de la Universidad de Surrey. El mismo es financiado por la Universidad de 
Surrey.  
 
¿Quién ha revisado este proyecto?  
 
Este estudio ha sido revisado y ha obtenido un Opinión Ética Favorable (Favourable Ethical 
Opinion: FEO) de la Comisión de Ética de la Universidad de Surrey (the University of Surrey 
Ethics Committee).  
 
 
Gracias por haber tomado el tiempo de leer este Folleto Explicativo.  
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Appendix C: Participant Consent Form in English and Spanish 
 
Consent Form 
 
 I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study on the judicial council and  
judicial accountability in practice.                                          
 I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a full 
explanation by the researcher of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration of the 
study, and what my participation will entail. I have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions on all aspects of the study and have understood the advice and information given 
as a result.     
 
 I consent to audio recordings/ audio-visual recordings (delete as appropriate) being made 
of my interview with the researcher.  
 
 I consent to potentially being contacted by the researcher with follow-up questions after my 
interview.   
                            
 I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, being 
used for this study and other research. I understand that all personal data relating to 
participants is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in accordance with 
Argentine data protection laws and the Data Protection Act (1998) of England and Wales. 
 
 I consent to the researcher anonymously quoting what I say during interview in publications 
arising out of the research.  
 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to justify 
my decision and without prejudice. 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in 
this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree to 
comply with the instructions and restrictions of the study. 
 
Name of participant (BLOCK CAPITALS ..................................................... 
 
Signed ......................................................  
  
Date ......................................................  
 
 
Name of researcher (BLOCK CAPITALS) …….............................................. 
   
Signed   .................................................... 
 
Date      …………………………………….. 
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Formulario de Consentimiento 
 
 
 Yo, el/la abajo firmante, accedo voluntariamente a participar en el estudio sobre el Consejo 
de la Magistratura y la responsabilidad judicial en la práctica.   
 He leído y comprendido el Folleto Explicativo que me ha proporcionado la investigadora. 
He recibido una explicación completa de la investigadora, de la naturaleza y propósito del 
estudio, y de la ubicación y probable duración de la entrevista, y de que conllevara mi 
participación. He tenido la oportunidad de hacer preguntas sobre todos aspectos del 
estudio y he comprendido el resultante consejo e información.  
 
 Autorizo a la investigadora a realizar una grabación de sonido/ grabación audiovisual de 
la entrevista.  
 
 Autorizo a que la investigadora me contacte para dar seguimiento después de la 
entrevista. 
                            
 Autorizo que mis datos personales, detallados en el Folleto Explicativo proporcionado por 
la investigadora, sean utilizados para este estudio y otras investigaciones. Entiendo que 
todos los datos personales de los participantes serán guardados y procesados en estricta 
confidencialidad, y en conformidad con las leyes de protección de datos de Argentina y de 
Inglaterra.   
 
 Autorizo a la investigadora a citar de manera anónima mis declaraciones durante la 
entrevista en publicaciones resultantes del estudio.   
 
 Entiendo que estoy en libertad de retirarme del estudio en cualquier momento sin tener 
que proporcionar una justificación por mi decisión y sin perjuicio alguno.  
 
 He leído y entendido lo anterior y accedo voluntariamente participar en este estudio. He 
tenido suficiente tiempo para considerar mi participación y estoy de acuerdo en cumplir 
con las instrucciones y restricciones de este estudio.  
 
Nombre del participante (EN MAYÚSCULA)   ...................................................... 
 
Firmado ......................................................  
 
En Fecha ......................................................  
 
Nombre de la Investigadora (EN MAYÚSCULA)  ….............................................. 
  
Firmado  .................................................... 
 
En Fecha ……………………………………..                                                      
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Appendix D: Interview Schedules in English and Spanish 
Schedule for Interviews with Lawyers and People Working for NGOs (English)  
 
1. What is your opinion on the last year’s judicial reforms?  
a. What do think of the attempted changes to the composition of the National Judicial 
Council? 
b. If favourable: do you think similar reforms should be proposed at the provincial level?  
c. If negative: What is your opinion on the current constitution of the judicial council?  
2. The reform was based on the supposed need for the judiciary to be “democratized”. What do 
you understand by “democratization”?  
a. What do you believe “democratization” should include? 
b. If we define civil society as the sum of all national residents acting in their personal 
interests, what type of role do you believe civil society should have in the monitoring 
and disciplining of judges? What changes could be implemented to afford civil society 
such a role? 
3. What is your opinion on the current level of access you have to information about the judiciary 
and judicial proceedings?  
a. (If the answer is negative): How could access be improved? 
b. Have you ever tried to request the sworn declaration of assets of any judges? If yes, 
were you successful? If not, why not?    
4. Imagine a situation where you suspect a judge has been bribed to rule in a biased manner; 
would you communicate this to the relevant authorities?  
a. Why? /why not?  
b. If yes, how would you communicate it?  
c. If no, why not? What would need to change about the process in order for you to 
change your mind?  
d. Are there any alternative steps that could be taken? Would these be more or less 
effective? Why?  
5. If, hypothetically, you made a complaint about judicial corruption to the judicial council/the 
legislative committee for impeachment, do you believe that your complaint would be properly 
investigated?  
a. Why/why not?  
b. Do you think that the investigation would be conducted in a timely fashion?  
c. Do you think that you would be entitled to updates concerning the investigation?  
d. What factors do you think would affect the outcome of the investigation? 
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e. Who would be in charge of the investigation? 
6. Where a complaint that you, hypothetically, made about judicial corruption were referred to the 
Special Jury, do you believe that the trial will be conducted in a fair and impartial manner?  
a. If not, why not?  
b. What factors do you think would affect the outcome of the trial? 
c. Who would decide on the outcome of the trial? 
7. In the event that a judge is removed from office by a Special Jury for corruption, do you believe 
that criminal proceedings for corruption would be commenced? 
a. If not, why not?  
b. If yes, do you believe that the proceedings will be conducted in a fair and impartial 
manner?  
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Schedule for Interviews with Lawyers and People Working for NGOs (Spanish)  
 
1. ¿Cual es su opinión sobre la reforma judicial del 2013? 
a. ¿Qué opina sobre los cambios que sugirió la reforma en la composición del Consejo de 
la Magistratura? 
b. Si la respuesta es favorable: ¿Cree que reformas similares deben ser sugeridos a nivel 
provincial? 
c. Si la respuesta es negativo: ¿Qué opina sobre la composición actual del Consejo de la 
Magistratura? 
 
2. La reforma se ha basado en la supuesta necesidad de “democratizar” la justicia. ¿Qué entiende 
usted con “democratización”? 
a. En su opinión ¿qué debe contener esta “democratización”? 
b. Si entendemos el término “sociedad civil” como el conjunto de todos los residentes del 
país actuando en sus intereses personales, ¿qué rol cree usted que debería tener la 
sociedad civil en cuanto a monitorear y disciplinar a magistrados? ¿Qué cambios en el 
sistema podrán lograr rol de este tipo?  
 
3. ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre los niveles actuales de acceso a la información sobre el poder judicial y 
los procedimientos jurídicos? 
a. Si la respuesta es negativa: ¿Cómo se podría mejorar el acceso? 
b. ¿Alguna vez ha entregado una solicitud de acceso a la declaración jurada de bienes de 
un magistrado? Si lo han hecho, ¿lo ha obtenido? Si no, ¿Por qué no? 
 
4. Imagínese una situación en lo cual usted sospecha que un magistrado ha aceptado una coima 
para dictar a favor de alguien; ¿lo comunicarían a los autoridades competentes? 
a. ¿Por qué/ porque no? 
b. Si lo hiciese, ¿Cómo lo comunicarían? 
c. Si no lo hiciese ¿Cómo tendrá que cambiar el sistema para que cambie de opinión? 
d. ¿Existen pasos alternativos que se podrían seguir? ¿Serian más o menos efectivos? ¿Por 
qué?  
 
5. Imaginamos que ha denunciado un acto de corrupción judicial al consejo de la magistratura/la 
comisión de enjuiciamiento, ¿usted cree que su denuncia estará investigada adecuadamente? 
a. ¿Por qué cree eso? Porque no? 
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b. ¿Cree que la investigación se hará en un plazo razonable? 
c. ¿Cree que tendrá derecho a reclamar actualizaciones sobre la investigación? 
d. ¿Qué factores afectaran, en su opinión, el resultado de la investigación? 
e. ¿Quién estará a cargo de la investigación? 
 
6. Imaginamos que el Consejo de la Magistratura remite su denuncia al Jurado de Enjuiciamiento, 
¿cree usted que el juicio estará llevado a cabo de una manera justa e imparcial?  
a. Si no, ¿Por qué no? 
b. ¿Qué factores influirían, bajo su opinión, el resultado del juicio? 
c. ¿Quién decidiría el resultado del juicio? 
 
7. Imaginamos que el magistrado sea removido de su cargo por el Jurado de Enjuiciamiento, ¿cree 
usted que procedimientos penales serán interpuestos? 
a. Si no, ¿Por qué no? 
b. Si cree que si, ¿cree usted que el procedimiento será llevado a cabo de una manera 
justa e imparcial? 
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Schedule for Interviews with Judges and Former Judges (English) 
 
1. What is your opinion on the last year’s judicial reforms?  
a. What do think of the attempted changes to the composition of the National Judicial 
Council? 
b. (If favourable) do you think similar reforms should be proposed at the provincial level?  
c. If negative: What is your opinion on the current constitution of the judicial council?  
2. The reforms suggest the need for the judiciary to be “democratized”. What do you understand 
by “democratization”?  
a. If we define civil society as the sum of all national residents acting in their personal 
interests, what type of role do you believe civil society should have in the monitoring 
and disciplining of judges? What changes could be implemented to afford civil society 
such a role? 
3. What is your opinion on current levels of access to information on judicial proceedings?  
a. How is this implemented in practice?  
4. What do you think of the requirement for judges to file public declarations of assets?  
a. Have you ever been requested to file such a declaration?  
b. What are the problems/advantages of this requirement?  
5. Anyone has the right to file a complaint against a judge for corruption before the Judicial 
Council/Legislative Committee for Impeachment. In your opinion is this something positive or 
negative?  
a. In your opinion, how does this right co-exist with the principle of independence of the 
judiciary? 
b. What possible changes can you envisage to improve the complaints system? 
6. What is your opinion on the way in which such investigations are carried out by the Judicial 
Council/Legislative Committee for Impeachment?  
a. Do you believe that such investigations are carried out in a reasonable timeframe? 
b. Do you believe that you would have the right to request updates on the investigation?  
c. What factors, in your opinion, would affect the result of the investigation?  
d. Who would be in charge of the investigation?  
7. Hypothetically, where a complaint that is made about purported judicial corruption is referred 
to the Special Jury, do you believe that the trial would be conducted in a fair and impartial 
manner?  
a. If not, why not?  
b. What factors do you believe would be taken into consideration at trial?  
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c. Who decides the result of the trial?  
8. To your knowledge, what are the different ways in which judges are disciplined in practice?  
a. What measures and procedures are used?  
b. How common in your opinion are such procedures?  
9. How effective is the Judicial Council/Impeachment Committee in its role of monitoring and 
disciplining judicial corruption?  
a. If you were to suggest changes, what would they be?  
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Schedule for Interviews with Judges and Former Judges (Spanish) 
1. ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre la reforma judicial del 2013? 
a. ¿Qué opina sobre los cambios que sugirió la reforma en la composición del Consejo de 
la Magistratura? 
b. Si la respuesta es favorable: ¿Cree que reformas parecidas deben ser sugeridos a nivel 
provincial? 
c. Si la respuesta es negativo: ¿Qué opina sobre la composición actual del Consejo de la 
Magistratura? 
 
2. La reforma se ha basado en la supuesta necesidad de “democratizar” la justicia. ¿Qué entiende 
usted con “democratización”? 
a. En su opinión ¿qué debe contener esta “democratización”? 
b. Si entendemos el término “sociedad civil” como el conjunto de todos los residentes del 
país actuando en sus intereses personales, ¿qué rol cree usted que debería tener la 
sociedad civil en cuanto a monitorear y disciplinar a magistrados? ¿Qué cambios en el 
sistema podrán lograr un rol de este tipo?  
 
3. ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre los niveles actuales de acceso a la información sobre los 
procedimientos jurídicos? 
a. ¿Cómo esta implementado en la práctica? 
 
4. ¿Qué opina sobre el requisito que obliga a los magistrados a entregar declaraciones juradas de 
bienes?  
a. ¿Usted ha recibido alguna vez una solicitud entregar un tal declaración? 
b. ¿Cuáles son los problemas o las ventajas de este requisito? 
 
5. Cualquiera tiene el derecho interponer una denuncia contra un magistrado por corrupción 
frente al Consejo de la Magistratura/Comisión de Enjuiciamiento. En su opinión, ¿esto es algo 
positivo o negativo? 
a. En su opinión, ¿Cómo co-existe este derecho con el principio de la independencia 
judicial?  
b. ¿Qué cambios podría imaginarse para mejorar el sistema de quejas? 
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6. ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre la manera en lo cual están llevados a cabos tales investigaciones por el 
Consejo de la Magistratura/comisión de Enjuiciamiento? 
a. ¿Cree que la investigación se hará en un plazo razonable? 
b. ¿Cree que tendrá derecho a reclamar actualizaciones sobre la investigación? 
c. ¿Qué factores afectaran, en su opinión, el resultado de la investigación? 
d. ¿Quién estará a cargo de la investigación? 
 
7. Imaginamos una situación donde el Consejo de la Magistratura remite una denuncia de 
corrupción judicial al Jurado de Enjuiciamiento, ¿cree usted que el juicio seria llevado a cabo de 
una manera justa e imparcial?  
a. Si no, ¿Por qué no? 
b. ¿Qué factores influirían, bajo su opinión, el resultado del juicio? 
c. ¿Quién decidiría el resultado del juicio? 
 
8. Hasta donde se conoce, ¿Qué diferentes formas de disciplina están utilizados contra 
magistrados en la práctica? 
a. ¿Cuáles son las medidas y los procedimientos que están utilizados para disciplinar a 
magistrados? 
b. Hasta donde se conoce, ¿con que frecuencia se utiliza tales procedimientos? 
 
9. En su opinión, ¿el Consejo de la Magistratura es efectivo en su rol de monitorear y disciplinar 
magistrados? 
a. ¿Por qué/porque no? 
b. Si podrá sugerir cambio, ¿Qué cambios sugerirá? 
   
Page 327 of 366 
 
Schedule for Interviews with people from the Federal Judicial Council1507 (English) 
 
The regulation of the Judicial Council has been subject to a lot of controversy since it was created. There 
have been many proposals and changes to the regulatory framework, including law 26.855 passed last 
year. I will start with a few questions on this regulatory debate, and then move on to some more practical 
questions about how the Council works in practice.  
 
1. There has been much controversy about the composition of the Council, and it has changed 
several times. In your opinion, have changes in the composition affected the Council? 
a. If so, in what way? 
2. The reforms that were almost implemented last year focused on the so-called 
“democratization” of the judiciary. What do you understand by “democratization” and what is 
your opinion on these suggestions?   
a. Who does the Judicial Council currently represent when holding judges accountable?  
Whose interests?  
b. How does it represent those interests? 
c. Is it accountable to those interests? In what way? 
3. May a member of the public request documentation relating to an ongoing or finished 
investigation? 
a. Does the Council guarantee a response to such requests? Does the Council guarantee 
access to documentation? 
b. Who is in charge of deciding who to grant permission to view documentation? 
c. What criteria is used in deciding who may access documentation and why? 
4. Who in the Council receives complaints about judges?  
a. Who in your experience files most complaints relating to suspected judicial corruption? 
5. Who decides whether or not to investigate a complaint by a member of the public, and what 
factors are taken into consideration when making that decision? 
6. If an investigation is started, who conducts the investigation and how?  
a. Who decides whether to start proceedings before a Special Jury and what factors are 
taken into account when making that decision? 
b. What are the consequences of such an investigation on the judge in question? 
c. Are investigations conducted in a reasonable timeframe?  
d. Are members of the public entitled to request updates on investigations? Are judges?  
                                                 
1507 This title has been kept short for convenience, but included a range of people including councillors themselves, 
legal advisors, administrative staff, and an employee of the FIJ  
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e. What factors would affect the outcome of the investigation?  
7. Do you think that the rules governing the procedure before a Special Jury are efficient in 
practice? 
8. If a Special Jury removes a judge from his or her position, who decides whether or not to bring 
criminal charges of corruption? 
9. Finally, how effective is the Judicial Council in its role of monitoring and disciplining judicial 
corruption?  
a. If you were to suggest changes, what would they be?  
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Schedule for Interviews with people from the Federal Judicial Council (Spanish) 
La regulación del Consejo de la Magistratura ha sido muy polémica desde la creación del Consejo. Había 
muchas propuestas y cambios en el marco legislativo, incluyendo la ley 26.855 del año pasado. Voy a 
empezar con unas preguntas sobre este debate sobre regulación, y luego pasare a unas preguntas más 
practicas sobre el funcionamiento del Consejo en la práctica. 
  
1. Existía una gran controversia acerca de la composición del Consejo, que ha cambiado muchas 
veces. En su opinión, ¿los cambios en la composición ha afectado el Consejo? 
a. Si es el caso, ¿de qué manera? 
 
2. La reforma del año pasado se enfoco en la dicha “democratización” de la justicia. ¿Qué entiende 
usted con el término “democratización”? 
a. En su rol de responsabilizar a magistrados, ¿a quién representa el Consejo de la 
Magistratura? ¿Los intereses de quien? 
b. ¿Cómo representa estos intereses? 
c. ¿Tiene que rendir cuentas a estos intereses? ¿De qué manera? 
 
3. ¿Un miembro de la sociedad puede hacer una solicitud de documentación relacionada con una 
investigación que se está llevando a cabo, o que ya ha concluido? 
a. ¿El Consejo garantiza una respuesta a una tal solicitud? ¿Garantiza el acceso a este tipo 
de documentación? 
b. ¿Quién está a cargo de decidir quién puede tener acceso a documentación? 
c. ¿con que criterios se decide quién puede tener acceso a documentación? ¿Por qué son 
estos los criterios? 
 
4. ¿Quién en el Consejo recibe las quejas sobre los magistrados? 
a. En su experiencia, ¿Quién interpone la mayor cantidad de quejas relacionadas con la 
corrupción judicial? 
 
5. ¿Quién decide de abrir una investigación basada en una queja interpuesta por un miembro de la 
sociedad, y que factores se toman en cuenta para llegar a esta decisión? 
 
6. En el caso que se abre una investigación, ¿Quién la conduce, y cómo? 
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a. ¿Quién toma la decisión de interponer una demanda o no frente al Jurado de 
Enjuiciamiento, y que factores están tomados en cuenta para llegar a esa decisión? 
b. ¿Cuáles son las consecuencias para el magistrado que está siendo investigado? 
c. ¿las investigaciones se hacen en un plazo razonable? 
d. ¿miembros del público tienen derecho a reclamar actualizaciones sobre las 
investigaciones? ¿Y los magistrados? 
e. ¿Qué factores afectan el resultado de las investigaciones? 
 
7. En su opinión, ¿las reglas que rigen el procedimiento del Jurado de Enjuiciamiento son eficientes 
en la práctica? 
 
8. En el caso de que el Jurado de Enjuiciamiento remueva un magistrado, ¿Quién decide presentar 
o no cargos criminales de corrupción? 
 
10. Por ultimo: en su opinión, ¿el Consejo de la Magistratura es eficiente en su rol de monitorear y 
disciplinar magistrados? 
a. ¿Por qué/porque no? 
b. Si pudiese sugerir cambios, ¿Qué cambios seria? 
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Schedule for Interviews with people from the ACBA Judicial Council (English) 
 
The regulation of the National Judicial Council has been subject to a lot of controversy since it was created. 
There have been many proposals and changes to the regulatory framework, including law 26.855 passed 
last year. It is notable that the regulation of the Judicial Council of the ACBA is markedly different. I will 
start with a few questions on the debate surrounding regulation of judicial councils, and then move on to 
some more practical questions about how the Council works in practice. 
  
1. The composition of the Judicial Council of the ACBA is different to the composition of the 
National Council (which has been the subject of much controversy). Why is there a difference? 
2. The reforms of the National Judicial Council that were almost implemented last year focused on 
the so-called “democratization” of the judiciary. What do you understand by “democratization” 
and what is your opinion on these suggestions? 
a. Is the debate about “democratization” relevant for the Judicial Council of the ACBA? 
Why/why not? 
b. Whose interests does the Judicial Council of the ACBA currently represent when holding 
judges accountable?   
c. How does it represent those interests? 
d. Is it accountable to those interests? In what way? 
3. Speaking of the relationship between the Judicial Council and civil society, may a member of the 
public request documentation relating to an ongoing or finished investigation? 
a. Does the Council guarantee a response to such requests? Does the Council guarantee 
access to documentation? 
b. Who is in charge of deciding who to grant permission to view documentation? 
c. What criteria is used in deciding who may access documentation and why? 
4. Who in the Council receives complaints about judges?  
a. Who in your experience files most complaints relating to suspected judicial corruption? 
5. Who decides whether or not to investigate a complaint by a member of the public, and what 
factors are taken into consideration when making that decision? 
6. If an investigation is started, who conducts the investigation and how?  
a. Who decides whether to start proceedings before a Special Jury and what factors are 
taken into account when making that decision? 
b. What are the consequences of such an investigation on the judge in question? 
c. Are investigations conducted in a reasonable timeframe?  
d. Are members of the public entitled to request updates on investigations? Are judges?  
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e. What factors would affect the outcome of the investigation?  
7. Do you think that the rules governing the procedure before a Special Jury are efficient in 
practice? 
8. If a Special Jury removes a judge from his or her position, who decides whether or not to bring 
criminal charges of corruption? 
9. Finally, how effective is the Judicial Council in its role of monitoring and disciplining judicial 
corruption?  
a. If you were to suggest changes, what would they be?  
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Schedule for Interviews with people from the ACBA Judicial Council (Spanish) 
La regulación del Consejo de la Magistratura ha sido muy polémica desde que ha sido creado el Consejo. 
Había muchas propuestas y cambios en el marco legislativo, incluyendo la ley 26.855 del año pasado. Es 
notable que la regulación del Consejo de la Magistratura de la Cuidad Autónoma de Buenos Aires sea 
considerablemente diferente. Voy a empezar con unas preguntas sobre el debate sobre regulación de los 
consejos, y luego pasare a unas preguntas más practicas sobre el funcionamiento del Consejo en la 
práctica.  
 
1. La composición del Consejo de Buenos Aires es diferente a la composición del Consejo Nacional (que 
es muy polémico) ¿Por qué existen tales diferencias? 
 
2. La reforma del Consejo nacional del año pasado se enfocó en la llamada “democratización” de la 
justicia. ¿Qué entiende usted con el término “democratización”? 
a. ¿El debate sobre la “democratización”, es relevante para el Consejo de Buenos Aires? 
b. En su rol de responsabilizar a magistrados, ¿a quién representa el Consejo de la 
Magistratura? ¿Los interese de quien? 
c. ¿Y cómo representa estos intereses? 
d. ¿Tiene que rendir cuentas a estos intereses? ¿De qué manera? 
 
3. ¿Un miembro de la sociedad puede hacer una solicitud de documentación relacionado con una 
investigación que se está llevando a cabo, o que ya ha concluido? 
a. ¿El Consejo garantiza una respuesta a una tal solicitud? ¿Garantiza el acceso a este tipo de 
documentación? 
b. ¿Quién está a cargo de decidir quién puede tener acceso a documentación? 
c. ¿con que criterios se decide quién puede tener acceso a documentación? ¿Por qué son 
estos los criterios? 
 
4. ¿Quién en el Consejo recibe las quejas sobre los magistrados? 
a. En su experiencia, ¿Quién interpone la mayor cantidad de quejas relacionados con la 
corrupción judicial? 
 
5. ¿Quién decide proceder o no con una investigación basada en una queja interpuesta por un 
miembro de la sociedad, y que factores están tomados en cuenta para llegar a esta decisión? 
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6. En el caso que se abre una investigación, ¿Quién la conduce, y cómo? 
a. ¿Quién toma la decisión de interponer una demanda o no frente al Jurado de 
Enjuiciamiento, y que factores están tomados en cuenta para llegar a esa decisión? 
b. ¿Cuáles son las consecuencias para el magistrado que está siendo investigado? 
c. ¿las investigaciones se hacen en un plazo razonable? 
d. ¿miembros del público tienen derecho a reclamar actualizaciones sobre investigaciones? ¿Y 
magistrados? 
e. ¿Qué factores afectan el resultado de investigaciones? 
 
7. En su opinión, ¿las reglas que rigen el procedimiento del Jurado de Enjuiciamiento son eficientes en 
la práctica? 
 
8. En el caso de que el Jurado de Enjuiciamiento remueva un magistrado, ¿Quién decida presentar o no 
cargos criminales de corrupción? 
 
9. Por ultimo: en su opinión, ¿el Consejo de la Magistratura es eficaz en su rol de monitorear y 
disciplinar magistrados? 
a. ¿Por qué/porque no? 
b. Si pudiese sugerir cambios, ¿Qué cambios sugerirá? 
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Schedule for Interviews with people from the Legislative Impeachment Committee 
of the Tucuman Legislature (English) 
 
The Committee carries out a role that in other provinces is carried out by judicial councils. I will start with 
a few questions about these differences, and then move on to some more practical questions about how 
the Committee works in practice.  
 
1. How are judges monitored and disciplined in the province of Tucuman?  
a. What are the benefits or disadvantages of such an approach compared to the way in 
which judges are monitored and disciplined at the federal level? 
2. Last year’s proposed reforms to the National Judicial Council focused on the so-called 
“democratization” of the judiciary. What do you understand by “democratization” and what is 
your opinion on these suggestions?   
a. Do you believe that this debate is relevant to the Committee?  
b. Is the Committee more or less “democratic” than the Council? Why? 
c. Whose interests does the Committee currently represent when holding judges 
accountable?   
d. How does it represent those interests? 
e. Is it accountable to those interests? In what way? 
3. Speaking of the relationship between the Committee and civil society, may a member of the 
public request documentation relating to an ongoing or finished investigation? 
a. Does the Committee guarantee a response to such requests? Does the Committee 
guarantee access to documentation? 
b. Who is in charge of deciding who to grant permission to view documentation? 
c. What criteria is used in deciding who may access documentation and why? 
4. Under the current regulation, anyone may file a complaint about suspected judicial corruption 
with the Committee. Who in the Committee receives these complaints?  
a. Who in your experience files most complaints relating to suspected judicial corruption? 
5. Who decides whether or not to investigate a complaint by a member of the public, and what 
factors are taken into consideration when making that decision? 
6. If an investigation is started, who conducts the investigation and how?  
a. Who decides whether to start proceedings before a Special Jury and what factors are 
taken into account when making that decision? 
b. What are the consequences of such an investigation on the judge in question? 
c. Are investigations conducted in a reasonable timeframe?  
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d. Are members of the public entitled to request updates on investigations? Are judges?  
e. What factors would affect the outcome of the investigation?  
7. What rules govern the procedure before a Special Jury? 
a. In your view, are they efficient in practice? 
8. If a Special Jury removes a judge from his or her position, who decides whether or not to bring 
criminal charges of corruption? 
9. To wrap up, how effective is the Committee in its role of monitoring and disciplining judicial 
corruption?  
a. If you were to suggest changes, what would they be?  
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Schedule for Interviews with people from the Legislative Impeachment Committee 
of the Tucuman Legislature (Spanish) 
La Comisión tiene un rol que está llevado a cabo en otras provincias y a nivel nacional por consejos de la 
magistratura. Voy a empezar con unas preguntas sobre estas diferencias, y luego pasare a unas preguntas 
más practicas sobre el funcionamiento de la Comisión en la práctica.  
1. ¿Cómo están monitoreados y disciplinados los magistrados en la provincia de Tucumán? 
a. ¿Cuáles son los beneficios y desventajas de esta forma de hacer estas cosas comparado 
con la manera en lo cual magistrados están monitoreados y disciplinados a nivel 
nacional? 
 
2. La reforma del Consejo nacional del año pasado se enfocó en la llamada “democratización” de la 
justicia. ¿Qué entiende usted con el término “democratización”? 
a. El debate sobre la “democratización”, ¿es relevante para la Comisión? 
b. ¿La Comisión es más o menos “democrática” que el Consejo? ¿Porque?  
c. En su rol de responsabilizar a magistrados, ¿a quién representa el Consejo de la 
Magistratura? ¿Los interese de quien? 
d. ¿Y cómo representa estos intereses? 
e. ¿Tiene que rendir cuentas a estos intereses? ¿De qué manera? 
 
3. ¿Un miembro de la sociedad puede hacer una solicitud de documentación relacionado con una 
investigación que se está llevando a cabo, o que ya ha concluido? 
a. ¿La Comisión garantiza una respuesta a una tal solicitud? ¿La Comisión garantiza el 
acceso a este tipo de documentación? 
b. ¿Quién está a cargo de decidir quién puede tener acceso a documentación? 
c. ¿con que criterios se decida quién puede tener acceso a documentación? ¿Por qué estos 
los criterios? 
 
4. ¿Quién en la Comisión recibe las quejas sobre magistrados? 
a. En su experiencia, ¿Quién interpone la mayor cantidad de quejas relacionadas con la 
corrupción judicial? 
 
5. ¿Quién decide proceder o no con una investigación basada en una queja interpuesta por un 
miembro de la sociedad, y que factores están tomados en cuenta para llegar a esta decisión? 
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6. En el caso que se abre una investigación, ¿Quién la conduce, y cómo? 
a. ¿Quién toma la decisión de interponer una demanda o no frente al Jurado de 
Enjuiciamiento, y que factores están tomados en cuenta para llegar a esa decisión? 
b. ¿Cuáles son las consecuencias para el magistrado que está siendo investigado? 
c. ¿las investigaciones se hacen en un plazo razonable? 
d. ¿miembros del público tienen derecho a reclamar actualizaciones sobre 
investigaciones? ¿Y magistrados? 
e. ¿Qué factores afectan el resultado de investigaciones? 
 
7. En su opinión, ¿las reglas que rigen el procedimiento del Jurado de Enjuiciamiento son eficientes 
en la práctica? 
 
8. En el caso que el Jurado de Enjuiciamiento remueva un magistrado, ¿Quién decide presentar o 
no cargos criminales de corrupción? 
 
9. Por ultimo: en su opinión, ¿la Comisión es eficaz en su rol de monitorear y disciplinar 
magistrados? 
a. ¿Por qué/porque no? 
b. Si pudiese sugerir cambio, ¿Qué cambios sugerirá? 
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Appendix E: Case-Study Protocol 
 
Process in practice (identifying problems) 
 Does the process in practice follow the process set out in the law?  
o Are the time limits respected?  
o Are judges given adequate right of defence?  
 Is the process transparent?  
o Are judges kept informed of complaints and decisions about them?  
o Is evidence against judges fully disclosed to them at the appropriate stages? 
o Can NGOs adequately follow the decisions made by judicial councils?  
 Are there any other irregularities at any stage in the process? 
 What practical problems are faced with the process in practice? Ie. time, resources, 
training etc.  
 How is the system viewed by lawyers or NGOs who may wish to report a judge?  
o Would they file a complaint if they suspect judicial corruption? Why? Why not?  
o Would they take any alternative steps?  
o Do they have enough access to information about cases in order to form a strong 
case against a judge?  
 Where discretion is built into the process, what factors are taking into account when 
making decisions?  
 How does the composition of the commissions and councils affect the decision making 
process?  
 What people are involved at each stage of the process in practice and does this match 
what is set out in the regulations? (ie. who receives the complaints, who decides 
whether to open a case, who decided who investigates a case, who investigates a case, 
who decides whether to pursue charges against a judge, etc).  
Influence of alternative interests 
 Are criminal proceedings for corruption conducted in parallel where judicial corruption 
is reported, and what influence if any does this have on the removals process?  
 Is there a wider trend of the government or other actors trying to undermine judicial 
independence/”discipline” judges?  
 Who files complaints against judges in practice?  
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 Is the process affected by popular/mediatic pressure?  
 Who decides whether information about cases is provided to the media/public at large? 
 Whose interests do councillors feel they represent, if any, and in what way do they feel 
accountable to those interests?  
Impact on judicial independence 
 Is the process abused by people making malicious complaints? How does the council 
respond to this?  
 Are judges open to this type of oversight? What are their views of the fairness of the 
process?  
 Can judges be removed for political reasons or due to the influence of someone holding 
power over the process in practice? What form of power is this and to what extent can 
it be exercised?  
 Are judges protected from complaints by someone holding power over the process in 
practice? What form of power is this and to what extent can it be exercised?  
 How do investigations impact a judge?  
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Appendix F: List of Codes for Nvivo Analysis of Interview Transcripts 
 
Codes in black were identified from the research protocol, codes in green are new themes that 
emerged from the data. 
 
 Process in practice 
o Complaints made against judge 
 Malicious complaints 
 Personal experience of  
 Whether or not make a complaint if suspect judicial malperformance 
 Fear of retaliation from judge 
 No belief in system 
 Time/money/effort 
 Access to information/transparency of judicial proceedings 
o Filming of judicial proceedings 
o Accessibility of case materials 
 Electronic 
 Informal 
 Through formal requests for information 
o Obtaining evidence of judicial corruption  
 Sworn declaration of assets of judges 
 Procedural anomalies 
 Content of judicial rulings  
 Who makes complaints 
o Decision by JC to reject or process complaint 
 Who decides 
 How is this decision reached 
 Judges investigated/judged for content of judicial rulings 
o Complaint investigated 
 Who investigates 
 How is investigation conducted 
 “shelving” (cajonear) of complaints/investigations 
o Disciplinary committee reaches conclusion and proposes action to plenary 
o Plenary council’s decision on whether to instigate proceedings against a judge  
 Composition of council 
 Party politics 
o Politicization of non-political component of council 
o Appointment of councillors 
o “majorities”/lack of “majorities” in council  
o Proceedings before a special jury 
o Jury’s decision 
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o Whether time limits respected 
 Process rushed  
 Cases closed due to time limits 
o Judge’s right of defence 
 Judge’s timely notification of complaint 
 Judge’s access to evidence against them  
o Practical problems with process  
 Time (multiple roles of councillors) 
 Training (lack of) 
o Positive view of fairness and impartiality of process  
o Other factors affecting process 
 Culture of informality  
 Informally agreed mutual silence between councillors 
 “Argentineness” 
 Anomie 
 Has to change  
 Lack of respect for institutions 
 Cult of personality at centre of politics  
 Lack of honesty 
 
 Influence of external interests 
o wider trend of government “disciplining” judges 
 “democratization” & judicial reform of 2013 
 Stated intention behind “democratization” and reforms 
 Political intention behind “democratization” and reforms 
 Meaning of the term “democratization” in this context  
 Judge’s personal experience of government’s attempt to corrupt them 
 Need for independence of judicial council 
 Make an example out of a judge as a warning to other judges 
 Fear of removal  
 Media “lynching” 
 Politicians publicly criticising judicial decisions 
 Judges seeking political protection  
 Wire-tapping judges  
 False public accusations of judicial corruption 
 Publicly discrediting judge  
 Intimidating judge whilst judging a case 
 Personal experience of  
o popular/mediatic pressure 
 Councillors speaking to media about investigations  
o Judge removed for political reasons  
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 Forced resignations 
 Supreme Court review of cases 
 Personal experience of 
o Judge protected from removal  
 Oyarbide 
o Judicial “corporatism” 
o Parallel criminal proceedings 
 
 Judicial Independence  
o Judge’s attitude to oversight of judicial council 
o Judge’s views on right of anyone to file complaint against them 
 People file complaints for wrong reasons 
 Reinforces judicial independence 
 Negatively impacts judicial independence 
 Threats of complaints affect judicial independence  
 Publicity of filed complaints creates pressure on judges 
o Impact of process in practice on judicial independence  
o Judicial independence in general (as context) 
o Need for accountability of judicial council  
o Impact of judicial council’s investigation on judge 
 Pay 
 Suspension 
 Media attention 
 Resignation (and right to state pension) 
 
 Historical/legal analysis of participant 
o Political theory behind introduction of council in Argentina 
o Political context behind introduction of council in Argentina 
o Nature of regulation of council 
o History of regulation of council in Argentina 
o Lack of detail about judicial council in constitution 
o Previous system of oversight of the judiciary 
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Appendix G: Glossary of Translated Terms 
 
SPANISH ENGLISH 
Poder judicial Judiciary 
Mal desempeño Malperformance 
Inconducta Misconduct 
Denuncia Complaint 
Consejo de la Magistratura Judicial Council  
Jurado de Enjuiciamiento Impeachment Jury  
Comisión de Disciplina y Acusación Commission of Discipline and Accusation 
Secretaría General General Secretariat 
La Comisión Permanente de Juicio Político Permanent Impeachment Commission  
Funcionario público Public official 
Denunciante Complainant 
Desestimacion (de la denuncia) Rejection (of the complaint) 
Admitir (la denuncia) Accept (the complaint) 
Imputacion Accusation 
Dictamen fundada (de la Comission) Justified Decision (of the Commission) 
Emitir To issue 
Sorteo Raffle 
Improcedente  Inadmissible 
Consejero Informante  Reporting Councillor 
Declaraciones (de testigos)  Statements (of witnesses) 
Sala (de la Camara) Divisions (of the Appeal Court) 
Ministerio Público/ Ministerio Fiscal Public Prosecutor’s Office 
Fuero Penal, Contravencional y de Faltas Criminal, Misdemeanors and Petty Offences 
Court 
Juzgado Criminal y Correccional Federal  Federal Criminal and Correctional Court  
Fuero Contencioso Administrativo y 
Tributario 
Administrative and Tax Court 
Camara Contencioso Administrativo Administrative Court of Appeal 
Salas (de la Camara) Divisions (of the Appeal Court) 
Colegio de Abogados Bar Association 
Recurso Extraordinario Extraordinary Appeal 
Juez subrogante Acting judge 
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Appendix H: Critical Self-Reflection  
Professional experience has taught me that self-awareness, both in terms of identifying your own 
biases and in terms of understanding the ways in which others perceive you (and therefore the 
way in which you may be influencing other people’s reactions to you) is an incredibly difficult if 
valuable skill to master. I cannot pretend that I have come anywhere near mastering this skill yet. 
Any attempt here to explain why my participants were willing to be interviewed by me (and in 
one case, not interviewed by me), or the extent to which participants trusted me, would be mere 
speculation. Nevertheless, for the purposes of full transparency about the way in which this 
empirical research was conducted, I will briefly reflect on my own biases, and set out the context 
and some of my own informal observances as to how my participants reacted to me. This 
reflection was written several years after my data had been collected, as I was listening back over 
my interviews and analysing my data.  
 
At the time of conducting the interviews for this thesis, I was a 30 year old Caucasian female with 
dual British and Swiss nationality (my mother is Swiss, my father is British). Prior to starting my 
PhD, I had worked in legal practice in both Barcelona and London, and had qualified as a Solicitor. 
I chose to present myself to my contacts and participants as an English-qualified lawyer/non-
practising Solicitor who is currently working on a PhD thesis. When asked, I mentioned that I had 
dual nationality. I believe that this profile served me well in some respects. I suspect that my 
English professional qualification helped create a sense of trustworthiness. I also felt that the fact 
that I have some professional experience led my participants to take me more seriously than they 
may have if I were less experienced, particularly given that an understanding of how things work 
in practice is particularly important to this study. Many of the participants actually specifically 
asked my age at some point before the interviews.  
 
I have never lived in Argentina and I have no blood ties to Argentina, but I was living with a long-
term Argentinean partner (in England) at the time the interviews were conducted. However, I 
believe that the fact that I am a foreigner in Argentina worked mainly in my favour for a number 
of reasons. I believe that it was clear that I am an outsider to the political and legal establishment 
in Argentina, and therefore also clear that my interest in participants’ views was truly and purely 
academic. Given the politically sensitive nature of the topic, I feel that this may have helped 
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participants feel that they can talk more freely given that I may have been perceived to be more 
neutral and less judgmental about the underlying topics at hand than an Argentinean 
researcher.1508  
 
I was also led to believe that many legal professionals in Argentina have a high regard for the 
British legal and academic world and therefore quite possibly wanted to be welcoming and 
helpful to a British lawyer/academic, and welcomed establishing a new international contact. The 
flip side of this is that many of my participants indicated that they felt that as a British/Swiss 
lawyer, I may have difficulty in understanding the informality and corruption that, in their 
opinion, pervade legal practice in Argentina. However, this worked in my favour as they therefore 
took the time to explain details about informal practices that among Argentines may have been 
implicit or taken for granted.  
 
I speak Spanish fluently – I learnt whilst working as a legal intern at a Spanish law firm in Barcelona 
for three years. As many of my friends and colleagues at that time were Argentinean, I pronounce 
many words in the Argentinean way that is markedly different from the pronunciation used in 
Spain or elsewhere in Latin America. Due to a personal interest in the Argentinean culture and 
society, I also have a far-ranging knowledge of popular Argentine culture to the extent that I feel 
that I pick up on most cultural references that Argentineans use among themselves in both formal 
and informal speech. I also feel familiar enough with colloquialisms, manners of expression, and 
the cultural norms that dictate social interactions to feel that I can communicate very effectively 
with Argentineans in their own language and without them having to modify their manner of 
expression for me. 
 
Listening back to the recordings of the interviews, it is clear that participants could tell that I had 
a very high level of fluency in Spanish and that I was to some extent at least familiar with the 
local context. I feel that they expressed themselves linguistically largely in the same way that 
                                                 
1508 In his book on qualitative research, Michael Patton quotes a qualitative researcher, Radhika Parameswaran, 
reflecting on her research: ‘I still wonder whether these young women would have been more open about their 
sexuality with a Westerner who might be seen as less likely to judge them based on cultural expectations of 
women’s behaviour in Indian society’. Being an outsider may sometimes help towards building rapport and 
empathy with participants when researching sensitive topics. Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & 
Evaluation Methods (4th Edn, Sage 2015) 59. 
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they would have done with an Argentinean interviewer - using the same words, expressions, and 
speed. I feel that they also did not hold back on cultural references and name-dropping, although 
some of them did, as an after-thought, pause to check that I was following. This means that they 
were expressing their thoughts in the way most natural to them. This is important for the 
research as it allows me to analyse the ways in which they have chosen to express ideas, knowing 
that it is their authentic expression of their views.  
 
Nevertheless, as anyone who has learnt a foreign language will know, it is easier to understand 
others than to speak and write yourself. Whilst I am very comfortable communicating in Spanish, 
I do occasionally make minor grammatical errors, and feel that I cannot always express myself 
quite as precisely and eloquently as I can in English. Listening to the recordings of the interviews, 
I feel that – particularly in the first couple of interviews – I expressed myself worse than I usually 
do. Whilst I liked to feel like I had everything under control, I suspect that the stress of conducting 
such interviews for the first time combined with the stress of being in Argentina alone1509 with a 
daunting goal that I was emotionally invested in, meant that I probably focused all of my mental 
energy on trying to ensure that I got the information I needed rather than my verbal expression 
in Spanish. Thankfully, the questions and topics covered by my Interview Schedule were quite 
straightforward and therefore my lack of eloquent expression did not seem to have much effect 
– the participants answered my questions, and in the very few cases they did not understand the 
question, they simply asked for clarification.  
 
Conducting these interviews as a foreigner may also have had an impact, not on my participants, 
but on the way in which I acted myself. What I perceived my role to be, the biases that I may 
have, and the way I thought I was being perceived, may have all influenced the way in which I 
presented myself, the way in which I asked questions, and perhaps even to some degree, the 
questions I asked. I will therefore briefly set out the perspective and concerns I held at the time.  
 
                                                 
1509 I also had the misfortune of being robbed at gun-point in Buenos Aires whilst I was settling in, and before I had 
started conducting any interviews. A group of young men/boys set a pack of dogs on me and an American 
relative who was visiting me for a couple of days, pointed guns at us, checked our trouser pockets, and took our 
bags. Except for a large bruise on my elbow where one of the dogs bit me, we were unharmed, however the 
experience undoubtedly left me on edge for the remainder of my stay.  
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Whilst participants may have viewed me as British or Swiss, I myself identify as having a multi-
cultural background, and have worked and studied in many countries. I therefore found myself 
in a social role that I am very accustomed to – that of an outsider. Given that I have a lifetime of 
experience of being in this role, I suppose that I dealt with this better than those who may not 
be used to working outside of their own country. I consider myself to be extremely perceptive of 
cultural differences, and quickly recognise misunderstandings caused by cultural and linguistic 
differences. This skill proved helpful for the analysis of the interviews as I am less likely than many 
to be affected by cultural and linguistic bias when interpreting what was said. I also quickly 
recognised where the participants may not have understood what I was getting at, and was able 
to ask follow up questions, or clarify what I meant. Being an outsider also had the benefit of 
meaning that I did not hold the same prejudices and biases that Argentineans may have had, and 
I may therefore have been able to bring a more neutral, or at the very least different, perspective 
to the table.  
 
As someone used to being an outsider, however, I am also used to feeling misunderstood or 
misinterpreted, and before the interviews I worried about how I would be perceived by my 
participants. Whilst this did not turn out to be an issue, my fears as I boarded the aeroplane on 
the way to conduct my research in Argentina were: 1. People may be offended that I, as a 
European, was coming to ask them about problems in their justice system; and 2. That they might 
not take me seriously, wondering what a young Swiss/British “girl” knows about problems in the 
judicial system in Argentina. I decided that worrying about the latter was useless. As pointed out 
above, to the extent this was the case, it actually worked in my favour. The very fact that I was 
conducting interviews should also show my participants that I am purposely incorporating the 
local views into my analysis, and therefore, to the extent that they may be worried that I would 
misunderstand the phenomena, I was providing them with an opportunity to explain it to me.  
 
I mitigated my concerns through a number of strategies. I feel that using the snowballing 
technique helped, as I was being vouched for by people that my participants respected. The fact 
that I am fluent in Argentinean Spanish – something that many participants commented on- was 
also a very visual mark of understanding and respect, I felt. I also hoped that my participants 
would understand that I was not conducting this research under any illusions that I would have 
the solution to the problems that many great Argentine minds have been battling for much longer 
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than I have, nor did I think that I could import British “solutions” to remedy local ills. On the 
contrary, I feel that the rest of the world can learn something from Argentina’s experience and 
wanted to highlight the importance of understanding the local context in my research.  
 
In the end, however, I figured that the fear of offending my participants was probably something 
that bothered me a great deal more than it would bother my participants, and that those who 
agreed to be interviewed by me in the first place were unlikely to have concerns in this regard. 
The only way in which it may have affected my interviews if participants did feel this way, is that 
they may have tried to portray their country in an overly favourable light. Given that most of my 
participants were very vocal about the problems with the system, this does not seem to have 
been the case.  
 
On the other hand, the fact that it bothered me had the potential to affect the way in which I 
conducted the interviews. The danger was that if I was afraid to offend, I may have been afraid 
to be too critical, to ask probing questions and to be too deferential to the answers provided. 
Luckily for me, my participants were on the whole very forthcoming with information, without 
the need for me to say much at all. However, due to this goodwill, I was afraid that if I was critical 
of their answers, they may shut off or become defensive. I therefore did not correct participants 
where I identified mistakes in their answers (for example, where they wrongly cited legal 
provisions). Additionally, where participants were not forthcoming with answers, I tried to be 
sensitive to non-verbal clues as to how far I should push a matter. When I was not getting a clear 
answer, I tried repeating the question using different phrasing once, and where it was still clear 
that the participants were uncomfortable with the question, I simply moved on.   
 
With hindsight, the humility with which I approach the interviews may have helped build trust 
and a good rapport with my participants, which may partially explain why they felt comfortable 
talking to me. Listening back to the recordings of the interviews, I also realise that I used humour 
to break down any cultural or other barriers between me and my participants. For example, 
participants often expressed surprise that I was using two voice recorders, so I joked that it would 
ironic to come all this way for a tape recorder not to work. This is not something that I did entirely 
purposely; I believe that to quite a large degree though, the way in which I interacted with my 
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participants was something that I do naturally due to my life-long experience of constantly 
communicating with people from different cultural backgrounds. 
 
On a different note, another factor that may have affected how I conducted the interviews was 
my expectation as to the results. I had been warned by others who conducted research on rule 
of law issues that it is often difficult to obtain information, or to get people to speak. I therefore 
entered the interviews with the mind-set that the more my participants spoke the better, and 
with the intention of interrupting them as little as possible. In this regard, I think I misjudged the 
situation by not fully taking into account that speaking about corruption is not a taboo subject in 
Argentine society. On the contrary – Argentines are well known in the legal world for their work 
on human rights, the passion with which they stand up to injustice. Although I promised my 
participants anonymity, many participants told me straight out that they would not mind if I did 
quote them publicly, saying that they had no problem in telling the world their views and do so 
within their communities frequently. However, this was not the case for every participant, and 
in particular in the province of Tucuman, participants were on the whole less forthcoming. 
Therefore, whilst I may have been able to interview many participants more actively and 
critically, on balance it was probably best to take the cautious approach that I did.  
 
I was lucky that my participants are highly educated legal professionals (some have PhDs in law 
from world-leading universities), as many seemed to be very conscious of what information 
would be useful to me, and made sure to express themselves clearly and fully on the subjects 
covered. Some kept their answers concise and to the point, whilst others scattered their answers 
with anecdotes and stories in order, I assume, to be as thorough as possible with their answers. 
This goodwill and understanding considerably eased the task of interviewing for me, although it 
did mean that I forfeited some control of the conversations. Given that I did not want to, and 
most probably would not have been able to make the participants tell me anything they did not 
want to tell me, I did not have an issue with sitting back whilst my participants told me what they 
wanted me to know about the topics under discussion.  
 
I greatly valued the opportunity to meet and talk to so many people with an enormous wealth of 
knowledge and experience. I found it fascinating, not only for the purposes of my research, but 
also on a personal level to watch and listen to my participants tell me their stories and to ponder 
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their opinions. Seeing them at their place of work, or in their homes, certainly brought their 
experiences closer for me, and I hope that they feel that I have done their stories justice in this 
thesis, and that perhaps it offers some further insights for them.  
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